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Abstract 
Strategic conflict in this work refers to the spectrum of co-operative and oppositional 
activities in which organisations engage when their interests meet. The origin of the work 
is in the management and prediction of corporate strategic conflict, but it will be seen that 
there are significant similarities between corporate struggle and that of international rela- 
tions. 
Following a review of the nature of conflict and the characteristics of strategic decision 
making, the work examines the effectiveness of three existing general approaches to con- 
flict modelling and management, namely 
informal and qualitative methods; 
general systems analysis methods; 
and game theoretic approaches. 
Desirable criteria for a strategic conflict management framework are derived and a frame- 
work is then proposed which has three components: - 
Setting thefuture environment 
The future of the organisation is described by a network of states of nature. 
Resolving the Conflict 
Within each of the states which represent the future, the options for participants are 
identified and the possible outcomes and interim states identified. An analysis of the 
influence and power of the participants over transitions between states is carried out, 
which indicates likely development paths in the conflict, from which conclusions 
can be drawn about both the likely outcomes, and about the actions which should be 
taken by a company to bring about preferred outcomes. 
Closing the Loop 
Feedback of information obtained by analysis and by contact with the real world 
back into the two structures described above allows examination of the effect of 
changing perspectives and the differing beliefs of participants. 
The application of the framework is shown through case studies examining thejustifiabil- 
ity and appropriateness of each of its elements and as a whole. These case studies cover 
both small and large companies, a variety of business conflict cases, both live and retro- 
spective and draw on the recorded material in international relations for examples of non- 
. commercial conflict. 
Future development paths are identified for the concept. 
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Chapter 1- Introduction 
This chapter provides a background to the problem addressed in this work. Detailed 
discussion of strategy and the strategic process are delayed until Chapter 2, but the nature 
of strategy and strategic conflict is discussed here in order that the problem addressed can 
be put into context, and the value of the work can be assessed. The research methodology 
of the study is delayed until Chapter 4, but the layout and general reporting approach is 
discussed here, as are the aims and objectives of the work. 
Strategic conflict resolution is the process of reconciling the differing and often opposing 
interests between parties. Sometimes these differing interests can be accommodated within 
an essentially cooperative structure, such as an international alliance or a contractor-supplier 
relationship. Sometimes the differences remain, perhaps temporarily, irreconcilable, leading 
to situations of more direct conflict. This study covers both conflict and cooperation in this 
sense. The origin and objective of the work are in the strategic problems of commercial 
organisations, but it will be seen that there are extensive similarities between the approaches 
needed for the planning of industrial strategic action and those needed for the understanding 
of the behaviour of actors in international conflict. 
Strategy and strategic conflict - background 
Conflict 
Conflict is often perceived as being either the absence of accord or as the engagement by 
two parties in joint action in pursuit of conflicting aims. Stagner (1967) describes it as '... 
a situation in which two or more human beings desire goals which theyperceive as being 
obtainable by one or the other but not both. ... there must be at least two parties; each 
party is mobilising energy to obtain a goal, a desired object or situation; and each party 
perceives the other as a barrier or threat to that goal... 'The energy to which Stagner refers 
is not necessarily that of physical energy. In a legal struggle, for example, plaintiff and 
defendant are not physically engaged in a struggle, but it is a battle nonetheless. '... [A] 
relationship ofquite genuine conflict may exist, even though none ofthepeople behave in 
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a manifestly violent manner.. ' (Mitchell, 1981, p 15). Mitchell goes on to observe the 
possibility of conflict being a state of mind among the parties rather than a state of action 
between them, and his tripod of situation, behaviour and attitudes provides the basis for a 
qualitative description method discussed below. We see this possibility of conflict being a 
state of mind rather than a state of activity in the planning process in business particularly. 
Two or more companies may be engaged in preparing for the struggle for a new market 
without actually being in contact within the market place. Similarly, the extensive low- 
level conflict surrounding the inner German Borderformost of the latterhalf of the twentieth 
century can be seen as a conflict maintained at the potential, inactive state, but there was 
no doubt at the time that the western powers and the USSR were in conflict one with the 
other. 
This work adopts Mitchell's working definition of conflict as 'Any situation in which two 
or niore social entities or ýparties'(however defined or structured) perceive that they 
possess mutually incompatible gouls. ' (Mitchell, op. cit, p17) Within this work we shall 
concentrate mostly on the particular social entity of the business organisation, but examples 
will be drawn from the conflicts between other social entities, particularly nation-states 
and on occasion, by way of amplification, between individuals. These goals can often be 
vague, and sometimes are perceived as goals only by subsets of the participants, or as they 
are often called in both international relations and business literature, the actors. Mitchell 
(ibid. ) observes that'... circumstances ofscarcity may arise both over material goods (oil 
wells, motor cars) and positional goods (roles as managers, permanent members of the 
UN security council), the latter being scarce in some absolute andfinal sense. ' We shall 
see in examples below, in both the international relations sense and in the wider context of 
industrial corporate conflict, that the embodiment of positional and material goals can 
take diverse forms. In a later example of the conflict between a government official and a 
potential blackmailer, the goal is not only non-material but is abstract; it took the form of 
a struggle over the very freedom of political action of the official ensured by freedom from 
a blackmail threat. Between two companies engaged in positioning for a major project the 
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goal takes the form at first glance of being positional, namely the establishment of a desired 
relationship on a major defence project, but on closer examination transmutes into the 
material goal of profit. We can see then, that the generally accepted groundwork of 
international relations in classifying and considering conflict, in this sense, is applicable 
as much to the struggle between corporations as it those between nation states. 
Mitchell also observes that in the same way that one expects to see non-conflictual behaviour 
(i. e. cooperation, teaming, implicit agreement) between corporate entities, one also observes 
cooperative behaviour between the actors in international conflict (treaties, spheres of 
influence, trade). The conclusions are surnmarised in Table I below (Mitchell, op. cit. 
p24) 
'Pure situation' Goals Characteristic Characteristic Characteristic 
behaviour Inter-party relationship 
A ffiff trf, * a 
Conflict 
Co-operation 
Isolation 
Incompatible: Solely at own Hostile Enmity 
(i) in different behest, blocking, 
order of resistant, 
importance interfering. cost 
(ii) contradictory; imposing 
mutually 
exclusive 
Congruent: Via consultation; Friendly Alignment 
Identical. concerted or 
interdependent or accommodative. 
complementary benefit-conferring 
Independent: None directed Ignorant or non- None 
No interactive towards the other existent 
effects. goals can party 
be held 
simultaneously as 
none affect. i the 
other 
Table 1 (from Mitchell, 198 1) The characteristics of conflict, cooperation and 
isolation from an international relations perspective. 
The definitions of conflict behaviour used in general conflict study are rather limited. For 
example, 'Action undertaken b one party in a situation ofconflict aimed at the opposing Y 
party with the intention ofmaking that opponent abandon or modify its goals. ' (Mitchell, 
op. cit. p29) Note here the assumption that the conflict is essentially between two parties 
or (optimistically) that it can be thought of as a series of bipartite engagements between 
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subsets of a larger actor group. There is no basis for this assumption, and we shall see later 
that it is not necessary to consider a multi-player conflict as a series of two-player conflicts; 
more sophisticated modelling approaches allow the wholesale, inclusion of multi-player 
motivations and powers. 
Neither is it necessary to make the assumption in Mitchell's work that the objective of one 
player is directly to confound the other. His definition quoted above must be taken to 
imply that each player is attempting in some way to break the will of the other, to 'mak[e] 
that opponent abandon ... its goals'. It is not necessary to have such a narrow comprehension 
of objective, nor is it desirable: in many situations of conflict it is just as acceptable an 
outcome to have the opponent neutralised as it is to induce a fundamental change in the 
opponent's desires and objectives. In business, the imperative is more likely to be to make 
a profit than to act ideologically to change the competitor's value system. Moreover, it is 
not so simple in a multi-player game to achieve a direct opposition of wills as implied in 
Mitchell's definition. With three or more parties, each may have different objectives, so 
that the confounding of one may allow the third to gain what we want to avoid. 
Strategic conflict, then, is characterised by the misalignment of objectives amongst a number 
of players in a situation where the outcome is significant to the players. If the result were 
not important it could not be judged as strategic, in the normally accepted sense of a 
significance which is more important rather than less to the participant, and which takes 
place over a longer rather than shorter period of time. If there were no misalignment of 
objectives amongst the players there would be no conflict nor any prospect of conflict. 
Lastly, we observe, with Mitchell (op. cit. p33) that conflict is characterised by being 
dynamic, and that we must take into account that factors may change during the progress 
of a strategic struggle. First, the objectives of the players may change as their expectations 
alter and, indeed, as the understanding of the achievability of different desired outcomes 
grows. Second, the set of actors themselves may change, as some lose motivation to engage 
in the conflict at all, while others are stimulated into action by a developing situation. 
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Third, the relative strengths and capabilities of the players may alter. Fourth, the perceptions 
of the players about the struggle may alter with time. Last, the relationships between 
participants may alter over time. 
Such an extensive embracing of what is meant by strategic conflict requires a similarly 
extensive and flexible dynamic model. Discussion of the capability of present methods to 
cope with such a concept is reserved until chapter 3. 
Strategic planning 
Strategic decision making is frequently represented as a developmental process whereby 
a company decides what it wishes to achieve, identifies where the gaps lie in its capabilities, 
produces a plan of action, and implements it. Pfeiffer (1991 -p xii), for example, offers the 
following summary flow chart for the process. See Fig 1. Gup, (1979 - pp 28-3 1) describes 
the three questions on which strategic planning should be based, namely, "ere are yozj 
going?, TMat is the environment? and How doyou get there?. In many respects this provides 
a very reasonable and workable framework for general strategic planning. It has the 
advantages of being well accepted in practice and being essentially sequential in approach; 
progress toward an action plan can be audited and measured. 
As we shall see below, in a later crifique of approaches to strategic decision making, there 
are difficulties in this focused approach. It is an assertion of this work that such a process 
is essentially limited by its preoccupation with the company whose strategy is under 
development, or as it will be called here, the client company. Examination of Figure I will 
indicate that attention is focused on those elements of the process about which much is 
known; our intent, our mission, our capabilities, our shortfalls, the impact of the environment 
on us, our plans, what we have to do. Such an approach is ethnocentric, also, in that it 
tends to assume that the values and ob ectives of others are either simflar to or are extensions 
or reflections of our own. Often it is assumed that a competitor will act in opposition to our 
intent simply because of his status as competitor. Alternatively, assumptions can intrude 
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regarding the neutrality of an environment which is, in fact, in opposition to our intent. 
Sometimes the reactions of regulators or customers, particularly in oligopsonies, are 
inappropriately ignored. Like a pre-Copernican cosmologist it is all too easy to view our 
market and our industry as rotating around ourselves. 
IqnNng*to"'* P .,.. Plan 
. 
Er 
-V 
'6ý a Application Monitoring S Considerations 
Mis 
alog 
Busine 
M ýOc odellin 
Nrkmirice 
-- ----------------- ýudjt N VII WX &W , na sts': '%! . ,, 
ý y , 
I mgrat]ng'.. nte 
-". Action Plam", 
Confingenqy 
InVlemenlat' ýon. 
f 
Figure 1: The Applied Strategic Planning Model 
(from Pfeiffer, 199 1) 
This is particularly true of those business situations where we find ourselves in more or 
less direct confrontation with a competitor, a group of competitors, a potential partner, a 
customer or a regulatory body. Procedures such as Pfeiffer's are followed and clear action 
plans result. We know precisely where we want to be and how to achieve it. All too often, 
however, other players have different ideas, and we find ourselves re-examining our strategic 
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models part of the way along the action planning path, in the light of unexpected behaviour 
on the part of other interested parties. What has gone wrong? 
All too often our model of the struggle is centred on our own view of the contest. it is 
insufficiently rich in terms of examination of the world-view of the players, their objectives 
and, most importantly, their options in striving for success as they define it. 
We shall see later that there do exist some techniques for addressing this type of interactive 
struggle. Some come from the domain of game theory, others from hard and soft systems 
analysis and others from a symptomatic approach to management science. Each have their 
shortcomings; those which are rigorous tend to be highly limited in applicability, and 
those which are widely applicable tend to be too general for application to specific strategic 
conflict problems. The purpose of this work is to provide the connective tissue between 
some of these approaches in order to develop a usable framework to allow these strategic 
conflict situations to be described and planned for. 
The strategic conflict situations referred to here can be of a number of types and can be the 
object of interest of a number of organisational levels of an organisation. For example, at 
the highest organisational level of a company, a strategic conflict situation might be the 
merger with or acquisition of another company. There might be a number of prospective 
bidders, each of which may have differing objectives and influences, capacities and resources 
in the struggle for control of the target. Such a situation is clearly one of opposing objectives 
and intent and thereby constitutes a strategic conflict. At the beginning at least, the options 
for the players may not be clear even to them. In many cases the identity or existence of 
participants may not become apparent until late on in the development, and in some cases 
may not even be apparent after the event. 
Another example of a strategic conflict situation is the struggle for a competitively bid 
major project. If the project is sufficiently important to the client company its winning will 
be seen to be strategic and, since the client company's options, objectives and view of the 
world will be opposed by other players, including the customer and competitors, who will 
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hold different views on what is desirable in the development of the opportunity, such a 
struggle can be considered a strategic conflict. 
Lastly, a strategic conflict situation may not involve outside players necessarily. A third 
example of strategic conflict is the struggle for control of a company from within itself, 
either in terms of the ambitions of board level parties or individuals, or of divisions in a 
federated company. All these fall under the definition of strategic conflict used in this 
work. 
Objective and aims 
Under the working definitions declared in the previous section, then, the following aim for 
the research emerges. 
Research Aim: 
To provide an appropriate, justified techniquefor the predictive understanding of stra- 
tegic conflict 
In order to achieve the aim the programme of work had the following objectives: - 
1) Examine the characteristics of strategic conflict and the decision processes 
needed to plan for it. 
2) Identify the desirable characteristics (criteria of goodness) for a strategic 
conflict resolution method. 
3) Assess the appropriateness of existing methods of strategic conflict 
resolution against these criteria . 
4) Propose a candidate framework for consideration. 
5) Compare this framework against the criteria of goodness and assess its 
fit with the needs of major companies. 
6) Develop the chosen framework to a working state by developing a 
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particular embodiment of the framework including its supporting 
techniques. 
7) Test the individual supporting techniques and overall embodiment of 
the framework in practice. Assess the embodiment against the criteria of 4 
above. 
8) Make amendments and propose further development to the framework 
as appropriate in the light of the experience gained in the pilot studies. 
Structure of the Dissertation 
The aim of this dissertation is to show that the particular framework developed here (known 
as the foveal game approach) has ajustifiable and appropriate embodiment for the predictive 
understanding of strategic conflict. Two novel techniques are used in the embodiment. The 
first, Extended Field Anomaly Relaxation (EFAR) is a futures scanning tool which sets the 
overall environment for the solution and description of the strategic conflict. The second, 
Powergraph, serves to provide operational/tactical solutions to the strategic problems 
presented. The two work together under the foveal game framework to provide both 
sensemaking and action planning products. 
The dissertation has six sections comprising a total of eleven chapters and supporting 
material. 
Section I- Problem statement 
The present introd4ctory chapter, Chapter 1, is the only chapter in Section I (Problem 
statement). It states the problem which is to be addressed in the research and provides only 
sufficient background for the initial understanding and valuation of the problem. Preliminary 
definitions of fundamental terms such as strategy and conj7ict are offered, again, to assist 
the reader in appreciating the problem statement. 
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Section 11 - Existing approaches and their failings 
This section addresses, in Chapter 2, the strategic process as understood by writers from 
the contributory disciplines. Two particular viewpoints are adopted. First, the nature of 
strategic decision making and the uncertainties inherent in it are examined in order better 
to understand the context in which strategic conflict is placed. Clearly strategic conflict 
forms part of a wider strategic process, and it is this wider process which is discussed. 
Second, it is important to understand the contribution of rationality and this is examined in 
some depth. Lastly in Chapter 2a set of criteria for a competent strategic conflict resolution 
method are derived, in order that the existing methods and the framework and embodiment 
derived in this present work, can be tested for appropriateness. 
In Chapter 3 an extensive examination of existing methods is carried out. Various approaches 
and methods are tested against the criteria derived above, and an evaluation carried out of 
their appropriateness for the present task. There are three main areas of supporting previous 
work, namely economic game theory, hard and soft systems methods and the particular 
techniques of conflict resolution and metagames which fall between the first two in style 
of approach. The deficiencies of each are identified. 
Section III - Methodological foundations 
The single chapter in this section provides a foundation for the selection of a research 
methodology by firstly addressing the fundamental difficulties of strategic research, and 
in particular the problems of intervention and relativism and the consequent undermining 
of any logical positivist scientific approach. An appropriate research methodology is 
described which allows these fundamental difficulties to be circumvented and its particular 
implementation in this work is described with particular regard to the testing of validity 
both in terms of internal consistency of a method and the evidence provided by case work. 
Section IV -A solution framework and its elements 
Chapters 5,6,7,8 and 9 are grouped into Section IV, the aim of which overall is to argue 
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for a conceptual framework for the solution of strategic conflicts and known as the foveal 
game approach. This conceptual framework is described in Chapter 5, and its emergence 
from the criteria of goodness derived above demonstrated. In particular the need for a 
strategic futures scanning tool is identified as is the requirement for a method of providing 
predictions of the behaviour of the participants in operational level structures. 
The futures scanning requirement is fulfilled by a network based method of generating 
scenarios, known as Extended Field Anomaly Relaxation (EFAR). Chapter 6 described 
the origins of this method and shows its validity in practice by means of case study evidence. 
Chapter 7 describes the central technique of the embodiment, Powergraph, and with 
extensive use of case work evidence shows itsjustif ication as a practical tool. Powergraph 
has itself a number of sub-techniques and these important elements are, similarly tested in 
the case study environment. Particular attention is paid to the nature of the product of the 
Powergraph process, which is both sensemaking and focused action planning. Chapter 8 
describes a method of generating the discrete state structure necessary for the Powergraph 
method. Chapter 9 describes two case studies which provide evidence for thejustification 
of Powergraph according to the criteria established in chapter 4. 
Section V- A developed framework 
The last chapter of the main body of the work is Chapter 10, which revisits the framework 
and the criteria of goodness in the light of the knowledge gained about the embodiment 
elements discussed in the previous section. These elements are now fitted together into an 
overall practical method, which is examined as an ex ante real-life case study of the strategic 
analysis and eventual action planning for a medium-sized media company. This case study 
shows how the overall foveal structure supports the specific embodiments of the strategic 
multi-futures method, EFAR and of the conflict modelling and management technique, 
Powergraph. In Chapter II the case study evidence described in the previous chapters is 
used in conjunction with the overall study of the media company of Chapter 10 to justify 
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the overall approach and to illustrate its strengths and weaknesses. The justification is 
based upon criteria derived in Chapters 3 and 4 
Section VI - Supporting material 
Ilis section contains annexes containing detailed supporting material from the case studies 
and the list of references. 
Page 24 
Section Ih Existing approaches 
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nature of the strategic decision 
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criteria for strategic decision support 
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multiple futures planning 
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Chapter 2: The strategic process and its 
requirements 
Introduction 
The aim of this work is to develop and validate a methodology and underlying techniques 
to assist with the understanding of and management of strategic conflict. In order to do 
this we need to understand the nature of decision making at the strategic level, since, to the 
extent that the strategic process conditions the requirements of its supporting techniques, 
we must work within the practical and theoretical constraints of that process. This implies 
an examination of the aims and extent of strategy, its necessary processes - i. e. its ration- 
ality - and the components of that rationality. This chapter is divided, accordingly, into 
two main parts. 
The first deals with the strategic process itself and will examine the current state of 
thought regarding the nature and process of strategic decision making. 
The second deals with the critically important issue of rationality in decision mak- 
ing in order that subsequent work in describing and conditioning behaviour can be well- 
founded. 
Lastly, from these connected examinations emerges a set of characteristics which 
are desirable in the support of a strategic decision making process, and this set of charac- 
teristics forms the benchmark for subsequent examination of current approaches and the 
developed approach which is the subject of this work. 
The Nature of the Strategic Decision 
There are many models of strategic thought, both within the business community and the 
corps of practitioners and academics. In the main part the differences between them are 
those of viewpoint and emphasis rather than in the product, since strategy is, in a sense, 
self-defining - it is what the heads of organisations concern themselves with - it is what 
strategists are told to think about by their CEO's. This view is in contrast with the widely- 
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held position that corporate strategy is concerned with the long term, the broad sweep of 
history and the global struggle for markets rather than the tactics of business. Rosenhead 
(1989) is of the opinion that 'one key distinction hetween tactical and strategic situations, 
is the uncertainty so characteristic ofthe latter'. There is no doubt that strategic decisions 
are made under conditions of uncertainty, deception and error, and we will discuss the 
nature and extent of that uncertainty later in this chapter, but two preliminary points must 
be made regarding the tactical component of corporate decision making. 
First, tactical decisions, too, are subject to error, deception and uncertainty. The context in 
which decisions are made is changeable; staff move and take their costly world-views with 
them; the very objectives of the corporation shift and change under the sway of short term 
stock-market pressures and long-term barely-felt geopolitical currents. Often the tactical 
decision-maker is unaware of the changes in the environment in which he is making his 
decisions either because of shortcomings in the communication and decision-making abil- 
ity of the organisation around him, or because the speed with which tactical decisions have 
to be made and the geological creep of the strategic context are incompatible. 
Second, tactics condition strategy. Without the existence of projects to ensure the cash- 
viability of the corporation or to provide the development vehicle for increased competi- 
tive advantage, there can be no strategic position to adopt. This is particularly so in 'granular' 
corporations which are dominated by projects each of which (or many of which) form a 
large fraction, say 10% or more, of the turnover of the company. It is a different case where 
the company's business structure consists of a plethora of small projects none of which 
per se is essential; but even in this case the aggregation of projects into managed market 
sectors, lines of business (LOBs) or skill areas effectively agglomerates these to give the 
effect of a granular company. Frequently, the tactical situation on a major project will 
condition the behaviour of the company in respect of the potential conflict inherent in 
deciding whether to compete with a fellow team member on a new and critical project. 
One might argue that the distinguishing characteristic of tactics with respect to strategy is 
that tactics are short-lived whereas strategy is long-lived (or at least long-sighted). This 
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would be unsound, since in many cases either the major projects, in the case of the granu- 
lar company or the aggregated projects forming the business sectors of the conventional 
company, have a decision lifetime which is at least as long as the ability of the strategist to 
predict the context in which strategy has to be designed and implemented. In other words, 
the stability of the decisions and the weltanschauung of decision-makers within a major 
project, stemming from the nature of the contract and the inertia of the design or produc- 
tion process in train, is often as great as the stability within the strategic decision-making 
structure and of the weltanschauung of the strategy makers. In this latter, strategic case, 
the stability stems from the extended time horizon under consideration and breadth of 
admitted solution-set rather than the existence of long-term internal stabilising factors 
such as the contract and the work in progress. 
Figure 2 illustrates the point. It is the methodology of a typical strategic process from a 
major international company, which exhibits the commonly used divergent-convergent 
approach coupled with a layered examination of successively more tactical areas of atten- 
tion. (The notes on the diagram give examples of the different stages for the reader). It sets 
corporate imperatives in the box marked 'Strategic Position Level'and then examines the 
implications of those corporate imperatives on a number of broad market positions at the 
next level down. Each of these market positions is assessed for compatibility with the 
corporate imperatives and for desirability according to feasibility and financial perform- 
ance criteria. In order to assess the desirability of each position, the lines of business 
(LOBs) which comprise the position need to be assessed, and, similarly, at the lowest 
level of this process, the projects which comprise the LOBs need to be examined and 
appraised. This is a typical example of a strategic process which attempts to reconcile the 
need for an expansive long-sighted view, both in market terms and in time-horizon, with 
the need for firm underwriting of strategy by realistic project foundations. 
The strength of such an approach is in its exhaustiveness and discipline. If implemented in 
its full form it is not unlike the methods used in the system engineering of complex safety 
critical systems (from which area it did, in fact, originate) and like those methods it is an 
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Strategic Position means 
Engineering Conglomerate 
or Leisure Comany 
or Aerospace 
or Aerospace and Detence 
or Global Conglomerate .... 
Market Position means 
Helicopters 
Regional Aircraft 
Hotels 
Financial Services 
Line of Business 
means 
Military Helicopters 
Large Transports 
C31 
Insurance 
Project level means 
CNGF 
L rIhI Attack Hplo 
Fig. 2: Large company strategic approach showing 
layering (Marsh, 1995) 
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example of an approach that, if applied conscientiously, invariably produces a system 
performance or strategic analysis that is comprehensive and thorough, and in at least one 
sense 'correct', in that when completed it generally satisfies the a prioli expectations of 
the user. 
Its weakness, however, lies in this very completeness and exhaustiveness. The content and 
scope of the process increases exponentially; even a moderate number of scenarios with a 
moderate number of possible positions having a realistic number of underlying projects 
could lead to an examination of over a thousand combinations. 
The process described attempts to act in a way described as teleological by many authori- 
ties from Aristotle through Maupertuis (175 1) and Vico (1965) to, in more modem times, 
Huxley (1873), Planck (1960) and Fichte (1982). Such processes are invested with an 
ultimate target which is the aim point of the design process, whether this process is theo- 
logical explanation or philosophical construction. Such processes inherently assume that 
if sufficient examination is made in a sufficiently complete manner a target state can be 
achieved - the process is convergent to an achievable and calculable point which can be 
reached by the application of sufficient effort sufficiently well-ordered. 
This is in stark contrast with the position of the strategist who is generating plans for the 
evolution of his corporation in an environment which is not only changing according to 
the internally generated and constantly changing objectives of his competitors and, in- 
deed, policy-makers and the collective whim of the market, but also because it responds to 
the implantation of the strategy itself. On occasion the response of the environment is 
neutral; more often it acts as Lenz's Law in opposition to any change; occasionally it acts 
so as to reinforce the desired strategic result. The strategic business environment is inextri- 
cably bound together with the strategic development of its components, and this is espe- 
cially so in the case of the oligopoly, where the degree of expenditure of each player on 
examining the behaviour and objectives of the others is high. 
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'Teleology assumes that order must have a consequentpurpose, which is planned' (Bar- 
row (1986)) and is in contrast to eutaxiological constructs which argue that '... order must 
have a cause, which isplanned'. The distinction is not a trivial one, and is highly relevant 
to the design of strategic decision-making structures. Rittel (1973), for example distin- 
guishes between 'tame'problems which can be specified in a form agreed by any relevant 
parties ahead of analysis and which does not change during analysis, and a 'wicked'prob- 
lem which is ill-defined. Rosenhead (1989b) cites two sets of characteristics for para- 
digms of problem-solving in OR, and it is worth reproducing these here overleaf in Tables 
2 and 3, in full. Inherent in many of the clauses of Rosenhead's Table 3 is the concept of an 
eutaxiological decision methodology which, because of its acceptance that a fixed objec- 
five probably cannot be defined satisfactorily at the beginning of the process, let alone 
reached in practice, respects the uncertainties in the environment and attempts at any point 
in the decision process to act in such a way that if the objective remained fixed its point-to- 
point behaviour would be convergent to that objective, but that if the objective were to 
move, its point-to-point behaviour would be convergent to that new objective. Such a 
decision system acts in a 'good' way rather than seeking for the 'best'. It is the quality of 
the journey which is weighed continuously in the balance rather than the achievement of a 
specific pre-declared objective. Checkland (198 1) approaches the concept of eutaxiology 
but stops short at the more restricted concept of teleonomy, which he describes as 'A 
neutral term indicating that developments may be described by an observer in terms of 
the ends served by them. ' He draws the distinction between 'purposeful' (teleological) 
behaviour and 'purposive' (teleonomic) behaviour. 
Strategy, then, is concerned with survival issues of the corporation. In general it will con- 
cern itself necessarily with longer term, sometimes dimly viewed, objectives, but on occa- 
sion the close coupling of critical tactical issues will inevitably draw the attention of the 
strategic decision making body into considerations which are short term and fast-moving. 
The strategic process, however, is not determined entirely by the external issues facing the 
corporation; we must turn to the connections between strategy and organisation in order to 
Page 32 
Problem formulation in terms of a single objective and optimisation. 
Multiple objectives, if recognised, are to be traded-off on to a common 
scale. I 
2. Overwhelming data demands, with consequent problems of distortion, 
data availability, and data credibility. 
3. Scientization and depoliticization, assumed consensus. 
People are treated as passive objects. 
5. Assumption of a single decision maker with abstract objectives from 
which concrete actions can be deduced for implementation through a 
hierarchical chain of command. 
6. Attempts to abolish fiiture uncertainty, and pre-take future decisions. 
Table 2. Characteristics of the dominant paradigm of operational research 
(after Rosenhead, 1989, p 12) 
Non-optimizing; seeks alternative solutions which are acceptable 
on separate dimensions, without trade-offs. 
2. Reduced data demands, achieved by greater integration of hard and 
soft data with social judgements. 
3. Simplicity and transparency, aimed at clarifying the terms of 
conflict. 
4. Conceptualizes people as active subjects. 
S. Facilitates planning from the bottom-up. 
6. Accepts uncertainty, and aims to keep options open for later 
resolution. 
Table 3. Characteristics for an alternative paradigm 
(after Rosenhea d, 1989, p 12) 
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see into the effect of internal constraints and mandates upon the strategic process. 
Decision Making processes 
No discussion of strategy in organisations would be complete without a review of the 
processes of decision making itself. Inevitably the process model both describes and con- 
strains the rationality of the decision maker and provides the basis for judgement of the 
behaviour of other participants in the strategic struggle. Without an understanding of the 
process of decision making itself, we cannot hope to mobilise knowledge of our oppo- 
nent's decsion making in our favour. 
Following Noorderhaven (1995), we compare firstly a generic conceptual model of deci- 
sion making with the well-known normative-rational model, and then describe four types 
of organisational strategic process. Noorderhaven's model consists of eight activities ar- 
ranged as shown in Figure 2. It follows the conventional models of decision making, start- 
ing with an awareness phase, which may be compared with Friend's (1989) shaping phase 
of his shaping-designing-compaiing-choosing model. This is then followed by an analysis 
phase (encompassing the remaining three phases of Friend's model) and then moves into 
an implementation phase. It accepts the recursive nature of the process in that, for exam- 
ple, the choosing can affect the perception of the environment of the first phase of the 
process. Similarly the implementation issues are kept in mind at the analysis stage in 
evaluating options. It is inoted here that the decision itself is essentially defined by the 
decision maker; it is externally required, but internally framed. 
The distinction between Noorderhaven's model and the normative-rational model of fig- 
ure 4 is clear to see. The latter starts from an instrumentally-rational point with the goal 
being set externally at the start of the process. Sensing and evaluating of the context is 
carried out only in the SWOT stage. The model is widely used in industry (Huff & Reger 
1987; David, 199 1; Hitt & Tyler 199 1; Grant, 1995: Hax and Majluf, 1996 pp26-29; Bow- 
man and Faulkner, 1997). 
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Figure 3. Noorderhaven's developmental model 
The distinction between the two models bears greatly on our view of decision making in 
the organisation. Note that the process model of Figure 3 includes the setting of the goals 
as part of the process, whereas the normative rational model of Figure 4 has these set as a 
starting condition. Consequently the perceptions of rationality within the respective or- 
ganisations will be different. 
Sethng 
managenal 
goals 
I 
Extemal I SWOT Intemal 
analysis analysis analysis 
Generahng 
strategi 
optionsc 
Figure 4: The normative-rational model 
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Four conceptual models of organisational rationality are generally identified, namely syn- 
optical planning, disjointed incrementalism, logical incrementalism and the interpretative 
approach ' 
Synoptical Planning 
Synoptical planning has two main components, the design school and the strategic plan- 
ning school. It gets its name from the concept that top management should periodically 
weigh up the situation in which they find their company and engage in an episodic process 
of strategy generation. It is thus open to all the criticism which the social process critique 
and, particularly, the structural power critique bring to bear. 
The design school 
This approach emphasises the importance of top-down decision making and 
the role of the CEO (Mintzberg, 1990,1994) (Christensen et al, 1987). Lower 
levels in the organisation, the strategic support staff, divisional managing di- 
rectors and others are viewed merely as support staff who may carry out analysis 
and implement the results of the strategy, but are the mere drones and worker 
bees to the CEO queen. 
There are certain consequences. The strategy must be made visible to the con- 
tributors, but on the other hand it must be sufficiently simple to be kept in the 
mind of a single person, the CEO. Implementation and formation of the strat- 
egy are separated. The process of learning by the organisation as discussed by 
Argyris (in (Shrivastava, 1983)) is distinctly hindered, and the cognitive bi- 
ases reported by Barnes (1984) remain unfettered by the checks and balances 
of a strategic group. Mintzberg (1994) characterises the design school as fol- 
lows: - 
Strategy making should be a controlled and conscious process 
The CEO is the strategist 
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The strategy making process should be kept simple and informal 
Strategies should emerge Uly developed 
Strategies should be made explicit. 
Strate-ic Plannina School ep ep 
Here (Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Ansoff, 1987; Mintzberg 1990,1994; Mintz- 
berg et a], 1998), the process is a highly formalized and ritual elaboration of 
the similar design school process. The distinguishing feature with respect to 
the eutaxiological, adaptive approach is that the assertion of the strategic plan- 
ning school that the development of the firm is controllable in the long term. 
Information on and prediction of the future is limited only by the skill and 
effort applied, and so the strategy emerging is the product of an essentially 
deductive process. It is therefore highly rational in a conventional sense and to 
the extent which it fails the tests of rationality, it fails as a strategic decision 
making process. It is highly teleological; it places clear and unambiguous ob- 
jectives and goals, and the ability to achieve these goals is limited only by the 
intellect of the strategist. Ansoff's (1975) study of corporate strategy, for ex- 
ample, is based on this approach, and exemplifies the algorithmic nature of 
decision making of this school well. He shows (ibid. p. 74) charts and taxono- 
mies of objectives, flow charts of decision processes (ibid. p. 146) and self- 
observant diagnosis charts (ibid. p. 219) all of which characterise the school. 
Disjointed incrementalism 
The bounded rationality perspective on decision making within organisations is embodied 
in the disjointed incrementalism of Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) (Lindblom, 1959). 
It is essentially descriptive rather than prescriptive. Managers are assumed to have control 
and perception only of their immediate areas of responsibility. Moreover, any attempts to 
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operate on and predict any future is assumed to be infeasible. The future is as unknowable 
as the operating characteristics of the next department in the organisation chart. The result 
of this conscious organisational and temporal myopia is to approach strategic develop- 
ment incrementally. The organisation has no choice but to step cautiously from tussock to 
tussock across a misty swamp of internal and external uncertainties. Braybrooke and 
Lindblom (ibid. ) summarise the disjointed incrementalist approach: - 
Choose as relevant objectives only those worth considering in view of the 
means available or likely to come available in the immediate future. 
Contemplate means and objectives at the same time 
Limit attention to alternatives that differ only incrementally one from the other 
and from the present situation or policy 
Evaluate alternatives only in terms of their incremental effects with respect to 
present policy or situation. 
One particular pathological form of the disjointed incrementalist approach is the 'garbage 
can'model where the organisation is unaware of its technology, its goals and its processes. 
In this model the organisation reacts opportunistically to the random and fortuitous juxta- 
position of perceived, transient goals and ephemeral solutions. It is an organised anarchy. 
The disjointed incrementalist approach in both its forms can appear essentially irrational 
in the orthodox sense ftom outside it, but to members of the organisation the approaches, 
processes and effects may noi seem so. Judged according to its own lights, they may seem 
logical, clear, logically well-connected and acceptable to the senior management. Ration- 
ality is what rationality expects. 
Logical increm'entalism 
Logical incrementalism was developed during the late 1970s by JB Quinn (1978,1980) as 
an attempt to improve upon the synoptic model so as to incorporate the intuitive aspects of 
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decision making into a more flexible process (Quinn, 1978,1980). It has become a flag- 
ship of the learning organisation movement, advocating double-loop learning by organisa- 
tions about their environment and themselves. (Quinn and Mintzberg, 1992; Mintzberg et 
al, 1998pplOI-102) 
In Quinn's conception of decision making the decision makers within the organisation are 
bound to act in an essentially intuitive manner because it is in the nature of the strategic 
problem that there is no recipe for solution. Moreover the very rules of approach and the 
critical characteristics will be markedly different in one case from another. 
Quinn also admits and even encourages the operation of subsets of the organisation as 
change agents. Each sub-community has its own agenda, tempo, capabilities and informa- 
tion and will react accordingly. Ansoff's weak signals (Ansoff 1975) are made easier to 
detect because the disparate parts of the organisation share sensed data. Shared signals 
will amplify within the organisation to give an efficient distributed sensing system, by 
virtue of the association of different subsystems to the declared strategic imperative. 
The cost to the organisation of this sensitivity and flexibility is that the logical incremen- 
talist approach can lead to disjointed strategy. Strategy appears almost as a Darwinian 
emergent property of the organisation, but there is no guarantee that the criteria for on- 
ward selection at the subsystem level is compatible with or convergent to the global crite- 
ria for strategic success (assuming such criteria exist). 
The logical incrementalist approach can be summarised as follows (after Noorderhaven, 
1995) 
Effective strategies for the organisation as a whole emerge from the partial 
strategies of subsystems 
The decision making processes within the various subsystems follow a logic 
and tempo of their own. 
Within each subsystem specific restrictions with regard to information avail- 
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ability, constraints and process characteristics apply. 
Strategic decisions are strongly influenced by unexpected major events. 
The interpretative approach 
This approach views organisations as paradigms. It takes issue with the logical element of 
Quinn's logical incrementalism in recognising that the cognitive shortcomings of indi- 
viduals and groups can affect the interpretative process in a fundamental way. For exam- 
ple, it is often assumed that managers react to signals from their environment, but in fact 
what they respond to is their own perception of the signals. Behavioural research has 
shown that the cognitive model of the observer is a strong driver of the sensing process 
(Shrivastava, 1983; Barnes, 1984; Isenberg, 1991; Mintzberg, 1995). Closure, constancy, 
proximity and similarity tend all to drive cognition away from the simple physical model 
of eye, retina and brain (Noorderhaven 1995 pp. 74-94). Writers on the interpretive ap- 
proach (Pfeffer, 1981; Shrivastava et al., 1983; Johnson, 1987,1988; Johnson & Scholes, 
1993) observe that managers tend to observe and extrapolate the historical perspective of 
their organisation as much as the pertaining environment. As Noorderhaven says (1995, 
p 174) 'success breed simplicity: all minds are set at continuing a given successfulpolicy'. 
From the perspective of this work the decision making is structurally defined and valued. 
The acceptability of deductive processes will be viewed within the organisational struc- 
ture which has converged on the organisational paradigm. Irrationality will be viewed as a 
kind of secession from the organisation. The scope for rational choice is deemed to be 
more restricted in the interpretive model since the organisation is subject to what is known 
as strategic drift, because the cognitive models of the managers are unable to change as 
fast as the environment which they are ostensibly tracking. The response to this failure is 
often catastrophic, leading to staff change rather than learning by individual managers. 
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Strategic process - summary and relevance to present work 
The examination of the strategic process above tells us much about the nature of the deci- 
sion making which this work aims, ultimately, to support. First, the strategic process is a 
function of the organisation. The definitions of the objective are arrived at differently in 
different models of organisation and the interpretation of rationality is different from type 
to type. For example, in the strategic planning model, irrationality would be viewed as a 
failure of information or expression of goals, or possibly as a failure of the deductive 
analytic process. In the garbage-can model no one may even notice. Irrationality would be 
viewed as the normal disjunction of coincidence as, contrary to the benevolent view of the 
model, means and ends happen to be in conflict and are therefore ignored. In the logical 
incrementalist model irrationality is not devalued in the sense that it is expected that differ- 
ent subcultures will have different views of the objectives of strategy (if any such exists at 
the holistic level) and the means for obtaining and implementing it. Lastly, in the interpre- 
tive model, irrationality evinces itself as a gradual cancer of drift as cognitive models 
become more and more at variance with reality and the extrapolation of the history of the 
organisation becomes more and more at variance with a differently developing reality. 
Second, the valuation of the strategic process depends on the level of application of the 
definition of rationality in the model of the organisation. It is dependent, in other words, 
on the value-context. Some models absorb irrationality at one level as Part of the next layer 
of understanding. We shall see this process at work again in the section on rationality in 
games. We can, therefore, have an accommodating organisational theory such as the logi- 
cal incrementalist model which can absorb apparently irrational behaviour by viewing it 
as part of a sub-process - the adoption of an incorrect goal is a necessary part of the process 
of strategic development. The mismatch between the local irrationality of parts of an or- 
ganisation is viewed as a necessary precursor to strategy generation for the whole. 
Third, definitions and views of the strategic process can be observed reified in the organi- 
sations directly. Particularly in the interpretive and synoptic models, the organisational 
topology is itself the definition of the process. Strategy and organisation cannot be distin- 
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guished. Oiganisations accept what they do according to their set norms as what is appro- 
priate - what we do correctly is what is rational, and we organise accordingly. 
Fourth, the appropriateness of the process depends in all cases on an adequate observation 
of the outside world. The different models view the adequacy of that sensing in different 
ways, but they all have in common that what is not sensed 'correctly' (i. e. according to 
what the collective cognitive model of the outside world is in that particular organisation), 
then it is not the basis for appropriate strategic decision making. Rationality is a function 
of the distributed cognitive model of the organisation and requires that model to be used. 
Fifth, we observe from the work of Mintzberg (1989 pp. 342-348) Isenberg (1991) and 
Handy (1989) that there is an increasing need for the recognition of the power of intuitive 
processes in the exercise of thinking in business. It is tempting to follow the psychological 
arguments of rejecting these processes as inappropriate, but they are quite legitimately 
included if they produce results which satisfy, and can be shown to satisfy the needs of the 
organisation. 
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Strategic rationality 
Scope, aims and justification 
Concepts of rationality and irrationality pervade the literature and practice of strategy. 
They emerge from discussions of behaviour and implementation, from philosophical and 
ideological foundations and are everywhere to be found in the modem literature of man- 
agement science. Without an appreciation of the implications of rational ity/irrationality 
there is little justification for any predictive model of behaviour; if we cannot adjudge 
rationality, we cannot predict behaviour, since the prediction of behaviour implies ration- 
ality on the part of the observed system. On the other hand, much of the theory of behav- 
ioural science and social science tends to take a wider definition of rationality than the 
traditional rationalist, and particularly the positivist schools, admit. This section seeks to 
reconcile the apparent need for rationality and rational behaviour as stable foundations for 
decision making with the contrasting need to recognise and absorb the irrational behav- 
iour and perspectives of the instigators, pursuers and objects of strategic thought. 
Rationality or rational behaviour is a highly valued quality in human terms. We value the 
predictability of a person whose behaviour appears governed by a predictable connection 
between what we see as the facts through logic to the consequences. We find it difficult to 
deal with the insane, the highly artistic, the immature, the dreamer and the anarchist pre- 
cisely because of the quality which, at least partly, defines those subsets of the human race. 
'I can't do business with him, ' we say, 'he's totally irrational! Irrationality is the weak 
cousin of insanity as an indicator that the subject is unpredictable and difficult, not to be 
trusted, odd, a misfit. In one sense at least rationality defines not only the sapiens part of 
our biological designator, but also our qualifications for membership of one of the set of 
social species. Rationality defines us in our mentality and behaviour, both individually 
and collectively, and is at the same time both an intellectual and a social construct. 
So it is with companies. We find it difficult to do business with bodies which do not share 
our view of what constitutes predictable, rational behaviour. Sometimes we find, when 
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engaged in negotiation with companies from other cultures, that the value judgements 
which they place on, for example, trust and integrity, are at variance with our own. We find 
their behaviour strange, their speech-acts opaque, their signals weak and confusing, and 
we then accuse them of behaving irrationally, often confusing an accusation of illogicality 
with an actual offence of social dissimilarity. 
This view of the irrationality of others can often lead to weakness in negotiation on our 
part. We dismiss the rejection of short term monetary motivation on the part of business- 
men from a Moslem cultural background as naYvet6, failing to recognise the importance in 
our own culture of trust and integrity and ignoring the benefits to be gained in the long run 
or on a group (rather than on an individual) basis. We call irrational the rejection of a 
business opportunity by a Moslem businessman who has been cheated on a previous occa- 
sion; he does not behave as we do; he is irrational. Defined by his own cultural parameters, 
of course, he is right. Most of the time in everyday life being rational is a socially accept- 
able behaviour, and indeed defines that acceptability, and yet on occasions irrationality is 
valued and encouraged, for example in artistic thinking and in play. There is an essential 
dichotomy between the unifying desire for rational and hence predictable behaviour (and 
by implication thought) and the observation that irrational behaviour can sometimes lead 
to business success or creative advance. 
Huge quantifies of writing in the literature of management science alone have been de- 
voted to the pursuit of the rational. The quality of decisions is largely viewed as isomor- 
phic to the rationality of the process of decision making. In the 1970s MBA was held to 
stand for management by analysis, and the joke is not entirely without foundation; man- 
agement was viewed primarily as a problem to which an answer could be found. Today 
this view has been softened. The societal implications of strategic thought are now recog- 
nised more, and 'right brain' or intuitive thinking together with expanded definitions of 
rationality have gained a place in strategic thought, but we are still, to quote Immanuel 
Kant (178 1), 'prisoners of rationality', valuing, almost above success, the quality of ra- 
tional thought in our decision making. 
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This acceptance of rationality as an a priori requirement of strategic thought is not suffi- 
cient. If we could see no advantages in behaving or thinking irrationally there would be no 
justification in considering the need or demands of rationality. We can see, however, such 
situations around us frequently. The negotiator who behaves deliberately irrationally up- 
sets the assumption of his opponent. The games player who plays in a considered random 
way will almost always gain an advantage over one who plays identically on all occasions. 
The insane are treated more advantageously with regard to their contribution to economic 
society than are their able counterparts. Moreover, there are frequent occasions when irra- 
tional thought processes are deemed creative and worthy. The poet Coleridge, for exam- 
ple, is a well known example of a creative individual who deliberately used rationality- 
suppressing drugs to engage his creative process, and at a less agricultural and self-immo- 
lating level, we frequently use the effect of the subconscious mind's background working 
to solve a knotty problem. The mathematician JE Littlewood (Bollobas 1953 - p. 192) 
describes the process clearly, 'Incubation is the work ofthe subconscious during the wait- 
ing time, which may be several years. Illumination, which can happen in afraction of a 
second, is the emergence of the creative idea into the conscious. This almost always oc- 
curs when the mind is in a state ofrelaration, and engaged lightly with ordinary matters! 
We see, then, that in at least some circumstances there can be positive advantages in acting 
or at least thinking irrationally, and this is itself justification for addressing the require- 
ments of strategic thought in this respect, particularly as such an examination may yield 
characteristics of a strategic decision support scheme which may be either desirable or 
undesirable, but should at least be noted. 
The scope of this section ranges from a survey of the philosophy of rationality, dealt with 
broadly as a background to the remainder, through the approaches taken to rationality in 
management science and those aspects of behavioural science which are relevant to strate- 
gic thinking. The distinctive and restricted approach to rationality taken by economics, 
and particularly that subset of economic thinking known as social and economic game 
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theory is discussed, as is the literature on critical systems thinking, which is largely rede- 
fining the meaning of rationality through the application of the philosophy of the German 
philosopher, Mrgens Habermas. This fourfold survey of the literature is followed by a 
discussion of the limits of rationality in the context of strategic thought, which will inevi- 
tably cover the value of rationality and its normative content in particular. Lastly, some 
conclusions are drawn which link the present literature with some desirable characteristics 
of strategic decision support methodology. These conclusions are subsequently linked with 
material in the next part to provide a symptomatic specification for a strategic decision 
support methodology, declared at the end of this section. 
The objective of this section, then, is to clarify the position of rationality in strategic thought, 
and in business conflict analysis in particular. It aims are the following 
a) to survey critically the literature of rationality in this context 
b) to identify the contribution to be expected of rationality and irrationality 
to the strategic process 
C) to identify the constraints induced by this contribution to the design of a 
strategic decision support methodology. 
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The Philosophical Heritage 
Rationalism and empiricism -a brief developmental perspective 
Rationalism in the context of the history of philosophy is a concept whose meaning varies 
greatly from context to context. In essence, philosophers who are deemed to be rationalist 
are understood to give greater weight to the products of logical, syllogistic thought than to 
some other posited source of knowledge, for example, faith or belief or tradition, or expe- 
rience. It is an epithet which is more often applied to other philosophers than to them- 
selves, and carries a somewhat pejorative odour. 
Modem philosophy is deemed to begin with a rationalist rejection of that Aristotelian 
mode of argument which places the axiomatically based approaches of mathematics above 
all other methods of argument. This alternative argument offers a connection between 
axiomatic or self-evident truths and the products of algorithmic thought. Thereby our base 
of knowledge is self-derived, self-consistent and independent of any observation of the 
suspect real world by virtue of the tubelike nature of the argument from axioms to conclu- 
sions. Experience is essentially irrelevant, and in any case cannot provide the necessary 
degree of certainty. From our lofty viewpoint of late twentieth century post-modemism 
this seems rather quaint, but it must be remembered that three of the greatest philosophers 
espoused rationalism, or at least from the belvedere of hindsight are seen as espousing it ; 
these three are Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, against whom were ranged, in an empiri- 
cist school of retreat to practical exposure to the real world, the philosophies of Locke, 
Berkeley and Hume. Between these two schools, of rationalism on the one hand, and 
Modem radical scepticism on the other, lies a gulf bridged only in the latter half of the 
twentieth century. 
Descartes 
Descartes shows us the very essence of rationalism when he wrote (Descartes, 1637) of his 
liking for 'those long chains composed of very simple and easy reasoning' which he ob- 
served being used by geometers in their proofs. He drew the conclusion that all that we 
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had to do to expand our store of soundly based knowledge was to reject those axioms 
which we found unsatisfactory, and base our thinking on a set of syllogisms which would 
lead us inexorably to newly discovered and verifiable knowledge. 
Spinoza 
Spinoza (1677) is often viewed as an exemplar of the geometric manner of writing. His 
great work commences with an axiomatic declaration of the basis for his study of the rules 
of behaviour. In conversation with Oldenburg, however (Curley, 1986), Spinoza's reply to 
a challenge to the self-evident nature of the axioms was that he cared little whether they 
were self-evident or not so long as they were accepted. He later began to treat these axioms 
as if they were merely propositions. Spinoza proposes to his readers that if the argument is 
found difficult they should deal with the argument as a whole rather than accept proof only 
step by inexorable step, a distinct weakening of his rationalist position. 
Leihniz 
Leibniz, often hailed as the rationalist par excellence, maintained that every true proposi- 
tion is either trivially true (an identity) or reducible to an identity by step by step analysis. 
Hence every truth is reducible to an axiom. On the other hand even Leibniz advocated 
public laboratories to perform experiments. When Locke offered the pessimistic observa- 
tion that scientific truth could never be obtained, Leibniz replied that 'considerahleprogress 
will eventually he made ... hecause the great numher of experiments which are within our 
reach can supply us with more than sufficient data. '(Leibniz, 1765). Once again, these are 
not examples of the strict rationalist sentiments which are often attributed to this group of 
three. Leibniz, in fact, was of the opinion that only God could be certain of the priors, and 
held that the use of the a priori method by man was 'not entirely impossihle' (Leibniz, 
1857) so long as he does not attempt to descend to the particular. Leibniz distinguishes 
between the truths of reason which constitute, for example, a mathematical truth and 'truths 
offact', a distinction which we will have reason to note in later sections. 
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Kant 
These three then constitute the main trunk of what is known as the traditional rationalist 
view of epistemology, but in order to gain an adequate understanding of what rationalism, 
I 
and by inference rationality, means in late twentieth century usage, it is necessary to make 
at least superficial study of the work of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), regarded by many as 
the greatest of modem philosophers. 
Kant's rationalism extended from a belief that synthetic judgements were possible apriori 
to a belief that certain concepts exist which coincide with properties of objects in exist- 
ence without these concepts being founded upon their existence in reality (Kemp Smith, 
1964). These are Kant's categories, of which the best known are substance and cause. 
Kant leaps the obvious question of how a concept applied to an object can exist without 
being derived from it, by appeal to transcendental deduction of categories. He argues that 
all representations are mutually supported by the observer perceiving them at the same 
time. They are co-apprehended in one consciousness. He then argues that they have such a 
unity only because they are synthesised according to rules encapsulated in the objects. 
It is important to understand that the single most relevant conclusion of Kant's Critique of 
Pure Reason is a surprising reversal of the trend up to this point. In his critique of the a 
priori concept, Kant comes to the conclusion that only sense-derived material can be used 
to determine the categories, so that our a priori information is in fact limited to the expe- 
rienced world. 'Ae source ofapriori knowledge is not experience, hut its only legitimate 
subject matter is otjects ofpossible experience' - such is Kant's compromise between 
rationalism and empiricism (van Cleve, 1993). It is this, perhaps surprising, terminus which 
is the starting point for the rationalist imperative of the late twentieth century, and which at 
the same time provides the basis for its own replacement by a post-Kantian dialectic whose 
operation we shall see below. 
Quine and radical reductionism 
Willard Quine (1908-), who has had a major effect on the development of epistemology in 
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this century, and in particular on understanding the place of empiricism in that structure, 
represents the next major step in the foundations of rationalism. Although an American, 
his greatest influence was during the 1930s when he visited Vienna, collaborating exten- 
sively with Rudolf Camap, with whom he gradually came to share a commitment to the 
role of philosophy as part of science. In this respect, then, he represents the modem termi- 
nus of a line of thinkers rejecting the rationalist tradition which has its beginnings well 
before Descartes, Leibniz and Kant. Quine's collection of papers, From a Logical Point of 
View (1953) have had a great influence on modem understanding of knowledge, as, from 
a slightly different perspective, has his book Word and Object (1960). 
Quine's distinction in the first work between analytic and synthetic knowledge echoes that 
of Kant, but his reductionism, which holds that 'every meaningful statement is held to be 
translatable into a statement.. about immediate experience' (Quine, 1953) represents a 
complete commitment to the empiricist ideal. Quine holds that the distinction between 
analytical (self derived) truths and synthetic (externally argued) truths can only be mean- 
ingful if radical reductionism is valid. In the study of management science this assertion 
may seem distant from the practical problems of business conflict, but in fact the validity 
of data and information on which our strategic decisions are based are determined in no 
small measure by the approach which we take to the nature of knowledge and the methods 
which we use to collect and create it from the raw material of our collective consciousness 
in the firm. Quine's approach, too, is highly relevant to the knowledge gathering and use 
of the strategic process, since it presents a signpost to the sources of knowledge. We need 
to understand to what extent we can operate upon our underlying concepts and internal- 
ised analysis in the firm to produce the organised information we refer to as knowledge, 
and to what extent we need to refer to experience. Now the ubiquitous positivist tradition 
would hold that reference to empirical data is the only truth, but we must take a more 
sophisticated approach, arguing that the retreat to measurement brings with it not just the 
advantages of having our feet well grounded in the plough-field of reality, but also the 
clods of uncertainty and error which come with that bucolic position. As Christopher 
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Hookway observes (Dancy & Sosa, 1993, p. 409), 'analytic truths, linking other state- 
ments to ones about immediate experience, determine how we should revise our beliefs in 
theface ofsurprising observations'. It is this very ability to deal with the surprising that 
determines our ability as strategists. 
Relativism 
One should not imagine that it is only the battle between empiricism and rationalism which 
concerns twentieth century epistemology. The relativist school of thought, extending right 
back beyond Plato, is still a relevant doctrine of knowledge, particularly in the context of 
social science with its moving platform of observations and context. 
Relativism espouses the nature of knowledge as being essentially a function of the state of 
the observer, particularly as regards time and space, culture and conceptual paradigm. It 
makes no sense to claim knowledge that is not a function of the state of the observer. The 
most savage attacks on the doctrine claim that it cannot be valid by virtue that it cannot 
hold of itself, i. e. it is self-referentially invalid, since if it were true it would not be possible 
to claim its validity except as a special case. It can be defended only by giving itself up. 
(Siegel, 1987). Additionally, the concept that something is 'true for me' or 'true for my 
company' is more a statement about what the individual or the company believes in than 
what is true 'out there'in the world to be observed. It will be apparent that the adherence or 
otherwise to a relativist view of knowledge has fundamental effects on the model of the 
competitive world in which strategy is planned and executed, and that the decision support 
methods for it are consequently highly conditioned. The mathematical work of Bacharach 
(1993) reviewed in a later section draws on a highly relativistic position to attack the 
problem of Variable Universe Games, where each player may have a different view of the 
universe as well as of the more conventional individualistic payoff functions. 
Relativism still has many adherents, however, not least because of the unpalatability of the 
consequences of its rejection, since that rejection would induce a need for a theory of 
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certainty which is not available to Philosophy except in very limited senses. The language- 
and sociology-based developments of Wittgenstein and of the so-called 'strong programme' 
of attempting to underwrite the whole basis of socially understood truth, while attractive 
from a management science basis as a foundation for knowledge is unavailable, not just 
because of its unproven nature, but because of the very contentiousness surrounding its 
feasibility. The most satisfactory lead would appear to come from Rorty, whose doctrine 
of contemporary neo-pragmatism (Rorty, 1979,1982) offers an empirical ly-based doc. 
trine sensitive to the social context in which knowledge is gained and used. This offers 
some hope to management science as a basis for extending our tendrils of knowledge into 
different structures of knowing. 
Naturalism - science and social science 
Lastly, before turning our attention to rationality itself, we examine the theories surround- 
ing the applicability of the methods of natural science to the social sciences, the doctrine 
of naturalism. There are three reasons why naturalism may not be sustainable or even 
necessary. 
First, the social sciences and, within them, the study of strategy as (at least in 
part) a social process are reflexive, in the sense that they are part of the social 
system which they study. So in management science do we observe that the proc- 
ess of managing information is the subject and object of the process itself. Unlike 
the natural sciences, generating theories about management is part of manage- 
ment itself. The problem is slightly worse, perhaps, in the behavioural sciences 
where the observers are deemed to be dependent upon the subjects themselves for 
their views of the object of study, but the distinction is a fine one. In management 
science we, too, are unsure who are the warders and who the inmates. 
Second, social phenomena are highly complex, and, moreover are not readily 
amenable to the kind of controlled observations common (indeed required) in the 
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natural sciences. Admittedly the recent extensive work on the complex nature of 
physical and biological systems known as complexity theory indicates that some 
previously well-understood physical systems have a capacity for emergent be- 
haviour at least as complex as social systems, but the essence of the difficulty 
here is that social systems do not have the capacity of being experimented upon 
without involving the observer or experimenter in the social system. One cannot 
carry out an experiment on the strategy team of a major public company without 
changing its view of itself, its cognitive models or its patterns of behaviour, or at 
least, not, %ithout making changes of such nicety that they are unrecorded. 
Third is the problem of the contestability of many of the doctrines and theories 
of social science, by which is meant that they contain what amount to valuejudge- 
ments because, in the view of Gallie (1955) they are evaluative rather than de- 
scriptive and because of the complexity of the process of observation, which re- 
quires that manyjudgements be made about the admissibility of the observations 
themselves. 
Rabermas and Critical 77; eory 
These difficulties, striking at the heart of rationalism as applied to the social sciences, 
therefore indicate the need for a particular and specific epistemology for the social sci- 
ences, and, by inclusion, for management science. The contribution of Habermas (1971, 
1979,1981,1990), the successor to Marx in developing a critical theory of social struc- 
ture, is quoted extensively in the management science literature (Ulrich, 1983,1987a, 
1987b, 1988; Oliga, 1988,1990; Flood & Jackson, 1991; Flood, 1991,1990; Jackson, 
1991a, 1991b, 1991c; Flood & Oliga, 1991; Feunmayor, 1991; Schechter, 1991). We 
discuss his relevance to systems thinking in a later section, but we observe here that his 
view is that if the social sciences are engaged in essentially technical activity, they should 
be either practical or critical. Practical here means aiming at understanding as distinct 
from the critical orientation of interpretation or liberation. Habermas among others sug- 
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gests that we should not aim at 'the development ofabstract theories directed at the under- 
standing ofthefine-grainedpredictionsofconcretesocialphenomena'(d'Agosfino, 1993), 
but rather at understanding or interpretation at a higher structural level. The distinction is 
made easier to understand by an observation made by writers (Gibbons, 1987) between 
'thin and thick' descriptions of phenomena. A thin description is generally understood to 
be one detached from the participants, behaviourist in approach and content, as contrasted 
with the thick description using their vocabulary and therefore using their concepts. The 
thick description, therefore, imbues the observers with the understanding of the partici- 
pants and does not separate the two in that respect. The thick descriptions are claimed to 
be free of the three difficulties cited above, in that the descriptions are voiced by the par- 
ticipants. Other writers, however, feel some difficulty with the distinction, because of the 
obvious problems surrounding the independence of the observer. 
The concept of interpretation is central to the specific epistemology of the social sciences. 
On the one hand we see a structure based on the recovery of concepts from the vague 
world of reality, the lifeworld of Schutz and subsequently of Luckmann and of Habermas 
(Schutz, 1962; Schutz and Luckmann, 1963; Habermas, 198 1), and on the other a struc- 
ture based on suspicion of the motives and self-delusive capacities of the participants. The 
great difficulty, summed up in the Principle of Charity (Davidson, ' 1983), is that unless we 
can relate to the beliefs and understandings of the subjects of our research we cannot take 
any view of the empirical data. If we are not to have a broad agreement with their beliefs 
we will find their behaviour opaque, mysterious and forbidding. The relativist opposition 
of Quine (1960) in pointing out the imperative of viewing all truth from the point of view 
of the observer is a related position. Here, in the social science epistemological debate we 
see an even more difficult problem in the Principle of Charity. Essentially the observer is 
part of the observed system. Relativism, with all its problems, appears inescapable. 
Habermas (1981), however, offers some solace through the concept of communicative 
action which aims at testing, during the observations, the validity of the claims implicit in 
the actions of the participants. Claims which pass our collective tests are admitted as evi- 
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dence. The message here for management science is that checks on the basis for consen- 
sual approaches to epistemic valuations are essential, a point which has not escaped the 
practitioners, but which we must continue not to ignore in practice and in particular in the 
design of decision support systems. 
Logical positivism and undecidable propositions 
It would be remiss to leave any review of the rationalist and anti-rationalist traditions of 
western philosophy without reference to the logical positivist school, derived from the 
logical empiricism of the Vienna school of the 1920s and 1930s, which has so influenced 
scientific - and therefore empiricist - thinking since then. It is positivist in its assertion 
that science is the only form of knowledge, and it is logical in its dependence on logic, 
and, in particular mathematics, as the only basis for argument. The essence of the argu- 
ment is that epistemic objects outwith the reach of science are unknowable and therefore 
to discuss them is meaningless. Logical positivism relied and continues to rely on the 
essential belief that unless something is formally decidable in the language of mathemat- 
ics, and meta-mathematical logic, then it is inadmissible. 
It therefore caused some shaking of the rafters when the implications of the work of Kurt 
G6del (193 1) became clear. G6del's seminal work challenged the very heart of the logical 
positivist body, in that he discovered, by a process of using mathematical structures to 
examine the logic of mathematics itself, that in any sufficiently rich structure there were 
propositions which, although true could not be formally proven. The effect on the logical 
positivist establishment was slow to occur, but fundamental. Not only had the structure 
fallen, it had been pushed over from within by mathematics itself. The argument, however 
is not over; it has merely moved to another part of the forest where we can hear the noise 
of blows being struck between Lucas (196 1), Anderson (1964) and Good (1967), engaged 
in a fight over the relevance over G6del's theorem to the processes of the human mind. 
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The zoo of rationality 
Types of rationality 
In philosophical terms rationality can be roughly described as the use of legitimate rea- 
son. There are nine commonly applied descriptions (Dancy and Sosa, 1993, pp, 415 - 49). 
conformity with deductive logic 
The most obvious use of the term rational is in indicating that the correct rules of 
deduction have been applied. 
correct calculation 
There is a correctness inherent in the correct application of the rules of math- 
ematical calculation. 
definition or meaning 
Certain conclusions can be drawn directly from the definitions of words 
appropriate extension 
Some arguments arejustifiably extensible from an empirical to a general theory. 
For example adequate controlled examination of the real world would be regarded 
as a good basis for the testing of a general theory. 
correct assessments ofprobability 
The correct application of self-consistent arguments to probabilities is a particu- 
lar kind of rationality widely recognised and highly relevant to strategic conflict 
questions. 
factual generalisation 
It would be a rational deduction to assume that if it has been raining the grass will 
be wet. Generally speaking gardens do not have roofs on them, and it would be 
irrational to assume otherwise. Conversely, however it would not be rational nec- 
essarily to assume that because the grass is wet it has been raining. The hose has 
been in action. 
personal advantage 
In economic theory in particular it is assumed that an individual will act accord- 
ing to a rule which maximises his utility. 
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morality - ends and means 
Connected with the previous category of rationality is the supposed rationality in 
considering ends rather than means. 
meta-finguistics 
The understanding that communication takes place between humans who have at 
least some common understanding over and above what is strictly being said 
provides the basis for a rationality which is best described as meta-linguistic. For 
example, if in reply to the question, 'How was the playTone received the answer, 
'The scenery was pretty good' one could draw rationally the conclusion that the 
leading lady wasn't. 
The type of rationality, specifically, which lies at the heart of strategic decision-making, 
concerning economic behaviour is contentious. Sen (1982) has pointed out the danger of 
assuming that dishonest behaviour is irrational, by considering the actions of a criminal 
accountant. From an economic point of view such embezzlement would be viewed as 
irrational, but from the accountant's viewpoint, entirely the reverse, particularly if hejudges 
the probability of being caught as vanishingly small. 
Lastly, we should consider the philosophical background to the issue of intuition com- 
pared with deduction, and hence with rationality. Intuition is knowing a conclusion di- 
rectly, from the thing itself, without deduction, immediately and without mediation. In 
this respect it is distinct from knowledge by deduction, whereby the knowledge occurs by 
the application of a chain of reasoning. Generally speaking intuition has been viewed as 
highly suspect by philosophers. One can cite, for example, Frege (1974) as the philoso- 
Pher who has most enthusiastically tried to winnow out the chaff of impure intuition from 
the pure grain of logic. Listen to Frege (1967). 'To prevent anything intuitive from pen- 
etrating h ere unno ticed, I had to bend every effort to keep th e chain of inferen cesfreefrom 
gaps P. 
Locke on the other hand was, like Descartes, a strong supporter of intuition, arguing that a 
Syllogism is actually redundant when the mind can make the leaps of correct argument 
Page 57 
without its encumbering weight. There is, indeed, a practical difficulty here, too, in reject- 
ing intuition: as Locke is reported to have said (Stough, 1993) 'Intuitiveproofs are shorter'. 
It is difficult to conceive of any process of reasoning in practice which did not rely on 
intuitive leaps to a conclusion which is then tested retrospectively by applying purely 
deductive (or inductive) chains of reasoning. We shall see later the effect of this intuitive/ 
deductive interplay in the design of the strategic conflict resolution network method. 
Organizational Limits to Rationality 
Rationality in Organisations 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the concept of rationality within decision making 
in large organisations, since it makes little sense to consider a strategic decision making 
process without at least a vestigial organisation to apply its implementation. It is clear 
from even a superficial examination of the behaviour of individuals that their behaviour is 
changed by being part of a wider structure, and since all human beings (with the possible 
and temporary exception of Robinson Crusoe) are a part of wider structures we can confi- 
dently assert that the separated individual is, like the single magnetic pole, a convenient 
abstraction. Before going on to examine the main models of decision making in organisa- 
tions it should be made clear that the word 'organisation' here is essentially that of the 
industrial organisation, but without specific definition. Close-knit and geographical ly-co- 
herent firms; distributed and loosely-organised companies are all admitted. Equally, the 
exact limits to what is meant by organisations in social terms are deliberately not narrowly 
defined; an organisation could be includedwhich extends even beyond the limits of the 
commercial hegemony of the individual company and into a wider and often more loosely 
defined social structure. Bums (1971b), for example, describes the way in which career 
paths within industries form social structures (loosely organisations) around and beyond 
the formal structure of the firm, in his example, of the BBC. 
The central concepts here, in analyses such as that of Weeks and Whimster (1985), con- 
cern the decision-making context of individuals, in terms of the ways in which organisa- 
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tion and structure set the contexts for rationality. The goals and objectives of individuals 
are at least attenuated or modified by the organisations in which they sit. The means and 
ways are, in the main part, set by the organisation. At its most fundamental level it is the 
organisation which requires that rationality be engaged in requiring that a decision should 
be made. Generally speaking, the requirement upon the individual is apparently to act in a 
strict economic optimising fashion. 'Organisation-man' is the epitome, in terms of his set 
objectives, of the homo economicus so beloved of the economic community, a being so 
limited in his understanding of the world around him, so uncaring of the effects on his 
fellow man that he is limited to maximising his profit in the form of a transferable quantity 
known as utility and usually rendered in translation as profit. 
In the organisation the individual receives the goal, the information and the environment 
in which the decision is to be provided in return to the surrounding organisation. 
Conventional descriptions of organisational rationality (Weeks & Whimster, 1985) distin- 
guish between prograrmned decisions and non-progranuned decisions; the distinction is 
in the degree of discretion allowed. It is primarily with the latter that we are concerned. 
Rationality within the organisation has a retrospective sense different from its generally 
synthetic contribution within the general philosophical framework. Often it is viewed not 
as apath to a decision but asjustification of a decision. Rationality is linked inextricably to 
the process of decision making. Pfeffer (1978) lays out the position clearly. '[It] is gener- 
ally construed to mean choosing that course ofaction which will maximise the chooser's 
expected utility. The concept of utility recognises that outcomes may have different values 
to differentpersons, and the concept of expectation recognises that decisions may he made 
under conditions ofuncertainty. ' It will be seen that this forms a wholly appropriate basis 
for the judgement of utility-based reasoning needed in this present work. 
Bounded Rationality 
One of the clearest views of the role of rationality and decision making in organisations 
comes from HA Simon (1965) who distinguishes between seconornic man', taking his 
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Maximising decisions in an optimal fashion according to his utility function, and 'admin- 
istrative man', operating within an institutional organisation. Economic man operates es- 
sentially in what Simon calls an 'objectively rational' framework, where the originator of 
the decision is required to quantify all the inputs and outputs of the decision process, 
provide a clear definition of the utility to be maximised and the associated costs and pen- 
alties. He has clear preferences, outcomes are scaled and the goals and the means are 
compatible. Little or no account is taken of how the decisions are arrived at or how they 
are implemented. It is man as bureaucratic entity. 
Administrative man, on the other hand, is constructed with the view that any decision 
making process is not to be understood in isolation from the environment in which it 
taking place. The decision maker is part of the organisation. He will certainly also be part 
of the decision and its implementation and will usually be, at least in part, the subject of 
the decision. 
Simon describes this type of rationality as subjective or bounded rationality 'people act 
intentionally rational, hut only limited so'(Simon, 1957). In these circumstances the goal 
becomes not optimality but adequacy, and we see the rise of satisficing (March & Simon, 
1993), where it becomes important to find a satisfactory alternative to optimality. This is 
in stark contrast to the recognised behaviour of economic man. Decision makers are no 
longer assumed to have a measured ordering of outcomes, or even an ordinality. They 
simply adopt a sequential choosing procedure which leads them either to the end of the list 
of perceived alternatives or to the first adequate solution. The process stops as soon as the 
level of aspiration is found (Simon 1955). 
Contingency theory (Perrow, 1974) extends this view. Perrow holds that we must view a 
range of contingent factors which affect the organisation at particular moments. No abso- 
lute model of the decision can be constructed, since this will change from time to time and 
from situation to situation. The connection with the relativist school of philosophy above 
is clear. We shall see later the important influence of Habermas and the post-Marxist phi- 
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losophers on our concepts of behaviour in social systems, which affects not only the de- 
scriptive view of man in organisation as rational being, here, but also the systemic, poten- 
tially normative decision and delivery systems of late- and post-modemist critical systems 
thinking. 
Noorderhaven (1995) gives four types of rationality in surnmarising the literature, namely: - 
Substantive Rationality 
Here the decision maker takes the alternative that is objectively best, having 
concern only for the choice rank ordering of the decision maker. It is assumed 
that information is complete and deductive errors are absent. 
Instrumental Rationality 
The right means are chosen in relation to the end, given the decision maker's 
set of beliefs. No logical errors are assumed, but the decision maker's belief 
space does not necessarily correspond with reality. 
Cognitive Rationality 
All the information available on the environment is deemed to be available, as 
a special case of instrumental rationality. 
Procedural Rationality 
This simply requires that, in the light of the information available, a reason- 
able decision-making procedure is followed. 
Social Science Critiques 
Three types of critique can be applied to the concept of economic versus administrative 
man: a social process critique, a structural power technique and a communicative rational- 
ity technique, and each will lead us to an improved understanding of the limits of man's 
rationality in the organisation. 
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Social Process Critique 
The social process critique takes as its starting point the assertion that individuals within 
organisations belong to groups, and are therefore influenced by the environment set by 
those groups in the widest possible sense. Let us not be confilsed by the appearance of 
organisation charts. These do not define the organisation. Organisations develop subcul- 
tures and sub-organisations with rules and objectives that may align themselves with that 
of the overt organisation only in part and only from time to time. As Weeks and Whimster 
(1985) observe, 'Under these conditions the identification ofunambiguous organisational 
goals becomes a hopeless task'. 
Mintzberg's bleak view of the large US organisation as a machine bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 
1989, pp 334-373) supports the social process critique. He refers specifically to the way in 
which an aggregated rationality descends over an organisation, which squeezes the life out 
of individual rationality. This is a somewhat extreme view of the lack of resilience of the 
members of an organisation, and one which is at variance with the parallel rationality view 
which is favoured here, but it is a valid view in at least some organisations. Mintzberg also 
draws our attention to the irrationality of attempting to achieve rationality in an organisa- 
tion of a machine bureaucratic kind. 
Structural Power Critique 
This concept of the power holders within an organisation observing, and, indeed limiting 
the rationality of the members of an organisation is the essence of the structural power 
critique of rationality. The thesis of proponents of this view, such as Durkheim (1938), is 
that the goals which organisations apparently set themselves to achieve are in fact set, or at 
least highly conditioned by a wider social structure. A good example of this is the Marxist 
view of the organisation, which does not take the limited view that the profit motive of 
firms is sufficient explanation for their behaviour. Finns are viewed as elements within a 
wider social structure of economic, educational and social power within which they are 
buffeted and thrown. The aim of management is to control what is called the 'effort bar- 
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gain'(Baldamus 1961) by which the costs of production are kept low and the output high. 
Clearly such a bargain could only be successfully modelled in a wide social framework 
which would include political power, overall economic power and the educational em- 
powerment loaned to successive generations of production captives by an overarching 
power structure. 
There are less extreme views, however, even within the Marxist ideal. In contrast with the 
account above, which is a paraphrase of Braverman (1974), a view has emerged in the 
1980s (Herman, 1982) which, accepting that the power of production will always prevail, 
recognises that management control is nevertheless exercised through a hegemony, whereby 
the relations of consent and contract between workers and management is the basis for a 
distributed replacement of the iron-bound harness and bit of the essential Marxist concept. 
Shrivastava (1983) indicates that the whole process of orthodox strategic management 
actually constitutes a self-serving self-perpetuating power group part of a community of 
interest which transcends the firm. He draws attention to the microcosm within the firm of 
the power-establishment surrounding the firm. Porter (1980), in his influential analysis of 
company strategy leading to his later work (Porter, 1985) relegates the consideration of 
company profit motives to a footnote, and almost entirely ignores the surrounding pres- 
sures on the firm of regulatory bodies, government and society. 
Rationality then, is once again seen to be a swirl of mist, blown around by the surrounding 
pressures of the social context. The rationality both of individuals and groups within the 
Organisation and of the firm as a whole is a largely unobservable and unmeasurable at- 
tribute, for how are we to measure it? If we are to observe rationality of the firm from 
outside it, how can we detect the extent to which the deductive process is carried out, even 
assuming that individuals in the Organisation are compliant with our own view of the ends 
to be achieved? If from within the Organisation how can we be adequately aware of the 
implicit goals set by the collective of pressures outside the firm, which are uncoordinated 
and incoherent, and which collectively set the requirements for the behaviour of the firm 
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since we ourselves are part of the observed process? It is not sufficient to argue that it is the 
shareholders who will set the agenda, for there are powerful arguments (Freeman, 1984; 
Mitroff, 1983) of the importance of other stakeholders in the firm. The importance of 
competitors, too, as part of the wider power context has not been ignored (Garratt 1995), 
'... it is notpossible toform strategiesfor one's ownfirm untilyou [sic] have taken a view 
on the strategies ofthe competitors, potential competitors and allies'. And having done so 
one must conceive of a reciprocity of capability which will imply that the competitors will 
have done the same analysis for your company mutatis mutandis, and that your strategic 
context is itself now changed since its context has changed. A message for the analysis of 
conflict is the multiple recursion of strategic views. The development of one's own strat- 
egy in turn affects the start point of competitors' strategies, which in turn affects the envi- 
ronment of one's own decisions and so on. 
Communicative Rationality 
The last critique of rationality in organisations is a powerful one, stemming as it does from 
the thinking of Eirgen Habermas (1929- ), the influential German philosopher and soci- 
ologist and part of the Frankfurt School of Marxist social theory. Unlike conventional 
Marxism, the critical theory is highly self-observant, and has engaged itself in an exami- 
nation of the meaning of rationality which has been enthusiastically picked up by the 
social science community (Ulrich, 1983,1987,1988; Oliga 1990; Flood & Jackson, 1991; 
Feunmayor, 1991; Flood, 1991,1990; Jackson, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c; Flood & Oliga, 1991; 
Schechter, 1991). 
Habermas is centrally concerned with rationality, and starts from a point similar to that of 
Weber in sociology. Both their concepts of individual rationality recognise the instrumen- 
tal rationality whereby, by considering alternative means to an end, and by taking into 
account the means to that end, and the secondary results, the relative importance of differ- 
ent ends can be weighed one against the other (Weber, 1968). This is a tall order. Haber- 
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mas (1984) considers such action not to be social. Such myopic behaviour is in a sense 
sociopathic, since it does not recognise the need for the individual to form a part of the 
social order. Moreover, goal seeking of this parochial nature is directly antisocial since of 
essence it requires the individual to use others to his own ends. Habermas' communicative 
rationality requires the group within which the individual sits to reach a common under- 
standing. Individuals act as parts of a group. Now this concept is not limited to the role of 
individuals. Groups who themselves acting under bounded or limited rationality are in 
social intercourse with other groups, and such are required to engage in communicative 
acts to establish a balance of pressures at their level of aggregation, too. Habermas effec- 
tively conceives of four types of rationality or action: teleological or instrumental action, 
where the activity is goal-driven and insensitive to the social context (analogous with 
administrative man), strate(ric, where the social context is recognised, but only so far as to eD 
take into account the rational behaviour of other persons, constative or communicative, 
where mutually acceptable and understood agreements are reached by members of the 
social group and dramaturgical which operates exclusively in the aesthetic sphere (Hab- 
ermas, 1981,1, pp. 331-335). 
This communicative action faithfully reports and accounts for the social mechanisms and 
processes within the group and gives full account of the social power flows within the 
group and outside it (in so far as the group is aware of them). A necessary consequence of 
this is that rationality is no longer the limited concept of Kant and Descartes; it encounters 
the full social processes in a way that are not (some would argue should not) be expressed 
in the poverty-stricken language of syllogism. In any case the application of any syllogism 
is a vain hope - the group will shift its ground in argument, since, being self-referentially 
subject to its own deductions, will include its own mutating interests in the emerging 
rationality. The consequences for rationality in our organisations are stark. Habermas re- 
jects any possibility that communicative action can encompass instrumental action. If in- 
strumental rationality is the characteristic of an organisation, communicative rationality 
cannot survive there. 
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Habermas (198 1,1, pp. 842) gives three criteria for a new rationality- 
1. The proposition can be tested against the objective world. 
2. Its content and the way in which it is said is compliant with the norms of 
the group 
3. The speaker is held to be sincere in his or her communicative regard 
for the group 
Habermas is attempting here to transcend the mere expediency of group compliance with 
action. He is concerned greatly with the ideal that the group as a whole will now hold a 
common view of the world and of its objectives, ways and means. Thus he seeks to estab- 
lish an empirical rationality more real than the parochial definitions he sees earlier in 
philosophical development. 
There are difficulties here, however. First, there is a problem over the extent to which 
communicative rationality represents a stable decision mode. The very self-identity of the 
group engaged may be defective. It may contain members who do not share the same or 
even consistent views of the aim of their activity. Habermas' world seems to contain only 
individuals who are amenable to argument. After all he rejects the role of power as a 
legitimate means of control and persuasion, and unless the majority of individuals comply 
with the objectives, there would seem to be practical problems in initiating movement 
towards a consensus. Second, time is often a limiting factor in decision making, and the 
consensual approach would appear on occasions to be impossible to achieve in a timely 
fashion. Third, the members of an important group may not be accessible or able to be 
communicated with. It might for example be a highly communicative-rational act to dis- 
cuss issues of procurement policy with competitors, partners and customers, but only a 
minority of those will likely wish to participate. 
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Modernism andpost-modernism: lessonsfor conflict analysis 
Management science today sits on the boundary between the deeply positivist Harvard 
Business School 'management by analysis' observed above and the social science per- 
spective which reflects the human organisational issues that surround the implementation 
and indeed the problem-framing phases of strategic response. We need to be aware of the 
social science perspective on these apparently hard-edged strategic issues of conflict be- 
cause of the increasing awareness generated by, among others, Churchman (1979), Ackoff 
(1974,198 1) and Checkland (I 984a, 1984b, 1989,1990) that the dimensionality of the 
problems of response to the needs of a social system is higher than we thought. Prior to the 
soft-systems revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, we could afford to assume that the organi- 
sation has sufficient self-awareness and contact with the surrounding real world to be able 
concisely and accurately to express its desires in a way that could be analysed and imple- 
mented. Now, however, our view is somewhat different, and it has changed not just be- 
cause of the practice of different systems theories, but because theories of system theories, 
too have advanced. In particular the advance of modernism away from the narrow confines 
of positivism has provoked a new wave of rejectionist theories, bleak and cynical in their 
view of knowledge and the possibility of progress, which we call post-modernism. 
Modernism in today's vocabulary upholds the ideas of rationality and the advance of the 
human race towards an asymptotic perfection in themselves and in their social organisa- 
tions. In business terms it would conceive of an organisation which was aware of its objec- 
fives and limited in its ability to achieve those objectives only to the extent that it could 
think its way through the stormy episodes which form the future, accommodate them and 
reach the desired conclusion. Modernism views the world as logical and orderly; we are 
limited in our knowledge of it only by our ineffectiveness as observers. Models of the real 
world can be constructed, tested against the environment and either accepted or modified. 
This essentially logical positivist approach was the dominating paradigm even of the so- 
cial sciences where, however, as Vickers (1983) has observed, 'Human Systems are differ- 
ent'. Language is viewed as the primary and transparent vehicle for human communica- 
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tion, by which real meaning can be transferred from the mind of one human animal to that 
of another. 
Post-modemism in comparison is an anarchic, self-filzzying set of views which tends to 
reject self-definition even, as energy-sapping and irrelevant. It seeks to puncture the self. 
important balloon of certainty inflated by modernism. It denies even that science has any 
access to objective truth, and rejects the progress of history and society towards any uni- 
tary end. Society and the real world are viewed as so complex that the narrow explorations 
of science and the poverty-stricken models it generates are doomed to fall under the weight 
of error, complexity and confused self-induced mutation of the universe. Language is more 
a barrier to communication than a channel; it is not transparent, and, moreover is the field 
on which an arbitrarily large number of 'language-games ' are played, each speech-act 
being observable at any depth by successively more opaque examinations of potential but 
unidentifiable meaning. 
All, however, is not lost, but we do have to be tolerant of newly perceived differences, to 
be aware of the potential parallel rationalities of different speakers and thinkers. Since 
there is no 'meta-theory' to explain the world (Jackson 1991 c) we must learn to live with 
the incommensurable. Post-modernism thrives on the paradoxes inherent in this icono- 
clastic view of parallel realities and extreme philosophical relativism. It rejects the inva- 
lidity of 'truefor me', discussed above, by a crushing certainty that there is no certainty 
and that there is no other truth other than relativist truth. The image is more significant 
than any reality because there is no reality. It has a disturbing tendency to reject any values 
of seriousness and discipline, emphasising superficiality and ephemerality. 
Systemic and critical modernism 
Lyotard (1986) gives a view of two types of observable modernism, namely systemic 
modernism and critical modernism. Systemic modernism is a postwar thesis, generated in 
Parallel with the rise of operations research and the logical positivism of physics. It views 
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social systems, including firms, as mechanical structures, with rules of behaviour which 
can be approached by successively improving models satisfactorily tested in the external 
world. The more work we do the better we can understand the system. The system itself is 
the product of an instrumental rationality which leads to a development of its history and 
progress towards its own defined aim. In particular, it follows its own logic to increase 
what is known as performativity or self-defined efficiency. 'Humanity is dragged in the 
wake ofthe system' (Jackson, 199 1 c). Science is preferred over all other types of learning 
and in turn science and technology become the servants of the system itself. Research 
becomes limited to those activities which increase performativity. Perhaps most serious is 
Lyotard's (op. cit. ) observation that what is implemented becomes what is correct, even to 
the extent of education. 
Critical modernism, on the other hand, is concerned with Lyotard's 'grand narratives', 
whereby society is a part of a great structure with a single collective purpose. There are 
two types of 'grand narratives' which unify the activities of the system. First is the idea 
that there are philosophical totalizations which potentially unify all knowledge. There is a 
search for what the physicists call a TOE, a theory of everything, or its equivalent in other 
sciences. Hegel (1817), for example, develops a theory of universal history of philosophy. 
Second come the ideas that history is a progressive liberation process. Once again the 
theory is that in this, the best possible universe, there is a unifying principle of unitary 
progress. The philosopher whom we have been observing in the previous section, Haber- 
mas, is viewed as the archetype of critical modernism, and we have seen that his ideas are 
even now only beginning to become accepted in the practice of management science, as 
practitioners become aware of the fruitfulness of concepts which rely as much on the 
communicative collective sense of groups as on the ability of the systems modernist prac- 
tice to develop more and more complex models. Habermas can be seen to be a central 
structural element of the critical modernist tradition by observing that his communicative 
action (or rationality) concept assumes that there is a means of communicating and that 
language is an adequate vehicle for the gradual unification of the perspective of interested 
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parties. The post-modernist would strongly deny the existence of such a medium of trans- 
fer of knowledge, and would view Habermas' perspective as nafve, since it relies on the 
thesis that individuals in groups are doing anything more than playing games with their 
utterances. Both the modernist traditions hold the assumption that there is a reality beyond 
the laboratory, the lifeworld of Schutz and Luckmann (Schutz, 1962; Schutz and Luckmann, 
1963; Habermas, 198 1,1, pp. 108,340-343, passim. ) which can be sensed and approached 
by observation and communication. 
Lyotard's great contribution to this debate is the observations he makes surrounding the 
prostitution of system power in- the furtherance of the system itself In business terms, 
without the emotive language, we are dealing with the stakeholder concept (Freeman 1984). 
Different groups within the company have different and not necessarily complementary 
ends. In the analysis of the unenlightened firm using Freeman's approach we recognise in 
the behaviour of the board and senior executives in rejecting the wider interests of the 
stakeholders, the rejection of the type of ideas which Lyotard expresses. In the application 
of stakeholder analysis we see the operation of a wider definition of the community of 
interest. The application of stakeholder analysis in any form which required intercourse 
between the groups identified, as distinct from the merely unitary analysis from within the 
power group of the firm as an externally imposed analysis, would be a clear indication, 
albeit loosely expressed, of the communicative rationality of Habermas. The critical mod- 
emist thesis is at the heart of emergent best business practice. Lyotard, however, has com- 
menced an examination of some of the cracks at the confident foundation of modernist 
theory. 
ne arguments of the post-modernists 
To identify some of the cracks let us take the case of science. The positivist approach to 
science, espoused essentially by both the systemic and critical modernist schools, views 
science as creating models of reality convergent to that reality. It deals with essentially 
stable systems; if there is instability it can be modelled in a higher dimension (sometimes 
Page 70 
literally, sometimes metaphorically) and the understanding achieved at that greater level 
of complexity of view will resolve the instability. Brownian motion, for example, the ar- 
chetypal random process, is rationalised by the application of a model, called a random 
walk model, which explains enough of the attributes of the elements to allow a feeling of 
security that even though we cannot predict the behaviour of an individual dust speck, we 
have an adequate model of the aggregated behaviour of the dust specks. 
Unfortunately, this is now an inadequate view of the behaviour of scientific epistemic 
objects. The work of Schr6dinger and Heisenberg, in particular, have shown that there are 
physical limits to knowledge. The pre-1950s view of science as a knowledge-aggregating 
engine, rolling towards a more perfected view of the universe, is untenable. Such concepts 
as Schr6dinger's representation of the existence of an object at a place as being expressible 
only in probabilistic terms, and Heisenberg's observation that the momentum and mass of 
a particle can only be jointly measured, so that there is a limit to the total knowledge which 
can be obtained, is equivalent to the truths expressed by the social science community 
about their own experimental universe, namely that observation itself causes ripples and 
changes in the observed system. The new physics is concerned directly with those insta- 
bilities, and seeks expressions of the behaviour of systems which are no longer particulate 
(in the sense of applying to particles), but which may of necessity only be expressible as 
emergent properties. 
Next the post-modernists attack the concept, inherent in Habermas' work, that there can 
exist an overarching metalanguage which can provide a means of communicating be- 
tween different interest and perspective groups (Habermas 1981,1, pp. 95-101,397-398, 
II, pp. 259-261). Conformity of any sort in utterances is an embodiment of an imposed 
power structure, and language itself then becomes divisive rather than a catalyst for con- 
vergent behaviour. All we can hope to do is to deconstruct (Foucault 1969; Cooper and 
Burrell, 1989) the language in an attempt to understand not any fundamental meaning, but 
which pseudo meanings, embodiments of the abuse of language by the users, we can de- 
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tect. We can tell which lies are being perpetrated but not detect the truth. The connection 
between this and the conversations (speech-acts or communicative acts) of negotiation 
and competitive manoeuvring is clear and highly relevant for the study of strategic conflict 
in the required social context. 
This anarchic hopeless view of post-modem knowledge-seeking, however, is not without 
its more hopeful aspects. There is, for example a concept ofjustice through the individu- 
al's ability to come from behind the shield of collective responsibility and stand unencum- 
bered in the confiised world. The knowledge that we live in a universe of alternative reali- 
ties is itself a kind of rationality. It makes no sense to behave in a rational way if that 
implies the use of knowledge that we cannot have. The irrationality is not, however, uni- 
versal. We clearly claim to know some things, even if that is that we know nothing. 
Critical Systems 77iinking 
It will now be clear that the two modernist schools of thought (systemic and critical ) have 
spawned a number of methodologies for the examination of systems. The analysis of two 
of these, namely 
I the hard systems approaches of the general engineering discipline and 
the associated OR and mathematical support and 
2. the soft systems methodologies of Checkland and others 
are covered in chapter 3 in a separate survey of their literature, treating them as specific 
potential sources of methodologies, methods and techniques for strategic conflict resolu- 
tion. Here it is only necessary to align the two systems approaches with the relevant philo- 
sophical views and to address an emergent approach to systems which calls itself critical 
systems thinking and which claims to hold the ground won by Habermas and others at the 
boundary between modernism and post-modemism. 
It is best to review briefly the approaches known as 'hard'; and 'soft' systems before 
addressing the critical equivalent. The approach follows Jackson (1991a). 
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As Checkland writes (I 984a), hard systems approaches are ' ... based upon the assump- 
tion that the problem task they tackle is to select an efficient means ofachieving a known 
and defined end. The framing of the problem then allows a quantitative model to be cre- 
ated the aim of which is to include all the relevant aspects of the problem. This model is 
then used as a predictor whose results are then compared in logical positivist fashion with 
the available data in the real world. If necessary adjustments are then made to the model. 
It is clear that this approach is coincident with what we have described above as systemic 
modernism. The rationality of the model is an instrumental one. To the extent that knowl- 
edge is gained it is enclosed within the system representation. It is open to all the criti- 
cisms which have been levelled at systemic modernism by its detractors, including the 
structural power critique, here particularly relevant because of the 'ownership' of the OR 
function in large companies by the senior members. In Noorderhaven's (1995) terms, the 
hard systems approach exhibits instrumental rationality and is the servant of a normative 
rational paradigm. Jackson (1991 a) observes that the modernist approach can be reinter- 
preted with all its criticisms in a post-modemist fashion. Thus the unavailability of objec- 
tives and the frequent failure of the information sources necessary for such an approach 
can be viewed as evidence of a doomed search for order in an irrational and unpredictable 
world. 
There is a particular subset of systemic modernism, exemplified by Beer (1979,1985) and 
Steinbruner (1974) which adopts an essentially cybernetic approach to systems. To a de- 
gree this approach is more flexible than the main line systemic approaches, to the extent 
that Beer's viable system model accommodates changes in the environment which could 
not have been foreseen. Requisite variety is required within the system, and this variety 
then has to be managed. It is quite clear that Beer's work, by his own words is an element 
of the modernist approach. As Jackson points out (ibid. p 295) Beer views his own work 
as generating tool design rather than 'social system design'. Beer's model is open to the 
same criticisms as other systemic modernist approaches, but it is widely criticised, in 
Particular, as being a ready-made controlling mechanism for those in power within an 
Organisation to suppress the generation of new rationalities within the structure. 
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Soft systems thinking 
Soft systems methodology, SSM, is concerned with ill-structured problems. The works of 
Checkland and others (Checkland, 1981,1990; Ackoff, 1974,1981; Churchman, 1979)) 
are well known and a full critique is delayed until chapter 4. It is considered that they 
represent an advanced state of systemic modernism, bordering on the critical modernist 
approach. Both Churchman and Ackoff claim an enlightened objective for the work, even 
to the extent of claiming that it is a method of pursuing the ultimate objective of society. 
Checkland (I 984a), interestingly, sees SSM as a'... formal means ofachieving 'commu- 
nicative competence " in the unrestricted discussion which Habermas seeks. However, the 
examples which Checkland, in particular, cites are almost all of the system modernist 
type. Little is done in practice to ensure the width of conversation which the communica- 
five rationality requires. A particular criticism is that the methodology itself contains no 
requirement to examine the validity of views of reality or of the validity of the objectives 
presented to it. 
Critical Systents Thinking 
During the 1980s the critical system theories of Ulrich (1983) and (Flood, 1990) attempted 
to embrace five characteristics in order to fill the gaps perceived in the SSM approach in 
particular. These five characteristics are 
1. critical awareness: A particular awareness of the assumption and values 
entering into proposals 
2. social awareness: An awareness that here are social pressures which make 
certain methodologies and approaches more acceptable to the existing 
structure than others. 
3. a dedication to human emancipation. 
4. complementarity in use: A commitment to the use of systems method 
ologies in practice 
5. complementarity in development: A commitment to the development 
of systems techniques. 
Page 74 
Critical systems thinking today is viewed as being on the verge of turning itself into a post- 
modemist approach, on the basis that Habermas and Foucault, who stand on opposite 
sides of the modernist/post-modemist chasm, would each view plurality of theories as 
acceptable. The main argument, in fact, is one surrounding the extent to which informa- 
tion follows the power in an organisation (or vice versa) or whether power is applied 
independently of knowledge since there is no accepted basis for knowledge in a post- 
Modernist world. 
It cannot be claimed that critical systems thinking has been extensively applied. The sys- 
tems of systems methodologies applied by Flood and Jackson (Flood, 1990; Flood and 
Jackson, 1991b) in the form of TSI (total systems intervention) is one example, but the 
applications appear at present to be ill-directed. They do not appear to satisfy the inevita- 
ble specific demands of the recipient community for methodologies which satisfy their 
perceived requirement. In spite of critical modernism and post-modernist interpretations 
of the world there are still the payers of pipers and they still call the tune. The message for 
the design of methodologies of strategic conflict resolution and analysis is that a method- 
ology must be acceptable in the culture in which it finds itself being applied. 
Relevance to the present work 
What is seen in the critical modemist/post-modernist dialectic is important in terms of 
management science. If we accept the post-modernist view (and we do not have to), we 
can view the failure of its type of rationality as an opportunity to advance a metarational- 
ity. Observation of the historical perspective at the beginning of this chapter will reveal 
successive enclosures and rejections of different types of rationality. Often when we ac- 
cuse others of behaving irrationally it is because we do not understand (at the instrumental 
rational level) what they are assuming as their ways, means and ends. Once we understand 
that, their irrationality can appear logical and understandable. Such a 'helicopter view' is 
an example, from the point of view of the instrumental rationalist, of a metarationality 
being applied. From the perspective of the observer of rationality, however, it is not a 
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metarationality, but the straightforward application of tests of rationality in compliance 
with a higher dimensioned model. 
In this respect the mobilisation of post-modernist views of knowability are a metarational- 
ity over and beyond that of the two modernist traditions. 
This concept of metarationality will be seen to be central to the structure of the framework 
disclosed later in this work. The post modernist metarationality conception allows for the 
embedding of systemic and critical modernist structures within a self-referential overall 
structure. In so far as we can detect metarationality then the approach is a valid one. In so 
far as it fails to represent metarationality, like any other representation, it will be defective. 
Jackson's (199 1 a) view is as follows. '77iere are four issues raised by post-modernism 
which emergefrom our discussion as having important implicationsfor systems thinking 
and practice. These concern logic and order, progress, power and language. 7he search 
for logic and order and the desire to design well-structured systems seem inherent in hard 
and cybernetic systems thinking, andyet thefeasibility ofachieving these has been radi- 
cally questioned by post-modernism. The pursuit ofprogress has been in terms of the 
performativity of systems ... but this is regarded as a 
dangerous myth bypost-modernists. 
Power, which is central to any post-modernist account of social relations is largely ig- 
nored by hard and cybernetic methodologies and is treated simplistically even in modern 
versions of soft systems thinking. Finally, soft systems thinkers and critical thinkers both 
embrace language as the medium through which understanding, consensus and accom- 
modation become possible. ' The design challenge for a strategic conflict management tool 
is to introduce these metarationalities, and, specifically, the representation of power into 
an approach which will be acceptable to practitioners. 
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Limits to individual rationaliv 
As we have already observed, the primary context for rationality in strategic thought is 
that of the organisation. The organisation instigates decision making and conflict resolu- 
tion through its executive structure, provides the definition of the required end result through 
its observation of the outside environment together with its inherent knowledge of its own 
Objectives, and, lastly, provides the ways and means for its implementation through its 
provision of resources. Hence, in all major respects, it is the organisation which conditions 
Most strongly the decision context. Organisations, however, are composed of individuals, 
and we should make certain observations about the limits of rationality for the individual, 
Particularly so in the case of rationality in the context of strategic conflict analysis, since it 
is often a small group of individuals who govern the critical events. 
Since the decision making of the individual as part of the organisational structure is de- 
Pendent upon the information available, we need to examine the extent to which the indi- 
vidual is in a position to have access to the environment, to the objective and to the ways 
and means of strategy, not just in terms of making good strategic decisions, but also for 
implementing them. Next we need to consider the limits of individuals' cognitive abilities, 
since access to information does not guarantee an efficient evolution of data into knowl- 
edge. Third, the essence of rationality, as we have seen both in our historical development 
Perspective and in our examination of the organisational issues, is deduction, and we shall 
examine the ways in which individual deductive capability can fail. Fourth, we observe 
that there are occasions when rationality is transcended by other modes of behaviour, 
some Of them societal and some of them inherent in the individual. Fifth, we look at those 
circumstances where apparently irrational behaviour is, in fact, the result of limitations 
being placed on the individual by the Organisation failing, deliberately or involuntarily, to 
provide the wherewithal for the decision to be effectively made or implemented. 
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Information failures 
Within the organisation the individual is largely dependent upon information being pushed 
to him, rather than being able to pull information in by pro-active means. Peter Drucker 
(1992) argues for the distribution of mandate, inherency of change and above all for equal- 
ity of knowledge within the organisation, but points out that the prerequisite for such 
efficient decision making structures must be what he calls 'a freedom of organisations 
from policy'. By this he means that the organisation must be free to react to whatever it 
senses on the basis of its collective cognition, rather than having to comply with a prear- 
ranged policy which is made at a time when the policy-maker cannot have been aware of a 
changed situation. This is, however, a doctrine of imperfection, since, additionally, any 
organisation needs to be aware of that overriding vision which stems from its most senior 
executives (Shrivastava, 1983). If the Drucker approach were to be followed, one would 
develop an extreme case of an incremental organisation with little semblance of structure 
or declared purpose. 
Organisations are not perfect at accessing information either on internal or external mat- 
ters. To the extent, for example, that information systems departments continue to present 
data and information to the executives they, in turn, will suffer from a paucity of the knowl- 
edge which is indispensable for action. Weick (1985) and Huff (1985) illustrate the com- 
plexities with which organisations have to cope in presenting knowledge to their constitu- 
ent elements, drawing on the mental map images to show the disparities which can exist 
within organisations. See also McCaskey (1989). If the organisation has no coherent view 
of itself or its environment it is difficult to conceive of a coherent set of strategies emerg- 
ing even from the more responsive and adaptive models of organisation. Similarly Huff 
and Schwenk (in Huff, 1985) indicate that the ability of individual CEOs to sense what is 
relevant in the outside world is, perhaps understandably, highly conditioned by the state of 
the company. In good times they tend to be significantly less responsive than in bad iimes 
to the changing requirements of the environment. 
Colin Eden (1989) in offering the SODA cognitive mapping technique as a means of achiev- 
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ing convergence among the different world views of participants in the strategic process, 
observes the overwhelming inconstancy of views. Each member of the group is viewed 
from the start as having his or her own subjective view of the problem. Similarly Mintz- 
berg (1995) using the model of strategy as 'seeing' stresses the disparity of views which 
inevitably arise in the corporate sensing process. 
All these authorities present a similar view of one aspect of organizational life, namely 
that the flow of information into the ambit of the individuals in an organisation will be 
imperfect in spite of the best (and sometimes the worst) of intentions on the part of the 
heads of the organisation. It must be observed, too that this information flow is often not 
merely failing in its flow from centre to periphery, from top to bottom, but fails too in 
flowing information inwards from informed individuals in contact with the outside world. 
Cognitive failure 
The human mind is one ofthe most effective cognitive systems we know, and yet it fails all 
too frequently to observe accurately the world in which it is immersed. It would be inap- 
propriate here to review the massive literature of behavioural and cognitive science, but a 
few authorities fall on the management science side of the frontier, and these are assessed 
here. 
Perhaps most comprehensive is Bames' study (1984) of the impact of cognitive bias on 
strategic planning. He observes five main areas of bias. 
. Availability People 
judge an event as likely if instances of it can be recalled 
easily and can be easily understood in spite of any evidence that it is fairly 
rare. 
Hindsight : Knowledge of an event's occurrence increases the perception of 
that event's inevitability. We are not surprised about what happened in the 
past. 
Misunderstanding the sampling process: We tend to give too much credence 
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to sparse occurrences of events, and place too much reliance when building 
theories on too few data points. 
Judgements ofcorrelation and causality: We tend too often to attributecauses 
to uncorrelated events 
Representativeness: We fail to ask the question, 'How representative is this of 
the underlying processT 
Barns also observes (op. cit. ) that here is also a common overweighting of the heuristic 
process. If it is based in experience then we tend to believe it to be true. Direct experience 
is unduly weighted in decisions. Managers tend to be very wary of probabilistic measures, 
and seek certainty from advisors where none can exist. Any opinion with an associated 
probability is distrusted, possibly because of a need for the specious certainty of expressed 
knowledge. The comforting illusion of control over an uncontrollable world is a powerful 
one. 
Shrivastava, (1983), Eden (op. cit. ) and Huff (op. cit. ) are all relevant to this complex area 
of study. 
Einstellung Effect 
The satisficing approach to problem solving, where the first feasible solution to be en- 
countered which satisfies the minimal requirement is adopted, can produce fixation and 
stereotyping in the decision maker. The 'Einstellung' effect is where an initially promising 
solution path turns out not to be adequate as the details develop. We then become more and 
more in dissonance with the realities surrounding the choice, but reluctant to give up what 
was a once promising solution. Luchins (1942) has performed a series of experiments on 
the phenomenon, and Cyert & March (1963) observe similar effects. Kaufman (1991) 
gives a more general description of similar fixation processes. 
Functional Fixedness 
Past experience can be a burden in problem solving as well as a benefit. Duncker (1945) 
Shows by simple laboratory experiments that we become locked into the use of objects in 
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particular ways. An example cited by Kauftnan (1991) is the use of pumping engines 
exclusively statically for a hundred years before they were conceived of as being able to 
move themselves. 
Deductive failure 
In spite of our confidence in our deductive abilities there are many examples of its failure. 
There is evidence that in practice our logical abilities are perhaps not quite as sharp as we 
would believe. 
Perhaps the most worrying aspect of recent research into rationality is the experimental 
work reported (Nisbett & Borgida, 1975) on the behaviour of subjects when presented 
with logical problems of a simple nature. The work shows clear evidence of human deduc- 
five failure even when the syllogisms required are essentially simple. 
Intuition, as has already been discussed, need not be viewed as deductive failure, and there 
is an extensive literature (de Bono, 1969; Brunsson, 1982; Blackburn, 1983; Pondy, 1983; 
Shrivastava, 1983) which advocated a more relaxed acceptance of intuitive thinking, sup- 
porting the view that intuitive thinking is frequently more speedy, creative and less likely 
to be trapped in a suboptimal state because of its gestalt leaps of attention around a larger 
solution space than is generally accepted in linear thinking. Agar (199 1) also discusses the 
use and acceptability of intuition among top executives. 
Transcendence of rationality 
Human beings are known deliberately to act irrationally (or at least as judged so by ob- 
servers) because of obedience to a higher ideal than that expressed in the goals of the 
rationality being addressed. An identification with the social ideals of critical modernist 
and beyond, for example would be viewed as irrationality in the view of the instrumentally 
rational systemic modernist school. We see here an example of the inclusion of irrational- 
ity within a perception of rationality at a higher level, what has previously been called 
trietarationality. Binmore (1994), in his extensive work on game theory applied to social 
situations makes this inclusion process a main part of his comprehensive argument draw- 
ing on the views of Rawls' Yheory ofJustice (1972) and of Rousseau (1913). He notes, 
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with regard to the social economic philosopher Sen (1987), '1 agree with Sen that an 
individual who acts only in his own narrowly conceived sey-, interest would often he he- 
havingfoolishly. 'Sen refers to these people as 'rational fools', and we should bear in mind 
when wejudge rationality, both in individuals and in groups, that it is always possible that 
the irrationality we see is in fact the rationality of a higher ideal. Brams (1980) goes even 
further, in applying a metarationality using simple game theory to a number of encounters 
between individuals and their god, for example Abraham in the Old Testament. By clever 
inclusion of the goals of the participants in wider and wider rationalities he explains ap- 
parent paradoxes in their behaviour. Colman, (1982, pp. 254 -269) reports a wide set of 
applications of game theory to social situations, including a treatment of the social con- 
tract and its connections with strategy. 
Emotion, too, is a kind of transcendence of rationality, and Howard (1971,1993,1997a, b) 
and Fraser & Hipel (1984) cover extensively the application of game theory to the emo- 
tional content of situations (also Bennett, 1986). Reputation effects are adequately cov- 
ered in the economics literature, particularly in Fudenberg and Tirole (1993). 
A third variety of transcendent behaviour is that of allegiance to a wider group than is 
recognised by those who are judging rationality. Olson (197 1) shows us the immense 
effect which collective action and objectives have on the rationality of the participants. 
Price maximising firms, for example, in a perfectly competitive industry will act against 
their interests as a group. The result is a rationality which at the individual firm level is 
valid, but at the group or industry level is invalid. Macdonald, too (1975) gives a number 
of striking case studies in which the perception of the decision makers is constrained 
either by power exerted within the organisation or from outside. 
Axelrod's (1980,1995) work, together with that of Rapoport (1965) deals with the effects 
of reputation, loyalty and other socially derived attributes in stylised contexts, including a 
computerised 'world' in which the Prisoners' Dilemma game is played. The behaviour of 
individuals in supporting groups of like others is found not to be at all inconsistent with a 
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good return from the interactions, but there are significant difficulties when external preda- 
tors enter a stable society. Axelrod's later work (Axelrod 1995) discusses the ways in 
which behaviour can be made to emerge by an evolutionary process in such a computer- 
ised model of society. 
Force Majeur 
A brief observation in support of the structural power technique is appropriate here to 
view the effects of constraining power within the organisation from the point of view of 
the individual within it. Nigel Howard (197 1) gives a surprising insight, 'We suggest that 
among socioeconomic theories, Marxism theory, for example, failed at least partly be- 
cause certain ruling class members, when they became aware ofthe theory, acted so as to 
disobey it. ' 
Power in the organization can be exercised at any level of the rational model: of choosing 
between means to a declared end. The objectives can be dictated, the means themselves 
denied or made available, the criteria for judging acceptable styles of solutions and in 
some cases the deductive processes themselves can be shaped. 
Rationality in Game Theory 
I 
Rationality Concepts in Game Theory 
In its attempts to discover and impose structure upon the decision making of the partici- 
pants in conflict, game theory is, of essence, concerned with the rationality of those par- 
ticipants. Right from the very start of its development, from von Neumann and Morgen- 
stem's (1944) original work, the debate about rationality of decisions, the paradoxes which 
surround the behaviour of players and the types of equilibriums which surround them has 
raged unabated. We will see that there are significant weaknesses in the foundations of the 
theory which militate against the appearance of a theory of rationality which complies 
with wider human experience. This is not, of course, such a terrible criticism of the sub- 
ject, any more than the observation that Newton's model of the universe is a poor one 
compared with that of Einstein. 
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In this section we shall discuss the definitions of utility on which rational choices are 
supposed to be based in game theory and examine their shortcomings. Next, we observe 
that game theory, and indeed most of economics, relies on the concept of the rational man 
to explain or model the behaviour of human beings operating under requirements of choice, 
and we observe the assumptions made about the nature of those choices and connect it to 
the concept of instrumental rationality discussed in a previous section. 
Rationality is connected in game theory to the concept of equilibrium, in the sense that it 
is the purpose of game theory to find choice-sets for the players which reflect a supposed 
rationality for each one so that if there exists a solution in any sense, all the players are 
satisfied that they have done the best they could under the circumstances. 
The work of Bacharach (1993) in discussing the effect of different belief-spaces of players 
is examined, since it bears upon the expanded definition of rationality discussed above. 
Lastly some general observations on the relevance of the strict approach to rationality in 
garne theory are made. 
Utility 
In standard economic theory the individual is supposed to act so as to maximise his pref- 
erences between outcomes in an ordinal way, expressed by utility cardinals. Generally 
speaking we can conceive only of utilities which are transitive, in the sense that if A is 
preferred overB and B is preferred over C, then A is pref6rred to C This is not always true. 
One of the most important contributions of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) was to 
allow the translation of this ordinal concept of utility in to a cardinal version, where a 
variable is established by which the degree of preference can be expressed. We can now 
speak of outcome A being twice as good as outcome B. Next we have to admit of a utility 
which is averaged over outcomes whose arrival is not certain, so that we have an expecta- 
tion of utility. The essential normalising concept here is that of equivalent lotteries, where 
a subject can be asked questions which determine his indifference function between un- 
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certain outcomes. Theory then states that the utilities follow from the indifference func- 
tions. 
There are considerable problems with these concepts. Hirschleifer aný Riley (1992), for 
example, illustrate three paradoxes where subjects fail under laboratory conditions to dis- 
tinguish the correct utility maximising choice, for example between bets in a lottery. The 
Allais paradox (Allais, 1953) gives similar results. 
Some authorities reject the expected utility assumptions of the economists on this basis, 
arguing that the human mind does not operate in the instrumental way which they assert. 
Others, including Hirschleifer and Riley (1992), argue that we are simply seeing particular 
failures of the human ability to calculate probabilities. This seems to smack of sophistry, 
since, whatever the reason for the behaviour there are at least some cases where the indi- 
vidual does not behave according to the estimated utility rules, and we must therefore in 
practice assume at least some situations where irrationality (in the sense of compliance 
with expected utility assumptions) will appear. 
Gauthier (1986) refers to the market as 'a moral-free zone', implying that the rationality of 
the market is an optimising process involving the ordering of options on the basis of ordi- 
nal or cardinal utilities. This is not a very sophisticated way of accounting for human 
behaviour. In particular it does not generally account for the fact that our views of utility, 
if we have such and if we are that self-observant, tend to alter as we go through a sequence 
of occurrences. Although there have been attempts made to model sequential series of 
games (Rapoport 1965b, 1967; Snyder & Diesing 1971) where the outcomes of games 
lead into the next, the utilities of the games are fixed from time to time. Real life is differ- 
Cnt, however, since the information on the utilities of the players is not available necessar- 
ilY to all; it is not necessarily available to the individual player himself, and is not neces- 
sarily constant from time to time. 
There would appear to be two views why the rationality of players in actual games should 
depart from the rationality of the equilibrium solutions calculated (Camerer, Johnson, 
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Rymon & Sen 1993), namely fairness considerations and learning. Often players of games 
who are in a position to dictate extremes of return to the other player, do not in fact do so, 
but 'let him off the hook' and offer a position actually less advantageous to themselves. 
Second, there is evidence (Binmore, Shaked & Sutton, 1985; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1993 
pp 145 - 203) that learning takes place during a game which rationalises the behaviour of 
players into a style more consistent with the game theory prediction. The latter case could 
be viewed as indoctrination of the subjects to comply with the expected basis of behav- 
iour, namely game theory's expectations. 
Rationality and Equilibriums 
Ile embodiment of this rationality in game theory is the equilibrium. An equilibrium 
position is a set of choices made by each participant which results in a set of outcomes for 
each which is consistent with the choices each could have made and the assumption that 
each will act so as to improve his utility by the maximum amount. Thus we expect players 
to behave so as to reject choices which either directly or indirectly will result in things not 
turning out as well for them as they could have achieved. We also expect them to use 
whatever information is available to them in order to bring about these decisions, so that 
all information relevant and available is incorporated into the decision, either in terms of 
choices available, outcomes or other players' intents, outcomes or options. 
The most commonly discussed equilibrium is that of Nash which is distinguished by its 
being rational for all the players in a N-player game. Specifically, there is no outcome to 
which any player can move by his own freedom of choice alone, which would improve his 
position. The concept often fails because of a plethora of solutions. 
In conflict analysis terms, an extension of the Nash equilibrium is given in Fraser & Hipel 
(1984, pp 240 - 246) in the following broad terms. Firstly, outcomes are categorised ac- 
cording to the following exhaustive list: - 
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Rational Outcomes 
Here a player cannot move to an adjacent tactical position unilaterally (i. e. 
through his own freedom of choice alone) which has a more advantageous 
outcome for him. Given the choice between staying at the present state or 
moving to a less advantageous position, the player acts rationally by staying 
where he is. 
Sequentially stable positions 
There may be positions to which a players can move immediately from which 
another player can induce a movement to a position which is more advanta. 
geous to the second player and which would result in a less preferred position 
for the first. In other words the first player could obtain a merely transitory 
improvement which could be denied him (unilaterally) by another player. Note 
that in order for any homogeneous rationality to apply the second player must 
be acting in a way so as to increase his own utility, otherwise the sanction (as 
it is known) would not be credible. 
Simultaneously stable positions 
Here we present the first player with a choice between the outcome of the 
present state or moving to another state where, acting alone or in consort with 
other players, another participant by moving simultaneously, can improve his 
own position. 
Unstahle positions 
Here the player has a position to move to which improves his outcome without 
any other player being able to counter it. Again, the sense in which no sanction 
is available to the second player, is that he can only move to a situation which 
decreases the first player's utility by decreasing his own utility. Thus he must 
act according to a rule of rationality. 
One of the interesting aspects of the Fraser & Hipel approach (and indeed of Howard's 
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(1971) work) is that transitivity is not required. It is entirely possible to achieve stable 
results in the sense described above while having a circular relation between any player's 
valuation of outcomes of situations. 
We must also cover here some adjacent equilibrium concepts which may be important in a 
theory of rationality for strategic conflict. These are non-myopic equilibriums, Stackel- 
berg equilibriums and Pareto optimality. 
Non-myopic equilihrium 
This is the result of work by Brams and Wittman (198 1) (Brams, 1985, pp. 66 
- 74) who envisage an equilibrium concept based on the idea that with suffi- 
cient knowledge of the outcome of a complex sequential game players can act 
so as to avoid chains of play which lead to an outcome which is eventually 
discovered to be less advantageous. This sounds very simple, but it has a number 
of weaknesses. First, Brams and Wittman have to date only encompassed a 
small number of steps while some sequential games may in practice be played 
a significantly larger number of steps. More critical is the problem that in 
some games no equilibrium in this sense can be found. 
Stackelherg equilihHum 
Here the first player makes his choice by optimising his position with due 
account of the second player playing after him, whereas the second player 
plays in full knowledge of what the first has done. 
Pareto Optimality 
The Pareto optimum is achieved when there is no other outcome at all which is 
preferred by any other player. The concept ignores the path which may be 
necessary for an outcome to be achieved. 
It should be noted that these concepts of conflict equilibriums are similar to those of Howard 
(1971) and are explained in Fraser & Hipel (ibid. pp. 214 - 216) 
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Knowledge 
Although the literature on the effect of knowledge in game theory, particularly in the eco- 
nomic field is extensive, it is not proposed to review it as such. Rasmusen's (1989) treat- 
ment is exhaustive. 
The important and new work by Bacharach (1993), however, deserves particular attention. 
Bacharach concerns himself with the question of rationality under conditions where the 
extents of knowledge of the participants is different in a cooperative situation. He cites 
two games, one, the well known Rendezvous game where cooperating players have to 
agree with no knowledge or communication on a place to meet in a city, and Blockmarking, 
a more artificial situation where coloured blocks are marked independently by the two 
players without mutual knowledge. If the same block is marked by both, they both win. 
The essence of Bacharach's approach is that each player has to make assumptions about 
the knowledge possessed by the other. Moreover, he must not assume that the other has 
more knowledge of his own belief-space than the other actually has, because in the Ren- 
dezvous game assuming that the other player thinks you have less knowledge of the city in 
question is at least as bad as overestimating knowledge. 
The result of Bacharach's work is that we have the beginnings of a theory of disjoined 
information which will bear greatly on the concepts of rationality and the method of rep- 
resentation to be applied in the approach of the present work, of which the essence is the 
differing views of the participants of the field of play and the implicit utilities of the par- 
ticipants. 
Lastly Hammond (in Binmore, 1993) draws our attention to the requirement that the Nash 
and other equilibriums require there to be a common expectation, i. e. that there needs to be 
a conunon joint probability function over all players' strategy choices. 
Summary - rationality in Game Theory 
A number of conclusions can be drawn and some observations made on the nature of 
rationality in game theory and the relevance to the present approach. 
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First, at the level of the economic games rationality is inextricably rooted in the instru- 
mental rationality of homo economicus and systemic modernism. There is little prospect 
of applying these models outside a limited domain of sub-problems. Within these sub- 
problems, however, the rationality applied is entirely appropriate. It requires a common 
view of outcomes and, generally speaking, the structure of the game is held as common 
knowledge by the players. 
At a strategic representation level, however, that difficulties are encountered. On occasion 
we will meet behaviour on the part of the other participants which appears irrational, and 
we must be aware of the sources of this. It is most likely to stem from a disjunction of view 
among the participants. This could stem from the outcomes, the definition of the game 
structure or the tactical choice made within that structure. We can hold on to the concept of 
rationality as the bounded rationality of imperfect knowledge, while attempting to draw 
conclusions from the behaviour and, indeed the communications of the other participants 
in order to reconstruct their belief-space. The concept of rationality, then, is subsumed 
under a wider model of reasonable behaviour which encompasses the idea that the other 
players may not see the world as we do. Similarly we may not view the world as they do. 
Third, when the idea of a dynamically changing game is added, there is another layer of 
rationality to absorb. In a static view of conflict, there exists the luxury of an essentially 
static universe upon which the participants are seeking to converge, and a critical modem- 
ist view can be maintained - that by observation of the speech-acts of the others we can 
achieve a greater understanding of the 'real world'. In a dynamic conception, however, the 
possibility exists that there may be a large number of entirely reasonable parallel real 
worlds, all conceived of by different players, and all constructed on the basis that in each 
transaction between the players, new concepts of reality will be created. These will result, 
for example, in fresh appraisals of 
relative weightings of outcomes 
desirability of outcomes 
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availability of tactical choices 
other players' utility choices and tactical options. 
This represents a new and challenging rationality in game theory terms, parallel in many 
respects with the post-modemist concept of alternative realities which must be reconciled 
with a practical need for a solution method. 
Criteria for strategic conflict decision support 
While the main conclusions drawn from this section regarding the required attributes of a 
strategic conflict decision analysis tool are withheld until they can be put into the context 
of the material of chapter 3, some preliminary observations are appropriate here. 
It is observed that the critique of the anti-relativist position leads to the conclusion that at 
least at the higher levels of representation (i. e. at the more strategic and global level of any 
hierarchy of models), the methodology should take account of the discontinuities between 
the world-views of participants. It must be accepted that different participants in the strug- 
gle will have different views not only of their objectives, but also of what the very nature 
of the struggle is. In Habermas's (1984) terms we observe differently a single lifeworld 
which is fundamentally inaccessible to each of us. Our subjective worlds are necessarily 
different and we can have no common access to the underlying lifeworld. Communicative 
acts can bring us closer to a common view, but never to an identical one. Thus we observe 
that any satisfactory model of strategic conflict (or indeed of any social structure) must 
have the capacity to comprehend conflicting alternative views of the structure under ex- 
amination. 
Regarding the interference of human beings in the process, it is observed from the discus- 
sion so far that the arbitrary nature of human motivation must become an appropriate part 
of the structure of the conflict. The representation of conflict should be anthropic, in the 
sense that the human beings become part of the decision process rather than external to its 
representation. 
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Lastly, at this stage, one would observe that an intuitive/deductive approach to the conflict 
resolution is likely to be more effective than any appeal to a strict logical positivist ap- 
proach. 
Other conclusions are dealt with in chapter 4 where a full list of the main requirements of 
a decision support methodology resulting from this appraisal of rationality and knowledge 
in the strategic process are laid out. The above extended examination of the problem of 
strategic conflict management and the underlying characteristics of its process lead us to 
certain observations on the characteristics which are necessary appropriate or simple de- 
sirable for any technique which is aimed at supporting decision making in conditions of 
strategic conflict. These criteria of goodness derived here will be used later in the work as 
a benchmark for the appropriateness of an overall framework (called the foveal game 
approach) and for a particular embodiment of that framework which is trialled in practice. 
Requirements derivingfrom the characteristics ofstrategic decision making 
Certain key points emerged from the discussion above of the process of strategic decision 
making itself These points are integrated in Table 4 below, which correlates them with the 
sources from which they are derived. 
First, decisions are necessarily made in an environment of uncertainty and decep- 
tion. Data is essentially limited because of lacunae in the present scene, because of the 
delay factor between present action and future results (the prediction problem) and be- 
cause of defects and errors caused in the perceived scene either through self-induced er- 
rors in sense making or because of deceptive action on the part of the other participants. It 
should thus be acceptant offintited, or indeed deceitful data, and should ideally, be capa- 
ble Of improving that data, through additional structuring, for example. 
Second, there is a strong connection between different layers of decision making in 
Organisations. Both the synoptic school and the incremental school are bound in their 
strategic product by the realities of the situation, so that even in the most extreme synoptic 
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approach, the CEO as strategist will be governed by expressions of practical feasibility 
generated by the body of then organisation. Similarly the logical incrementalist organisa. 
tion, generating its emergent strategy throughout its structure is nevertheless constrained 
and mandated by strategic statements emerging, if not from a synoptic head, at least from 
the collective view of what the strategic focus of the organisation is or should be. In other 
words the synoptic school declares strategy and is constrained by feasibility, and the logi- 
cal incrementalist school declares feasibility or operational desirability and is constrained 
by process and objective values which are emergent properties, but which are nevertheless 
very real in their effects. There is thus strong connection between lower (more operational 
levels) of decision making and the strategic levels. The process should thus be capahle of 
depth changing between levels of decision making in an organisation. 
Third, strategy by its very importance is a process highly integrating in its effect, in 
the sense that the ripples of a strategic decision made in one participant's organisation will 
be felt in the board rooms or cabinets of other participants. Strategy is a high energy 
system, in physics terms. It is highly connected. The existence of the large body of eco- 
nomic game theory models of behaviour supports this, in that the base assumptions of 
such an approach takes for granted that the players' actions are going to affect the percep- 
tions or achievements of others. Because of this and because of the relatively long term 
nature of strategic behaviour, we can observe that teleological behaviour alone is inappro- 
priate, since by the time we have reached the vicinity of the objective which we declared at 
the time of the strategic decision, other participants' actions and the vagaries of the strate- 
gic environment may well have rendered our achievement of that particular objective no 
longer relevant. We therefore need a strategic decision making tool which is sensitive to 
the changes in objective which may take place while our strategies are being implemented. 
Table 2 above, from Rosenhead (1989b, p 12), can be seen to reflect these emergent re- 
quirements, particularly in respect of the need for an ateleological behaviour and the need 
to Mobilise a wide range if input data types, specifically both hard and soft data. Other 
SiTnilarities will emerge below. 
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Requirements derivingfrom rationality considerations 
The rationality considerations above lead us similarly to a number of clear conclusions 
regarding the desirable characteristics we should seek in a support methodology. Again 
these are summansed, together with their derivations, in Table 4 below. 
First, we note that rationality, both as something we expect in ourselves and something 
which we seek in others is essentially a human trait. It is subject to the vagaries of human 
will in terms of its objectives and process judgements. Often wejudge the behaviour of a 
competitor as irrational because we have no view of her belief space, particularly with 
regard to the weightings she places on various outcomes. We need the process to be an- 
thropic, in the sense that it recognises that the strategic decision making is run by and for 
human beings, with all their arbitrqriness and unpredictability, In particular, we note that 
the representation of other parties in the decision support methodology needs to reflect 
that they may not be perceived to be behaving rationally, but their actions and utilities 
nevertheless need to be represented. This ability to represent arbitrary apparently irra- 
tional positions is strengthened by the observations above on the nature and causes of 
rationality failure on the part of the individual. In the vocabulary of the previous part of 
this chapter, the process should be anthropic, recognising the pre-eminence of the human 
beings as part of the system in focus. 
Second, thejudgement of what constitutes a valid contribution to rational decision making 
needs to be perceived as being syllogistic, correct in reasoning. In order for that to be seen 
to be so, therefore, any decision support method must be auditahle, transparent in Rosen- 
head's sense, so that it can be checked for correctness of structure. A structural power 
critique of this requirement, however, places suspicion on such an unbiased need; the 
requirement for transparency may simply be placed by the ruling power group in the or- 
ganisation in order to detect interference by another. 
Third, the resultant epistemic position of the rationality discussion above is essentially 
relativist. The communicative rationality views of Habermas (198 1), who, in building upon 
the essential relativist position of Schutz and Luckmann (1963) becomes himself a relativ- 
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ist, appearing to provide an appropriate compromise between those who fail to apply a 
scientific method to management research because it is unable to be applied, and those 
who fail to provide any conclusions because they adopt the ultimate relativism and equally 
ultimate sterility of the post-modernist position. The conclusion for the strategic conflict 
resolution toolset is that we must be able to take into account arbitrarily differing belief 
spaces (Bacharach, 1993) in order to accommodate the essential relativism of the strategic 
decision world. 
Fourth, the requirement emerging above for auditability or transparency is supported by 
the examination of rationalism in the context of knowledge, as part of the 'justified' ele- 
ment identified there in the shibboleth, 'justified true belief'. 
Fifth, the work of Flood (1990) and of Ulrich (1983) is represented in this set of require- 
ments by accepting their set of five characteristics quoted above (page 62). In particular it 
is accepted that a critical awareness of assumptions and values (characteristic 1, above) 
and the two complementarity requirements (characteristics 4 and 5) add specifically to the 
requirements declared here, whereas the remaining characteristics are already subsumed 
in previously derived criteria of goodness. One of Flood's characteristics (number 3, a 
dedication to human emancipation) is rejected. Flood's critical system thinking was di- 
rected towards conventional social systems, and whereas one would seek to espouse some 
greater meta-economic aim for corporate-based struggles in particular, one must accept 
that the universe of action and discourse of the strategic struggle is more limited than that 
of the original domain of Flood's design. Emerging from Flood's design, then are the 
following criteria: the method should be based on thepower ofparticipants to direct the 
conflict; it should be sensitive to the social context, it should be complementary to exist- 
ing systents methods; it should be adaptive. Other requirements identified here are also 
supported in a more general sense by Flood's work. 
Sixth, Jackson's related observations on the importance of the structural power critique 
power, which is central... is largely ignored... and is treated simplistically ) (Jackson, 
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1991b) form the basis for a view of strategic struggle which is essentially a power analy- 
sis. Motivation, power and structure would appear to be the three central elements re- 
quired if the support methodology is accurately to represent the need implicit in the late 
modernist/post-modemist dialectic. 
Seventh, the examination of rationality of equilibriums in game theory indicates that the 
conventional equilibrium definitions are unsustainable in the light of the emergent charac- 
teristics, notably because of their requirement for perceived rational behaviour on the part 
of the participants. The requirement, here, then, is more negative in nature, in that it is not 
deemed essential to adopt the conventionalgame theoretic definitions of equilibrium. 
Summary of requirementsfor a strategic conflict decision making support method 
The requirements implied and derived above can be summarised in the following thirteen 
features which appear in Table 4 together with the specific authorities from which each 
requirement derives. Each feature noted here derives from a number of points emerging 
from the previous sections. 
1) The method should be based on the power, motivation and potential of participants 
to control and direct the conflict. 
2) It should not be bound by conventional game theoretic views of what constitutes 
equilibrium. 
3) It should be acceptant of differing belief spaces on the part of participants as regard 
rationality, objective, structure and intent. 
4) It should not be end-directed (teleological) in the sense that as a situation develops 
it should not require that the original aim point should be maintained necessarily. In 
other words it should be adaptive to changing circumstances. 
5) It should be acceptant of limited, defective and deceitful data. 
6) The method should be data improving, using newly perceived structures in the 
conflict model to provide new insight into data. 
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Summary of requirements for a strategic conflict resolution method 
Relevantpage of Source references 
ihis work 
Intemalprocess 
Based on power, motivation and potential 62-66,95 Ulrich (1983) 
Flood (1990) 
Jackson (1991 ab) 
Churchman (1979) 
Ackoff (1974,1981) 
Not bound by game theoretic definitions 86-91,95 Howard (1971) 
of equilibrium Fraser and Hipel (1984) 
Axelrod (1980,1995) 
Depth changing 28-29,33,94 Rosenhead (1989 - criterion 5) 
Marsh (1995) 
Data-improving 32-36,92 Rosenhead (1989 - criterion 6) 
Rittel (1973) 
Noorderhaven (1995) 
Simple, auditable and transparent 
1 
28-29,33 1 Rosenhead (1989 -criterion 3) 
Differing belief spaces 32,33,64-76,92 1 Rose md (1989- criterion 6) 
Bachftch (1993) 
eac 
Checkland (1981) 
Quine (1960) 
Mintzberg (1995) 
Eden(1989) 
Habennas (1984) 
Acceptant of limited, deceitful and 28,32-33,77-89, Rosenhead (19889- criterion 6) 
defective data 
192.95 
Eden(1989) 
Using hard and soft data sources 32-33,72,73,92 1 Rosenhead (1989 -criterion 2) 
Checkland (1981,1984a) 
Jackson (1991 a) 
Contextual 
Adaptive (ateleological) 29-32,95 Rosenhead(1989 - criteria I and 6) 1 
Checkland (1981) 
System-centred vis-bL-vis self-centred 72-74,93 Checkland (198 1) 
Garratt (1995) 
Habermas (198 1,1, pp 842) 
Jackson (1991c) 
Anthropic 3240,43-61,67- Rosenhead (1989- criterion 4) 
70,94,95 Howard (1971) 
Olson (1971) 
Habemias (1981,1, pp 8-42) 
Vickers (1983) 
Aware of social context of intervention 74-76,95 Ulrich (1983) 
Flood (1990) 
Olson (1971) 
Complementary to and contributory to 74-76,95 Ulrich (1983) 
Systems methods I Flood (l 990) 
Table 4: Criteria for Appraisal 
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7) It should be anthropic, in the sense that it will accept the human elements of the 
struggle with their vagaries and apparent irrational ities. 
It should exhibit a depth-changing ability between tactical and strategic levels of 
decision making. 
9) It should be sYstem-centred, in opposition to self-centred. In other words, it should 
not view the struggle exclusively from the viewpoint of one party. 
10 It should cope with both hard and soft data sources 
11) It should be simple, auditable and transparent 
12) It should be aware of the social context in which it operates and should be aware that 
its acceptability is itself a social phenomenon 
13) It should be complementary with and contribute to the development of existing sys- 
tems methods. 
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Chapter 3: Existing approaches and their 
shortcomings 
Introduction 
Conflict, as has been seen, lies at the heart of much of human endeavour and interaction, 
and as such has engaged many intellects. Some, as in the case of game theory or conventional 
conflict analysis in the general sense, have conflict as their main and central focus, while 
others approach conflict indirectly, having, as their subject, a more general interest of 
which conflict is often a part, but which is seen as a somewhat tiresome additional factor 
in an already complex problem situation. A number of management techniques fall into 
this latter category. 
In this chapter these bodies of knowledge will be reviewed within the context of the problem 
defined above. The extensive literature is divided into the following parts: - 
1) General conflict resolution methods, stemming from the international relations 
literature and which is characterised by a generic approach, strong on description 
and taxonomy, but necessarily weaker in the normative and specific features 
required of a specific strategic conflict management technique. 
2) Game theory, originating with the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944) and extensively and enthusiastically adopted by the economics community 
as a numerical basis for the study of behaviour of groups and individuals under 
conditions of conflict of interest, measured by economic utility. 
3) General system approaches to problem description and solution exemplified 
by the soft systems approach of Checkland (1989) and others. These approaches 
tend to be general in their applicability but less strong in determining the detailed 
descriptions and normative action planning product required by a strategic conflict 
resolution method. 
4) Specific conflict analYsis methods and, in particular, the work of Howard 
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(1971) and Fraser and Hipel (1984). 
From a study of these four areas emerge not only a critique of their shortcomings, but, 
more positively, an understanding of the different styles of contribution of each, from 
which a framework for strategic conflict resolution will emerge in Section IV. 
Conflict resolution - the international relations approach 
Differences of objective 
The literature of the international relations (IR) community can be neatly divided into that 
dealing with the resolution of conflict and that dealing with its description. Both have as 
an underlying assumption the desire to remove conflict, to resolve it. As Chestnut (1986, p 
ix) explains, IR seeks 'to identijy conflicts in their early stages and to develop and establish 
more effective means of conflict resolution as a way ofresolving and settling international 
disputes'. The IR agenda is '... to develop more acceptable and less destructive ways of 
resolving international conflicts than the current military methods of solution'. A non- 
European view is that '[t1he objective in a proper conflict resolution should be either to 
prevent such a situation [conflict] or to see that such an attempt by one ofthe parties does 
not affect political, economic and cultural viabilities of the other party. ' Murthy and Pai, 
(1986, p73) Azar and Burton (1986, p86) are clear on the objective of the process. 
'Resolution in this sense means that a new set of relationships will eventually emerge 
which are sey-sustaining and not dependentfor their observance upon outside coercion 
or thirdparties. ' 
Conflict itself is defined, too, in a somewhat restricted fashion. Conflict consists of 'phases 
of initiation, escalation, controlled maintenance abatement and terminationlresolution. ' 
(Sandole and van der Merwe, 1993, p6) Conflict involves 'at least two actors.. [who] 
Pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatible goals by physically damaging or 
destroying theproperty and high-value symbols of one another,, andlorpsychologically or 
Physically injuring, destroying, or otherwiseforcibly eliminating one another'(Sandole, 
1980) 
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In commercial conflict many similarities with these two sets of definitions exist, but there 
are a number of important differences. Firstly, the nature of the conflict in commerce is 
different. Firms are not concerned with the physical destruction of a competitor's assets, 
but (merely? ) with the maximization of their own benefit (Johnson and Scholes, 1997; 
Bowman and Faulkner, 1997 passim). Generally, the methods used are not the same as 
those assumed by Sandole (op. cit. ) and others (Mitchell, 1981; Mack, 1965; Boulding, 
1962; Schelling, 1960); rarely do we find companies engaged in the type of direct action 
assumed by IR practitioners. There are, however, sufficient similarities at the fundamental 
level such that seeking assistance in the IR domain is notprimafacie useless in the analysis 
of commercial conflicts. Secondly, there is a fundamental difference between the very 
objectives of the interested parties in international disputes and in the pursuit of business 
aims. The role of international relations is to resolve conflict. The role of industrial strategic 
analysis is to resolve conflict in the favour of the client. In other words, the position of the 
firm in strategic conflict is analogous to that of the interested party, the individual country, 
in the IR problem. There is little or no recourse in the industrial case to the apparently 
independent position of the third party in the IR problem. Of course, this position of 
independence is of itself interested, albeit in a different timescale and for ostensibly 
universally beneflcial ends, but it is, nevertheless, an interested position, even if it is to 
ensure that the resolution of the conflict is aligned with some pre-dcfined criteria of 
acceptability to the constituency of the international arbitrating/mediating third party. 
The difference between conflict resolution and conflict analysis used here is one that is 
generally used in the IR literature, and is employed to distinguish between two different 
approaches, conflict resolution, which, as we have seen, concerns itself with the 
achievement of a stable solution to conflict acceptable to the world community (a somewhat 
restricted solution set) and conflict analysis, which is a set of techniques used within the 
framework of conflict resolution in order to predict the behaviour of certain elements of 
the IR conflict. 
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Conflict Resolution 
The approach of the majority of the IR literature towards the behavioural aspects of conflict 
is typified by the work of Mitchell (198 1), Azar and Burton (1986), Sandole and van der 
Merwe (1993), Swingle (1970) and Chestnut (1986). Each of these works is a compilation 
of papers by other authors which together give a tour de horizon of the assumptions and 
attitudes implicit in the IR view of conflict. 
As has been observed, the central tenet of all these works is that conflict is something 
outside the international bodies which is dangerous, undesirable and to be reduced or 
resolved'. We see extensive discussion of methods by which parties can be brought to a 
greater understanding of the world views of their fellow troublemakers -parties ... thus 
learn about themselves and their relationship with their adversaryfrom theirown behaviour, 
from their adversary andfrom a third party. ' (Azar and Burton, 1986, pp85,92-116) 
(Mitchell, 1981, pp44-45). The process of resolution of the conflict is seen as essentially 
one of praxis, to which the subjective is as freely admitted as is procedurally based, 
analytically derived understanding (Azar and Burton, 1986, pp 117-124,141-153). Conflict 
resolution is primarily seen as problem solving whereby a party external to the conflict in 
some sense 'takes charge' of the situation and by intervening reduces it as a surgeon does 
a dislocatedjoint. This is essentially a different approach from that of the industrial conflict, 
where the participants have no recourse to a third party, and, moreover, may not want the 
situation reduced; the industrial conflict, on the other hand, may be part of a continuum of 
relations which can extend from direct confrontation of interests to ephemeral and superficial 
disagreements within an essentially stable and cooperative business relationship. The 
essence of international relations from the point of view of the community at large is to 
reduce conflict; the essence of industrial behaviour is to provoke appropriate conflict (in 
Mitchell's sense) in order to exploit market mechanisms. 'Problem solving is to lookfor 
superordinate goals, that is, goals which both sides individually want but can only get by 
cooperating together' (Azar and Burton, 1986, p89) in IR conflict resolution, but not in 
industrial conflict, at least from the perspective of the participants. The contrast between 
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this literature and, say, Porter's market force model (Porter 1985) or Ansoff's (1987) 
corporate strategy framework is striking in the sense that the commercial objective is clearly 
to resolve the conflict but in the favour of the client company. The essential difference 
between the two literatures is that of perspective and objective function. 
There is a certain concentration in the conflict resolution literature, too, on the process of 
problem solving. The process of conflict resolution is seen as a procedural problem. If a 
'good'process is established, the scales will fall from the eyes of the antagonists and the 
situation will be resolved. (Azar and Burton, 1986, p89,98-116; Saaty, in Chestnut, 1986, 
pp9l-94; Ascher and Brown in Chestnut 1986, pp95-102). Sandole and van der Merwe 
(1993, pp70,71) deal with the difficulties of obtaining cognitive equilibrium and emotional 
equilibrium in the resolution process in an attempt to achieve what they refer to as 
4components of serenity'. Mitchell (in Sandole and van der Merwe, 1993, pp78-94) relates 
techniques of progress to the phases of a conflict according to his general theory (Mitchell, 
1981). 
The behavioural explanations and models adopted are eclectic. There is substantial 
discussion of the origins of the conflict (Clark in Sandole and van de Merwe, 1993, pp43- 
54) (Mitchell, 1981, pp43-44,124) and of the origins of power and influence and 
misconceptions from an essentially intemalised view. The argument is more about the 
cause of the conflict with a view to its reduction than an acceptance that a conflict exists in 
order to cope with the consequences of its existence. The approach can be taxonomic. 
Raven and Kruglanski in (Swingle, 1970, pp69-106) give a full analysis of the nature of 
power relationships within generalised conflict, with a view to understanding the ways in 
which that power relationship could develop. They indicate the differences between power 
Originating from expertise, from situation, from coercion and the prospect of reward. The 
perspective again, is that the objective is to reduce the antagonism, rather than necessarily 
to secure a favourable position for the parties. Some of the literature is concerned with a 
taxonomy of causes which seeks to establish a hierarchy of conflicts, from those which 
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stem from basic human needs through learned and socialised values and interests towards 
the highest level of conflict, namely the political and strategic level (Lau and Sears, 1986). 
A correlation is then made between the level of conflict and the choice paradigm, with 
greater rationality entering the process as the level of conflict rises in the hierarchy. 
Mitchell's (198 1) analysis of the dynamics of conflict is at first glance a useful insight into 
the ways in which conflicts can develop, but on closer examination it develops into a set of 
observations of the ways in which the tensions in a situation of diplomatic intervention 
develop rather than the prediction of the dynamics of the situation of conflict as such. His 
observation that a conflict's progress is determined by situation, behaviour and attitudes 
often in unequal measures is a useful characterisation of the nature of the problem but fails 
to provide specific advice for a specific situation. It is as if we were in possession of a 
handbook of flora but had no literature on farming methods or the cultivation of plants. 
The inconvenient conclusion, then, is that because of the specific rules of engagement of 
the IR literature on conflict resolution, and, in particular because of the specific objectives 
of the process, only limited assistance can be expected from the conflict resolution work. 
Essentially the difficulties are 
a) the objective of the work is to assure the reduction of conflict rather than to 
predict or manipulate its progress 
b) the prediction processes which are discussed are to do with the progress of 
generalised conflict resolution process rather than the progress of a conflict in the 
outside world 
c) the descriptions of causal behaviour are too generalised to be of use in a 
particular conflict situation 
d) the perspective is one of a third external party rather than of a participant. 
This is not to say that the literature of conflict resolution is not useful. Far from it; it 
provides an extensive foundation for the particular set of problems it is aimed at solving, 
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namely the assurance of stability in the international arena. 
Chestnut (1986, page x) indicates clearly where the analytical initiative lies. 'At the level 
ofthe multinational corporation, as well as at the level ofthe large industrialfirms within 
a nation, many of the same causesfor conflict exist as those which produce international 
conflict. Ways have been found in the commercial worldfor resolving such international 
conflicts without resorting to militaryforce as a hasisfOr conj7ict resolution. Perhaps 
more thorough studies ofsuch non-military means of conflict resolution should he made 
and couldprove important. 'While one would disagree that the industrial community have 
developed truly effective ways of managing strategic conflict, it is clear that it is largely 
inappropriate to look within the conflict resolution literature of the International Relations 
community for effective specific solutions. 
There is significant work, too, on the tactics of negotiation. While much of the material is 
concerned with examples of financial negotiation, covered below, the impact ofpsychology 
and power relationships between participants is discussed. Swingle (1970, pp45-68) 
addresses the effects on negotiation of toughness in bargaining within a socioeconomic 
structure which allows the identification of the effects of gender and other social 
discriminants on behaviour. While this type of work is most valid, and allows some insight 
into the detailed stricture of negotiation, it is less helpfal in detailing the type of strategic 
normative structure which is the aim of this work. Similar criticisms can be levelled at the 
conflict analysis work which seeks to present a behavioural psychological analysis of 
power in conflicts. Raven and Eachus, (1963), Raven and French, (195 8), Mintz (195 1) 
and Thibaut and Faucheux (1965) all adopt this approach. The analysis is insightful at the 
level of interpersonal relations in negotiation, but less helpful at the level of intercompany 
conflict. To the extent that interpersonal relations in a specific conflict dominate the ouýCome 
of that struggle, the work of these authors will be relevant. 
Similar, equivalent work exists for the discussion of coalition power (as distinct from the 
individual power discussion of the previous paragraph). Here we find a number of competing 
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theories which can be surnmarised as 
minimum resource theory, where the coalition forms on the basis ofproviding 
the minimum resource necessary tý achieve the desired result 
minimum power theory, where the coalition forms using the minimum power 
necessary 
anti-competitive theory, where in certain social situations persons act so as 
to create the minimum social tension 
and utter confusion theory [sic] where coalitions are deemed to form on a random 
basis (Gruder, in Swingle, 1970, pp II 1- 154), (Garnson, 1964) 
While these theories are interesting they would not appear to be sufficiently robust or 
applicable to specific situations to provide any strong basis for development under the 
present requirement. 
These brief commentaries on a large literature of behavioural models of conflict aim to 
summarise a position on the relevance of that work as appropriate for the small scale 
prediction or description of behaviour in a conflict (specifically, a bargaining) situation. 
There are serious shortcomings, however, as far as their appropriateness as a foundation 
for a strategic conflict resolution tool, either in IR or in industrial use. In terms of the 
criteria of Table 4, these methods are unable to change depth from the symptomatic level 
of their design; they exhibit no ability to move from the level of individual behaviour to 
encompass the relations between group and corporate entities. While they are strongly 
anthropic and aware of the social context of intervention (requirements II and 12), they 
stand completely apart from the system methods and there is little hope of achieving a 
bridging between theories which predict conflict by examining its sources and theories 
which predict the behaviour of conflict in order to manage it. Criticism of the non-game- 
theoretic systems models is of a slightly different nature. By failing to encompass the 
essentia, l competition between the objectives of parties, these models remain at the 
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descriptive and generic level and form little basis for an appropriately detailed conflict 
management tool. 
There is a clear dichotomy between the analytical, mathematical tools and the writers on 
behavioural models, sununarised by Swingle (1970, p3) as follows. '... the principles of 
conj7ict resolution as they emerge in game-theoretic analysis have nothing to do with such 
matters as reduction ofhostility, redefinition ofgoals or interests or the like. Certain 'equity' 
Principles are, to be sure, invoked in bargaining theory, but only to the extent that they 
rzfect symmetries in the strategicpositions oftheplayers - hence, purely structuralfeatures 
of the game itsetC not the psychological characteristics of the players. In short, game 
theory is a 'depsychologized'decision theory, dealing with situations controlled by more 
than one decision maker' Swingle's criticism is a sound one, but the implication - that 
because game theory is inadequate, a psychological approach is sufficient - is incorrect, 
too. Swingle also makes the observation (1970, p39) that '[Game theory] must abstract 
entirely from all the psychological or sociological factors of conflicts, thus sacrificing 
immediate relevancefor logiýal precision. ' It is the aim of the present work to bridge the 
gap between the two approaches. 
In terms of the criteria of Table 4, the IR community's methods fail primarily because they 
do not offer any specific prediction of the development of a conflict. 'Conflict resolution... 
is not primarily or even mainly concerned with particular cases. ' (Sandole and van der 
Merwe, 1993, p60) They fail to comply with any requirement of internal process 
(requirements I to 5) because the objective is incompatible with the management of the 
conflict in the present sense of developing the interests of a participant. Their objective is 
too limited to allow any substantial transfer of technique from this area. 
Nevertheless it is clear from the work of Mitchell (198 1) and Sandole and van der Merwe 
0 993) that the essential characteristics of conflict in both areas are similar. Mitchell (198 1, 
p3), for example, makes the observation that '[c]onj7ict between New York cab drivers' 
Organisations could conceivably contain elements similar to those present in a conflict 
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between independent sovereign states. ' Similarly (ibid. p4), 'something which can, for 
convenience, be called "conflict" exists throughout human experience, extendingfrom the 
individual to the interstate level'. Boulding (1962, pl) comments, 'conflict does exhibit 
many general patterns, that the patterns of conflict in industrial relations, international 
relations, interpersonal relations and even animal life are not wholly differentfrom one 
another, and that it is therefore, worth lookingfor the common element.. It is my contention 
that there is a general theory of conflict that can be derived'. We shall see below in the 
examination of the subjects of the game theory analyses which originate from this area, 
that there is much in common between the objects of interest of the two communities. It is 
justified, then, to look for examples from the IR literature in order to test and develop a 
general conflict management toolset. 
Associated with the conflict resolution literature is a body of work referred to here as 
conflict analysis and covered in detail below in the analysis of the work of Fraser and 
Hipel (1984) and of Howard (197 1). Its aim, unlike that of conflict resolution is to describe 
the behaviour ofparticipants in conflict situations. In this respect it takes a similar perspective 
to the present work in that it is not per se attempting to reduce the level of conflict in a 
particular situation. Moreover, whereas conflict resolution in the IR field, as we have seen, 
is concerned essentially with generalities, conflict analysis aspires to more particular 
solutions. Conflict analysis in general draws heavily on the general theory of games, and 
as such is discussed in that section, but whereas game theory applies itself to economic 
and other problems in rather a wide sense, the conflict analysis material concerns itself 
with game theoretic and other approaches to the prediction of the dynamics of conflict. 
SYstem Approaches 
There are a number of general systems analysis approaches aimed at planning under various 
conditions of uncertainty. These originated in the OR community as a reaction against 
what was seen as an unnecessarily restrictive set of approaches which did not take adequate 
account of the soft' aspects of system intervention. 
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Robustness Analysis 
The method developed by Rosenhead (1989) and practised by Best et al (1986), Caplin 
(1975) and others is a natural response to the desire to adopt a strategic solution set which 
reflects the uncertainties inherent in any situation. Every attempt at the definition of a 
strategic path is beset by the uncertainties induced by errors in the data, the duplicity of 
competitors, the policy changes of procurement authorities, the death of statesmen and 
princes, and the plain intractability of adequately rich problem definitions. Inherent in the 
strategic process is the uncertainty of the scenario which constitutes the foundation of the 
process - by the time the implantation of the strategy is complete the probabilities are that 
the foundation assumptions have changed. Robustness analysis attempts to maximise the 
likelihood that the path embarked upon will result, under uncertainty, in a good result. 
It does this by a breakdown of the possible results in a tree form. Each result is ascribed a 
desirability level, and simple analysis is carried out to produce, effectively an a priori 
likelihood estimate of there being a desirable outcome. Extensions to the basic approach 
cover the avoidance of catastrophic outcomes by means of a debility matrix. The process 
is attractively illustrated with a case-study of choices in secondary school for the author's 
daughter in Rosenhead (1989). 
As part of a suite of contributory tools robustness analysis has many attributes. It is 
essentially eutaxiological in that its fundamental aim is to make robust the choice of the 
first step along an unknown path. It is highly forgiving, transparent, data-pragmatic and 
anthropic. Its limitation is perhaps that it is too convergent. Other methods such as 
metagames have the advantage over it of presenting two-dimensional interactive diagrams 
which promote connectivity of ideas, whereas the dendritic structure of the robustness 
structures tend to draw the mind to linear examinations and extensions of existing part 
solutions. It would seem at this stage that robustness analysis is more likely to be a tool 
used at a particular stage in a conflict analysis to address the robustness of emergent solution- 
sets rather than a tool of first resort to structure a 'wicked' conflict management problem 
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ab initio. In terms of Table 4 it is defective in that it does not adequately comprehend the 
different belief spaces of participants (requirement 6) and that it is not essentially depth- 
changing in its performance. More generally, it is an inadequate basis for proceeding to a 
general conflict management tool because of its lack of definition in the specific dynamics 
of a system representation. 
Strategic Choice Approach 
This portmanteau of techniques, attitudes and methods originates in the local government 
area of management and is strong in its ability to cope with what Friend (in Rosenhcad, 
1989) refers to as '... two realnu of decision making - the construction industry and city 
government - in which powers of decision are widely diffused, and much depends on 
collective processes of negotiation and debate. ' He makes the point that the process is 
'empirical rather than intellectual'and this is strongly represented both in the case studies 
(Fridn and Hickiling, 1987; Friend, 1989) and in the style of exposition. 
An attractive part of the method is the recognition of the uncertainty of the environment in 
which the strategic process is taking place. Friend has three types of uncertainty 
UV Uncertainties pertaining to guiding values 
UE Uncertainties pertaining to the environment 
UR Uncertainties pertaining to related decision fields. 
Ibis is a valuable structure but it does not recognise what in strategic decision-making is a 
key distinction between those uncertainties which are properties of a neutral but not always 
convenient universe (the earthquake destroying the offshore production line) as distinct 
those which are properties of agents which are actively in opposition, wholly or partly, to 
the desired end-result (or development paths). This distinction is crucial, particularly when 
extended to encompass the distinction between those uncertainties which are controllable 
or removable and those which are not. The distinction between game theory and control 
Page 110 
theory is relevant here, as is the difference in design approach between a complex software 
system designed to cope with random failures as distinct from one designed to cope with 
terrorist or criminal attacks. The approaches are very different. Nevertheless, the explicit 
recognition of uncertainty is a useful and often neglected part of decision making, and the 
Strategic Choice approach is strong is this respect. 
Also useful is the elucidation of four stages of decision-making, shaping, designing 
comparing and choosing, and the attention to each of these phases require by the process is 
a useful structuring act; it is often the case that decision making groups tend to rush to the 
deciding domain before they have even understood the question. 
It is at this point, however, where doubt be; ins to enter about the applicability of the 
process. To what extent is its success the effect of the charisma and individual intellectual 
flexibility of the consultant, and to what extent is the method itself adding value? Like the 
French 'enarque' one is tempted to observe that it may be excellent in practice but it will 
never work in theory. This is not an inconsequential jibe; if strategic success is to be tied to 
the performance of individual gurus in the application of their individualistic methodologies 
because the value added comes from the flexibility and brilliance of the guru rather than 
the methodology, we are limited in the promulgation of the methodology within a 
corporation or, indeed, within an industry. The danger here is not that the process described 
is insufficient per se, or that it acts as a catalyst rather than a directing structure, it is that, 
if mistakenly presented as a solution tool it will appear ineffective. 
Soft Systems Methodology 
At first glance Soft Systems Methodology (Checkland, 1984), particularly when presented 
superficially as in (Checkland, 1989), appears as a methodology. Its characteristics are 
presented as being diagammatic and structurally based and it has immediate appeal to the 
user brought up in the domain of engineering, where concepts from cybernetics and 
analogies from control engineering fall readily to the eye. At this level it has the following 
stages 
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Stage I Enter the situation 
Stage 2 Express the problem situation 
Stage 3 Formulate root definitions of relevant systems of 
purposeful activity 
Stage 4 Build conceptual models of the systems 
Stage 5 Compare models with real world actions 
Stage 6 Define possible changes which are both desirable and feasible 
Stage 7 Take action to improve the problem situation 
and recommends consideration of the entities using the following categories: - 
Customer 
Actors 
Transformation process 
Weltanschauung 
Owner 
Envirorunental constraints 
These would appear both reasonable and, equally importantly, good foundations on which 
to build an adequately complex paradigm (Checkland's 'rich picture'). 
Checkland does not suffer from the paucity of theoretical foundation of Friend (Systems 
Choice). His book Systems Thinking - Systems Practice (Checkland, 1984) is strong on the 
philosophical underwriting of the systems practice which he claims was practised from 
the building of the Great Wall of China onwards. This is not adequate; to present success 
in complex endeavour as evidence of a particular structure of thought is to confuse effect 
with result. A road system is not constructed with its final connectivity in mind, it results 
from the aggregated effect of individual road builders attempting to solve their own 
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individual problems. And yet if the growth of the road system were to be observed from 
above over many centuries one would receive the distinct impression that there was a 
single great intellect at work planning the response of the road system to the needs of wars, 
the arising of new cities and the invention of new modes of transport. 
This however, is merely an observation on the antecedents of the method. Checkland himself 
makes the point a number of times that the purpose of SSM is to be pragmatic. He refers to 
the methodology as 'generating structured debate' rather than seeking goals, and it is on 
this basis that SSM must bejudged - does it achieve its results, how, and does its performance 
need to be enhanced? 
The case studies for SSM are convincing in that good development paths emerge from the 
reported work. The work is seen to be productive and contributory. The method clearly 
appears to act eutaxiologically, but it should be noted that this is in great measure achieved 
by the insistence of the facilitator that this should be so. Nothing in the strict methodology 
prevents the users seeking a direct end result, in spite of Checkland's structural arguments 
to the contrary. This flexibility, of course, is no demerit. 
An interesting gap in the SSM literature is the absence of any taxonomy of structure. Hard 
system engineering texts are full of structural design examples - feedback, feed-forward, 
phase advance, Kalman filter, van de Waal's system - the SSM literature generates none 
of this, and perhaps this is concrete evidence that the method is merely a device for 
structuring debate, rather than a structure in which to debate. 
The philosophical antecedents of the SSM methodology are extensive, drawing on the 
theological and epistemological theory touched on in the second section of this note, and 
widening its grasp to take in cybernetics, information theory and the whole of system and 
control engineering. Does it, however, fulfil the potential of its genes? Nothing in the case 
history shows the application of information theory, for example, and yet the cost of 
gathering information of diverse kinds in industry is immense, and the most common 
Constraint on strategic definition or implementation is the absence of information on which 
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to make those decisions. Wiener's (1949) work on adaptive systems in cybernetics is 
frequently cited but does not appear to emerge into practice. 
It is in this practical neglect of the potential of this rich heritage that SSM fails, and it is 
suspected that the advances to be made are in the mobilisation of some of the underlying 
harder methods within an SSM structure. In terms of the issues of Table 4, SSM appears to 
have every attribute except for the ability to depth-change. It could of course be that the 
user of the method has a set of behavioural rules for himself when in contact with the 
client that ensure that these attributes are satisfied. Once again one is left unsure whether 
the value-added comes from the methodology or the guru. 
Nleta-methodologies 
The last section referred to the Checkland SSM methodology as a methodology 'only at 
first glance'. The same is true of a number of the methods reviewed here. 
It is easy to condemn these methods to one degree or another for their lack of structure, for 
their failure to declare their terms adequately or for their potential to provide a smoke 
screen behind which a talented facilitator can perform. In each and every case the accusation 
can be brought either that the methods are rigorous but limited (game theory, hypergames) 
or that they are flexible and arbitrary (metagames, SSM, Strategic Choice). Indeed, the 
position of each method along this single axis is almost a metric for its hardness or softness. 
To do so, however would be largely to miss the point. 
SSM for example, is both a methodology (containing a set of methods) and a structure 
which sits above the level of methodology. Like the evolution of Rosenhead's attributes 
and the examination of goal-seeking behaviour above it is an exercise in meta-methodology). 
Such a distinction can be applied to all the methods and methodologies discussed. Game 
theory can be represented as a set of theorems of limited use which, if it finds a suitable 
Problem can provide a deceptively accurate answer; but it can also be presented as a structural 
tool which conditions the analyst to attempt the expression of options in a disciplined and 
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ordered way. It is meta-methodological in the sense that it is sensitive to the value of the 
choice to the protagonists and the inherent interaction of their choices one to the other in a 
way that such sensitivity can be carried over into other methodologies, such as SSM or 
metagames. Equally, hypergame theory can be considered merely as a set of approaches to 
conflict problems where the objectives of the players differ and as such is subject to the 
criticism of limited applicability. It can also be considered, however, from the meta- 
methodological point view, in which arena it provokes a need to require methodologies to 
be sensitive to the conflicts of weltanschauung and objective among the protagonists. 
It should be noted that uniquely among the methodologies studied, it is SSM which comes 
closest to the concept of meta-methodology; it is only in its embodiment that it gravitates 
to earning its daily bread as a methodology. In comparison with other approaches, detailed, 
below, however, it appears inefficient in its style of argument from the general to specific. 
Game theory approaches to conflict 
Developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) in the 1930s and 40s, classical 
game theory approaches the conflict situations of economics by expressing the choices 
available to a restricted number of players in either a decision tree (games in extensive 
form) or in a matrix of options for each player the elements of which contain the pay-offs 
which would accrue to each if the particular combinations of choices were to be made 
(games in normal form). 
In the case of two player games where the total benefit to be gained by playing the game is 
unchanging (zero- or constant-sum games) a solution always exists, but it is almost always 
of the mixed strategy form. This type of solution involves the player engaging a random 
number generator in order to select, on each play of the game, an option in such a way that 
the opponent cannot guess what specific choice will be made. The solution to the game 
consists of the vector of probabilities associated with each choice. This presents an 
immediate problem. Many of the most important business situations are not repeated. The 
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teaming decision on a major defence contract does not appear again and again, as in some 
Parlour game. Hence the concept of a mixed solution is rendered questionable, or at least 
indigestible, in practice. All is not lost, however, since some aspects of major business 
decisions are repeated to some extent. This is particularly so in oligopoly or oligopsony 
markets, where the buyers and sellers keep meeting one another and, although the specific 
decisions are different there is a strong degree of historic judgement applied to the successive 
plays of the extended game. The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, discussed below, is relevant, 
as is the extensive literature on behavioural psychology. 
One positive aspect of the early game theory is its very simplicity. A game in extensive 
form with its information sets marking the knowledge held by each player of the others 
choices is highly intuitive and falls naturally into the hands of strategists attempting an 
exhaustive elucidation of a conflict situation. 
Regrettably, however, in practice even the simplest games fall short via two mechanisms. 
First, the practicalities of expressing the competitors' options in such a way that they are 
mutually exclusive means that a large number of options emerge even in the most simple 
of cases. Any simplification renders the solution dubious, since there is no characteristic 
of 'forgiveness' in the sense above in classical game theory. Certainly few of the 
characteristics deemed desirable above are not present in classical game theory; it is almost 
the archetype of the 'hard' OR approach. To a degree it is anthropic in that the options 
expressed emerge from a consideration of the human players involved, but it is suitable 
only for the most stark and pedagogic examination of strategic decision making. 
Classical game theory deals with noncooperative behaviour on the part of the players. 
They simply activate their random number generators and act in order to maximise their 
own returns at the expense of the opponent. The next development in game theoretic terms 
was to consider cooperative games and to extend the noncooperative theory to games 
where the total payoff to all players was not constant. This latter relaxation is a very important 
approach to reality, since the behaviour of noncooperative competitors can frequently lead 
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to a reduction in their collective benefit. Bennett, Cropper and Huxham (in Rosenhead, 
1989) describe a striking example in the area of planning development. 
This development into cooperative behaviour and non-zero-sum games leads to the 
iMportant mathematics of coalition theory and of games in characteristic function form. In 
this form of game the players can agree to form coalitions; the total payoff to the coalition 
is the sum of the pay-offs to the players, but of course they can improve over their individual 
positions because they are not in competition and so can coordinate their play. Associated 
with the coalitions, not surprisingly, is the concept of an imputation, which is the 
mathematical embodiment of sharing the spoils after a successful team approach. In practical 
terms we can imagine this as the result of a work-sharing negotiation. 
Lastly we should be aware of the very extensive and well-recognised work carried out by 
Nash (1950,1951,1953) and Harsanyi (1977) in the modelling of negotiation. The Nash 
approach starts a negotiation between two competitors at the point for each of them which 
is the best under the assumption that they do not, in fact, cooperate. It is in a sense the 
'safety net': 'If I play correctly I will gain this amount in spite of my opponent's 
intransigence'. From this pessimistic point a set of feasible bargaining positions (known 
as a Pareto-optimal set) can be defined and Nash then assumes that the negotiators recognise 
that cooperation will move them both to a better position. He imagines that each will 
accept that the product of each of their gains over and above the start point will be collectively 
most desirable. He thus maximises (u - u*)(v - v*) where (utv*) is the start position and 
(u, v) is the maximising position. 
The literature on the subject is huge (Rasmusen, 1989; Gibbons, 1992; Morris, 1992; 
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1993; Heap and Varoufakis, 1995) even for the discrete games 
discussed above. The literature for continuous games which cover, for example timing 
issues in negotiation and allocation problems such as financing decisions in market 
penetration, is even greater. 
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In the specific field of IR, one can select as a typical source, Brams and Kilgour's (1988) 
presentation of a generalised conflict game based upon a generalisation of the Prisoner's 
Dilemma which they subsequently use as a basis for the modelling of the politico-dynamics 
of the SDI (Star Wars) initiative and for a generalised discussion on the threat process and 
deterrence in IR situations. The difficulty here is that whereas the solutions are clearly 
reasonable and, to a degree provide insight into the general behaviour of participants, they 
remain at the general level of representation. Earlier Boulding (1962), began the 
development of a dynamic theory of conflict representation based on a type of vector field 
theory, the strategy seeking process one of optimum seeking over a field of utility functions. 
The work is related to the Isaacs (1965) studies of differential games and to the work of 
Richardson (1956,1960) and Rapoport (1957). Recent developments build upon these 
earlier continuous models of attrition (Richardson, 1956; Protopopescu, Santoro and 
Dockery, 1989a, 198 9b; Nicholson, 1992; Gass, 1994; Dockery and Woodcock, 1994; Gass, 
1997a, 1997b). The main criticism of these conflict dynamics approaches is that the action 
space of participants in strategic situations is rarely seen as continuous. More often, as is 
described by Guetzkow (in Chestnut, 1986, p36), the future is seen as a set of discrete 
states representing possible futures. This is clearly related to the work of Washburn (1990) 
on directed graph games and will form an important theme of the methods described in the 
next chapters. Boulding's (1960, p53) view of game theory as essentially a state space 
problem is useful, however, as a unifying principle. It is also observed that his notes on the 
difference between the strategic game and a more closely resolved 'local game(ibid. p39- 
40) provide a useful basis for progress. Additionally, Boulding's observations (ibid., p35) 
on the 'misunderstanding processes' mirrored by Bacharach (1993) in the latter's later 
work on games with differing belief spaces is a long range insight into the instabilities 
induced in game situations where the participants see the game itself differently. 
There are many texts dealing with game theory as a topic within economics, but few which 
deal practically with the implications of game theory to management. One of these is 
MacMillan (1992). It presents the ubiquitous simple guide to game theoretic concepts and 
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then offers analyses of bargaining problems, contract design, executives' pay structuring 
and a number of other practical management problems, using the concepts of game theory. 
The situations addressed are essentially two-player games, and result in analyses which 
are clearly of assistance in a general sense in understanding the way on which negotiators, 
for example, will establish focal points for bargaining and negotiating spaces by 
consideration of the values of negotiated assets to themselves and the other party. The 
analyses fail, however as a basis for strategic conflict management primarily because of 
the lack of transferability to the complex strategic situations to be expected in industrial 
conflict situations. Once again we find that the game-theoretic methods provide good 
specific solutions and good generalised understanding but the specific solutions are 
insufficiently transferable, while the global understanding is insufficiently specific. 
Rasmusen (1989), Gibbons (1992), Fudenberg and Tirole (1993) and Heap & Varoufakis 
(1995) all provide a wealth of specific solutions and are all subject to similar criticism as 
far as the transferability of their results are concerned. 
Incisive as Boulding's observations (1962) are, in general, there are distinct difficulties 
with game theory as summarised by two observations by Shubik (1983) on the breadth of 
acceptability of solution concepts. 'Unfortunately the concept of a solution ... for non- 
zero-sum'games is not agreed upon. The Nash equilibrium, frequently used is subject to 
considerableproliferation, does not in generalgive a unique value and must he interpreted 
with great care. ' (Shubik, 1983, p vii) '... even if we have afull description of "the game " 
we have to make an inductive leap based upon our socialperceptions as to what we wish 
to consider to be a solution. ' (1983, p12) 
In spite ofAumann and Hart's (1992) optimism, 'Game Theory may be viewed as a sort of 
umbrella or 'unifiedfield theoryfor the rational side ofsocial science.. it does not use 
different, ad hoc constructs.. it develops methodologies that apply in principle to all 
interactive situations', Shubik (1983, p 12) offers a general observation on game theory's 
applicability. 'There should be some universally acceptable way ofresolving the conflicting 
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goal problem which takes into account both the realities ofpower and the concepts of 
equity and efficiency. Eventually this philosopher's stone may befound, but in the current 
state of strategic analysis and of game theory there does not appear to be a uniquely 
agreed upon set ofassumptions concerning intent or behaviour but there are many different 
solution concepts and apatchwork ofpartial theories which have been more or lessjustiji'ed 
in certain usages. ' This neatly surnmarises the partial nature of the game theory approach. 
It consists of a wide set of elegant solutions to particular problems which have little general 
applicability. Hargreaves, Heap and Varoufakis (1995, p2) are even more dismissive, 'Game 
theory does not actually deliver'. Each new problem has to be solved afresh. This is not 
adequate as the basis of a toolset for strategic conflict management, but it will certainly 
provide the basis for individual tools within that set. In terms of an adequate contribution 
to the strategic process described above, these later developments have something to offer. 
They are richly documented and very well-founded mathematically; they exhibit data- 
improving behaviour; they are anthropic. On the other hand they are limited in application, 
highly teleological, procedural, work at a single depth and are unforgiving in the sense of 
table 4 (requirement 7). As Shubik remarks (1983, p25) 'The formal methods of game 
theory do not distinguish between tactics and strategy. ' Game theory is very distinctively 
teleological, '[rjationality is cast in a means-endsframework with the task ofselecting the 
most appropriate meansfor achieving certain ends. ' (Heap and Varoufakis, 1995, p5) It 
must be said, however, that in the hands of an expert such as Rasmusen (1989) the results 
are appealing, believable and contributory to the type of conflict analysis to be expected in 
strategic decision making. 
A promising byway in this field is that of the automatic game player which, for an insoluble 
game such as chess, can provide solutions (or at least sequences of good plays) without 
having to act in an end-seeking teleological fashion. Out of the morass of methods designed 
to calculate the solutions for real games has emerged a body of work which establishes 
criteria of goodness for the state of play in any particular game situation and then, by a 
recursive method recommends appropriate good moves from that point on (Morris, 1992). 
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7bis is a promising style of solution, but one which may yet fall by the wayside because of 
the need to establish, at the very least, a structure to the game which may not be feasible in 
practice. , 
Game theory is also criticised by Heap and Varoufakis (1995, p30) with the observation 
that 'To be specific, game theory accepts the strict separation ofactionfrom structure. ' It 
is clear in the practical words of both IR and business, that it is inappropriate to hold that 
participants fix their actions on the basis of a structure which then remains the same for the 
remainder of the conflict. More likely is that the structure of the conflict is determined 
both by what the participants see apriori as their tactical options and, in a recursive fashion, 
by an expanded set of possible actions resulting from considerations of the objectives of 
the players. In other words the structure conditions the tactical choice set as much as the 
tactical options determine the structure. In neither case is either fixed for the game, since 
the game is determined by the perceptions of the participants. 
In summary, game theory is an essential underwriting of much of the conflict analysis of 
the twentieth century. It is of itself unlikely to provide more than a simplified view of a 
highly stylised situation. Game theory fulfils hardly any of the criteria established in the 
first section by virtue of its inflexibility, inability to change depth and teleological behaviour. 
As a potential lower level module for specific purposes and situations, however, it more 
thýn justifies its presence in any critical review of the subject. 
Non-game-theoretic conflict analysis 
WEle the analysis of conflict is centred on game theory, there have been and remain other 
approaches, mostly of a system analysis or control theoretic descriptive type. Kopacek and 
Breitenecker (in Chestnut, 1986, pp63-70) indicate approaches based on ideological 
analysis, macroeconomics and on a 'power approach'. They present a state-space control 
theory of international stability which is convincing but general in nature. The variables in 
the model are a mixture of economic variable such as defence resources and more subjective 
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ones such as threat and pressurefor reform. VvUle the behaviour of the model reported is 
convincing it remains at the symptomatic level, neither giving a universal solution nor an 
adequately specific one for conflict prediction. This is typical of a series of largely 
undeveloped approaches which attempt to provide a high level generally applicable model 
of international conflict behaviour. Other examples can be found in Tu (1983,1986) and in 
Onishi (1986), a dynamic soft systems approach to a similar problem, with the special 
characteristics that it is an attempt at a global early warning system for conflict. Van der 
Merwe (in Sandole and van der Merwe, 1993, p289) makes a strong argument for the 
paucity of the static models so prevalent in IR analysis '... evolutionary analyses ofconj7ict 
dynamics also need to be incorporated into the models previously examined. ' 
Variable Universe Games 
A useful set of concepts to deal with the difficulties which arise when players have notjust 
different pay-offs for given terminal states, but where the players have different knowledge 
of characteristics of the game space. These are described as engendering different belief 
sets. An example (from (Bacharach, 1993) best serves to explain. 
There is a well-known puzzle known as Rendezvous. Imagine that you have 
arranged to meet someone in a strange city, say Cardiff. You know that you are to 
meet your friend at, say 2 pm., but unfortunately you have forgotten to agree on a 
place to meet. You cannot now contact your friend, of course, because she too is 
in Cardiff experiencing the same dilemma. What do you do? 
Many people decide on a place such as the main post office, or the main railway 
station, or the Town Hall, and when played as a party game that is usually a 
winning strategy if neither player knows Cardiff. Problems arise, however, when 
one player knows the locale and another doesn't. For example, I might know that 
a very prominent building in Cardiff is the National Museum, and would probably 
decide on that as my best bet to meet you. If you know Cardiff to the same extent 
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you may well also alight upon the striking museum columns as a good place to 
meet. We would 'win' the game by using our common knowledge of prominent 
buildings in Cardiff. Information has, in fact, been added to our game solution. 
But what if one of us knows Cardiff and the other does not? The knowledgeable 
participant may choose the museum steps while the less knowledgeable would 
choose somewhere more generally known, such as the railway station. They would 
not meet. What has happened is that a level of information has not been used 
correctly, namely that the more knowledgeable participant could have used the 
knowledge that his partner did not know Cardiff as an indicator that she would 
not choose the museum for a rendezvous, since it is likely that only the cognoscenti 
would pick it. 
They key concept here is that of the belief set of each player. In the first (equal and poor 
knowledge) case, both participants have a limited belief set, namely the obvious public 
buildings. In the second case (both knowing Cardiff well), each includes the museum in 
the set of possibilities and the outcome is highly favourable. The difficulty in the third 
asymmetrical case is that the more knowledgeable has to adjust his set of feasible options 
because he should have realised that the belief set of the other party could not include the 
museum as a feasible option, and that the other party could only assume that he in turn 
would have a belief set which excluded the museum (since how could she have known that 
it could be included in the set of options when she did not know of its existence). 
Bacharach (1993) gives an example of a game he calls Block Marking. In it two players are 
shown a box containing twenty children's blocks. The object of the game is for two players 
independently and without knowledge to mark the same block. If they succeed they win 
f 10 each. If they pick different blocks they win nothing. One can imagine that the bottom 
of one block is secretly marked by the first player, who then leaves the room while the 
second chooses. It will be easily seen that the game has a clear connection with Rendezvous. 
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Bacharach gives three versions. In the first (VUG 1) there are twenty red blocks all identical. 
In the second (VUG2) there are nineteen yellow blocks, all identical, and one red block. In 
VUG3 there are 2 red (identical) and eighteen yellow, identical except that careful inspection 
reveals that one of the yellow blocks has a slight curvature of the grain. 
In VUGI the obvious tactic is to choose completely at random. There is no reason to 
suppose that any other ration al person would do differently. In VUG2, however, the rational 
person would choose the single red block, and a win would undoubtedly result. In VUG3, 
however, we have a similar dilemma as that which arose from the asymmetry of information 
in Rendezvous. Should the first player pick the unique, but subtly distinguished grainy 
yellow block, or should he choose one of the two reds, with a 50150 chance of success? 
Intuitively one makes a balance between the probability that the other player will be 
perceptive enough to see the grain in the unique yellow block as against the possibility that 
she will not. 
Bacharach starts from the premiss that a player cannot have a strategy about a situation 
which cannot be conceived of (or believed in). In this way the belief space, being the set of 
all things which the player can conceive of defines not only the playing space of the game 
in terms of its topology or connectedness, but also specifies the actions which can be 
conceived, since if I have no knowledge of a possible state of affairs, I can have no concept 
of what to do there. This in turn restricts my belief space about my opponent's belief 
space, and in turn my conception of what is allowed as an action in any circumstance. Note 
that this is a much stronger concept than von Neumann and Morgenstern's (1944) 
information set reported in many texts (Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Rasmusen 1989; Fudenberg 
and Tirole, 1993). 
Deterministic Graphical Games 
Deterministic Graphical (DG) games were introduced by Washburn (1990) in order to 
expand the traditional concept of game trees (games in extended form) to encompass re- 
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entries into information sets, a capacity which is strictly forbidden in the normal case. 
Such games take place on a directed graph, with defined nodes and transitions from node 
to node. Such games may cycle and return to a node or nodes and may be unending. 
Washburn's concept was to have pay-offs which are made at terminal nodes, while unending 
games have a zero payoff for all players. These are now known as DGT games (DG terminal 
games). Alpern (1993) has extended the payoff concept to include pay-offs where the payoff 
vector for players is (time) averaged over the path followed. Alperri (ibid. ) also describes 
stationary equilibriums for such DGA (DG games with time averaged pay-offs). 
Both these games are based on perfect information, a luxury in which the present approach 
cannot afford to indulge. Nevertheless, the basic theory may provide some insights into 
the structure and stability of DG games. As in stochastic theory we distinguish between 
markovian strategies (here called stationary strategies) which depend only on the present 
state of the game, and non-markovian strategies which have a memory of the history of the 
development of the game. It may seem at first glance that only the second type are admissible 
in any convergence towards real life, but this is not necessarily so. It may be possible to 
redefine the topology of the game to encompass each evolution of the state as a new state 
per se. 
DGT games have been discussed by Washburn (1990) in the two-person zero-sum setting. 
He exhibited an algorithm for finding an optimal pair of pure strategies in polynomial 
time. Everette (1957) has proven that a solution value exists and an improved algorithm 
for determining the solution strategies was given by Baston and Bostock (1990). The 
observations made by Boulding (1962, pp4l-57), while being rudimentary in comparison 
with the later work of Washburn, has striking connections with both it, and the metagame 
analyses of Fraser and Hipel (1984) and Howard (1971). Brams (1994) also presents a 
'view of a matrix game as directed graph, in that the individual players have control over 
the moves between potential outcomes. The outcomes are defined as locations in a network, 
and the powers of the players are available to invoke moves in so far as they are motivated 
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so to do. Figure 5 illustrates the approach of Boulding. 
a2b2cl 
Figure 5 The approach of Boulding to discrete games (Boulding 1962, p54) 
In the figure outcomes in order for each of three players, A, B and C are contained in the 
rectangles and the tactical choices leading to those outcomes are thus, a2b 2CI* In the bottom 
right hand comer two outcomes and their associated tactical choices are shown. It will be 
seen that the only difference between the tactical choices is in the choice made by C (c, vis- 
a-vis c2). We say that Chas unilateral control over the transition. Since the C-component of 
the outcomes shows that Cprefers the extreme bottom right hand comer outcome (1,0, -I) 
to the one up and to its left ((2,0, -2)), C will invoke the transition, as indicated by the 
arrow. 
Brams (1983,1993,1994), building on Brams and Hessel's (1984) and Hipel, Wang and 
Fraser's (1988) work, extends this idea and establishes sequences of moves which are in 
the interests of the relevant players to invoke each transitional step in the sequence. He 
establishes the wider concept of 'moving power' and its associated concepts of holding 
power, staying power and threat power which are used to establish likely behaviours in 
such scenarios as the Suez Crisis and in a series of analyses of Old Testament scenarios. 
He also establishes (Brams, 1994, pp215-219) a complete taxonomy of W discrete games. 
The motivation for the study of such DGA games appears to be the behaviour of companies 
under conditions of discount or super-counting (where the discount ratio is greater than 1). 
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Alpern (1989) discusses an alternative method of calculating behaviour in the Rubinstein 
(Baston and Bostock, 1990) alternating offer bargaining game, where two companies set 
prices on alternating days. This is easily seen to be representable as a DG game 
A major drawback to the DGT games is that players must be indifferent to all unending 
plays. Alperri (1991) has presented an alternative payoff function which allows for a 
discounting of the different unending pay-offs, by averaging over the paths followed. In 
particular he has shown that (non-zero-sum) DGA games exist where there are no stationary 
Nash equilibriums. It can be shown, however that in the general DGA game (where the 
strategies are non-markovian) pure strategy history-remembering Nash equilibriums always 
exist. While this is comforting, it is unfortunately unlikely to be applicable to the practical 
case of any practical strategic conflict structure because of the need for perfect information, 
and because of the difficulty of establishing a cost function associated with a player's 
changing his tactical choices. Even if these changes could be costed it is unlikely that a 
straightforward economic cost would be adequate to represent the complexities of the 
power issues involved in the tactical choice changes in real life. 
Supergames 
The discovery or. recognition that certain very simple games possess at the same time an 
essential instability and a power to represent, albeit simplistically, human behaviour has 
lead to the development of interesting work in supergames. These are iterated versions of 
the very simplest games, and of these the most famous and relevant is the iterated Prisoner's 
Dilemma or IPD. Axelrod's (1981,1984) seminal work on this subject has lead to a 
burgeoning literature accessible both to social scientists and to management scientists. 
Briefly, it concerns the behaviour of individuals who are caused to choose between 
Cooperation with a partner or betrayal of that partner. Characteristically the order of benefit 
to any player is 
You defect - he cooperates with you (DC) best return 
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You cooperate - he cooperates (CC) 2nd best 
Both defect (DD) 3rd best 
You cooperate he defects (CD) worst return. 
A casual examination will reveal the instability inherent in the symmetrically desirable 
CC configuration; any departure by a player will (temporarily) improve his return. The 
dilemma, of course, is that the same applies to the other player symmetrically, and so the 
DD position becomes the adopted position where communication between the parties is 
not allowed. 
Axelrod (1984) has simulated the playing of the Prisoner's Dilemma in a computer-based 
tournament. The results show a striking success for the TIT FOR TAT tactic, whereby the 
previous choice of the other player is always immediately reflected on the next meeting. 
There is extensive further literature examining the robustness of this and other tactics 
(Behr (198 1), Axelrod (I 980a, 1995) and many others). 
While the individual game may be simplistic with respect to human behaviour, there is 
still much to be gained from the examination of the behaviour of CEO's in iterated situations. 
We certainly view other major companies with an anthropomorphic eye - GEC is risk- 
averse ; BAe can never make up its mind ; TCSF is always backing two horses - and 
these simplified personalizations undoubtedly precondition the decision makers' eventual 
choices. What the IPD work does not show is the effects of reiterated negotiation and the 
influence of trust and trustworthiness in conditioning the strategic posture of a corporation. 
It is not enough to say that the trust or mistrust is expressed only at the CEO level, since, as 
discussed in Chapter 2 above the strategic intent of an organisation can often be seen to act 
at a number of organisational levels. 
In tenns of the criteria of table 4, supergames represent, once again, a partial and sparsely 
adequate contributor. Their major shortcomings are in the area of their limited scope rather 
than in any particular shortfall with respect to the criteria. Nevertheless the represent an 
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important theoretical and experimental structure upon which extensions may be built to 
represent less stark and strictly repetitive situations. 
Hypergames 
One of the fundamental shortcomings of conventional game theory is that the protagonists 
necessarily have a common view of the pay-offs of the game. They may have different 
pay-offs one from the other, for any particular choice of options, but they each know those 
pay-offs. Put in another way, the players pursue the same objective. Moreover, because the 
vast majority of game theory is essentially numerical rather than structural, in that its 
results are usually expressed as particular algebraic solutions rather than as the geometrical 
'domain of action' results of softer methods (but note the apparently forgotten work of 
Isaacs (1965)), there is held to exist a common transaction variable by which one player's 
return can be compared with another. 
This is often not the case in the practical business situation. It is, for example, difficult to 
compare on any transaction-variable basis the benefit to companies engaged in a three way 
struggle for a major project. Company A may wish to win an opportunity in order to fill a 
predicted cash-flow crisis at some time in the future while company B may wish to cross 
the entry barrier into an adjacent market and company C may express its strategic 
implementation in this respect only symptomatically as defensively securing the boundaries 
of its market. Such disjunctions of objective frequently lead to apparently illogical and 
therefore unpredictable behaviour on the part of the competitor. Game theory does not 
help directly with such situations. 
The still developing hypergame work of Fraser and Hipel (1984), discussed in more detail 
below, and of Bowen (198 1), Bennett (1986), Bennett, Cropper and Huxham (in Roscnhead, 
1989), Rapoport (1965; Bennett, 1980,1985,1989) and others represents an encouraging 
adaptive methodology by which the complex interactions among protagonists can be 
modelled. Perhaps one of its most attractive characteristics is its depth changing ability (to 
use the criteria of table 4). It can dive into accurate representations of, for example, the 
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internal power struggles between divisions of a corporation within the decision making 
context of a corporation-wide strategy development model. Additionally, it is claimed to 
be data-pragmatic. Bennett, Cropper and Huxham (1989) claim that 'Having drawn up 
specific hypergames the technical notions of dominance, stability, and so on are brought 
to bear informal analysis proper using matrices, trees or tahleaux. 'Thus it represents, so 
far, the most promising area for development. It is certainly anthropic - its models are 
flexible, almost arbitrary and give ample opportunity for the expression of idiosyncratic 
views on the parts of the decision makers; it is thus also data-improving and forgiving. 
On the tcleology-eutaxiology axis it falls more towards the former, but there are indications 
that its flexibility of representation allows it to be used by both objective-driven analysts 
and others. If it has a weakness it is in the interface between the hypergame analysis and 
the underlying levels of, possibly numerical, analysis. The literature is sparse as far as this 
depth-changing ability is concerned; most papers restrict themselves to the hypergame 
level as such, rather than showing its effectiveness in a richer, more realistic scenario. 
Metagames 
At the technique level metagame analysis (Howard, 1971,1975,1987,1989a, 1989b, 1990, 
1993) has two components. First is a representation of a conflict situation (a game) as a list 
of options for a player together with his choice options (what the classical theory would 
call strategies). In this respect the metagame is simply an isomorphism of the normal 
form. A simplification is now applied, using judgmental criteria, as to which combinations 
Of options are possible and which are not. This results in a wholesale simplification of a 
complex game, and, moreover one which complies fullbloodedly with the anthropic 
requirement. There is total control by the users of which options are to be included and 
which are not. 
After rank ordering by desirability of outcome, the method presents the scenarios in which 
the players could find themselves in a highly accessible diagrammatic form. A form of 
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structural analysis is applied which identifies the 'improvement paths' for each player 
from one situation to another, together with the sanctions which others could invoke. The 
method provides a way of representing a range of ill-defined human attributes such as 
trust, love and anger in a partly convincing style (Howard, 1989b, 1993). 
Metagame analysis in comparison with hypergame analysis is a small but significant step 
towards the heart of the soft systems world. It has, in no small measure, all the attributes 
required of a soft system methodology in that it allows highly flexible and forgiving use of 
data, it is anthropic, generates signals indicating inconsistencies in data, and certainly 
cannot be accused of being teleological. It has the great advantage of presenting its 
recommendations in a structural rather than a numerical and prescriptive way. 
The case studies presented (Howard, 1989a) are well-bounded. One in particular deals 
with the analysis of the incompatible objectives of parties to a labour dispute, and the 
method indicates fairly convincingly a hitherto unseen solution, namely that of hiring 
external staff to fill the gap caused by a strike. This allows the company, now in a position 
of strength, to assure the rest of the workforce that their striking colleagues will not be 
dismissed, thus, counter-intuitively, undermining the position of the strikers. The method 
of resolution would probably have occurred naturally in discussion if a Human Resources 
manager sufficiently well-read in his own field had been present. 
Of itself, of course, such an observation is no basis on which to dismiss the method as 
insubstantial, and, in fact, it is suspected that there is a body of casework unattached to the 
academic literature which may be more convincing. One is left with the suspicion, however, 
that it is the practitioner's expertise as much as the methodology which produces good 
answers in practice. 
For the purposes of the present work, metagame theory offers a tangible contribution, by 
virtue'at least, of its hidden case histories which may reveal a method of transferability and 
applicability. Even if that were to prove the case, however, we are left with the criticism 
that metagame theory could not be said to be depth-changing or data-pragmatic. In the 
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S=e way that conventional game theory has the deepest structural difficulty in absorbing 
qualitative and subjective data, metagame theory has clear difficulty in absorbing quantitative 
inputs. 
The extension of Howard's (1971) work by Fraser and Hipel (1979,1984) (Hipel, Wang 
and Fraser, 1988) is central to the developments reported here, and will be discussed in 
somewhat more detail than other methods. 
Howard's approach was to identify a conflict as a set of outcomes, or states, which were 
defined by the choices available to the participants. Each participant has a number of 
choices which he can adopt as tactics; each opponent has choices which she can adopt. 
Combinations of choices lead to outcomes, as in a conventional normal form game. 
Howard's extension was to consider the extent to which payers can move between outcomes 
(tactical choices) on a unilateral basis. If the difference between two outcomes, i and j 
derived only from a tactical choice under the control of a single player, P, the change from 
i toj presents the possibility of unilateral action on the part of P. Howard then makes the 
observation that if P prefers i toj, he will not induce the transition, whereas if P prefers j 
to i the transition will be induced by P, and a unilateral improvement, or UI will be induced. 
Although best understood from scratch in the above manner, Howard's approach in fact 
stems from consideration of metagames. 'A metagame is a game that takes into account 
thepossible reactions of a particular player to the other players'known strategies in the 
basic game. ' (Fraser and Hipel, 1984, p205). Let us (following an example of Fraser and 
Hipel), consider a US-USSR standoff with each player having the options C, L and S, 
where C consist of a conventional attack, L consists of limited nuclear action, and S consists 
of full nuclear release. Outcomes of the game then consist, conventionally, of pairs (x, y) 
such as (L, C), where the US responds with a limited nuclear strike, L, to a conventional 
attack, C, by the US. 
The situation is not resolved in a single step, however, and metagame theory considers 
conditional responses on the part of one player to all options on the part of the other player 
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as if there were a sequentiality in the game. Thus, the US meta-strategy takes the form a/ 
b/c where a is the US response to a Soviet play of C, b is a response to the Soviets'playing 
L and c is the response to a Soviet play of S. There is a similar meta-strategy d/e/f for the 
Soviet player, where d, e and f represent choices from the available tactical choice set for 
the Soviet player. 
Moreover, it will be seen that if the meta-strategies are presented in a normal (matrix) 
form, they constitute a matrix game which is subject to all general solution approaches of 
such games. 
In the example presented, there are 27 possible US combinations. One of them, for example, 
is LLS, where the US will respond with limited nuclear response in all cases except where 
it is attacked with a full nuclear release. The outcomes of the game can be calculated and 
presented in a matrix such as Table 5 below. 
! UgSR 
IL 
i c1rl(c 
CICIL 
C/cls 
C/uc (Ulto 
iGs CIUL c vus 
CISIL 
C/S/s 
! etc. 
Table 5: Indicative example of metagame matfix. 
Howard (1971) then applies criteria of rationality similar to those of conventional normal 
form to ensure that players choose options which comply with their stated preferences as 
to outcomes. The method has the advantage that it allows a player to take into account the 
contingent nature of strategies in a sequential game, or in a game where sequentiality can be 
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assumed. The process can be continued, so that meta-meta-strategies are defined where a 
listing x/y/z/w/u/v/.. for the US defines the responses to a series of Soviet meta-strategies 
like d/e/f above. I 
Howard establishes algorithms for solution or equilibrium seeking. An outcome is rational 
for a player if it is the best outcome that she can obtain given that other players do not 
change their strategies. An outcome that is rational for all players is called an equilibrium. 
7here are three levels of rationality applicable which Howard defines, 
Rationality, where there is no unilateral improvement (UI) available to any player 
from a state (defined by a choice of meta-strategies on the part of the players). 
Symmetric meta-rationality, where, for every UI, another player can act so as to 
take the game to an outcome which the first player prefers less than the start 
position. 
General meta-rationality, which applies to all the other outcomes (after rationality 
and symmetric rationality have been found) if there are no inescapable 
improvement strategies available for the participants. General meta-rationality 
occurs when a cyclic argument must be applied; whereby a player apparently is 
sanctioned from a Ul by symmetric meta-rationality but then has a counter choice 
available which in turn is countered by other players, and so on (Fraser and Hipel, 
1984, pp 215-218). 
These are applied in the following flowchart (Figure 6) to detect stability or equilibrium. 
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End 
Fig 6: Flowchart (after Howard, 1971), showing the analysis algorithm for 
determining stability 
Fraser and Hipel then extend the Howard method (Fraser and Hipel, 1984, pp223-230) 
using the following argument. '[Ajn action on the part ofa player orplayers is credible if 
and only if the action results in an outcome more preferredfor the player orplayers who 
are levying the action. Thus the only outcomes that could credibly deter a playerfrom 
improving an outcome are those that can he achieved by the otherplayers improving their 
Position from either the possible UI available to the player, or from the outcome under 
consideration. ' This leads to the following important extension to the stability concept. 
Howard conceives of the stability induced by sequential stability, where a UI for a player 
A, from i toj is sanctioned by any other player, B, if B has a preferred UI fromj to another 
state which A prefers less than L Xs action is sanctioned because another player can 
subsequently take him to a state he likes even less than his start point. His satisfaction at 
reaching the preferred state j will be only temporary. Hence he will not invoke his power to 
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bring about the Ul from i to j. Fraser and Hipel then extend this concept from sequential 
stability to simultaneous stability. Here, the possible improvements from the state i to 
other states under the control of B are considered, as well as those states which could be 
accessed by B from statej, the intermediate one. Note, however, that we are still considering 
only UIs, namely that those transitions where a single player has control over the transition 
from one possible outcome to another. 
Fraser and Hipel then use their revised stability criteria to determine which combinations 
of outcomes are stable, and hence which are likely to be results of the development of a 
scenario. They apply this convincingly to a number of simple and complex scenarios, 
ranging from the Cuban Missile Crisis (ibid., p. 53-62), to the complicated Garrison (pp25- 
49) and Poplar River (pp. 160-167) conflicts between the US and Canada over the drainage 
system policy on their joint border. They also engage in a discussion of a state transition 
matrix approach which offers the potential of addressing the dynamics of a conflict. States 
are defined as previously, by the combinations of tactical choices, and the feasibility of 
moving between them is expressed in a state transition matrix, which can be solved using 
well known methods. 
We can view the work of Fraser and Hipel as carrying out the following procedure, in 
summary: - 
Define a set of players 
Describe the tactical choices available to each player as a set of bipolar choices 
(e. g. either invade or not invade) 
Compile a set of all mutually compatible tactical choices on the parts of the various 
players. Some combinations of choices of player A will not be compatible with 
choices for player B. This set of feasible tactical choices then constitutes the 
playing space of the game. The choices of tactical options constitute a set of 
states of possible future outcomes. 
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Determine which transitions between these states are feasible in the sense that a 
player has both motivation to move from one state to another, and can do so 
unilaterally because only his tactical choices have to alter in order for the transition 
to take place. 
Apply the developed stability rules to determine the equilibrium outcomes. 
We can thus see the Fraser and Hipel and Howard methods as discrete state space approaches 
to games. This perspective then links them intellectually with 
a) the DGGs of Washbum (1990) 
Theory of Moves of Brams (1994) 
The game theoretic representations of Boulding (1962, pp49-58) 
The multi-futures work of Rhyne (See below) 
and these connections will be expanded in Section IV, chapter 5, as a new framework is 
presented for discussion. 
Shortcomings of Howard and Fraser and flipelApproaches 
Before offering a critique of the two styles of approach together, we observe the comments 
of Fraser and Hipel upon Howard's (197 1) approach, (Fraser and Hipel 1984, p. 223) 
' Although the metagame analysis method of Howard (1971) discussed... provided 
one of thefirst approachesfor the rigorous study ofa complex conflict situation, it has a 
number offlaws that render it difficult to use in practice: 
1. Metagame analysis requires a large number of tables. In a thorough analysis 
each player requires a separate tablefor each outcome. Thus the total number of table is 
the number ofplayers multiPlied bY the number of outcomes in the game.. 
2. Metagame analysis merely determines the metaequilibriums in a game. It is 
uP to the analyst to distinguish the outcomes that are based on credible sanctions and that 
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thus might be resolutions to the conj7ict. Since often most ofthe outcomes in a given conflict 
fonn metaequilibriums, the metagame analysis does not really provide much information 
other than a convenient notation. 
3. Metagame analysis cannot readily be usedfor the analysis of games in which 
information is incomplete or misleading. 
4. Metagame analysis is not easy to computerise, although efforts have been 
made to do so. ' 
We note here the nature of Fraser and Hipel's critique; it is based on an assumption (point 
2 above) that the analysis method should secure a solution which does not draw upon 
extrinsic knowledge. A distinction is being drawn here between intrinsic knowledge, being 
that information whýich is comprehended formally by the model of the game and, on the 
other hand, extrinsic information which is a body of knowledge germane to the problem 
which is undeclared at the commencement of the solution procedure but which may 
subsequently appear to be relevant. Clearly the aim of a formal mathematical solution 
must be to achieve rationality over and above that of plausibility by restricting argument to 
the intrinsic information, being the only body of knowledge declared apriori. The contention 
in this present work, however, is that to act under such a limited definition of rationality is 
to deny access to a body of knowledge which is germane but undeclared. The price then 
paid is that of an apparent weakening of the logical chain from a priori assumption to 
conclusion, but if this linking is achieved without accessing a piece of information which 
is extrinsic and therefore not formally included, the conclusion will be less strong than if 
both intrinsic and extrinsic information were to be comprehended as they are perceived to 
be necessary in the solution procedure. The difference in approach derives essentially 
from a distinction between a proof and a normative-descriptive management tool. Moreover, 
there is an assumption that the conflict resolution process should be (indeed has the potential 
to be) rigorous. Both of these assumptions (invalidity of extrinsic knowledge and rigour) 
are rejected here as inappropriate save for the examination of stereotypical game theory 
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situations as distinct from the rich and woolly situations of real-life business strategic 
conflict. 
The following difficulties are observed in applying the two methods, of Fraser and 
Hipel and of Howard, in the business strategic application in particular. 
a) Paucity of tactical representations 
Both existing methods represent tactical choices as a set of two-way choices. In 
reality tactical choices are (or can be) much richer. For example, in a bidding 
struggle the choice of bid price can be represented as a set of bipolar choices, but 
is more effectively represented as either a choice on a continuum or among a 
large set of breakpoint prices. 'Ibis bipolar tactical choice set is something of an 
encumbrance, since it tends to exacerbate the combinatorial problem of the growth 
of the number of tactical 'words' in the tactical game-space. A multipolar tactical 
choice representation is more efficient in this respect. 
More generally, the representation of tactical choices as bipolar 1/0 options does 
not encourage imaginative tactical examination. One of the difficulties in the 
strategic process is that the opponent can only be imbued with objectives or 
assumptions of which one has conceived. See also (Bacharach, 1993, pp 259, 
258). The limited tactical representation does not appear to help with the necessary 
expansion of the sense-maker's belief-space. 
b) Order of analysis 
Both the conventional methods start with an examination of the tactics and end 
with statements about the likely outcomes. Figure 7 illustrates this. 
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Tactics 
Outcomes 
Objectives 
Figure Z Order of analysis in Fraser and Hipel approach 
This is not an unreasonable position; tactics, after all, determine outcomes. Many 
other things determine the outcome as well, however, and there is an implicit 
assumption in both approaches that if only the tactics of the players were defined 
(in terms of the choices they have made to induce an outcome) then an outcome 
can be defined. This is patently not the case, since a plethora of environmental 
factors which surround the model will also determine the outcome, to the extent 
that the game is an imperfect sampling of the rich real world problem. A more 
appropriate approach stems from the recognition that it is the outcomes which are 
important to players, and it is towards these outcomes that they will drive their 
actions. Figure 8 shows a structure which allows the accommodation of structural 
factors (states or outcomes), objectives and tactics to contribute to the perceived 
conflict structure. 
leodb-k 
tates 
Situation Tactics 
appraisal 
Objectives 
+ 
168-0 f. edbwk 
Figure 8: Sensemaking and action planning structure 
Actiýn 
planning 
Thus, it is the outcomes which determine the tactics as well as the reverse. Clearly, 
Page 140 
however, the two interact inextricably. In determining one's freedom of action in 
a situation it seems more natural to enquire what is the desired outcome, and then 
to move to a discussion of what options are open to the participants. The Fraser 
and Hipel approach is not unreasonable, taking as it does the assumption that in a 
well-defined model the outcomes will be determined by what the players choose 
to do, but it is likely to lead to a poorer view of the tactical freedom, since it 
moves ab initio to the tactical choices, rather than letting the likely actions of 
participants emerge from what they want. Fraser and Hipel are fatalistic, in a 
sense, in that they implicitly define the outcome as what is resultant from the 
effect of a choice of tactics among a set necessarily limited by being a priori. To 
put it another way, they only admit into the players' belief space those outcomes 
which result from a tactical choice, rather than admitting what is desired, even if, 
at first glance, the outcomes may appear unreachable. Moreover the alternative 
sensemaking/planning context (Figure 8) indicates that because of the order of 
assumptions and analysis, the output of the process is something which is 
controllable, namely the tactics, as opposed to something which is only secondarily 
controllable, namely the outcome. This is a matter of placement of the inventive 
effort in the planning process. New tactics may be inventable as a result of a 
recognition that what is desired is unachievable with the existing conception of 
tactics. In the conventional approach, the output is a set of outcomes which in 
reality are consequences of tactics and objectives and are therefore only susceptible 
to the inventive spark at second hand. 
c) Treatment of observed system 
The difficulty here is one common to all models which work by observing the 
system to be represented and then cease observing it while the analysis is being 
carried out. Most mathematical and logical models are of this type. The activities 
of the critical modernist philosophical community on the one hand and the soft 
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OR community on the other, however, admit of a different species of model, 
where the process of analysis itself is a continual re-examination of the system 
observed. These models no longer shut the door on the observed system after the 
initial observation; they continue to comprehend its changing character as the 
analysis evolves. One can categorise the problem by means of Figures 9 and 10. 
Figure 9 (from Fraser and Hipel, 1984, p7) shows the approach of the conventional 
methods. Data is effectively input only at the beginning of the process, so that the 
analysis must be rerun in order to insert further tranches of data later in the process. 
W6rid, 
"Conflict 
" Sta!! ity. 
Analysis 
-In rma n, for, ',, - '-" "; d6clilbn, 
Figure 9: Fraser and Hioel analysis sequence 
Figure 10, however illustrates the greater degree of interaction between the analysis 
process and the observed system more representative of the degree of interaction 
between action planning and sensemaking observed in strategic decision making 
(Huff, 1985; Huff and Reger, 1987; Pfeffer, 198 1). This is necessary because the 
process of strategic decision making is not simply one of representing an observed 
system. Rather, the strategic process is firstly a sensemaking activity (Weeks and 
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Whimster, 1985; Whittington, 1995) - only then can options be identified and 
weighed, leading to a resultant action plan. Sensemaking is at the heart of the 
decision making process. Added to this requirement is the observation that in any 
strategic problem, the analysis itself alters the observed system. The need for the 
structure of Figure 10 follows. 
Wotid 
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Figure 10: Altemative analysis sequence 
Confrontation Analysis and Drama Theory 
A recent extension of the metagame work reported above attempts to understand the effect 
of changing motivations, and utilities by players during the evolution of a game. Drama 
theory (Howard, Bennett, Bryant and Bradley, 1992; Howard, 1994,1997a, 1997b) observes 
that 'the dynamics of conflict are often driven hy the paradoxes actors encounter when 
trying to respond rationally to a situation perceived asfixed. '(Bennett, 1997, p4). Typically 
II 
these paradoxes present themselves as sanctions or promises which the actor would be 
unwilling to carry out. Often these irrationalities of choice are shown up as disjunctions 
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between a myopic utility preference in conflict with a perceived greater good for the 
economic context in which the actor sits. The game of Chicken, treated later in some depth 
is a good example of this, where a player is forced, by a myopic attitude towards utility, to 
put himself and the other player at personal risk in order to maximise his own gain. 
The drama theory approach is to identify the actors, their options and preferences in a 
frame of reference, the situation as seen by a particular actor. 
The drama evolves as a set of episodes. These episodes or scenes, defined by tactical 
choices made by the actors are expressible in a tree form. 
Within each scene there is a classical dramaturgical trajectory of scene-setting, buildup, 
climax and denouement, this being a microcosm of the drama as a whole. 
Each player in each scene adopts a position -a scenario which they would have come 
about. Communication takes place within these scenes which results in the understanding 
among the players that they each have incompatibilities between their own positions and 
those of the other players. This leads to a denouement or climax where the frames 
themselves come under the pressure of the observed incompatibilities. Stability is reached 
when the frames are no longer under pressure because all the pressure points have been 
explored. Drama theory claims to offer a general mathematical treatment of how the frames 
are transformed from episode to episode. Emotions are interpreted as stemming from 
irrational choice, where the positions of the players (their perceived frames) are 
incompatible. A realignment of the frame results, and drama theory claims a mathematical 
structure to predict this. 
The related confrontation analysis (Howard et al, 1992; Howard, 1994,1997a, 1997b; 
Bennett, 1997; Bennett and van Heeswijk, 1997) provides suggestions as to how the drama 
is likely to develop. In particular, a set of topologies is offered which together characterize 
the possible fi-ame incompatibilities which the players may encounter. An example (Bennett, 
1997, p9,10) is the cooperation dilemma; player A is undecided whether he should trust 
player B because in spite of a promise to cooperate, A sees that B has a myopic self- 
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interest not to cooperate. Confrontation theory in conjunction with drama theory seeks, 
then to characterise these stylised positions and to break down the overall drama into 
episodically treated micro-conflicts. It is well supported by software and has had some 
practical applications (Bennett and van Heeswijk, 1997). 
In the context of this present work, drama theory and its extension suffer from the same 
disadvantages that hypergames and their extension to confrontation analysis exhibit. In 
particular, the definition of scenarios (in conflict analysis) or episodes (in drama theory) 
exclusively by tactical choice is unnecessarily restrictive. Secondly, it would appear that 
the establishment of the positions of the actors can only be achieved with their cooperation; 
ifcommunication is not present, as is frequently the case in industrial situations, the observer 
cannot make any appreciation of the position of the actors. Nevertheless, drama and 
confrontation theory are seen as useful adjuncts to a more specific solution framework to 
the problem of planning and managing strategic conflict. 
Multiple Futures Planning 
Although they are not specifically concerned with the management of conflict, multi- 
futures planning tools such as Field Anomaly Relaxation (FAR), described below, provide 
the basis for planning in conflictual situations. A description of FAR is included here in 
order that tits connection with the discrete game approaches described above can be 
appreciated. It also provides the basis for a link between discrete multi-futures planning 
and directed graph games later in this work. 
Field Anomaly Relaxation (FAR) (Rhyne, 1974,1980; Coyle & McGlone, 1996; Coyle, 
and Sutton, 1994) is a future scenario development tool used in military planning. It has 
been largely ignored in spite of having an ease of use and applicability which at least 
compares with other futures tools. It has been used in the analysis of scenarios in the SE 
Asia region, and in at least one other limited analysis for the purposes of critique. Both 
appeared most promising and FAR received the approval of both sets of commentators in 
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respect of its potential for the exploration of future scenarios for the purposes of military 
planning at a national level. 
FAR is characterised by thefollowing steps, surnmarised in Figure 11. 
a) declaration of important, essentially self-contained fields which are aimed at 
characterising the nature of the future scenarios, the exploration of which is the 
objective of FAR. 
b) a breakdown of those charactcrising fields into a scale of effect. For example 
'tension' might be scaled into 'peace', diplomatic friction', 'sporadic non-firing 
conflict', 'limited hostility', 'general regional warfare'. 
c) the establishment of a metalanguage which consists of a word, the components 
of which are the scale values of the fields. These words then span all the possible 
combinations of fields and scale values. If, as recommended by Rhyne, there are 
around 7 fields and around 7 scale values there will be about 800,000 possible 
words. This is large, but not excessive; any smaller and the scenario possibilities 
will be insufficiently rich; any larger and the work content of any analysis explodes. 
Nevertheless steps must be taken to reduce this number of possibilities to allow 
progress towards a usable set of scenario possibilities. 
d) the pairwise comparison of elements of each vector-word to ensure that each 
vector-word word is internally self consistent. It is understood that this reduces 
substantially the number of feasible scenarios 
e) a whole word self-consistency examination. This reduces the number of 
feasible words, typically to around 100 - 200 possible futures. 
f) a grouping process (clustering) to allow the analysts to deal with a number of 
scenarios having similarities as a group. Additionally, of course, the substantial 
reduction in scenarios at this stage makes it significantly easier to hold the nature 
of the scenario group in the mind at one time. 
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compare parts of words 
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Assess each word for overall 
feasibility 
I 
cluster feasible words to 
form scenarios 
Describe each scenario in 
essay form 
Figure 11: General procedure for field anomaly relaxation 
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g) description of the members of this reduced set of states (words) in essay form, 
to bring them to life in the sense of testing their consistency and reasonableness 
against the world models of the analysts 
h) generating a tree structure (Figure 12) which illustrates the potential 
development from one scenario to another, together with a time-line. 
time 
scale 
Figure 12: Futures tree generated by FAR. Each node represents a clustered set 
of futures. 
This tree structure can be thought of as a type of directed graph where locations (nodes) 
are produced by the FAR filtering process. These nodes can also be considered potentially 
as the outcomes of a complex game where the tactical choices of each of he contributors to 
the futures contribute to the words, and these words form the basis for outcome calculation. 
In this respect FAR provides potentially a discipline for producing outcomes without explicit 
description of the players in a scenario. 
The work has been extended (Powell & Coyle, 1997) and (Powell, 1997) to make more 
explicit the directed graph aspect of Rhyne's work. This extension is reported fully below 
and fonns the basis for a supporting technique to the subject of this present work. 
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Summary of applicability of methods 
Table 6 below shows the main criticisms of the techniques addressed in this chapter when 
compared against the criteria of a strategic conflict management tool derived earlier. It can 
be seen that no single method covers all the requirements. No prospect appears for any 
substantial development of either the IR-derived methods not for the general soft systems 
representation methods such as SSM. In the first case the approaches are too concentrated 
on the procedures and bases for the conflict. In the case of the System Analysis approaches, 
while they will undoubtedly provide insight into the context and structure of the conflict 
situation, they are unlikely to be sufficiently focused on the conflict issues as such. 
We shall see below, however, that many of the techniques discussed here form part of a 
basis for the development of a unifying approach. In particular the following are particularly 
relevant for the framework proposed: - 
Conventional game theory in its multifarious representations is insufficient of 
itself to provide a wide enough and transferable basis for a general conflict 
management method. Nevertheless its elegant and specific solutions have the 
advantage of being robust in a mathematical sense, and should provide elements 
which fit under a higher level framework. 
Variable universe games may provide the foundation for a method which deal 
with the differing belief spaces of participants. 
Directed graph games, in combination with the concepts indicated from metagames 
will provide one basis for a state based approach which will allow successive 
focusing on elements of a wide structure -a depth changing approach. What is 
required is to make more general the basis on which the transitions between states 
can be allowed. In particular the concept of a unilateral improvement does not 
reflect the fact that in many practical cases the transition from one 'state of affairs' 
to another is very definitely not in the hand of one player, and while it would be 
argued that the state definitions of metagames could be expanded to account for 
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this, such an adaptation appears to be insensitive to the practicalities of state 
generation. 
Such a directed graph game, informalized to take into account the rich practical 
environment, may well use a higher level state-based environmental model to set 
the boundary conditions for the lower level game. 
Within such a structure the scenarios or states generated by FAR may well provide 
an overarching contextual and strategic structure into which more detailed conflict 
analyses may fit. 
A wholesale adaptation of the state generation process common to many conflict 
analysis methods, namely that the states of nature, the outcomes of the game are 
defined solely by the tactical choices made the players apriori must be undertaken 
if the framework is to reflect the interaction of sensemaking and action in strategic 
decision making. 
We shall see in Chapter 5 that these elements can be brought together to form a flexible 
framework which complies with the requirements of Table 4 derived earlier, and which 
gives effective action planning products for strategic conflict management. 
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Table 6. Summary of potential contributions of existing methods and their 
Potential as part of an overall framework 
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Section III. - Methodological foundations 
Chapter 4: Methodology and this research 
Aim and objectives 
Research paradigms 
Justification 
criteria 
internal 
external 
method 
Intervention inquiry strategy 
Overall study methodology 
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Chapter 4: Methodology and this research 
Alm, objectives 
In Chapter one the following research aim for this work was declared, and it is reproduced 
here for the convenience of the reader. 
Research A im: 
To provide an appropriate, justified techniquefor the predictive understanding of stra- 
tegic conflict. 
Rosavr, ý 0,, ýImvlves 
1. Examine the nature of strategic conflict 
2. Identify desirable characteristics for a method. 
3. Assess existing methods against these criteria . 
4. Propose a candidate framework. 
5. Compare this framework against the criteria of 
goodness. 
6. Develop a particular embodiment of the 
framework. 
7. Test the embodiment in practice. Assess the 
embodiment aganst the criteria 
8. Make amendments and propose further 
development to the framework 
Table 7., Objectives of this research 
Table 7 summarises the objectives leading to the achievement of that aim. 
The purpose of this chapter, then, is to report the selection of the methodologies, para- 
digms and study frameworks appropriate for the achievement of these aims and objec. 
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tives. It is assumed that, since strategic decision making is carried out by people, individu- 
ally and in groups, and is effected within a structure, be it industrial or sociopolitical, 
which comprises groups of people acting in a social order, it is, of essence a legitimate 
topic for the application of social science research paradigms. At first glance this assump- 
tion would appear to reject non-social science paradigms and, in particular, that of the 
logical positivist scientific traditions, but we shall see below that the latter tradition is fully 
comprehended (although enthusiastically undermined) by the social science paradigms. 
Research paradigms and perspectives 
Paradigms of social science research 
quantitative versus qualitative approaches 
John Stuart Mill (1843) was the instigator of a movement towards the quantification of 
social study in pursuit of the methods of the natural sciences. In an attempt to move for- 
ward the study of social systems it appeared appropriate, both for sociopolitical reasons 
and in a genuine desire to emulate the undoubted success of contemporary 'hard' science, 
to adopt what were understood as the main tenets of such quantitative approaches. Specifi- 
cally, the ease with which hypotheses could be verified (positivism) or falsified (post- 
positivism) was strongly related to the degree of mathematical precision with which the 
hypothesis could be stated. 
A quantitative approach today has enormous attractions to the researcher. Powerful tech- 
niques for the gathering of data are readily available; equally, powerful computers are 
available for their reduction. Moreover the very structure of the mathematical structures 
which underwrite much of the process of understanding in the 'hard' sciences lends itself 
to a simplicity of representation which is attractive to the observer/commentator. The ex- 
pression of a functional relationship between observed variables is efficiently expressed in 
mathematical form and is thereby easily studied by the quantitative method. 
Iliere are, however, significant critiques of the quantitative method in the context of the 
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social sciences. Guba and Lincoln (1994) divide these into internal or interparadigm, cri- 
tiques and external or extraparadigm critiques. Together they present a strong attack on the 
previously unchallenged supremacy of the quantitative method. 
internal critiques 
Context stripping 
The quantification and randomisation approaches inherent in the quantitative 
method strip away, by deliberately suppressing them, those variables which 
form the context of the study. In a sense, the accepted data gathering, reducing 
and interpretation methods are accused of presupposing the relevance of vari- 
ables a priori in the experimental designs. Additionally, because of the search 
for theoretical rigour, the generalizability of such models is effectively limited 
to the constrained sets of circumstances in which they were discovered. 
Exclusion of meaning and purpose 
When we consider the activities of humans, either individually or in groups 
we cannot divorce the behaviour from the intent, meaning and purpose of the 
subjects. These latter attributes are less amenable to quantitative approaches. 
The dilemma of inclusion over distancing 
The externalised, outsider (etic) theory brought to bear on the problem may 
have no relevance to the way of thinking or value systems of the informants. 
Unlike the qualitative approaches the quantitative are ungrounded in the belief 
spaces of the informants. An emic, insider view which includes the researcher 
within the participants' belief structure is essentially qualitative in nature and 
provides the possibility of determining the belief structures from within. For 
strategic research this is a most serious criticism. It is argued that the very 
nature of strategic conflict is determined by the beliefs which the participants 
have of the objectives, structure and behaviour of the conflictual situation. An 
observer standing at the door observing the behaviour of the participants in a 
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struggle may well, by virtue of that distancing, remove himself from that so- 
cial circle of information which it is necessary to penetrate in order to access 
the thinking of the informants. This protectionism of the beliefs and assumed 
knowledge of the participants is not to be underestimated. Frequently, in stra- 
tegic situations a decision making elite will employ an outsider (consultant) 
rather than run the risk of releasing sensitive information to a fellow subordi- 
nate employee. An emic approach is essential in the strategic application. 
Nomothetic/idiographic disjunction 
The critique here is that data derived for generalities have no application nec- 
essarily for a particular situation at a particular time. In strategic applications 
one might present the criticism as the observation that a particular conflict 
type is resolved by a particular method x% of the time is of little interest or 
relevance to the corporate situation, since failure to identify whether a theory 
is relevant may mean the difference between survival or extinction for our 
company. 
Exclusion of the discovery dimension of inquiry 
The insistence in the scientific method of the prior declaration of hypotheses 
excludes examination of the source of these hypotheses. Only empirically de- 
rived hypotheses are deemed to be appropriate. 
External critiques 
The criticisms offered above are serious ones but could be addressed by the use of qualita- 
tive methods either as a replacement for the quantitative approach or by a hybrid approach. 
Other criticisms exist additionally, however which offer alternative paradigms for inquiry. 
Theory-ridden facts 
Received wisdom assumes that data observations are made indepenedently of 
any assumptions about the theory under investigation. It would, however, now 
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seem 'established beyond objection that theories andfacts are quite interde- 
pendent - that is, thatfacts arejacts only within some theoreticalframework I 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1994, p 107) 
under-determination of theory 
Popper (1959,1968) among others rejects the verifiability assumptions of the 
scientific method in favour of an approach which allows a theory to remain 'in 
play' only to the extent that it has not been falsified by counter-example. The 
ambition of the scientific approach, then, to be concerned with things that are 
true is brought sharply into question since the result of the falsification ap- 
proach is to identify a set of theories which contains no elements which are 
disproved, but which may contain untrue theories which have not yet been 
proven to be so. Moreover, because science does not concern itself with theo- 
rising about everything which may be true we are left with the situation that 
the set of allegedly true theories 'in play' in the scientific body of knowledge 
contains some things which are false and excludes many things which are true. 
value-ridden facts 
In the context of human activity systems, facts are weighted by the value of 
the observer. There is thus no recourse to the independent observer status of 
the natural sciences. 
interactive nature of researcher-informant 
Strict scientific methodology separates rigidly the researcher as observer and 
the informant as observed. Evidence exists, however (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) 
that the interaction between the two parties is unavoidable. In the study of 
strategic matters, for example, the strategic decision making process is highly 
observed by competitors (Grant, 1995; Luffman, Lea, Sanderson and Kenny, 
1996; Bowman and Faulkner, 1997; Ford and Saren, 1997). The effect of this 
is that even the knowledge that a competitor is engaged in a strategic review is 
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of itself a piece of strategic information. The effect is that the integrity and 
security of the researcher/consultant becomes a vital factor in the effective- 
ness of the strategy. Unless the researcher/consultant is felt by the informants 
to be part of the informant's problem (sharing the same business objectives, 
being 'part of the team') exclusion will be total. This participation then renders 
any attempt at independence not just futile, but rapidly destructive of the re- 
search opportunity. Clients or informants set the agendas in strategic research; 
they are powerful members of decision making elites, and they will include 
researcher/consultants only on their terms, and their terms are to embrace the 
process and the values or be excluded (MacMillan, 1992; Pfeffer, 1981; Huff 
and Reger, 1987). 
On the basis of these arguments, a qualitative approach is adopted for the present work. 
This is not to say that there is no place for quantitative analyses of particular elements of a 
situation, but that the essential structures of strategic conflict will be addressed using quali- 
tative paradigms. It is now appropriate to discuss what paradigms are offered in replace- 
ment for the positivist scientific method. 
Four paradigms will be addressed, namely the positivist and post-positivist traditions, the 
critical theory paradigm and the closely related interpretivist/constructivist approaches. 
These last two will, in turn, be divided the better to determine and appreciate their rel- 
evance to the strategic problem addressed here. Following Guba and Lincoln (1994) we 
shall observe the characteristics of each paradigm under the headings of ontological as- 
SUmptions, epistemological assumptions, and methodological consequences. 
positivist 
Positivism assumes that there is a reality which can be accessed by directed inquiry. This 
reality is singular and we converge towards it by examining and declaring cause and effect 
laws which can then be compared with the underlying reality as if we had access to a fixed 
set of experimental apparatus. The observer and the observed are viewed as being inde- 
Pendent entities, and the investigator can observe without interference and without being 
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influenced by the observed. It is as if the inquiry is made by an observer standing outside 
the experimental situation, observing through a one-way mirror. Because of this isolation 
of observer from observed and the alleged existence of an underlying singular reality, facts 
can be understood as 'true' or 'false' with a certainty dependent only upon the excellence 
of the isolation of the observer from the observed and the truth of the theory. Methodolo- 
gies consist of attempts by the theoriser to state valid theories and then test them against 
the singular reality. To the extent that they are in concert with what is observed, then they 
are deemed 'true'. 
post positivist 
The post-positivist approach, stemming in no small part from the work of Popper (1935) is 
Characterised primarily by the rejection of the verifiable nature of knowledge, and uses, 
instead the idea of falsifiability. Thus post-positivist science establishes the known as a 
temporarily accepted 'truth', admitted to the set of true facts only by virtue of its having 
been tested but never proven wrong. In this paradigm reality is assumed to be apprehended 
only on a statistical asymptotic basis. Human intelligence is understood to be defective; 
the ontological assumption can be summarised as that of critical reality by virtue of the 
need to subject investigative results to as wide a critical a process as is possible in order to 
ensure as sound a basis for truth as is possible. Methodologically, post-positivism adopts a 
hybrid view, appending qualitative methods on a fundamentally qualitative structure. 
critical 
From the viewpoint of the critical or structural school, reality was once singular and avail- 
able but is distorted by the processes of the application of social, ethnic, economic and 
other factors, so that the original singular reality is crystalized into a series of structures 
which we have no reason to reject as the only visible remains of a long lost reality. Since 
we have no way of unearthing the original we are forced to accept the remaining structures 
as reality. Epistemologically, critical theory accepts the interdependence between observer 
and observed, and judges that what can be known is a function as much of the observer as 
Of the observed. Data are value-ridden, and the inquiry is transactional in nature. The 
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methods of critical theory are built byjoint inquiry onto the historically underwritten theo- 
ries in hand. In other words, the methodologies aim to resolve differences between partici- 
pants. The critical theory can be said to be strongly related methodologically to the 
Habermasian concepts of communicative rationality (Habermas, 198 1,1 and 11) and can 
be summed up neatly in Figure 13, which represents the relationship between the speech- 
acts of two participants, AI and A2 and the connection between their communications and 
acts which affect the objective world and their own views of the world. Habermas adopts 
an objective in human social intercourse of power-free communication, so that it is only 
by engaging in a convergence towards rationality as perceived by another that true com- 
munication (including research) can be achieved. To the extent that power-free communi- 
cation is judged to be possible, Habermas's communicative rationality is sustainable. 
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Figure 13 (from Habermas, 1981, /1, p 129 The relationship between the 
Objective and subjective worlds of participants 
Habermas's conception of the world is of a number of participants (in Figure 13 there are 
only, two) each of which has a limited access to an interpreted subset of an underlying 
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reality known as the lifeworld. Here he draws from the work of Schutz and Luckmann 
0 963). These interpreted views of reality are known as the subjective worlds of the par- 
ticipants and are distinct to them individually. Held in common are the social world and 
the objective world, the latter being the arena in which physical acts take place and the 
former being the commonly-perceived social structure in which both physical acts and 
what Habermas calls communicative acts are applied. It can be seen from Figure 13 that 
the communicative acts of the two participants establish relations between elements of 
these differing world views. They link the conceptions held by the participants in the 
respective interpreted versions of the underlying reality, the lifeworld. 
The scheme in Figure [13] is meant to illustrate that the lifeworld is constitutivefor 
mutual understanding as such, whereas theformal world-concepts constitute a ref- 
erence systemfor that about which mutual understanding is possible: speakers and 
hearers come to an understandingfrom out of their common lifeworld about some- 
thing in the objective social or subjective worlds. (Habermas 198 1,11 p. 126) 
In terms of relevance to business strategy, the connection between action, communication 
and the world views of the participants is clear. 
The concept ofcommunicative action singles out, ahove all, two aspects ofthis situ- 
ation management: the teleological aspect of realizing one's aims (or carrying out 
one's plan of action) and the communicative aspect of interpreting a situation and 
arriving at some agreement. ... Participants cannot attain their goals 
if they cannot 
meet the needfor mutual understanding calledfor hy the possihilities of acting in 
the situation... . (Habcrrnas op. cit. pp 126 - 127) 
What this means for the design of a strategic research methodology is that action cannot be 
divorced from understanding nor observation from participation. Inexorably, we must con- 
cede, step by step, that attempts to take a non-participatory role in the establishment either 
of action plans (through the conflict resolution techniques of this work), or of improved 
world views (through the multi-futures techniques) will constitute an interference with the 
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system under observation. No such observer role is possible. 
interpretivist1constructivist 
In this school reality is viewed as being local and specific in nature, multiply and person- 
ally observed and experientially based. Any concept of reality is burdened by the particu- 
lar circumstances of its conception. There may well be a central core of these alternative 
realities which observers hold in common, but this is no guarantee that the core in question 
represents an underlying truth, since an additional observer may well offer a reality which 
does not intersect that core. The constructions which observers make are mutable, as are 
the posited underlying (multiple) realities. In one respect the observers interpret reality 
differently (interpretivism), in another they construct reality (constructivism). In the analysis 
of strategic problems it is difficult to see how anything but a relativist (interpretivist/ con- 
structivist) position can be adopted. The views of the participants in a strategic struggle are 
entirely constructed by themselves. They have control over the value judgements which 
are applied and it is the application of these value judgements which determines the very 
structure of the conflict(s) which are being analysed. By application of a Habermasian 
communicative rationality concept it may be possible to establish as large a common core 
of the players' constructs as possible, but this will be limited by the combination of differ- 
ent players' value schemes, and by their necessarily deceptive communications one with 
the other. The strategic problem is essentially one in which no single reality is admissible. 
This multiplicity of world views (or belief spaces) is dealt with more fully later in this 
chapter. The position of the interpretivist/constructivist school is that findings are literally 
4 created' during the process of investigation by the interaction between observer and ob- 
served (Bruner, 1986). 'Constructivists are deeply committed to the.. view that what we 
take to he objective knowledge and truth is the result ofperspective. Knowledge and truth 
are created not discovered by mind. ' (Schwandt, 1994, p 125). The strategic intervention 
interpretation of this is that prior to the intervention the nature of the problem itself may be 
undefined. Byjointly experiencing the situation (the emic approach) an appreciation emerges 
which then becomes the reality of the strategic conflict at least from the point of view of 
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the informant, who, if she is the strategic decision maker (as is the case in a practical 
example discussed below) determines what constitutes the conflict. There is no other real- 
ity to the strategic conflict beyond the perceptions and value judgement of the strategic 
informant. This then conditions strongly the methodological approach, which must be a 
wholly emic one of wholesale involvement and identification with the objectives of the 
informant/client. The objective of the research/consultancy then becomes to provide an 
understanding which produces a set of actions which fulfil some performance criteria set 
by the informant/client, and these, in turn, set the criteria for performance of the research 
activity. 
Table 8 below (after Guba and Lincoln, op. cit, p 109) summariscs the four paradigms. 
item positivism post-positivism critical theory constructivism 
Ontology single reality and singular 'real' reality 'virtual reality shaped local and specific 
apprehendable but imperfectly by social, political. constructed realities 
apprehended cultural economic, 
ethnic and gender 
issues; crystallised 
over time 
Epistemology findings true findings probably value-mediatcd created findings 
true findings 
Methodology quantitive methods falsification of dialogic/dialectical participative, 
chiefly; verification hypotheses; may involved 
of hypotheses include 
quantitive/hybrid 
methods 
Table 8: A comparison of four research paradigms (after Guba and Lincoln) 
The impact of the strategic intervention problem on choice of paradigm 
Certain attributes of the strategic conflict problem now come into play to limit effectively 
our freedom of choice of research paradigm. The strategic conflict problem is defined in 
the minds and action sets of the participants (Stagner, 1967; Gup, 1979; Mitchell, 198 1). 
Often'the participants in the conflict do not communicate one with the other at all; tension 
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breaks out, diplomatic relations are broken off; boards of companies refuse to talk to one 
another. More frequently the communication between controlling parties is inefficient, 
sometimes it is deliberately deceitful; troop movements are disguised or intentions kept 
covert; bidding or coalition strategies are held back. More seriously, perhaps, it is ob- 
served in many strategic situations that the very existence of a conflict emerges from the 
preconceptions of the decision makers (Huff and Schwenk, 1985); the need to act in oppo- 
sition to a competitor emerges from a sensemaking discussion on the competitive environ- 
ment, and in that recognition that something needs to be done the strategic conflict takes 
form and breathes. In this latter instance it is incontestable that the nature of the problem is 
in the minds and perceptions of the decision makers and that the problem is perceived of 
differently, since until we take action the unassuming competitor may not even know that 
we present a threat. We have invented the conflict and therefore see it, but until we act the 
other party may not even accept that there is a conflict. 
Here the critical theorist might offer the charge of sophistry; there is a reality (that is, the 
existence of the conflict) but because of defects in the capability of the other party they 
cannot perceive the true situation. The counter to this argument is to enquire whether the 
conflict exists in 'the real world'until something is done about it, i. e. some public action is 
taken. And yet the conflict does exist - in the planning department's programmes and in 
the changed perception of how the strategic decision maker now views the outside world 
and his own organisation's capabilities. Until we invented the conflict we viewed these 
things in one way, but now that the conflict has been born, we view them with a different 
potential in mind. The differences between realities are clear. 
This argument remains true in the cases where the conflict has been made public, too, 
because, mutatis mutandis, to the extent that we make plans, make sense of the environ- 
ment and alter our value systems without communication with the competitor, we retain a 
different reality from that competitor. In terms of Habermas's communicative rationality, 
we approach his jointly held subjective world view only to then extent that we communi- 
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cate our rationality. As soon as we begin to hide the rationality if our actions either by 
withholding information nor by deliberately putting out deceitful information, we lose the 
likelihood of the convergence inherent in Figure 13 above. 
Because of the need for a pluralistic ontological approach, exacerbated by the need for a 
wholly emic approach to the strategic intervention, it is necessary to examine what such a 
constructivist paradigm means for research. What product could inquiry result in, and 
what use could it be in such a relativist universe? We shall address the issues ofjustifica- 
tion later on. 
Guba and Lincoln (1994, p 179) observe that the process of constructivist inquiry begins 
with the issues or concerns of the informant and the researcher and proceed through a 
dialectic of analysis, critique and reiteration towards a joint construction. They offer the 
following list of properties of these constructions. (From Schwandt, 1994 p 129) 
1. Constructions are attempts to make sense ofor to interpret experience, 
and most are sey-sustaining and seý(-renewing. 
2. The structure or quality ofa construction that can he held depends on 
upon "the range or scope of information available to a constructor, and the 
constructor's sophistication in dealing with that information " 
3. Constructions are extensively shared, and some ofthose shared are dis- 
ciplined constructions ", that is, collective attempts to come to common agree- 
ments about a state of affairs, for example science. 
4. Although all constructions must be considered meaningful, some are 
rightly labelled "malconstruction " because they are "incomplete, simplistic, 
uninformed, internally inconsistent, or derived hy inadequate methodology " 
5. Thejudgement as to whether a given construction is mal(ormed can he 
made only with reference to the paradigm out of which the constructor oper- 
ates "; in other words, criteria or standards areframework specific 
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6. One's constructions are challenged when one becomes aware of that 
new information conflicts with the held construction or when one senses a 
lack ofintellectual sophistication needed to make sense ofnew information. 
This table of construct properties will be used below in a discussion of justification of 
method, but here it provides an insight into the nature of the product of constructivist 
research. The aim is to agree constructs with our informant which satisfy the requirements 
of Guba and Lincoln's table. As such we shall aim towards a jointly held view of the 
strategic conflict situation which accords with our jointly held view and which satisfies 
the criteria, particularly, of item 4, above. Of course, the criteria of item 4 are not the 
watertight criteria of unfalsified theory espoused by Popper and the post-positivists, but 
they are the very best we can do under the severe constraints of the strategic conflict 
decision making process, both in its specifics and as an example of a human activity (and 
therefore social) system. 
Lastly, in the words of Ernst von Glasersfeld (Schwandt, 199 1, p 16), to know is 'to pos- 
sess ways and means of acting and thinking that allow one to attain the goals that one 
happens to have chosen' Alternatively, 'The validity of a knowledge claim is not to be 
found in the relationship ofreference or correspondence to an independently existing world; 
rather, a claim is thought to be valid if it is viable or if itprovidesfunctionalfit, that is if it 
works to achieve a goaL'(Schwandt, op cit, p 126) This perspective provides an alternative 
view of the constructivist product, namely that its utility is to be judged in the light if its 
added capability of allowing us to bring about the jointly held aims with which we cn- 
gaged in the first moment of intervention, when we stepped from the etic of observer into 
the emic of participant in the strategic process. 
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Justification 
Meaning ofiustification in a constructivist paradigm 
At first glance the essentially constructivist paradigm argued for above implies a limited 
expectation of proven validity or justifiability for the theories-in-play of the different 
players. Moreover, as has been argued, the inaccessibility of other critical players in the 
strategic conflict application means that comparison of world-view or theories-in-play 
of the participants is almost always impossible, at least at the time of the conflict. After 
the conflict we encounter the difficulty of retrospective self-justification and rationalisa- 
tion of behaviour by the winners and losers, so that even historical comparisons of 
theories- in-play become limited in their usefulness. Schwandt (1994, p 122) observes 
that, 'The interpretation one makes cannot properly said to he verifiable or testable. 
Rather, at best, we can appraise the interpretation by applying norms or criteria that are 
comparable with the very condition that demands that we interpret in thefirstplace. 
Hence tojudge such an interpretation we might use criteria such as thoroughness, 
coherence, comprehensiveness, and soforth, and ask whether the interpretation is 
useful, worthy ofadoption, and so on. 'Hammersley (1992) reinforces the difficulty of 
determining which of the theories-in-play accessible to the researcher are valid subjects 
for examination of validity. He comes to the conclusion that there can be '... multiple, 
non-contradictory descriptive and explanatory claims about anyphenomenon without 
denying that ifthose interpretations are accurate they must correspond in relevant 
aspects to thephenomena descrihed. 'Schwandt (op. cit. ) offers the embodiment of both 
his and Hammersley's objectives for justification/validity by seeking to focus on '... 
intentional meaningful behaviour that is by definition historically, socially and cultur- 
ally relevant! Valerie Janesick (in Denzin and Lincoln, 1994) reinforces the idea of 
relevance in validity from the point of view of the driver of the particular theory-in-play. 
'Validity in qualitative research has to do with description and explanation and whether 
or not a particular explanationfits a given description. In other words is the explana- 
tion credible? ' 
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The subject and the object of study are expected to use essentially the same resources for 
their study (Bauman, 1978, p234). In the context of strategic study, then, it should be 
accepted that the method of justification will not imply a standing outside the theory-in- 
play; informant and researcher will be expected to make progress only by the sharing of a 
common method of advance. The emic approach to research, then, is seen to be an element 
of the justification process as much as of the methodology itself. 
A number of writers have addressed the concept of validity in the qualitative research 
paradigm as a 'hyphenated'validity. (Altheide and Johnson, 1994; Atkinson, 1992, Eisner 
and Peshkin, 1990; Hammersley, 1990,1992; Lather, 1993). We have, then, validity as 
culture, validity as ideology, validity as gender, validity as language, validity as relevance 
or advocacy, validity as standards (Altheide and Johnson, op cit p488). All these hyphen- 
ated validities are end-directed in the sense that they are all different interpretations of the 
concept of validity as measured by effect and it is this central unifying concept which will 
be adopted here in the specific context of strategic conflict study and management. We 
should seek, then, for justification on a largely utilitarian basis. 'Interpretive accounts ... 
are to bejudgedon the pragmatic grounds ofthether theyare usefulfitting, generative of 
further enquiry and so forth. ' (Schwandt, 1994, pl3O) 
At this point a distinction must be drawn between the measures of validity to which the 
overall process of intervention and participative enquiry are subject and, on the other hand, 
those measures of validity which the techniques themselves require. The overall interven- 
tion in a strategic situation is subject to all the limitations of validity proof discussed above 
because of the specificity of the situation, the unrepeatability of 'the experiment' the need 
for an emic approach and the inaccessibility of other participants. The technique itself, 
however may be subject to some degree of replicated validity test for its generalizability, 
replicability and appropriateness of representation over and above the overarching require- 
ment for its specific applications to be subject to the metrics of Schwandt (op. cit. ) offered 
above. These possible metrics for cross-application validity tests are discussed below, but 
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is must be clearly stated that the ultimate test for validity of such a technique (for the 
management of strategic conflict) can only be the judgement of the informant and re- 
searcher at the time of the intervention as to the effectiveness of the understanding and 
normative product of the technique at that time, in that situation and with those particular 
participants. 
criteria 
The criteria for justification of the techniques and frameworks involved can be divided 
into those criteria which refer to the internal structures of the approach and those which 
refer to the external measures ofjustifiability applied to the results of the technique. 
internal 
stability 
We can reasonably expect that with a well-defined set of entry conditions, 
the procedures applied should produce stable, repeatable results. This should 
not be confused with an external requirement of replicability, a require- 
ment which as has been discussed is not within the reach of a method aimed 
at the representation of strategic conflict. We are concerned here with the 
stability of the method as a procedure applied after the entry data is fixed. 
This is analogous to the requirement for a mathematical computational tech- 
nique that it should not produce different solutions when the data inputs are 
fixed. 
consistency 
Related to the stability requirement is the need for the procedures to be 
internally consistent. There should be no inherent structural reason why the 
procedure should contradict itself This is analogous to internal rigour in a 
mathematical procedure. The expectations of mathematical rigour cannot 
directly be applied to the procedures as a whole, but we can reasonably 
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expect there to be logical consistency in the logical or mathematical proce- 
dures applied. 
traceable 
The procedure is expected to be traceable or auditable. This implies that it 
is possible to express sufficient detail in the procedure to allow an appropri- 
ately qualified or experienced person to audit the procedure for the correct- 
ness of the steps of calculation or syllogism. 
inclusion 
It is also expected to provide answers which mirror those of other tech- 
niques in so far as those techniques can be audited for correctness. In other 
words, where an equivalent technique can be shown to produce a particular 
answer to a conflict where the validity assumptions of that technique are 
consistent with the assumptions of the derived technique, it is expected that 
the derived technique will give (at least) the same insight into the solution 
as the equivalent technique. Where, for example, game theoretic solutions 
exist for particular styIised conflicts, we should expect the solution set of 
the derived technique to include those of the game theoretic solution. We 
can consider it is as a type of triangulation technique. 
external 
transferability to users 
It is reasonable to expect that a technique for practical application should 
be usable by practitioners other than the inventor. It is not reasonable to 
except that the results achieved should be identical for two users, because 
of the unrepeatability of interventions and nuances of the application of 
subjective and therefore differently sourced inputs into the technique. 
chronological stability 
It should be expected that when applied to a historical example the tech- 
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nique will reflect the progress of the conflict under investigation within the 
contemporary limits of knowledge of the participants. This is limited by 
the retrospective self-justification of participants and the desire to perceive 
a clarity which was not in fact present at the time. While this criterion of 
validity is limited, it is nevertheless a usefUl approach. 
contemporary validity 
During the intervention in which a technique is applied we should expect 
that the results should align with the perceptions of the researcher and 
informant(s) at the time. The obvious limitation of this approach is that the 
technique itself forms part of the strategic intervention, so that interim re- 
sults form part of the sensemaking of the situation at the time of applica- 
tion. This can be seen clearly in the example of The Spanish Mayor (Chap- 
ter 9), where, in a retrospective case study, two successive passes of the 
derived procedure produce different results because after the first pass greater 
understanding of the situation was achieved, allowing better perception of 
the important elements of the situation. 
contemporary valuation 
Critical to the justifiability of the supporting techniques and frameworks 
under the interpretation of Schwandt and others cited above is the concept 
of the usefulness of the results to the researcher-informant. Whereas con- 
ventional social science techniques tend to value their justifiability (valid- 
ity) in terms of the social benefit they can produce (Reason, 198 1) strategic 
conflict research cannot afford such a generalised benefit. The cruel reality 
of strategic conflict is that it takes place within a highly politicised and self- 
concerned structural power framework. The informants are likely to be 
managing directors, owners or strategy directors. If they were not powerful 
people working at managing or describing an important and value-laden 
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conflict, the latter would not justify their attention. Unless the research in- 
tervention is valued more or less continuously throughout the process, it 
cannot be realistically judged to be effective and therefore justified. The 
difficulty here is that the power structures of the informants' organisation 
can laden the strategic conflict process with undeclared values to the ex- 
tent, potentially, that the valuations publicly expressed of the emerging re- 
sults (be they sensemaking or action planning) can be distorted by unde- 
clared value systems. This is another reason why the emic approach whereby 
the researcher becomes a part of and is seen to absorb the values (both 
process- and end-) of the informant structure is essential to the success and 
justifiability of the research process (from the point of view of the researcher) 
and of the strategic decision making process (from the point of view of the 
client organisation). The position adopted, then, for this present work is 
that the contemporary valuation of the research intervention and hence of 
the techniques applied is the extent to which the research process and the 
techniques contribute to strategic decision making performance in the eyes 
of the informants and the researcher. 
There will be a number of bases on which this last and most important 
criterion is assessed. The perceived increased capability of the strategic 
team in sensemaking will be important, as will the efficiency of the process 
(it may be possible to achieve the same definition of action plan, but with 
less effort applied). Critically, the internally judged applicability of action 
plans will be relevant; not only is it necessary for the action plan to be 
contributory to the business, but the role of the technique in the internal 
marketing of the plan is an appropriate element of the judgment of the 
justifiability of the techniques and frameworks - Overall, 
Schwandt's (1994) 
usefulness criterion in the context of strategic conflict management is to be 
interpreted as 'Does the application of the method lead us to believe that we 
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have a good understanding of the conflict and does this in turn lead to good 
action plans which are likely to improve our strategic achievement in this 
conflictT 
method 
There is thus a need for the framework and techniques under assessment to be investigated 
for justifiability using a number of different types of application, aimed collectively at the 
criteria discussed above. This is done in the present study according to the following schema. 
See Table 9. 
internal awernal 
Assessment Example 
method "Awly wnmwzy Vacoade fflcký kwwkm&W chronlopmet conftný corm-POWNY 0 UMV W&b-W 
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Cirecks Yes Ws Ws Yes Yes 
Postage Scum 
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Project staffing 
OSF negouation 
Analytical Pnsoned 
comparative 
Dilenwris 
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Battle of die 
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Buddies 
Table 9: Contribution of assessment methods to justifiability argument 
It can be seen that no single method of assessment is sufficiently broad to allow full justi- 
flability on its own. There is a fundamental disjunction between the need for the perspec- 
tive of distance (and therefore a historical, ex post method) and a real-time (ex ante) ap- 
proach. The former allows some degree of comparison between what the techniques pre- 
dicted should happen in a conflict, but is tainted by the distortion of the reconstructivist 
tendencies to which all expost data is subject. We do not have the control over the data that 
we should expect in a positivist enviromnent; each contributor or participant has her own 
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view of the events that happened, or at least the extent to which knowledge was available. 
Conversely the real-time ex ante approach has the advantage that the technique can be 
tested against the future, but has the real disadvantage that the view points of the partici- 
pants are changing throughout the application. Lastly, the analytical, internal consistency 
test methods (logical structure and comparison with analytical methods) are insufficiently 
rich to allow, on their own, an adequate test. It is asserted here, on the basis of the coverage 
within Table 9, that the assessment methods shown collectively provide a good basis for a 
justifiability test. 
Intervention inquiry strategy 
Within a generally constructivist paradigm, three approaches are commonly applied to 
the research process (Reason, 1981 p324,325), namely Cooperative Inquiry, Participatory 
Action Research and Action Science/Action Inquiry. 
Cooperative Inquiry 
Stemming from the work of Heron (1971), Maslow (1968) and Shrivastava, Obert and 
Neilson (1971) among others, Cooperative Inquiry assumes that the subjects of research 
can free themselves from the burden of their previous experiences and, in particular of 
restrictive social processes. In a sense, then it is related to the Habermasian power-free 
communicative act concept, using the communicative rationality of a group of researcher/ 
informants to engage in 'open, authentic communication' (Reason, op cit, p 325). 
The essential foundation of Cooperative Inquiry is surnmarised by Reason (op cit, p326) 
as follows. I... in cooperative inquiry, all those involved in the research are both co-re- 
searchers, whose thinking and decision making contribute to generating ideas, designing 
and managing the programme and drawing conclusionsfrom the experiment, and also co- 
subjects, participating in the activity being researched. ' 
While the four phase process as described by Heron (198 1) (agreement of a topic, applica- 
tion, total immersion and reconsideration) are expressed in the general literature as involv- 
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ing both researcher and informant(s) in a socially improving programme of research which, 
because of the context of strategic intervention is inapplicable, the main tenets are still 
appropriate. The methodological lessons to be learned her are that the researcher should 
align completely with the tenets and value of the informants, consciously and publicly 
avowing the aims of the informants. Such devices as referring to 'our' company, 'our' 
objectives 'our competitors' and of adopting a conspiratorial style of communication with 
the informant (adopting a project key word, communicating in a deliberately obfuscatory 
style using a developing private vocabulary) are essential and effective in breaking down 
the barriers between outsider and the informant. There is, of course, an element of trust in 
this relationship which stems from ajoint appreciation of competence. The informants are 
generally at high levels in their companies and therefore expect to engage in some sort of 
competence assessment before adopting the joint objectives avowed by the researcher. 
Cooperative Inquiry 'rests on a collaborative encounter with experience' (Reason and 
Rowan, 198 1) and this provides a useful test for research validity. If the respondent is seen 
to include the researcher in the same broadcast of progress as his own staff, for example, 
one can be confident that the collaborative tissue is intact. This will be seen to be the case 
in the associated studies. 
Participative Action Research (PAR) 
The primary task of PAR is 'the enlightenment and waking of common peoples' (Fals- 
Borda and Rahman, 199 1, p vi), and while such a general objective is deeply inconsistent 
with the power-laden agenda of strategic research, there are elements which are useful in 
the study of strategic conflict. A secondary tenet is that knowledge can be gained through 
the experience of dasein, (being-in-the-world); the lived experience of people is a valid 
basis for the type of knowledge achievable by a constructivist research methodology. The 
elements from PAR which are included specifically in this research are the ideas that 
research is a collective empowerment and that genuine commitment to a worthy aim (in 
PAR proper, a social aim; here a strategic aim) produces a forward moving research agenda. 
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Action Sciencel, 4ction Inquiry 
The important work of Argyris and of Torbcrt in cstablishing a thcory of action and a 
corresponding action research methodology represents the essential structure of the Ac- 
tion Inquiry approach (Argyris and Schon, 1974,1978; Torbert, 1976,199 1; Argyris, Putnarn 
and Smith, 1985). The underlying theory of action bears strongly on the way in which a 
well-constructed strategic framework is observant not just of the conflict which it is en- 
gaged in representing, but also of the representation process itself. This is the essence of 
the Argyris double-loop learning which refers to 'the capacity ofindividuals to reflect on 
and amend not only their action strategies but also the governing variables behind those 
strategies' (Reason, 1994, p 330) Writers on the action science/inquiry process identify 
two models or theories of action which are relevant. Model I is described as a defensive 
theory that limits action science (Reason, op cit, p330) while Model Il offers a 'normative 
perspective that guides the action scientist' (ibid. ). The models are surnmarised in table 10 
below. 
Model I Model H 
to achieve the valid information 
purpose as the actor 
defines it 
to win not lose free and informed 
choice 
to suppress negative internal commitment 
feelings 
to emphasise 
rationality 
Table 10., Comparison of two models of action theory (after Reason) 
There is a clear disjunction between the aims of the strategic process in conflict and that of 
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Model 11, advocated by Argyris. It is quite clear that any attempt to argue an emergent 
strategic behaviour in pursuit of Model 11 would result in an approach which, at least at the 
beginning of a strategic intervention, would be unacceptable to strategic decision makers. 
The theory has, however, moved on, and the most recent interpretations (Torbert, op cit) 
emphasise four 'territories' of human knowledge, namely knowledge of purpose, knowl- 
edge of strategy, of behavioural choices and of the outside world, the latter emphasising 
the knowledge of the consequences of the adopted behaviour. It will be seen that these 
territories of knowledge constitute the inputs or outputs of a strategic conflict technique, 
and Torbert's perspective aligns well with the effect of a good conflict resolution tool in 
disciplining the explicit declaration of objectives and preferences, the derived structuring 
of the choices available to the client organisation in the particular situation, and the effect 
of the action on the structure and outcomes of the conflict. Additionally the Torbert struc- 
ture emphasises the importance to the strategic process of an examination of the surround- 
ing context of the particular conflict. The Argyris double-loop learning (Argyris and Schon, 
1978) is embodied here in a growing and iterative understanding of the conflict situation 
as a technique is successively applied. 
The main arena of applicability of the Argyris and Schon (1974,1978) approach is in the 
organisational aspects of strategic implementation; the mobilisation of the assets of an 
organisation towards a strategic end, be that action itself or sensemaking. As such, then, it 
is seen within the context of the present work as an implementation structure rather than as 
an intervention structure. 
Implications on intervention methods 
These considerations, by which the cooperative inquiry approach is adopted for the frame- 
Work, of intervention (honouring certain elements of PAR and action science/inquiry as 
discussed) leads to certain methodological implications. 
The approach adopted requires the whole hearted adoption of the values and objectives of 
the informant organisation during an intervention. This avowal of the client organisation's 
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aims must be public and without reservations, since, at the strategic level of intervention 
the issues of security and commitment are indistinguishable. Techniques adopted during 
the research activity ranged from the vocabulary used ('our' rather than 'your') to the 
adoption of tacit assumptions of the aims of the research which clearly aligned with the 
often unexpressed assumptions of the informant. Care was taken to test the assumptions of 
informants, on the argument that at this level of intervention, the researcher was frequently 
tested to ensure that his competence and professionalism were appropriate to the task. 
Similarly, this testing of competence was applied to the informants, on the basis that if 
they were not competent and did not feel that they were competent, the competence of the 
researcher and the research was in question. 
The competence of the researcher was always presented informally early in the interven- 
tions. The career history of the researcher, the fact that he had operated at the strategic 
level in a major company, the relevance of academic and professional training were all 
mobilised to condition the informant that here was a colleague who could be trusted, even 
to the extent that the researcher's competence may provide a place of security for an in- 
formant who felt insecure in the thin and unfamiliar atmosphere of strategic decision mak- 
ing. This was particularly the case with the owner/MD of OSF who clearly felt ill at ease 
with having to shift her attention from the operational level of decisions, with which she 
had a great confidence and a corresponding ability in making, to the unfamiliar strategic 
level of decision making. In her case the ability gap was clearly due only to the unfamili- 
arity of the type of decision making; after a short time she was clearly at ease with the 
different vocabulary and freedom of action implied in strategic decision making. 
In the light of the need to achieve a seamless integration with the informants it was judged 
important not to use a tape-recorder to record intervention events, nor was it deemed ap- 
propriate to make any notes when in contact with the client other than those necessary to 
undertake the action task. In other words, it was decided that extensive note-taking would 
indicate a role for the researcher which was different from that of the colleague/partner in 
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decision making. This proved extremely successful. The process, then, can be thought of 
as as a semi-structured interviewing technique where the process of the strategic decision 
making tool itself was the agenda. Notes were written up directly on computer as working 
papers and presented to the informants as if they were internal notes, albeit not on com- 
pany paper. These computer notes form the detailed basis of the case studies in this work. 
Care was taken that the style of writing reflected only the strategic decision making task in 
hand. 
The intervention surround was carefully managed so that contact was made exactly as if 
the researcher were a senior colleague of the informant. Where it would have been appro- 
priate, for example, to telephone a colleague at home because information derived was 
particularly potent or insightful, this was done. Equally, care was taken to comply with the 
often opaque rules of dress and behaviour of the organisation were adhered to. An exam- 
ple is the BAe Project Staffing case where the researcher had to dress up for a meeting in 
his own home in a business suit, shirt and tie in order to continue the impression of a 
colleague rather than a member of a university staff. 
Wherever appropriate the researcher obtained invitations to other consultancy/support 
meetings (e. g. with bankers, accountants etc. ) in order to achieve parity with the informant 
in their eyes. Thus the researcher was seen as a colleague of the informant, and this coher- 
ence of position was thereby strengthened through the nonverbal communications of the 
third party. 
Wherever possible a third party was used to triangulate the analysis of the strategic con- 
flict. In the BAe Project Staffing problem, for example, the highly experienced technical 
consultant who contributed to the analysis was used to crosscheck the appropriateness of 
the conclusions by examining the raw notes during the progress. His experience also pro- 
vided a crosscheck on the reasonableness of the results; by virtue of his thirty years expe- 
rience in project situations similar to that under examination, he could easily check the 
sense of the results of the models. 
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'Getting in', the process of achieving the trust of an informant (Fontana and Frey, 1994, 
P366,367) was not an issue in any of the interventions because of the procedure described 
above. The degree of involvement was easily detected through the nonverbal language of 
the informants, though their style and volubility of communication, through their use of 
appropriate pronouns and through the degree of trust they showed in sharing highly privi- 
leged information, much of it price-sensitive in the extreme, with the researcher. 
Overall study methodology 
Overall Approach 
The general approach or research strategy adopted during the study was a combination of 
well-known design techniques used extensively in the management science literature, to- 
gether with a controlled intervention methodology for the case study work. The latter is 
described above, and fits within the overall conduct of the work as shown in Figure 14. 
Here it will be seen that the overall approach follows the shaping - designing - comparing 
- choosing paradigm of Friend (1989) described more fully below. This approach disci- 
plines the designer into well-defined phases of problem statement (shaping), conceptual 
design or modelling (designing), comparison of various design options (comparing) and 
lastly choosing between design options or models in order to determine the design option 
most likely to satisfy the problem set in the shaping phase. This was amended in two ways 
for the study. 
1. Iterative Design Approach 
Firstly, Friend's methodology which has been successfully applied for the general 
modelling of social science and particularly business situations is essentially linear. 
Little feedback is postulated between the shaping - designing - comparing - choos- 
ing elements. One reason for this is a desire on the part of the modeller not to have 
the characteristics of the model retrospectively tainted by the results of any compari- 
son with reality or the test environment, since there is a danger in an observational 
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use of the method that the model may be retrospectively amended to produce the 
results which the researcher would have wished for in the test situation. It is a kind 
of control in the experimental design sense. Additionally, this insulation of each 
phase from the others is a means of disciplining client users into partitioning their 
thinking about what can often be highly complex and ill-defined problems. The 
partitioning helps to divide up the problem and the solution into manageable parts 
which the client user is more able to address. 
Since, in this application, the method is being used to design a methodology or 
framework rather than a model of a business or social science system, neither of the 
two constraints above need apply. In the case of the need to provide a control mecha- 
nism, recourse to reality takes place at the level of the application of the methodol- 
ogy to case study material. Any attempt on the part of the designer to claim unjusti- 
fiable adequacy at the design stage would be found out at the independent case study 
stage. In respect of the need to partition the problem to reduce the complexity for a 
client user, the constraint need not apply because of the increased amount of time 
available for the study compared with the often severe time constraints applicable in 
intervention with the client organisation. 
These observations allowed the amendment of the Friend design methodology to 
allow an iterative design approach. Thus, when initial case study work had been 
carried out, the specification of the elements of the framework could be amended in 
the light of that experience. Similarly, at the stage when the framework as a whole 
was trialled, practical experience allowed the design to be modified in order to make 
the methodology and its underlying techniques more usable. 
Z Inclusion of Case study material 
The second respect in which the Friend methodology was amended was in the inser- 
tion of case study work as a recourse to a test environment in the middle of the 
design process. The Friend methodology is essentially conceived as a design method 
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for the modelling of social science systems and, as such, because of the intervention 
difficulties and dangers of disturbance of the subject system, Friend (op. cit. ) ad- 
vises that the process should be carried through essentially in one pass. Clearly, 
when applying the method to a methodology design, opportunity exists, without the 
danger of inappropriately disturbing a subject system, to apply the methodology in a 
partly finished form. The effectiveness of the methodology is then assessed and de- 
sign changes may result. In the case of the application of the methodology to the 
modelling of specific problem, the observed social system will be affected by the 
application of the model, and if the researcher's task is to model the original system, 
no second recourse to reality can be made. 
In the case of its application to a methodology, however, no such constraint applies, 
since even complete failure of the emergent methodology in one application will not 
affect the likelihood of its being effective (suitably amended) in another application. 
In point of fact the trial applications of the method were generally successful, but 
lessons were learned in early applications which were later utilised in others. In 
particular, lessons learned in the elicitation phase of the multi-futures technique which 
forms part of the framework were mobilised to good effect in subsequent elicitation 
phases in the application of the conflict resolution technique. 
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Chapter 5. - 
An approach to strategic conflict: Foveal Games 
Key concepts and their origins 
The discussions of Chapters 2 and 3, of the strategic decision making process and the 
existing approaches respectively. contain certain key concepts whose juxtaposition leads 
naturally to a type of structure, the Foveal Game approach, which presents good expecta- 
tions of satisfying the requirements of Table 4 and of being workable and practicable in its 
results. 
Discrete structures 
The view of the strategic environment as a set of discrete states between which 
the world can move is contained within the connected concepts of Field 
Anomaly Relaxation (FAR) (Rhyne, 1974,1980) and of scenario planning in 
general (Schnaars, 1990; Shoemaker, 1995; Moyer, 1996). The latter tends to 
be more concerned with developing a view of the future which is pluralist as 
such, whereas the former is, at least to some extent aware that, in a treelike 
structure of possibilities (See Figure 12), transitions between the junctions of 
the tree, the discrete states, are possible. 
Transition-based analysis 
In addition to the strict mathematical structures adopted by Washburn (1990) 
in explicitly addressing directed graph games, a number of writers, such as 
Boulding (1962), Brams (1994), Howard (197 1) and Fraser and Hipel (1984), 
have attempted to analyse conflict generally or game theoretic problems spe- 
cifically by a transition-based approach. The rudimentary approaches of ex- 
amining what set of single move tactical choices needed to be made by the 
participants in order to constitute a change of state (expressed most usually as 
an outcome) was extended by Howard and by Fraser and Hipel to include 
consideration of the consequences of opponents' subsequent moves. 
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Game theoretic equilibrium concepts 
The ideas of an equilibrium being a state of the game from which there is no 
motivation for any party to make a move of which that player is capable is 
contained in the game theory literature at large, and particularly in the equilib- 
rium concepts of Nash. 
Multiplicity of belief spaces or viewpoints 
The variable universe games of Bacharach and the epistemological literature 
dealing with pluralist ontological viewpoints leads to an image of a strategic 
context as being a struggle in which the players may disagree about the very 
structure of the game. Multiple valid viewpoints may exist at all stages of the 
struggle. 
Iterative solution processes 
Checkland's (1981,1990) SSM procedure, among many others, lends the idea 
of an iterative sensemaking of a complex scene, where the analysis at any one 
stage of the procedure produces intertwined action and sensemaking products. ' 
The former directly affects the lifeworld and hence alters the environment of 
the conflict, and the latter provides both a renewed understanding of the prob- 
lem and an insight into the targeting of sensemaking resources. This connec- 
tion between action and structure is also seen in Heap and Varoufakis' (1995 
pp 29,30) critique of game theory. 
Layering andfocusing 
The nature of the strategic process in some large companies, as has been shown 
in Figure 2, is layered. This constitutes a focusing of attention when dealing 
with the strategic process in one layer in that considerations addressed at the 
next higher level are taken as boundary conditions or as a constraint/mandate 
instruction for the active layer. In other words, the decision making at the 
highest level of a company defines the freedom of action for decision making 
and action planning at the next level down, whereas feasibility statements at 
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this lower level will condition the appropriateness and feasibility of strategic 
thought at the next higher level and will thereby, correspondingly constrain it. 
The human eye/brain combination also works in this way, in that an object of 
interest is placed at the fovea of the retina in order to view it more accurately 
and with a higher resolution. If an object of greater interest (say, a bright light 
or a wild animal) appears in the periphery of vision, that is moved to the favea 
of the eye (Pirenne, 1948; Polyak, 1941). Thus an object of interest forms the 
centre of focus while an awareness of the periphery is maintained at lower 
optical resolution. We focus upon the object of interest under an assumption 
that it remains the object most of interest, while 'scanning' the periphery con- 
tinually to check the validity of that assumption of importance. Checkland's 
SSM approach can also be seen in this light. 
Meta-methodologies 
The concept of a methodology which links together a series of lower level 
techniques or methodologies emerges from much of the discussion of Chap- 
ters 2 and 3. Such an overarching methodology mobilises the usefulness of a 
series of lower level tool which, of themselves may not be sufficient to address 
the problem in hand. 
The Foveal Game Approach: General description 
Main characteristics 
These concepts lead naturally to a strategic conflict management framework which exhib- 
its the following characteristics: - 
discrete state-based 
The future developments of the strategic conflict situation should appear as 
a set of discrete futures, analogous with the branching points of FAR among 
which the situation moves. Whereas FAR shows these futures as linked by 
one-way paths, the wider strategic conflict requirement is for a network (in 
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contrast with FAR's tree structure) which allows regression to a previous 
state, on the basis that, at least in some strategic conflict situations, posi- 
tions can be recovered when left. The basis of analysis for action planning, 
then, is the struggle between players to control those transitions which they 
wish to bring about and to attenuate those which they judge undesirable. 
game theoretic 
The extensive work done on game theoretic equilibrium definition is not to 
be discarded, in spite of the apparently arbitrary nature of the Nash equilib- 
rium concept. In particular, the plurality of solutions discovered by analy. 
sis based on the Nash equilibrium should be viewed as an expression of the 
complexity of the conflict situation and the uncertainties therein rather than 
necessarily as a failure of the solution method underlying the framework. 
In the light of the difficulties over transferability of utility functions (Allais, 
1953; Hirschleifer and Riley, 1992), the framework should represent the 
utility of outcomes by a preference ordering. 
high and low resolution representation 
In order to encompass the requirement for a depth-changing characteristic 
of the framework, the representation of conflict is to be analogous with the 
attention-focusing typified by the human eye-brain combination. In other 
words, the framework should be able to focus on a locality of the conflict, a 
subset of the wider discrete state network such that a small subset of that 
wider framework can be more closely resolved. Thus the framework should 
be able to 'zoom' in and out of a particular part of the whole network, 
resolving that particular part in more detail as necessary. It is from this 
ability to focus attention on a (possibly temporarily) significant or domi- 
nant part of the complex conflict resolution problem, from which the foveal 
game approach derives its name. A necessary consequence of such a high- 
low resolution approach is the maintenance task of continuing to pay atten- 
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tion to the general scene while more detailed assessment of a subset of the 
wider network is being made. Within the local subset, it should be possible 
to mobilise a number of the existing more specific methods available in the 
domain of micro-economics and/or game theory. Alternatively, the local 
game may be embodied as a directed graph game identical in nature to the 
strategic graph game but dealing with a subset of the futures or outcomes of 
the strategic game. In other words, the local game can be a microcosm of 
the strategic game. 
multiple belief spaces 
The essentially different viewpoints of players (who may not be in commu- 
nication) must be comprehended, so that the discrete state network itself 
may be differently perceived by the different players, in addition to the 
valuation of outcomes being different. 
The framework. Strategic and local games 
The resultant framework is shown in Figure 15 
universe of 
possible 
infeasib 
states 
iped N-vector 
s in a 
ghbourhood) 
Figure 15: The basic foveal game structure showing the strategic level network, 
the links between states and the different belief spaces of the players 
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pams uwýlafvl I- 
negotiation locale 
Strategic graph and transitions 
Figure 15 shows a shaded area in which there are numbered locales (indicated as decision 
or negotiation locales). The shaded area represents the totality of futures or outcomes for 
the conflict, whether they are feasible or not. Within that universe of futures there are some 
subsets (the decision locales) which represent futures which could be reached from the 
present state (locale 0). The locales numbered 0 to 7, then, can be considered as nodes on 
a network of possible futures which are linked by transitions, shown in Figure 15 as ar- 
rows. Sometimes the arrows may be unidirectional, indicating that the move is only possi- 
ble in the direction shown. Often the arrows will be bidirectional. 
'Me layers in Figure 15 represent the different belief spaces of the players. Each sheet of 
the diagram could then represent a substantially different picture of the conflict, according 
to the different understandings of the various Players. 
It will be seen later that this network, or strategic graph, as it will be known, can conven- 
iently be represented by an extension to the Rhyne (1974,1980) FAR technique by 
reconflguring the feasible future states as a network rather than as a tree. 
Decision locales 
The numbered areas in Figure 15 (decision or negotiation locales) can be interpreted in 
two ways. First they represent feasible future outcomes among all possible futures. Sec- 
ond we can consider them as locations at which we engage in more detailed and condi- 
tional planning for a more local struggle. In this sense they are referred to as decision 
locales. 
For example, if we are engaged in a strategic analysis of a company which involves merger 
and acquisition activity, the numbered states of Figure 15 may represent the various stages 
at which offers are made by the companies competing on the Stock Market for control of 
a target company. Each of the numbered states, or decision locales, then represent a com- 
bination of offers made by the bidders. For example, one state may be 
Competitor A has bid B-89 per share and we have not yet responded with our counter 
bid. No other bids have been made. 
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While this may be an entirely adequate description of the decision locale in question at the 
strategic level, it does not have sufficient detail to allow the planning of the negotiations 
which may be assumed to be taking place between ourselves and the board of the target 
company. Nevertheless within the overall strategic planning of the acquisition process it 
defines succinctly and adequately the state of affairs. 
Within the decision locale, then, we conceive of a more detailed local examination (here 
the detailed planning of the negotiations with the target company's board) of what is re- 
quired to achieve the result we desire at that position in the strategic graph. To the extent 
that this can be achieved in practice, we can simplify the planning process by disconnect- 
ing the local issues within the decision locale from the strategic issues represented in the 
strategic graph. The process is shown for the particular case of a market strategy analysis 
in Figure 16, where the corporate market strategy breaks down into line of business (LOB) 
and project strategies, each mandated by the higher level of strategic policy. 
F 
ý0 W2 
Figure 16: Resolution of the strategic graph 
Maintenance of validity of the decision locale 
While this focusing of attention on the detailed planning requirements at a decision locale 
allows a simplification of the planning process, it has certain dangers. Let us take the 
example of the merger and acquisition planning of the previous section. We carry out our 
detailed negotiation planning on the assumption that our competitor has bid E3-89 as stated 
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and that we have not yet responded. We subsequently put our representative in front of the 
board of the target company in order the better to estimate what response we should make. 
If, during those conversations with the target company's board we detect that there is, in 
fact, another bid (from Company B) on the table we would think very carefully whether 
our negotiating plan remained valid. In all probability we should discreetly withdraw, 
reconsider the global, strategic situation (now fundamentally changed with the appearance 
of another interested party) and only return to the detailed, local planning when we had 
ascertained the strategic position afresh. 
We see here a process of constant examination of the validity of the boundary conditions 
by which the strategic level defines the decision locale. In a complementary fashion, infor- 
mation gained at the decision locale level informs the appreciation of the strategic situa- 
tion. While working at the local level on the detailed planning we keep in mind that our 
localised planning and the mandate for our action remain valid only to the extent that the 
boundary conditions which define the decision locale remain valid. 
Figure 17 shows this in a form familiar to practitioners of game theory. 
switching region of 
negotiating space 
act 
payoffs 
ofA 
contours of field 
descriptor 
Figure 17. The connection between decision locale and strategic context. 
The diagram shows a conventional two-player game-theoretic bargaining space (marked 
negotiating space) within which the players A and B can choose to agree on a joint out- 
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actions/payoffs of B 
come. The polygon thus represents all the deals to which they could agree within this 
opportunity for agreement and which are consistent with the players' valuations. This 
polygon, within this simplified structure, represents the decision locale in question. 
In Figure 17 the effect of these possible deals upon the field values which describe the 
strategic position are shown as a set of contours. The situation within the decision locale 
may have some effect on any of the field values which define the position within the 
strategic graph of Figure 15; here the effect on only one, arbitrary field value is shown. For 
example, in our example of the companies bidding for control of a target company, the 
negotiating space may be defined simply by the perceived pay-offs of bidder and recipient 
for the sale of the target company, but the decision locale may be partly defined at the 
strategic level by a liquidity condition on the bidding company. Clearly if the bid is driven 
in too expensive a direction, the negotiation may remain within the negotiating space of 
the local bargaining problem, but the strategic situation may be changed - i. e. the valua- 
tion of the deal may be most favourable, but the resulting overall cash-flow may be unac- 
ceptable. 
The strategic graph of Figure 15 can also be considered as a N-space of combinations of N 
field descriptors (as in FAR) each combination of which describes a conceivable future 
(outcome). There will be subset of that N-space which comprises all those feasible futures 
and these feasible futures can, again as in FAR be grouped or clustered in to decision 
locales. These clusters of future states, as described above, then define the boundary con- 
ditions for the detailed planning at the decision locales. On occasion, however, activities 
which take place (or indeed new perceptions gained) within the decision locale will affect 
the actual values of the field values which define the position in the strategic N-space. If 
actions taken within the decision locale affect the field variables of the strategic N-space to 
the extent that the boundary conditions of the decision locale previously assumed become 
invalid, then planning must revert to the strategic graph level. 
The decision locales sit within the strategic N-space as shown in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18: Action within the decision locales may affect the position within the 
strategic field (N-space) 
This movement within the strategic N-space as a result of local action may result in sud- 
den changes in the field values of the strategic N-space (the contours of Figure 17). In this 
case there may be a switching region where the validity of the boundary conditions of the 
decision locale may not be able to be clearly judged. 
switching switching 
region region negotiation in locale 4 
0 0" 
Figure 19: Action taken within the decision locale may render the boundary 
conditions invalid. This can happen suddenly or gradually. 
Figure 19 we see a field value (marked o- o') in the strategic N-space which is being 
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affected by action within the decision locale. Within the switching regions shown, the 
action taken locally affects to an increasing degree, the field value shown. Figure 19 repre- 
sents a section through o-o' of Figure 17. 
The overall relationship between the decision locales and the strategic graph is shown in 
Figure 20. 
local 
game 
strategy game 
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results of transition game 
condition transition 
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---------- -------------------- unstable local 
game invokes 
transition game 
Figure 20: Overall cyclic structure of the foveal game framework 
transition 
game 
This reappraisal of the strategic graph in the light of the information gained or action taken 4-1 
at the local level can consist of. 
a) a new judgement as to which node on the strategic graph represents the present position 
b) a new judgment of the preferences of the players about the nodes of the strategic graph 
c) a new understanding of the feasibility of transitions in the existing strategic graph 
d) the addition or deletion of nodes to form a new strategic graph. 
The foveal game structure concisely then is as follows: - 
the scenario game: A directed graph structure of heuristically derived sce- 
narios representing possible futures upon which a game is played in which 
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the participants attempt to move the state of the game from less desirable 
scenarios to more desirable ones, possibly in opposition to the activities of 
the other participants. 
the local game: The chilling of the boundary conditions of a local game or 
games at each of these scenarios in which, while being aware of the poten- 
tially altering validity of the scenario (and hence the boundary conditions) 
a negotiation or other game-theoretic procedure is carried out which is of a 
smaller dimension than the overall game by virtue of its boundary condi- 
tions being held firm. 
the transition game: A closure of the overall representation in which the 
validity of the boundary conditions of the local game are brought into ques- 
tion inducing a desire to disengage from the local game and to re-engage in 
the scenario game either by making another move in the existing game or 
by redefining the original game in the light of changed objectives or under- 
standing of the structure of the scenario game. 
Metagames and foveal games 
Figures 15 and 20, with the above understanding now take on the appearance of a board 
game, on which the players are allowed certain moves and attempt to move a marker 
(indicating the present scenario). In this respect we can view Figures 15 and 20 as exten- 
Sions to metagame graphs, albeit underwritten by a more effective generative structure. In 
moving between these scenarios, some players will have a high degree of control over the 
transition, some will have little, but in turn will have more influence in another part of the 
'board'. Time enters into the equation, too, so that two apparently similar scenarios are 
rendered different because of the passage of time, and the likely resultant changes in the 
balance of control which each player has over a particular transition. 
To the extent that a player can control transitions from desirable to undesirable scenarios, 
he will control the state of the game. 
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It should also be noted that this concept of a topological game played on a state transition 
graph allows potentially the concept of a game whose pay-offs are not terminal, but are 
merely statements of the present state of play. In a practical business situation the terminal 
payoff for the total activity of a company is considered but rarely: in practice some limited 
horizon is set at which the condition of the company is forecast and the decisions are made 
to maximise that expectation. A terminal payoff would constitute managing the company 
to winding-up or sell-off. 
Relationship to StrategiciTactical Levels 
Figure 16 above illustrates that the strategic freedom of a company is firnited by the lower 
levels of its operation just as much as it constrains them. To put it bluntly, having a twenty 
year strategy is only sensible if you can survive for the first twelve months. 
Each scenario in which the company actually finds itself represents a temporary stasis of 
the boundary conditions for the level below, and in turn, this level could be considered a 
microcosm of the level above, but with the boundary conditions set at the strategic level. 
See Figure 2 1. 
j: ýzig 
------------ 
strategic business level 
LOB business level 
/ project business level 
Figure 21: The layering of corporate strategic plans can be considered as a 
series of foveal game structures. 
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Similarly at the project level, the scenario in which the project decisions are made is deter- 
mined and temporarily set constant by considerations at the level above. This is not to say 
that the decision makers at any one level are unobservant ofpossible changes of the boundary 
conditions. Far from it; an awareness of the likelihood of their changing is a characteristic 
of many of the best decision makers, it is simply that a reduction in the dimensionality of 
a problem is a frequently used relaxation method for complex problems. An analogy can 
be drawn from control theory where the effectiveness of a control can be increased either 
by including more state variables or by considering rates of change of existing state vari- 
ables in the control law (Singh, 1983). Similarly, a skilled decision maker with a broad 
view will take into account the rates of change of the scenario determinants as well as 
internal variables. 
Some technical issues 
There are certain consequences of a framework such as that proposed, which must be 
taken into account when addressing the implementation design. 
1. The game is unlikely to be zero-sum. The different players will have 
differing views of the pay-offs to be expected 
2. It is always possible that there is in fact no transferable utility on which 
base a common transaction variable between players can be defined. 
3. The adjacency matrix of the directed graph (the array which dcfines the 
connections between states) will not necessarily be commonly viewed by the 
participants. There are of course situations where the scenarios will be so ob- 
vious that all the participants will view and define them in the same way, but 
this is deemed to be unlikely, particularly in the light of the fourth difficulty, 
namely that... 
4. ... the nature of the transitions themselves 
between the states will not 
necessarily be commonly viewed by the players 
5. There will be no symmetry among players with regard to the power which 
they each have over the transitions in the game 
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6. The view of the players about the nature of solution may well be differ- 
ent. In particular the need for a solution to be achieved within a particular time 
scale may be differently judged by one player compared with another. 
When the practical embodiment of such a game is addressed, the following emerge-- 
7. The abilities of the players to make the transitions will be derived from 
a plethora of sources. These transitions will be unrepresentable in the simple 
terms of cost of transition, or probability of transition. The moves will be 
ruled by reputation, the need for action, the costs of delay, the personal posi- 
tions of senior players and many other aspects discussed extensively elsewhere 
(Chapters 2 and 3). 
8. The other players may not necessarily be aware that they are in any kind 
of game or, in particular in a game that has the generic structural characteris- 
tics of the foveal approach. At first glance this would seem to be an advantage, 
but as Bacharach (1993) shows, ignorance on the part of the other participants 
can limit ones own freedom of manoeuvre. 
9. The knowledge of the parties of the powers of their opponents to induce 
transitions or to sanction or counter the desired transitions of other parties will 
not necessarily be held in common. 
10. Their will be errors in the problem statement itself. For example, it is 
often the case that the number or natures of the participants will be misunder- 
stood in the initial representation of the problem. Such errors are likely to 
prove rather difficult to drive out of subsequent, reappraised, problem defini- 
tions. 
11. The views of the players of what constitutes success in the overall sce- 
nario game are likely to change as the game evolves. 
When the transition process whereby the scenario game itself is the subject of play is 
considered, we find that the uncertainties discussed above are multiplied, and in such a 
way as to threaten the very nature of any mathematical structures which may have pro- 
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vided the basis for, if not solution, at least signposts to the nature or region of a solution. In 
the transition game 
12 the number and definition of the states, the scenarios on which the stra- 
tegic game is played become the subject of the game itself. 
13. The other participants' views of the pay-offs become the subject of the 
game 
14. The connectivity of the strategic game becomes the subject of the tran- 
sition game 
15. The empowerment of the players becomes open to change 
Action planning and sensemaking in foveal games 
The objective of a strategic conflict management toolset is to produce coherent action 
plans for interested parties, but as we have seen in Chapter 2, the connections between 
action planning (essentially ontological intervention) and sensemaking (essentially epis. 
temological intervention) are strong and numerous. The contribution of Habermas's con- 
cept of communicative rationality has already been seen to enable a reconciliation of the 
(different) subjective worlds of participants with an underlying life-world, from which the 
observable objective world is extracted. Action is then implemented in the objective world 
and sensemaking is a communication between participants which has the subjective worlds 
of the participants as its medium of communication. Figure 13 of Chapter 4 above illus- 
trates this. 
The variable universe game material of Bacharach (1993), presents an opportunity to use 
its intellectual framework as a structure on which to base an enquiry procedure as part of 
the support for the foveal game strategic game. Figure 22 shows the variable universe 
game concepts (Bacharach, 1993 pp 259-262) from the point of view of a hypothesising 
structure which attempts to derive the repertoire of the opponents (their potential actions) 
from their implemented action set and vice versa. 
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Figure 22., Interpretation of Bacharach's Variable Universe Games as a mapping 
of subjective world-views 
Writers as far apart in their disciplines as behavioural psychologists (Varela, 1995) and 
management scientists (Quinn, 1978,1980; Quinn, Mintzberg et al, 1988; Quinn, Mills et 
al, 1992) all advocate a predictive approach and model of perception. In particular new 
models of the visual system of the eye and visual cortex show a mechanism based not on 
the traditional view of the eye presenting an image which the visual cortex then processes 
and represents to the brain as a objects, but rather the reverse, whereby the visual cortex 
presents to the eye a set of a priori models of what it is expected to see. The eyc/nerve 
intermediate processing then confirms or denies the presence of the expected object. Simi- 
larly, the logical incrementalist approach of Quinn (1978,1987), coupled with the more 
loosely expressed weak signal analysis of Ansoff (1975,1988) all present observation of 
the outside world as an interpretation rather than as an observation without priors. In other 
words, understanding of the environment comes from a recursion process starting from 
priors and converging towards a model of the environment which is asymptotically valid 
to the evidence. 
Let us put this in another vocabulary, that of Bacharach (1993). We start with our own 
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assumptions of the characteristics (those attributes by which we judge and describe the 
environment). Our own action repertoire emerges from the process of Figure 22, as does, 
paripassu, our repertoire of characteristics, from which the former is obtained by applica. 
tion of the availability function. Of course we know little of this; we have no wider knowl- 
edge of the universe of characteristics than our own understanding; what does not occur to 
us does not exist. Nevertheless we can admit of a wider repertoire of characteristics and 
hence of actions that the opponents might have, but which we cannot conceive of. Simi- 
larly, their repertoire of actions may in fact be limited because of defective understanding 
on their part which is represented by the absence of components in our own model. There 
is, of course, a symmetrical set of views from each of the other participants points of view. 
At the first stage, then, we have achieved as much as can be done with the information 
available. This information consists of our widest reaching set of characteristics and our 
most imaginative view of the repertoire of characteristics of the opponents. We can carry 
out at least one other check using Bacharach's model, namely to conceive separately of the 
opponents' action repertoire and check that each element of the action repertoire has a 
corresponding characteristic (via the coverage relations). We will therefore have an epis- 
temically self-consistent set of pairs of action- and characteristic-repertoires. 
It will now be clear that as the actions of the opponents become visible to us some may fall 
outwith the perceived action repertoire attributed a priori to them. These will be of two 
types. First, an action may reveal that the opponent did in fact share a member of the 
characteristic-repertoire which we had erroneously denied him. Second, the opponent's or 
opponents' actions may reveal that there is a lacuna in our own repertoires of characteris- 
tics, and this would allow a reappraisal of the same to take place. 
While no claim is made here regarding the stability of such a process, particularly as the 
Opponent may engage in deception, such a process would have the benefit of disciplining 
our modelling and perception process of the outside world by providing an algorithm for 
self and external examination. 
What should be expected then, is that the process of modelling in the foveal game strucý 
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ture should be iterative, with successive passes through the modelling process resulting in 
both action planning and in sensemaking. The Habermas communicative rationality argu- 
ments indicate that there should be no expectation of action, and sensemaking being sepa- 
rated (Habermas, 1,198 1). 
Figure 23., The interaction of sensemaking and action 
This interconnectivity is shown in Figure 23, where it can be observed that the action is 
implemented in the lifeworld and the sensemaking in a subset of that lifeworld which is 
perceived by the sense maker. The problem situations perceived by the sense makers are 
subsets of the lifeworld. 
We can see this process operating clearly in a number of the case studies which appear 
below in the discussion of the supporting techniques to foveal games. In particular, in the 
case study of The Spanish Mayor we see an initial examination of a problem situation 
which results in two separate products. Firstly the client is provoked to take action in the 
real world to obtain ftirther information and secondly, the process of modelling results in 
an improved understanding of the problem situation of itself The situation in The Spanish 
Mayor case study reported in detail below, involves a regional politician who is, poten- 
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Sensemaking and 
action planning are 
inseparable in the 
process 
tially being blackmailed. Ple initial investigation establishes the direction of the threat to 
the Mayor (from one of the local police chiefs) and induces the Mayor to undertake inves- 
tigations and put in place certain defensive actions. Quite separately from the action plan- 
ning and implementation, however, the initial examination shows potential differences in 
the development of the situation according to whether the Mayor himself exposes the 
evidence on which basis he may be blackmailed, or whether an opponent does so. We thus 
see two quite separate products from a single pass of the faveal game process as illustrated 
in Figure 23, namely action planning to protect the Mayor from the threat and an increased 
understanding of the potential of the situation. The result of this in the real-life situation of 
The Spanish Mayor was to provoke a second pass of the foveal game process, based on 
this improved understanding but recognising the effect of action planned in the first pass, 
action which had changed the actual problem situation. 
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Chapter 6. - The strategic graph - EFAR 
Introduction 
From the previous chapter it can be seen that the first step for conflict representation and 
analysis is the production of a strategic graph. This is a directed graph which details the 
relevant feasible futures for the subject organisation and the transitions which are possible 
between these futures. The general method for the generation of these strategic graphs 
used here (Powell & Coyle, 1997; Powell, 1997) is based on the work of Rhyne (1974, 
1980,198 1). It is known as Extended Field Anomaly Relaxation (EFAR). 
A general description of the EFAR method is supported by a case study which illustrates 
its use to produce a strategic graph (futures network) for the major UK defence contractor, 
BAe, just after it had failed to win a bidding battle for the submarine builder VSEL. A 
second case study which deals with the competitive environment for a medium-sized me- 
dia company, Oxford Scientific Films Ltd. can be found in Chapter 10, where it forms part 
of an overall foveal game approach to the strategic problems of that company, showing 
how the overall strategic graph produced by EFAR leads to the boundary setting of con- 
flict analysis at the decision locale level. 
General description 
The Field Anomaly Relaxation (FAR) method (Rhyne, 1974; Coyle, Crawshay and Sutton, 
1994) represents the future by declaring a number of sectors (or fields) which take dis- 
crete and often arbitrarily defined values. The combined status of the sectors then charac- 
terises the state of the system under question - they form discrete-valued state variables. 
Certain combinations of these state variables are mutually incompatible and any selection 
of values from the set of state variables which contain mutually incompatible values are 
rejected as representing infeasible states of nature. The remaining (feasible) combinations 
then each represent a future scenario (or state) and the scenarios together comprise the set 
of all possible futures to which the system could move. The terms scenario and state are 
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interchangeable in this chapter. In a business application, for example, the state of the 
environment may be characterised by such things as share price, capability and market 
conditions. Each of these sectors have their possible values defined, and as a result it is 
theoretically feasible to examine all the possible combinations of states which the sector 
values could adopt. In practice, of course, with any realistic number of sector descriptions 
and sector values, there results a very large and unwieldy set of possibilities, so that filter- 
ing has to take place. 
This filtering in the original FAR approach is carried out by a pair by pair examination of 
possible sector values. For example, it might be judged that the likelihood of the customer 
confidence being very high while the company's ability to govern risk is very low are 
mutually incompatible, and so all possible combinations of states which contain this pair- 
ing would be rejected. Generally speaking this procedure rejects large numbers of states 
very quickly. It is then followed by an assessment of each state as a whole; certain combi- 
nations of pairs of sectors values may be reasonable, but when put together, produce a 
scenario which is not sensible. 
In the method applied here the FAR approach is adjusted in the detail of its filtering, but 
the essence of the method remains the same: characterising sectors are defined and exam- 
ined for reasonableness, the remaining feasible states then constitute the scenarios to which 
the system under consideration may move. A clustering process is then applied which 
simplifies the set of states and which allows the incorporation of experiential information 
from the business user. For example, the businessman may decide that certain states are 
effectively indistinguishable one from the other and they are then grouped together as one. 
It is at Us stage, however where the method departs from the procedure used by Rhyne 
and others. Having established the set of feasible and possible futures the possibility of all 
possible transitions between states are explicitly examined. A transition matrix is then 
produced, which is subject to the same type of business judgements as were applied to the 
clustering of states, and a network results which shows the possible futures and the feasi- 
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bility of moving from one state to another. In mathematical terms it is a directed graph 
The output of the analysis is fundamentally different from the conventional FAR output in 
that in the latteý the states are arranged into a tree form, whereby no backtracking is deemed 
possible. Because of the nature of the business problem and the way in which the sector 
characteristics are defined, the output of the extended FAR (EFAR) is a network of sce- 
narios, where the environment can recover to previous states. Whereas Rhyne's (1974, 
198 1) FAR tree represents successfully the development of the possible futures, say, of a 
region of the world in political terms (Coyle and McGlone, 1997) or of a military context, 
the network representation more effectively represents the movement of companies within 
that business context. It allows the more dynamic nature of such systems to be reprc- 
sented. It also allows the specific analysis of the transitions which are possible between 
states. These transitions represent the activities in which the companies can engage in 
order to exert their will, in bringing about situations desirable from their point of view or 
in thwarting the ambitions of others. It is this latter potential and the focusing which it 
induces in the planning and action elements of strategic decision making which provides 
the greatest motivation for the application of the method in business problems. 
In summary, then, the method applied here requires the user to 
a) Define those characteristics of the environment which are significant. 
There should be around half a dozen of them. The set of characteristics, 
known as sectors (or fields) should be such that if the status of each is 
defined the set of values would constitute an adequate description of the 
'state of nature'. 
b) For each sector dcfinc the values which the descriptor could take. There 
should be around half a dozen values. 
c) Examine each pair of sectors in turn and determine what valid combina- 
tions exist for the sector values. 
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d) Examine the remaining combinations and cluster them into similarly 
charactcriscd scenarios or states. 
At this point the extension to the FAR mct6d is applied, requiring the user to 
c) Determine which transitions between states arc possible and express them 
in a matrix. 
f) Apply business judgment to the resultant transition diagram to simplify 
the topology of the graph. 
g) Determine the essential characteristics of these transitions and express 
them in plain language. 
This is illustrated in the flow chart of Figure 24. 
The case study which immediately follows illustrates the method in practice and clarifies 
the procedure by example. 
Case Study - BAe's Alternate Naval Strategy 
Background 
In late 1994 BAe declared an interest in acquiring VSEL, the Barrow-in-Furness subma. 
rine manufacturer, primarily as part of its pursuit of naval prime contract business, but, 
secondarily, (in a largely opportunistic fashion), for purely financial purposes. In particu- 
lar VSEL presented a ready means of BAe's acquiring an immediate position as the prime 
Contractor of nuclear submarines for the Royal Navy and for the provision of hulls and 
associated system solutions overseas. At first it was thought that GEC would be neutral in 
the matter, but it soon became apparent that they had had second thoughts to the extent that 
they entered the fray with a bid which was higher in cash terms, but not immediately 
higher in equivalent value (because the BAe offer was expressed in terms of its shares). 
The matter was referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, who, in May 1995, 
had their opinion expressed by the then President of the Board of Trade, Mr. Michael 
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Heseltine, as favouring the proceeding of both bids without constraint. It was understood 
that certain undertakings had been made regarding the effect on employment in the Bar- 
row and Scotstoun areas if GEC were to be allowed to proceed. On publication of the 
MMC findings GEC made a substantial and ultimately successful offer for VSEL which 
valued it at around f. 800m. BAe then had to decide on an overall strategy for its naval 
business in the aftermath of this failure to secure VSEL, and this case study was the basis 
for that strategic plan. 
Methodological hackground 
Ms research was carried out while the writer was a BAe Research Fellow at Cranfield 
University. Shortly before, the company had planned for and ultimately failed to buy VSEL, 
and the writer had been intimately involved in the precursor activity to that bid. The re- 
search was initiated by the then Planning and Strategy Director, Mrs. Alison Wood who 
was the main informant, under a participative action research framework. In particular, 
there was a very close and open business relationship between the researcher and Mrs. 
Wood, not least because of the previous responsibilities of the researcher, namely as the 
BAe SSD director responsible for the submarine business of BAe. 
There was, thus, little concern about the participative relationship of the researcher, and no 
special considerations had to be made to ensure that the requirements of a participative 
research posture were met. On the contrary, there remain some minor commercially sensi- 
tive options for the company which are not recorded here (as they remain live), but these 
were freely discussed in the intervention environment in May 1995 (Wood, 1995). This 
free availability of commercially sensitive material is good evidence of an appropriate 
participative environment. There were a series of interventions during the period of re- 
search and the meetings were directly recorded as computerised documents, from which 
this case study is drawn. It was not appropriate to record in any other way; tape recording, 
for example, would not have been acceptable to the client. 
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The security considerations of the research at the time were most stringent. No discussion 
could be entered into at the time other than with Mrs. Wood and her immediate subordi- 
nate, Mrs. Liz Batchelor. The latter, however, provided a useful and stringent examination 
function of the working documents. 
Define the sectors 
Table II shows the sector and value array worked out between the researcher and Mrs. 
Wood in 1995. The acronym SOARCE is used to tag each field value for reference. 
The field values were described as follows: - 
Share Price (S) 
It was felt that a drop in the share price below f4-00 would constitute suffi- 
cient of a crisis as to change the environment in which strategic decisions 
would be made after a GEC buy of VSEL. Similarly a share price above; E6-00 
would represent an inherent capacity in the company great enough to allow 
significantly changed objectives if these were desired. , 
Extent of Objectives (0) 
The range of objectives ranged from mere survival, through a limitation of 
company objectives by 'lopping limbs' through the execution of an essentially 
incremental policy and ultimately to extensive ambitions of European and global 
domination of the defence markets. The present state was value 5 where it was 
felt that with the evidence of the company's ambitions towards VSEL and its 
European activities, primarily in Joint Venture company setups, it was appro- 
priate to describe the company's ambitions as significant, but falling 'short of 
immediate European dominance. 
Internal View of Abilities (A) 
The actual capability of the company to carry out the strategic intent is clearly 
of great importance in the description of the environment. 
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Risk on contracts 
It was felt intuitively that the performance of the company in this particular 
area would be of singular importance in characterising the business environ- 
ment for it. There is a strong and obvious degree of correlation between cus. 
tomer confidence and ability to manage risk. 
External Credibility (C) 
This sector is primarily aimed at expressing the confidence which the cus- 
tomer (UK or overseas) feels about the ability of the company. It is not solely 
related to ability and performance, since other factors, such as strategic indus- 
trial issues and personal credibility also enter the equation. 
Procurement Environment (E) 
This could profitably receive a study in its own right, encompassing the eco- 
nomic and political factors which may change over the next five years, but we 
are restricted here to statements about the general accessibility of the market 
by defence contractors, and BAe in particular. As the risk management capa- 
bility of the contractor falls, its ability to access the market will also fall. 
It can be seen that the sector values form a mixture of internal attributes [Extent of Ob- 
jectives], [Internal View of Capabilities] and external attributes, [Procurement Envi- 
ronment] and [External Credibility]. Similarly, some variables are directly controllable 
by the company [Extent of Objectives] whereas others are only indirectly controlled by 
the company, such as (Share Price]. 
Define sector value scales 
Table 11, again, shows that each sector has assigned to it a range of values. It is the com- 
bination of values for all the sectors which describe the state of the situation under exami- 
nation. 1bus S2 OIA2R2 C3 E. would represent a future situation where the company has a 
share price around E4, is concerned only with its survival, rather than with any develop. 
ment, and has the view that its performance is below what is needed for success, etc.. 
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Determine feasible states 
The next step in the procedure is to identify all the states which are internally feasible in 
the sense that the combination of values for the sectors represents a possible situation. 
Clearly, some combinations are not mutually compatible; if the share price is very low, a 
competent management is unlikely to engage in a strategy involving domination of a new 
market with high entry barriers and powerful incumbents, for example. The process of 
determining mutual feasibility is straightforward. Each pair of states is taken in turn and 
the feasibility of the sector values being compatible is considered. This leads to the pair- 
wise compatibility array of Table 12. 
Each column of Table 12 corresponds to a sector, with each possible value wl-&h the 
sector can take written in bold below it. Thus S can take the values I to 5 and R can take 
the values I to 6. For each value of each sector the feasible values of the other sectors are 
written out, while infeasible values, i. e. values of other sectors which are not compatible 
with the value of the sector under consideration, are replaced by a dash. Thus, if S has the 
value 4,0 can only take the values 4 or 5; A can only take the values 2,3 or 4; R can only 
take the values 4 or 5 and so on. Similarly, if R has the value 2, then C 
Ln only take the 
values I or 2, and E can only take the values 1,2 or 3. 
These feasibilities are judged entirely on the basis of the business judgement of the client 
and represent a significant input of business knowledge into the model. 
The admissible combinations of Table 12 are applied in a cascade fashion resulting in a set 
of feasible combinations of sector values which complies with each of the constraints of 
that table. This results in 108 possible future states, a substantial reduction from the 3 1500 
possible states at the start of the process. These states are defined in Annex A of this work 
both in terms of the combinations of sector values and using pen-pictures summarizing the 
reality of the state in the business world. 
This relatively long list of states is now examined, by clients' representatives with ad- 
equate knowledge of the business problem and context, in order to reject states which, 
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although compatible on a pairwise basis, made little sense in business terms as a whole. 
This process of combination and rejection resulted, in this example, in a set of 41 states. 
Clustering of States 
Examination of the remaining states at this stage often results in the client observing that 
in practice a number of states are indistinguishable one from the other. This often results 
from a new understanding that under certain conditions sector values can merge one into 
the other. For example, if development funds were freely available to a company, the ac- 
cessibility of the market, expressed as the value of the sector [market accessibility] might 
be rather important, because the exploitative possibilities would be limited by that acces- 
sibility. If on the other hand there were no development funds available, the accessibility 
of the market might well be judged irrelevant because no exploitation could take place for 
reasons other than the value of the hypothetical sector [market accessibility]. 
In the illustrative BAe example this process of clustering resulted in a reduction in the 
number of feasible states from 41 to 32. 
It is convenient at this point to arrange the remaining states in order of preference to the 
client company. This is generally a straightforward process since it is aided by the charac. 
teristics of the sector\value table (Table 11). The sector values have been arranged so that 
there is a progression from bottom to top, and so that the preferred values are at the top of 
the columns. This structure allows clients' representatives to identify preferred states by 
high sector values. 
The Transition Matrix 
Up to this point, with a few nuances arising from the particular application, the methodol- 
ogy has followed that of Rhyne (1974,198 1). Now, however, the possibilities for transi- 
tion between all states are considered and expressed in a transition matrix. The process is 
as follows. 
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Maximal Difference 
Transitions are rejected where the difference between the value for a particular sector is 
too great between the two states. Here, a transition of more than 2 steps was deemed 
infeasible. There are issues both of straightforward feasibility and of timescale here. Some 
transitions can be rejected simply because they cannot take place. Other judgements are 
more difficult to reject because, for example, the client may observe that it would take too 
long to move the company's competence from one level to the other if only limited funds 
are available. While these observations can be tricky to include in theory, practice shows 
that the time horizon of the problem is usually quite well defined. If the transition in 
question can be achieved within that timescale it should be included; if not it can be re- 
jected, but should not necessarily be. Ultimately the only loss in including a dubious tran- 
sition is that of unnecessary complication. This is, in any case, addressed directly in later 
stages of the process. 
e-difference 
The e-difference is the sum of the differences between the corresponding sector values of 
the two states, ignoring the sign. This allows for transitions which require too large an 
aggregated difference between the states. The technique is to calibrate the value of e above 
which transitions should be rejected by first considering on an experiential basis which 
transitions of a subset of those possible transitions are likely to take place. The c-differ- 
ences of these transitions are noted, and a rough pattern emerges, whereby transitions 
which had an e-value greater than a certain value (8 in the illustrative example) are un- 
likely to be judged feasible in business terms. They are then rejected. It would be possible 
to examine each transition one by one and achieve the same result, but the method de- 
scribed gives a quicker rejection of groups of transitions by noting the transitions rejected 
(on the basis of business judgement alone) in a subset, and then extrapolating the criterion 
to the remainder. It provides an indication of which transitions are likely to be rejected in 
the remainder of the set. 
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Examination of the feasibility of the transitions results in a matrix whose elements take the 
value I or 0 according to whether a transition is judged feasible or not (Table 13). Graph 
theory recognises this as a state transition matrix or connectivity matrix (Marshall, 1971; 
Bondy, 1976). In Table 13 the 0 entries have been suppressed for clarity. We will see later 
that this identification of the feasibility of transitions between states is the key element in 
representing the situation under examination since each transition implicitly represents an 
opportunity for the client company, a competitor or a neutral environment to act so as to 
change the state of affairs. The transitions represent in real terms the opportunities avail- 
able for participants to make investments or take other action in order to bring about a 
more desired state or to thwart the desires of a competitor. If this process of determining 
the feasible transitions were not to be carried out, the essential structure of the business 
situation in terms of determining what is or is not possible in practical terms would remain 
hidden. By explicitly identifying which transitions are possible we both reveal the possi- 
bilities for movement and provide, eventually, the basis for action planning in order to 
bring about those transitions. 
Clustering by transitions 
It would be possible at this point to draw out the transition matrix as a directed graph, 
linking states according to the value of the corresponding element of the matrix of Table 
13. This results in a rather complex picture which presents no more information than is 
contained in the matrix. Nevertheless a pictorial presentation is more accessible to senior 
executives. Clients understandably find that the numbers of transitions and states give a 
complex picture which seems to reveal less than was expected about the structure of the 
business situation under examination. The clustering technique allows consolidation of 
the picture so that the overall future picture and characteristics of transitions can be appre- 
ciated. A return can then be made to subsets of the detailed picture implicit in Table 13, as 
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Table 13: Transition feasibility matrix for BAe's alternate naval strategy 
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an example, in order to examine specific development paths. 
Fortunately the structure of the transition matrix gives clues as to likely candidates for 
clustering among states. Generally speaking, when states are densely connected they are 
likely to form groups which 
a) in terms of the readability of a directed graph are conveniently placed 
near to one another 
and 
b) in business terms are very frequently members of a set of business situ- 
ations which, although distinct, can be associated one with the other, so 
that the businessman will see them as a group of outcomes which he can 
deal with together, only breaking them apart for single consideration if 
greater resolution is needed. 
This dense connectivity appears in the transition matrix as triangular groups of Is indicat- 
ing that adjacent groups of states are connected one with the other. In Table 13 the follow- 
ing sets of states are candidates (among others) for this clustering process. 
104+102+98 (notated as 98+) 
98+78+75+73 (notated as 73+) 
73+101+93 (notated as 732 
93+106+96 (notated as 93+) 
47+64+57+63+54+45+35 (notated as 35+) 
10+ 13+9+8+7+6 (notated as 6+) 
9+8+7+6+19+15 (notated as 6 +) 
15+4+3+2+1 (notated as 1+) 
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It will be observed that some states fall into more than one putative cluster. Moreover, it 
must be stressed here that it is insufficient to rely on the structure of the transition matrix 
alone to justify the clustering of states. The membership of each state in a proposed cluster 
must be checked against the business experience of the client. On the basis of these con- 
nectivity criteria and by careful consideration of the practical (i. e. real life) differences 
between the states, the client's representative decided here that an appropriate grouping of 
states for the purposes of initial display were as follows: - 
104 to 70 (notated as improvement and representing states considerably 
more desirable than today) 
59 (separately perceived as a state where project performance had been 
successfidly translated into a trading improvement) 
57+64+63 (notated as 57+ and representing states in the irmnediate vicin- 
ity of today) 
45 (representing the importance of a changing market condition) 
35+47) (notated as 35+) 
20 
10+13+19 (notated as 10+) 
9 
6+7+8 (notated as 6+) 
15+4+3+2+1 (notated as decline and representing those undesirable states 
where the fortunes of the company have become so bad as to be indistin- 
guishable one from the other) 
The effect of combining states in this way is to condense the transition matrix to that of 
Table 14, to which the diagram of figure 25 can be seen to be equivalent. Since the transi- 
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tions are all bidirectional the transition matrix is symmetrical and only the upper half is 
shown in Table 14. These clustered states are defined in Annex B to this work. 
TO-> 
From 
Improve. 
ment 59 57+ 35+ 45 20 10+ 9 6+ Decline 
104 
Improvemen 1 
59 -1 
57+ 
35+ 
45 
20 1 
10+ 
I 1 1 
L 
Table 14: Relaxed transition matrix for Case 1- BAe's alternate naval stratent., ZF. w * 
It must be stressed here that in many respects the choice of states to be represented at this 
initial stage of presentation is subjective. Some client groups may wish to have states in 
the vicinity of today to be represented. Some may desire only a small degree of clustering 
while others may wish to have a greatly simplified diagram presented in the first instance. 
No information is lost in this process so long as the transition matrix of Table 13 or its 
equivalent is used as the source for ftirther, more detailed, investigations. 
Output 
The two final stages in the process are to represent the transition matrix in a graph form 
and to characterise the transitions in a way which relates them directly to the business 
environment from where they were derived. The resulting transition diagram for the illus- 
trative example appears as Figure 25. 
Graphical presentation 
Some care is needed in practice in presenting these summary directed graphs to the client, 
since too rich a representation can result in the essential structure being left out. Two 
Page 226 
techniques have proven useful in practice, both of which were applied, as discussed 
above, to produce Figure 25. 
Graphical Representation of Transition Matrix 
Proleffed 
Undesirable 
Simplified Key to states 
States 57+ - today 
States 6# weakened market 4ow share price 
State 9- low customer confidence & share price 
States 10+ -poor project performance 
State 20 - good performance but weak market 
conditions 
State 35+ - good market but unconvinced customer 
State 45 - repositioning because of week market 
State 59 - Improvement In project performance, hence 
strong markets 
Figure 25. Directed graph (Strategic graph) for BAe's Alternate naval straegy 
case (corresponding to Table 14) 
Firstly, it is often advantageous to limit the graphical representation to the vicinity of 
today. Then, as planning moves from consideration of the immediate Problems facing 
the organisation to longer term issues, other portions of the graph can be brought into the 
conversation as necessary. 
Secondly, a temporary grouping of the states in order to present a coarse filter of the 
Situation is often advisable. Then, as attention is drawn towards one region of the graph 
or another, further detail is revealed in that area. 
The diagram of Figure 25 exhibits only bidirectional links, but this is not always the 
case. The vase study in Chapter 10 (OSF's Strategic Future) reports on an application 
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which shows a relatively complicated output graph, produced using the second technique 
above, and which has a number of one-way links, representing irreversible business ac- 
tions. 
Transition Analysis 
In this application EFAR was aimed primarily at a general strategic sensemaking output, 
as distinct from a specific conflict analysis. Nevertheless, the diagram of Figure 25 pro- 
vided some surprising conclusions for the Board of BAe SSD, achieved by an examination 
of the practical business consequences of each transition and its effect. 
Firstly, the 'today' state, 57+, has three states immediately accessible from it, namely 
59 where BAe's project performance has improved significantly, and, in the long 
term, markets have strengthened 
35+ where the market has strengthened because of exogenous factors (say, an in- 
crease in long term tension) but BAe relative to the other competitors is not convincing the 
customer either of its commitment, capacity or capability. 
45 where the market has weakened, and, in spite of any capability on BAe's part, 
the trading conditions are not good. 
Additionally it was noted that state 45 was critical, in that movement to it would be out- 
with the control of BAe and that once at state 45, it would take only one step, say in 
allowing project performance to erode, to place the company at one of the dangerous 
'boundary states' only one step away from the disastrous decline states in the bottom right 
hand comer of the diagram. 
At this level of strategic scrisemaking, the environment is very broadly drawn, and the 
moves of the foveal game consist of broad strategies of endeavour. Here the board concen- 
trated on two main issues. First, they considered measures to improve project perform- 
ance, both as a defensive measure to insure against any uncontrolled movement towards 
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the states bordering decline, and offensive, in contributing to the desired move towards 
state 59. Secondly, the board addressed the consequences of their activities in the merger 
and acquisition market in terms of the confidence with which the customer viewed the 
company's activities. 
In respect of the project performance the effect was to benchmark the competitors' per- 
formance in the sector with particular regard to the risk management tools used. This 
resulted in a significant investment in risk management software, the appointment of two 
senior risk managers in important project functions, and an increase in responsibility of 
the commercial director to encompass total risk (commercial and technical). This appears 
in retrospect to have been a unilateral consideration (Kat can we do to improve our 
project performance? ) but such an interpretation would be erroneous; at the time of the 
board's consideration the issue was seen clearly to be a struggle for the technical contribu- 
tion to winning control over the transitions 57+ to 35 and 57+ to 59 in opposition'to the 
project performance of the competitors. 
As far as the merger and acquisition considerations were concerned, the diagram provoked 
an extensive exercise to identify a target for either a major strategic alliance (for example, 
with DCNI, the French national shipbuilder) or the buy of a smaller shipyard from which 
project performance in the naval sector could be improved, but, more importantly, which 
would indicate a degree of commitment to the government that the company was still in 
the ship business in a significant way. Again, while it may appear to be unilateral planning, 
it was clearly seen at the time to be an issue over the control of the transition 57+ to 35+. 
The merger and acquisition planning became ambushed by the local interests with in the 
naval sector of BAe. In particular, the systems interests of BAeSEMA, the joint venture 
which aimed at providing the combat and weapon systems for projects, became dominant. 
Whereas the purchase of VSEL would have meant that BAeSEMA had a dominant and 
ready-made position as system supplier (since the BAe-VSEL combination would have 
been formidable in the UK marketplace), a purchase of a smaller company, say VT, the 
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south coast corvette and small frigate manufacturers would not have placed them in such a 
dominant market position, and BAeSEMA would prefer, under those circumstances to 
remain independent. As a result, no purchase was attempted, 'although initial conversa- 
tions took place in 1996. 
Today's state is effectively state 45, the project performance of BAeSEMA, while good 
enough to sustain a good revenue stream for BAeSEMA has not proved good enough to 
provide a platform for BAe back into naval prime contractorship. Additionally, the ship 
market in UK has remained stagnant. Fortunately for BAe as a whole, their overall project 
(non-naval) capability has allowed a substantial share price increase to take place, making 
the need for naval prime contractorship wane. 
Practical considerations and observations 
General considerations of intervention practice are covered elsewhere. In both the case 
study described here and in OSFs Strategic Future study of Chapter 10 an approach of 
participative action research was adopted. The EFAR process appears natural for the cli- 
ent. Since it starts from an examination of the important attributes of the future, clients' 
representatives feel that they are in control of the process, and, since the detailed manipu- 
lation of the states clearly requires knowledge of the real business dynamics, this feeling 
of engagement is maintained throughout the process. 
Difficulties can occur if the client organisation is represented by more than one person, 
since different functions might have different valuations of objectives. Far from present- 
ing difficulties these debates serve to clarify the futures of the organisation by argument. 
Difficulties would occur if the different representatives retained conflicting views of the 
value of objectives, but this has not yet been observed in practice. In extremis parallel 
analyses could be carried out to represent the different viewpoints. 
Page 230 
Selection ofsectors and values 
In practice it has sometimes proved difficult for the client to select appropriate sector 
values. For example the client will sometimes fixate on one particular aspect of the future 
and offer a number of sectors which are so closely connected as to be indistinguishable. 
[Share price] and [Market capitalisation] might be examples. Sometimes, on the other 
hand, the state of the company is perceived in a very complex and rich way, so that the 
selection of a small number of defining characteristics is felt to be restricting. Because of 
the very large numbers of possible states which can arise it is essential to keep the number 
of sectors down to around seven, as advised by Rhyne (198 1), and in order to assist in this 
three observations need to be made to the client. 
First, the fact that later in the process the interactions between and among the 
sectors are examined in great detail means that many of the interactions be- 
tween the characteristics, which tend to be very much in the forefront of the 
mind of the client, can be examined and included in the representation. At the 
beginning of the process clients tend to think of the sectors as being independ- 
ent characteristics of the business, which gives a false view of the complexity 
of the underlying model. 
Second, the adequacy of the sector choice can be tested by asking the client to 
imagine, say, reporting to shareholders in the Annual Report on the state of 
the business or to their superiors on the state of a project or market sector. 
Generally speaking the sector values will be represented in the (implicit) head- 
ings used in a report. This approach seems to defuse the worries often ex- 
pressed that the state of the business cannot be expressed by a mere six or 
seven attributes. 
Third, the process becomes grounded with respect to the true business envi- 
rorunent because the descriptions of the states and the transitions provided at 
the end of the process come directly from the domain knowledge of the sub- 
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ject company's representatives (as opposed to the technique itself or the ana- 
lyst). 
The check on the adequacy of the sector values, the scale within each sector, is more 
intuitive. The originating executive is asked to imagine a business decision which might 
have to be made within the future context and is asked to think whether the degree of 
definition of the field value would be sufficient to determine the context. Although this 
appears an arbitrary and subjective way of assessing the sensitivity of the scales in each 
field, in practice it proves entirely adequate, and, moreover provides direct cognitive re- 
hearsal of the eventual application of the output of the EFAR context study. 
Compatibility of Field Values 
The process of determining which field values are pairwise compatible is largely a subjec- 
five one. It is important that the informant and researcher do not attempt to 'second guess' 
the collective consequences of the filtering process. Attention should be restricted to the 
particular pair of field values in hand. 
Clustering process 
The key to the state clustering process is to imagine in business terms what constitutes 
then important characteristic of the group of candidate states. Frequently the value of one 
particular sector will dominate the business. For example, if the availability of operation 
funds is so low as to be insufficient to retain the existing organisation, the nuances of 
customer confidence will be of minor importance, so that the effective business view is 
that of a cash-starved operation. We see this strongly in the OSF case study, where the 
share holding issue dominates the strategic multi-futures view. This is not to say that the 
underlying structure of states is insensitive to organisational posture, for example, or com- 
petitive pressure, but merely that the share holding, expost, is seen to be the catalyst for all 
business progress, and hence dominates the perception of the future. 
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Transition Analysis 
Practice shows that the filling in of the transition matrix is time consuming and weari- 
some. This can be avoided to some degree by assiduous clustering at the previous stage. 
Secondly, there are often patterns which emerge from consideration of the business reali- 
ties behind the state definitions. 
The clustering process at the transition analysis stage is aided by the two techniques de- 
scribed in the case studies, whereby the effective distance between the states is a cue for 
whether they are likely to be connected or not, Generally speaking if the definition (as 
expressed in the state 'words') of the two states are far apart it is unlikely that the two 
states will be connected. Ultimately, however, business judgement will prevail. 
Graphical Presentation 
In both case studies, and indeed in others not reported specifically here, the diagrammatic 
output can be produced within a reasonable time and with a level of contribution accept- 
able to the principals of companies. In the OSF case, reported as a whole in Chapter 10, 
the process took some three weeks to complete, with an initial meeting and two interim 
meetings with the owner to inject detailed domain experience. Each meeting took two to 
three hours. Other applications show similar patterns. The final, debriefing meeting took 
about two hours. The effort away from the company amounted to some four man-days 
work. 
The strategic graphs can appear daunting to some audiences, with a mass of connections 
linking an indigestible mass of states. A successful technique is to focus on one of the 
sectors (as in the OSF case, Figure 56 of Chapter 10) in order to fix the business situation 
underlying the structure of the states in the minds of the audience. By successive 
simplifications an understanding of the collective strategic graph is usually achieved. The 
number of connections between states can also be difficult to digest. A plethora of connec- 
tiOns is sometimes an indication of a less than careful clustering at the transition clustering 
stage or of a less than discriminating judgement as to which transitions are feasible. In the 
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absence of these two failure mechanisms, a good approach is to divide the strategic graph 
up into three connected diagrams which cover source states (those which originate ar. 
rows), sink or receiver states (which receive arrows) and internal structures within groups 
of states. The first of these are illustrated in the OSF case (Figures 58 and 59). 
Lastly, the analyst must remain flexible in terms of the display of the final network. it 
would be erroneous to think that there is a single acceptable presentation method for a 
complex future scene, and a certain originality is often appropriate in seeking ways to 
present the often complex networks which can result. In the case of OSF, the focusing 
effect of the realisation that the real problem was not that of organisation but of ownership 
allowed a wholesale simplification of the network as shown above. 
Action Planning analysis 
The action planning process also appears naturally from consideration of the output dia- 
grains by the clients' representatives. The structure of the network approach lends itself to 
a disciplined, procedural approach to those executives seeking completeness in their plan- 
ning, while the ability to look far into the future attracts those of a more intuitive nature. 
Essentially there are three approaches to the generation of action planning from the strate- 
gic graph. 
General analysis 
As can be seen in the case studies, the EFAR output can be seen as providing 
nothing more than an improved perception of the development process in which 
the client organisation sits. No particular effort is made to analyse the com- 
petitors'powers in controlling the transitions. The strategic graph is used merely 
to cue the management in to those issues which, in a general sense affect the 
future of the company. To the extent that the company's unilateral actions can 
condition that future, then the desired future or futures will be reached. We see 
this style of planning in the OSF case where the conclusion from the EFAR 
analysis is that the company's share structure must be drastically altered. Al- 
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though implicitly this involves a third party (a prospective buyer) it is not 
necessary to be specific about that third party. In fact, the very next step in the 
OSF analysis was to draw up with the owner's advisers (Coopers & Lybrand) 
a list of potential buyers, so that the transition from strategic graph to decision 
locale was made quickly. 
Functional Analysis 
The successive viewpoint which the different functions of a company can and 
do take to strategic planning can form the basis for a planning checklist for 
action planning. Here successive viewpoints are adopted from, say, IS, human 
resources, or marketing in order to answer the question, What can the function 
do of itself to further transitions which are desired. An example of this can be 
seen in (Munro, 1996) where the method is applied to the information strategy 
of a government design support organisation. Functional analysis, however, 
still takes essentially a unilateral viewpoint. 
Competitor-based transition analysis 
More in keeping with the origins of EFAR as a strategic graph production 
method is the approach whereby the abilities of the competitors and the client 
company to control the transition is taken into account. This is seen in the BAe 
case, where the effect of the competitors' project effectiveness is seen to at- 
tenuate the transition from state 57+ to state 35 because the competitors' ef- 
fectiveness in project terms is seen to re-norm the customer's expectations. 
The essence of the approach is to examine exhaustively the methods by which 
interested parties are able to influence the transitions which we wish to avoid 
or wish to promote. It is then straightforward to generate an output similar to 
that of case study one, where the requirements to defend or promote particular 
transitions are combined into an overall action plan. 
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How effective is EFAR? 
Further to the discussion of Chapter 5 (Figure 23) EFAR is to be judged in two separate 
respects, namely its ability to make sense of the environment and its ability to generate 
effective action planning. There is no recourse to any single truth under the constructivist 
paradigm adopted in the argument of Chapter 4. We have no greater confidence in our 
retrospective judgement of the veracity of the EFAR-derived view than we do in our con- 
temporary judgement during the analysis. In the later case we are in danger of burdening 
the model with judgements based on theories and data deriving from subsequent analysis; 
in the contemporary case our judgement of its behaviour in comparison with 'the true 
situation' is defective in a number of ways. First, our definition of the system in focus is 
constructed in a time frame and with a set of preconceptions which are only partly de- 
clared even to ourselves. Secondly, that view of 'the truth' is made from our own view- 
point; there is no guarantee that another's contemporary viewpoint will not be equally 
valid. The approach to justification, then is to enquire as to the effectiveness of the method 
in respect of its sensemaking and action planning techniques at the time of analysis as 
judged by the participants. 
In the example of the BAe case the judgement of the strategy and planning director was 
that the method and analysis produced a different understanding of the position of the 
company in its time-process. In particular, the observed reaction of the divisional board to 
whom the strategic graph of Figure 25 was presented was one of surprise and clear con- 
cern, that the company was apparently only a short distance away from the discomfort of 
the states marked decline. The direct result of the briefing to the board was the setting in 
train of two new initiatives 
a) an investigation and subsequent in risk management techniques for project 
management and 
b) an analysis of takeover options amongst the remaining community of 
naval contractors, and in particular the smaller UK shipyards. 
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The evidence of a tangible investment in risk management tools as direct result of this 
new perception and of the subsequent activities of the company in approaching other stra- 
tegic targets to maintain their position in the sector shows that the multi-futures approach 
did indeed improve the understanding of the managers in question of their situation. 
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Chapter 7. - The Management of Specific Conflict - 
Powergraph 
Introduction 
The strategic directed graphs resulting from the application of EFAR present competent 
solutions to the problem of overall strategic planning, but, generally speaking, do not offer 
sufficient detail to then allow the management of specific conflict situations. In order to 
address such matters a technique (known as Powergraph) is described which allows the 
representation of the specific options open to participants. It is an embodiment of the local 
game described in Chapter 5 and, as in Figure 13 above, can be considered as a subset of 
the overall strategic game. In Chapter 10, which deals with the practice of foveal game 
analysis, a case study (Oxford Scientific Films) is reported which illustrates clearly the 
connection between the strategic directed graph and the Powergraph analysis at the local 
game level. 
7be applications addressed in this chapter are chosen primarily to illustrate the technique 
of application of the method. They consist of an expost study of a simple military/political 
situation from the 5th century BC, chosen because ofýits non-contentious nature to illustrate 
the method, an fvc post study of a struggle between three UK defence companies for two 
major naval projects, chosen because of the clarity of its tactical conclusions vis-a-vis the 
actual behaviour of the participants, and a set of examples where Powergraph is applied to 
some classical game theory problems, chosen both to illustrate the ability of Powergraph 
to improve upon the classical solutions and to provide examples of analysis heuristics. 
Later case studies, including the analysis of the 1937 Postage Stamp Crisis between 
Nicaragua and Honduras provide further examples of analysis (in Chapter 8), as do 
subsequent studies of a blackmail situation (7he Spanish Mayor), a struggle over the staffing 
of an international project (BAe's Starffing Problem) (both in Chapter 9) and the disposal 
of a company (OSFs Strategic Future) (in Chapter 10). The last of these serves also to 
illustrate the connection in practice between EFAR and Powergraph. 
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Description of Method 
Fraser and Hipel's (1984) approach to conflict analysis, along with that of Howard (197 1, 
1989a, 1989b), can be considered in terms of the declaration of a set of states of play 
which together define the possible outcomes of the conflict, and a rule for determining the 
progress of the situation between those states. As has been discussed earlier, both Howard 
and Fraser and Hipel concentrate on the capabilities of individual players to bring about 
moves among this state of futures in order to identify those states which constitute stable 
outcomes, or equilibriums. 
The essential idea is that of unilateral improvement, or Ul. A player is deemed to have the 
power to move from state i to statej if and only if that player's tactical choice alone 
changes as the situation moves from state i to statej. In the two existing methods this is 
relatively easy to discern, since the states of play are themselves determined solely by the 
combined tactical choices of the players. The existing methods declare a preference ordering 
for each player over the set of states of play, and if a player prefers statej to state i and has 
the power to move from state i to statej, he is deemed to have a unilateral improvement 
from state i to state f 
The Powergraph method also declares a playing space which describes the feasible outcomes 
of the game and analyses the power and motivation of the participants to move from one 
state to another. In this overall topological respect it is similar to the existing methods. 
There are two essential differences, however. First, the playing space of feasible states is 
not defined directly by the tactical choices of the participants. Instead the possible states of 
play are determined by direct examination of the conflict situation itself. (A supporting 
technique to this part of the Powergraph process is shown in Chapter 9). As discussed in 
Chapter 3, Figures 7 and 8, the use of the tactical choices of the players as the basis for the 
generation of possible outcomes predisposes towards a set of states which are determined 
by the prior conceptions of the tactical choices open to the players. The objective of the 
ar Wysis is to determine what the players should do, i. e. their tactical choices. As such 
Powergraph derives the tactical choices from the analysis as opposed to assuming what 
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tactical choices available to the players ab initio. Second, movement between states is not 
determined simply by the powers of one player. In Fraser and Hipel's technique transitions 
between states which require the cooperation of two or more, players are rejected. In the 
Powergraph approach boolean logic expressions are used to show how the capabilities of 
more than one player are combined in order to bring about a transition which each desires. 
Figure 24 below shows the process diagrammatically. The figure shows that after defining 
the participants in the situation, the possible states of play are defined. These states of 
play are both the outcomes of the conflict and the (possibly transient) states which, while 
not being outcomes as such, are definable and important 'rest points' of the system. An 
example of the latter might be a state of indecision, which might persist for a substantial 
period of time, but which will eventually be left for an outcome state. For example, the 
coming together of parties to the negotiating table may be a most significant stage on the 
development of a conflict, but (notwithstanding North and South Korea) is not usually 
seen as an end in itself. The phrase 'equilibrium position' is not employed here since the 
status of each possible outcome, i. e. whether it is transitory or an equilibrium candidate, is 
a result of the procedure rather than an input. The word 'outcome', then, is to be understood 
in the sense of a possible outcome which may, in the event, be neither achievable nor 
desirable from the point of view of the participants. 
The next stage in the procedure is to order the players' preferences as to the states. This in 
turn will be used to determine the extent to which they will wish to use whatever power 
they have to bring about certain of these states and to avoid others. 
The ability of each player to move the system between the states defined above is contained 
in a matrix called the transition power matrix. A logic expression or boolean function is 
used to describe the various combinations of players' abilities needed to bring about the 
transition. 
The critical part of the process is the application of a simple rule which allows the motivation 
and power of a player to be compared in order to determine whether that player has the 
incentive and ability to control a transition. The rule is most simple; in order for a player to 
Page 241 
identify '%- list particip ants Agý 
network 
000 
identify states of 
%1- 
0 
the future Appp- 00 
consider who Boolean 
controls the expressions 
transitions 
participants 
rank order 
states preference ordering 
preferences 
)0- 
Figure 26: The overall Powergraph procedure 
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act so as to bring about a change he must have both the ability and the will to do so. This 
consideration results in the motivated power matrix which shows those transitions between 
states which are within the capability of players and desired by players. 
At one level of analysis, enough for simple games (which nevertheless can represent quite 
complicated business conflict situations) it is adequate to show the likely outcomes. in 
general, however, analysis of the structure of the network of states and the transitions 
between them is needed in order to simplify the examination. This is carried out using a set 
of heuristics which take account, for example, of the rationality of players in not moving 
towards likely equilibriums which they do not favour when they can move towards 
equilibriums which they do favour. These rules, which are related to the approach of Fraser 
and Hipel and of Howard, are described below using the applications of the method to the 
problems of simple conventional game theory, which also provide some evidence of the 
justifiability of the method, in that it will be seen that Powergraph mirrors the results of 
game theory in these cases but also provides a greater, unifying understanding of the 
cooperation/conflict dynamics therein. 
Last is the process of action planning whereby the network structural information can be 
turned into an action product by means of sensitivity analyses in order to indicate where 
the available resource for affecting the motivation and powers of other players should be 
best applied. This, being essentially an issue of practice, is described in later chapter 10 
using practical ex ante and expost case studies. 
These steps are described below in more detail and a simple example - the engagement 
of Mardonius, a Persian general, with the Greeks - will be used to illustrate each step of 
the procedure. 
Mardonius and the Greeks - 479 BC 
Historical Context 
The ambitions of Darius, the Persian pretender to the soil of Greece had foundered on the 
rocks of Marathon in 491 BC. The Athenian leader at the time was Thernistocles, known 
generally among his contemporaries as Neocles. He was, as Fuller (1954, p26) has it ' 
Page 243 
[mlore clairvoyant than most ofhis contemporaries', and he saw that Marathon was more 
the beginning of a longer war with the rapacious Persia than it was the end of one. 
Ilemistocles was fortunate in a number of ways as he commenced his period of sporadic 
rule over Athens. First, a recent battle between the home city and Aegina had convinced 
the Athenians of the need for a strong navy, a position which was to prove critical in the 
outcome of the Battle of Salamis, not treated here, which provided the context for the 
subsequent land engagements. Second, a rich vein of silver had been found at Matonieia, 
and Thernistocles was able to persuade the polis of the merit of using it, not - as had been 
proposed - as a windfall gift of bullion to the citizens, but to build a force of one hundred 
triremes. Third, Darius' motivation was temporarily weakened by a diversionary revolt in 
Egypt. Last, before Darius could focus his attention on the Greek homeland, he died, to be 
succeeded by his son Xerxes, who had to end the Egyptian revolt and then spend time 
establishing himself on the throne of Persia. 
By 484 BC, however, Xerxes had secured his position and was ready to invade Hellas. As 
Herodotus (Rawlinson, 1880, VII p143) writes, , ... was there not a nation in allAsia 
which Xerxes did not bring against Greece'. The invasion army was a formidable one. The 
Hellespont was bridged in 482, and by 481 Xerxes was in a position to send emissaries to 
Athens and Sparta to demand the traditional supplicant gifts of earth and water. He began 
his advance into the Greek homeland and, in particular towards Therma. 
The Greeks, however, were collectively already well aware of the Persian threat, to the 
extent that a pan-Hellenic congress had met at Corinth, under the presidency of Sparta, at 
which the defence of the peninsula was discussed. The Peloponnese was understood to be 
the wellhead of Greek independence, and, thereby, the defence of the Corinth isthmus was 
vital. It was also understood, however that if the defence were to be concentrated exclusively 
on the isthmus, the northern flank of the Greeks could be turned, and the Corinth region 
lost by that means rather than by direct attack. It was also necessary, then, to hold the 
enemy in the north. 
Xerxes engineered an agreement with the Carthaginians that they should mount attacks on 
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the Greeks of Italy and Sicily, while the Persians took the attack of the Greek mainland. 
Their implementation of their own element of the plan was to have a meeting of the sea 
force and of the land force in the vicinity of Thermopylae. Simultaneously the supporting 
force of Carthaginians would block the entrance of the strategically important Euboean 
channel, thus bottling up the Greek fleet. 
The Persian movement of 400 warships to the area was disastrous; caught at sea in a 
savage gale, many were lost. The next day, however the remainder regrouped and, as they 
were preparing their attack on the remaining Greek ships, numbering 53, a ship arrived 
fromThennopylae which broughtthe fell news thatthe all-important pass leading toAthens 
had been forced by the Persians, and the road to Athens lay open before them. The Greeks 
had no option but to withdraw their fleet to the south towards Salamis. Now only the tiny 
Greek flotilla stood between Athens and disaster. 
The Battle of Salamis is well recorded by many authorities (Fuller op. cit pp 38-43). To cut 
a long and courageous story to the bone, the Greeks drove off the Persian fleet without 
subsequently pursuing and destroying it. Nevertheless the Persian fleet, unchallenged in 
any serious way until that time, was left with its supremacy in tatters. Worried over his 
lines of retreat back to Persia over the Hellespont, Xerxes sent his fleet back towards Asia, 
and followed a few days later with a withdrawal of his army to the north, away from 
Athens which they had already invested. 
Xerxes soon recovered his nerve after realising that the Greek navy had not moved to 
destroy the Hellespont bridges (since they would have thereby left the Persian stranded on 
the wrong side from their homes and would have caused the destruction of the Greek 
economy by foraging). Mardonius was left with 300,000 of the best Persian troops 
(according to Herodotus). Without a fleet, however he could not renew his attack on the 
isthmus per se, and so chose to save the glory of the Persian empire from ignominious 
withdrawal by a diplomatic ploy, based upon the unending debate within and between the 
Greek city states. 
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Conflict situation 
Fuller (op. cit. pp43-44) sums up the situation succinctly, 
'In the early summer of479 BC he [Mardonius] sentAlexander ofMacedonia 
to the Ath enians with an offer of a free pardon for the past and an alliance 
with Persia on equal terms. 7his became ýnown to the Spartans who at once 
took alarm, and theAthenians agreed to reject the offer on the understanding 
that the Spartans wouldJoin then in an offensive against the common enemy. 
'Mardonius then began stirring up trouble within the Peloponnese. Knowing 
that theArgives were hostile to the Spartans. he intrigued with them to attack 
the latter so that when the two were engaged he might suddenly march down 
from the north and carry the isthmus by a coup de main. 7he plot miscarried 
'Mardonius then returned to a modified edition of hisfirst plan. This time it 
was to bring the Spartans into the open by putting pressure on theAthenians. 
On his way down from 7hessaly, he changed his direction accordingly and 
marched on Athens, at the same time sending an envoy to Salamis to reopen 
negotiations with the Athenians in the hope of alarming the Spartans. It 
succeeded in doing so: Aristides at once sent representatives to Sparta urging 
immediate action should the Spartans wish to retain the loyalty ofthe Athenians. 
The result of the threat was that after considerable delay afield army of 5000 
Spartan hoplites and 35000 armed helots was sent to the isthmus under the 
command of Pausanias,. regent for Pleistarchus, the young Spartan king. 
Mardonius, who had thusfar refrainedfrom damaging Athens, thenfired the 
city and withdrew to Boeotia to draw the Spartans and their allies into country 
more suitablefor his cavalry to operate in. ' 
Fuller's essential analysis (op. cit. p43), then, is that Mardonius misjudged the preference 
order of the Spartans, assuming erroneously that they would prefer 'a reconciliation with 
the Persians to an alliance with Sparta. ' 
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Identification of participants 
It is first necessary to identify the participants in the conflict. The key question here concerns 
the criteria for inclusion. Firstly, one observes that to qualify as a separate participant, an 
entity must have differences from other participants in terms of any of the following: 
beliefspace, 
preference ordering 
objectives 
tactical choices 
freedom of action. 
Second, elements of an organisation (SBU's or individuals on the board, for example) 
should only be included when they have an exercisable and distinctly different motivation. 
As an example, it is possible to treat the individual board members of a company as different 
players, since one might argue that each of them separately has different means of 
influencing the situation on behalf of their company, but this would be unnecessarily 
complicated since the totality of their freedom of action is comprehended by the common 
motivation of the set of board members who act to achieve the aims of the company as a 
whole. Only if the objective of the board members are different from those of the board 
should they be included separately. 
It is observed that while an expansion in the number of outcome states (discussed below) 
results in a combinatorial expansion of the work content, an expansion of the number of 
participants is only a linear expansion, since for a given number of states the number of 
participants determines the number of examinations of each transition for the influence 
and power being exerted therein. 
Lastly, it should be noted that successive passes through the Powergraph approach for a 
given problem may well show up differences between the motivations of entities initially 
agglomerated. If this is observed, the differently motivated entities are then split from the 
4 Parent' participant for the next iteration. 
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In the illustrative example we see that an appropriate set of players is 
P The Persians (Mardonius) 
A Athens 
S Sparta 
State Definition 
The second step in the process of modelling the conflict is to identify the states which the 
situation may resolve to, or which may act as temporary but significant intermediate states. 
A particular technique (top-down value-based state generation) for generating states for 
Powergraph is described in Chapter 8, but the following observations are relevant here. 
Feasibility of outcome 
The existing conflict resolution methods place much emphasis on the feasibility 
of states, representing in the model only those outcomes (defined by the choice 
of tactics among the participants) which are reachable by the set of tactics 
defined ab initio. This is not the method of Powergraph. We should not concern 
ourselve's with the feasibility of outcomes as input data; rather, the outcomes 
will emerge as feasible, transitory, etcetera, from the analysis. Frequently the 
subject of such observations as 'If only we could achieve ... 'is a useful source 
of desired outcomes. 
Examination of attributes 
The general approach of EFAF, in selecting a number of factors with which to 
characterise the future states, offers potential for cuing those states which the 
client company may find desirable, or indeed undesirable. An example of this 
can be found in the present example, where the various motivations of the 
Athenians, Spartans and Persians are used to cue the appropriate state 
definitions. The process is one of characterising the attributes of a situation 
which would be significant to the particular player. Other players may see 
other attributes as significant. For example, in the The Spanish Mayor case 
reported below, three policemen have been arrested having tapes of telephone 
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conversations in their possession (which constitute the threat to the mayor). 
These three will clearly view the disclosure of the information as important 
and material, but they will be equally concerned as to the maintenance of the 
information in their own possession, since public disclosure will prevent the 
use of the tapes as part of a plea bargain. 
Tactical choices 
As part of the outcome identification the tactical choices of the players are 
relevant. It would be inappropriate to define the outcomes exclusively as points 
in a space defined by the tactical options of the players, for reasons discussed 
above, but the apriori freedom of action of the participants does allow cues to 
finther definition. Often the outcome states can be partly defined in terms of 
the tactical choices of the participants with the addition of other state variables. 
Extension prvcesses 
Identification of some outcomes allows the extension to others. A diagram of 
outcomes can therefore be grown by considering what outcomes could result 
from an particular state. An example of this is the Powergraph treatment of the 
classic game, Chicken, reported below, in which Powergraph states are extended 
from the standard list of states defined in the game theory literature. 
Recursion processes 
The Powergraph approach allows the redefinition of outcomes in the light of a 
first pass through the analysis. Other outcomes can become apparent in the 
processes of analysis or of interpretation. Both The Spanish Mayor case and 
the ex ante case of Oxford Scientific Films Ltd. of Chapter 10 exhibit this 
recursion. 
Here we have the following states: - 
1 Athens and Sparta allied but neutral towards Persia. No offer from 
Mardonius. 
2 Athens and Sparta are allied but neutral towards Persia who is offering 
an alliance to Athens. 
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3 Athens has accepted the Persian offer, thereby allying with P. 
4 Athens and Sparta are allied and at war with Persia 
5 Athens and Sparta are unallied and are both neutral to P 
6 Athens and Persians are at war. Sparta is neutral 
7 Sparta and Persia are at war. Athens is neutral. 
Preference Ordering 
A table is drawn up showing the preference which each participant has for the defined 
outcome states. 
Table 15 shows the relative preferences between the various states for the three participants 
in the illustrative example. Each entry shows the ordinal preference of that state. T'hus 3 
means that the state is third most favoured. State numbers are shown thus, 10. 
........................ ........................ ....................... 
Table 15., Preference ordering for Athens, Sparta and Persia 
We see here that while Athens would prefer a state (1) of peace (or at least of nonaggression) 
she is quite prepared to go to war with Persia, but only if Sparta is with her (4). If that is not 
the case, then Athens would accept the Persians generous offer of an alliance (3). Failing 
that'Athens would prefer the security of an alliance with Sparta (5 to 7) to the prospect of 
facing the world without a friend. Lastly, Athens would be rather chary about either herself 
or Sparta facing the Persians in war alone (2). Almost certainly the Greek combatant would 
lose, and the other would follow. 
Sparta is quite happy with the status quo (2), but would prefer a combative alliance with 
Athens (4). Generally spealdng it is better from her point of view to confront the enemy 
than it is to wait to be overrun. Sparta is less keen on the idea of a threatening Persia 
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seducing her ally (2) and thoroughly dislikes the idea of Athens and Persia joining forces 
(as they eventually would) against Sparta (3) 
The Persians prefer that Athens be, broken away in order that the difficult Peloponnesian 
situation can be defused and so that Sparta can be isolated. Persia thoroughly dislikes the 
prospect of taking another tactical beating by the combined forces of Athens and Sparta 
(4) and is not keen on any war with a Greek participant if the other is merely neutral and 
therefore likely to join the war at any time. 
Chapter 9 shows a method of relating these preference orderings to the different agendas 
of the players, in order potentially to link the strategic games (which operate at a higher 
level than the Powergraph technique) of the different participants. 
Examination of Transition Power 
A matrix is then drawn up which eventually defines the extent to which each of the players 
has control over the transitions between each pair of the possible outcome states. This 
stage incorporates a large amount of subjective and often wide ranging information elicited 
from the knowledge base of the domain experts, and requires careful annotation as to the 
basis of the conclusions arrived at. Each transition should have a brief pen picture describing 
the nature of the influence being exerted by relevant participants in that transition. The 
leading diagonals of the transition matrix represent the 'sustainment power'at each location. 
This is the ability of participants to resist movement from the state in question as opposed 
to their ability to move away from it. Usually the sustainment power can be inferred from 
the ability of the players to move from the state, but it can also occur that the ability of 
players to prevent transition is different from their ability to move. 
The influences of a number of participants are expressed as a boolean expression. 
Table 16 below shows the degree of influence held by the Persians and the Greeks over the 
transitions in the present example. 
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............... ....... 
1 
. 
2 3 4 
........ ..... 
567 
A. S. P p AS A+S AS 
2 
.......... 
p A. S. P A AS AS 
3 
............... . ...... 
A AS A AS AA AS 
4 
............. 
AS (A+S). P AS AS AS sA 
5 A. S. P A. S. P A. P AS AS As 
6 
........................ 
A. S. P A. P s A AS 
7 A A S AS 
Table 16. Transition power matrix for Mardonius and the Greeks 
In the table we can see that Persia has control alone over transition 1>2. The sustainment 
power at state 1 is in the hands of AS and P, the first two because they could choose to 
move away by declaring war on the Persians or by breaking their alliance, and P because 
of her power to make the offer of an alliance to Athens. Other critical transitions are 4>2, 
where A or S could stop the Greek alliance warring with the Persians, but the Persians 
have control over the offering of an alliance to the Athenians. Both conditions (A OR S) 
and (P) are necessary, making up the boolean expression (A OR S) AND P, written (A+S). P. 
The transition from 4>1 is critical; Athens and Sparta must agree to end the war in order to 
reach state I from state 4, otherwise they will reach state 5 or 6. 
At this stage it is often convenient to represent the network of outcomes, preference ordering 
and transition powers in a graphical form. This is not essential, however, and it is often the 
case with more complicated situations that the matrix representation remains the more 
convenient. In addition the matrix form remains the easier input format for computerised 
reduction. 
Relaxation of Matrix 
7be next stage in the process is to examine the implications of the preference ordering 
upon the willingness and motivation of the participants to exert the power represented in 
the model. If it is not in a party's interest to move from one state to another, he will not do 
so, even though the transition is in his control. Such a preference sanctioning will result in 
the participant's influence over the transition disappearing from the model. This is the 
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exact analogue of the unilateral improvement (Ul) criterion adopted by both Fraser and 
Hipel (1984) and by Howard (1971). 
Often the rationality of such processes is easy to see and the relaxation of the diagram is 
straightforward, but in other cases issues of myopic versus non-myopic motivation arise 
which require different methods to be applied. These more procedural approaches are 
discussed, using the Battle for Trafalgar Case, below. Many strategic situations can be 
'solved' by the inspection method. 
In the illustrative example, applying the preference ordering to Table 16 gives Table 17, 
the motivated power matrix, where the power of a participant to induce transition is modified 
by checking that a motivation, expressed by an improvement in the preference, exists. If a 
participant has the power to make a move, but the preference of the terminal state is less 
than that of the source state (i. e. the result is less preferred, so that the preference order 
number is greater), no motivation will exist to bring about the transition. 
........... ....................... ............. ......... 23 
-------------- -- - 
4 5 6 7 
....................... 
. 
p 
....... . ... 2 
....................... 
A AS 
A. S 
4 
5 A. S. P A. P AS AS 
6 A. S. P A. P s A 
........... 7 A A s 
Table 17., Motivated power matrix for Mardonius and the Greeks 
Generation of graphical presentation 
It is almost always desirable at this stage to represent the control over the transitions as a 
diagram such as Figure 27, where arrows indicate feasibility of a transition, and the boolean 
expressions attached show the influence exerted by the different participants. Only in the 
case where the diagram contains too many states and transitions for it to be comprehensible 
is it appropriate to work with the exactly equivalent (motivated power) transition matrix. 
Additionally, the diagram itself provides means of communicating the essential structural 
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issues to respondents, as will be seen in Chapter 10. 
S Start t Key V31 
[2.2,31 Capitals denote power + motivation 
Small letters denote power + neutral 
motivation 
% 
AW k % 
State B. c 
[1,4,4] C 
6 
A+(E. C) +(13 C)/ 
- , 
Preference ordering aboWir 
for each player Inorder- 
, - 
-- [A, 8, C] I 
Figure 27 Part of a hypothetical Powergraph directed graph' 
Where necessary, preference ordering is shown as a 'word' attached to each state, as, for 
example, (at state Start), [2,2,3] where the preference ordering of the participants is shown 
in numerical or alphabetical order. Here A ascribes preference ordering 2 to the state, 
(meaning that there is one other state which A likes better) as does player B, whereas C 
ascribes third preference to the state. 
Arrows imply the feasibility of a transition from a source state (at the foot of the arrow) to 
a sink or terminal state at the head. Attached to the arrow is an expression such as (A. B+Q 
giving the logical expression which indicates which player or combinations of players 
have control over the transition. In this example (A. B +Q indicates that A and B together 
can bring about the move or C alone can do so. Where a player has the power to bring 
about a transition but is not motivated to do so because the preference ordering of the sink 
state is the same as that of the source state (i. e. the motivation is neutral), a small letter is 
used as, for example, on the transition from State 1 to State 2 in Figure 27. Conventionally, 
states are written in bold, thus, State 1 and transitions are written thus, Start > State. 
Where necessary, (D implies that no one has control over the transition. It could be random 
or predetermined, or under the control of a participant undefined in the model. 
For the illustrative example, the matrix of table 17 can be represented conveniently as a 
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directed graph or state transition diagram This is shown in Figure 28. 
[ 1231 (A, SP) 
15441 
13711 
A 
Figure 28. Full directed graph for Mardonius and the Greeks 
Stability Analysis 
At this stage in the Powergraph procedure the transition diagram (or equivalently the 
motivated power matrix, since they are topologically identical) is examined for equilibriums. 
Certain rules exist for the simplification of these diagrams, and these are covered in more 
detail below, but often the examination of the diagram is essentially intuitive, and certainly 
for simple diagrams, the stability analysis is straightforward. 
In the case of Mardonius and the Greeks, as one would expect from the simplicity of the 
diagram, the analysis of Figure 28 is indeed straightforward. First, it should be observed 
that state 4 has only arrows going into it, with the effect that it represents an end state or 
equilibrium state, in the sense that under the assumptions made in the model regarding the 
power and motivation of the participants, state 4 is one of the states to which the situation 
will progress. 
Second, certain states (6 and 7) possess only outgoing arrows. Tbus, unless the state of 
affairs is forced into one of those states the model cannot reach them. They thus represent 
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unreachable states which can be deleted from the stability analysis at this stage. Having 
carried out these deletions we observe that state 5 then has only outgoing arrows, so that it, 
too, can be deleted. This leaves the diagram of Figure 29, which shows the fundamental 
stability of the states in the model. 
Figure 29. Reduced transition diagram after deletion of unreachable states 
We see in figure 29 that under the control of the Persians, the system is moved to state 2, 
which represents the Persians offer to the Athenians. From this offer the system can move, 
under the control of the Athenians alone or the Athenians and Spartans acting in concert, 
to states 3 and 4 respectively. The transition 1>3 represents the acceptance of the Persians' 
offer by the Athenians. Equally, the Athenians and the Spartans could agree at this stage 
(state 2) that they will go to war together with against the Persians. This would require 
certain information to be made available. First, the Spartans need to become aware that the 
system is at state 2 rather than at state 1. They find this out by their spies in the Athenians' 
camp, but they could equally well have found out that the offer was on the table by an act 
of the Athenians themselves, or indeed by a leak from the Persians' camp. Note that it is 
not in the Persians' interest to release the information, since by keeping it secret they can 
deny the communication necessary to allow the function A. S to operate. In other words, 
without the information as to which state the system is in, the Athenians and the Spartans 
could not agree to act together in order to achieve state 4. 
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Persia makes the offer 
Athens and Sparta act together 
% ... and go to war with 
Persia 
Figure 30. Summary of stability analysis for Mardonius and the Greeks 
Another route to state 4 is via state 3. Observe that both the Athenians and the Spartans 
prefer the state ofjoint warfare against the Persians to the alliance of the Athenians with 
the Persians. The Athenians reject the hegemony of the Persians, suspecting that the great 
Persian economic machine will allow them the power subsequently to renegue on the 
agreement offered by Mardonius; the Spartans, on the other hand, feel strongly that such 
an Athenian/Persian alliance spells catastrophe for their warlike but ultimately vulnerable 
state. Tbus both sides, (A and S ), are motivated to enable transition 3>4 to take place. 
We thus see that Fuller (op. cit. p 43), in offering the observation that '... ftheAthenians 7 
Past suggested that they wouldprefer a reconciliation with the Persians to an alliance with 
Sparta' focuses on the fundamental structural issue in this system. If the Athenians had 
preferred the temporary stability of an alliance with the Persians to the cauterisation of a 
joint front against them, the model would have ended up at state 3, and the link between 
3>4 would not have taken place because of a lack of motivation on the Athenians side to 
go to war. 
The model shows us more than Fuller's analysis, however. Mardonius tries, in Fuller's 
words(ibid. ) '... to bring the Spartans into the open by bringingpressure to bear on the 
Athenians'. In other words Mardonius attempts to force the system into state 6, where the 
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Athenians and the Persians are at war. ' [Athens] at once sent representatives to Sparta 
urging immediate action. 'The Spartans follow transition 6>4 by sending 5000 hoplites to 
the Athenians' assistance. The Persians now faced a formidable motivated Greek'army on 
the Corinth isthmus. Mardonius had failed in his attempt to split the Greek forces. Ulfimately 
this led to the decisive battle of Plataea, where Mardonius, fatally, 'so compressed his 
forces that his archers, which, might have held the key to success, were unable to generate 
the rate of fire necessary to drive back the combined Greek forces. The Persian threat to 
Hellas was never again to be as great. 
Recursion 
Although it is not strongly in evidence in the illustrative case study used here, in practice, 
Powergraph shows itself to be most powerful when used in an iterative fashion. Because of 
its usefulness in making sense of the complex management environment in which strategy 
is identified and implemented, one Powergraph cycle provides an improved understanding 
which alters the perceptions of the user of the elements of the model. See Figure 3 1. 
Figure 3 1: Action planning and sensemaking in the Powergrah procedure 
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For example, new players may be identified as a result of analysis of the powers and 
influences in the transitions. Equally, new states may emerge from an understanding of 
what is possible for the opposition or indeed ourselves to do. Lastly, the whole basis of 
attention of the analysis may change. This last effect is shown effectively in Ae Spanish 
Mayor case study, described in Chapter 9. Here we see a first phase of analysis where the 
attention of the analyst is upon the gross characteristics of the problem; who is a real 
threat, who is a potential target for influence. This leads to an improved understanding of 
the threat to the mayor to the extent that certain parties (in fact, the Chief of Local Police) 
who were thought to present a serious threat to the political wellbeing of the mayor are, in 
fact, unmotivated to use any power that they have. This understanding then leads to two 
activities. First, it gives a targeting structure on which basis new information is gathered. 
'Does the arrested policeman actually have the threatening tapes? ' 'Does the local judge 
already know the situation? ' This new information then forms a basis for another stage of 
analysis. Second, it provides a basis for a new path of analysis of itself. Concentration in 
this second phase is upon the effect of each of the parties releasing the information which 
it is supposed they have. 
The second phase does not represent a subset or a resolved picture of the first phase. The 
two analyses are connected but separate. In a sense the second analysis is simply a picture 
of the same complex problem using a different sensor, more focused onto a particular 
aspect of the problem. 
There is a second respect in which the iterative approach is necessary, and this is shown in 
Figure 31 by a different path, marked 'action loop'. This iterative path recognises the 
intervention effect, whereby action taken as a result of analysis affects the situation being 
assessed. This action may be a direct intervention, or a gathering of information. In an 
extreme case it may be the knowledge that the situation is being addressed. It has been 
observed, for example, that in the suffocating atmosphere of the defence construction 
oligopoly, knowing that a company is developing a strategy alters the industry for which 
that strategy is being developed, even before any action is taken. 
Page 259 
Case Study - The Battle for Trafalgar 
In order to show in more detail some of the characteristics of the various elements of the 
procedure of Figure 26 a case study, The Battlefor Trafalgar, will now be described. 
The situation derives from the struggle between BAe and GEC for two major naval projects, 
the replacement NATO frigate, (known at the time as CNGF) and the replacement UK 
nuclear attack submarine, the Batch Two Trafalgar Class or B2TC. The case study is 
I. 
presented as an expost description of a rich and strategic level conflict which is not atypical 
of the struggles between large defence companies for new markets. Because it is expost it 
is not an appropriate metric for the ability of Powergraph to predict the evolution of a 
conflict situation, but, equally, because it is expost it provides an opportunity to weigh the 
effectiveness of Powergraph in representing a complicated and well-understood struggle. 
An analysis of this situation using the methods of Fraser and Hipel appears below by way 
of comparison. 
The Baffle for Trafalgar 
Background 
This example of the application of Powergraph to a strategic business conflict/cooperation 
situation concerns a real decision sequence made by a major defence company, British 
Aerospace PLC, when deciding what positions to adopt in teaming on two related projects. 
The sequence of events took place during early 1993. 
Firstly, a word is necessary about the contracting environment of the time. In accordance 
with a general desire to tighten up the effectiveness of defence procurement in the aftermath 
of series of unsatisfactory procurements such as the Type 2400 (Upholder) class submarine 
(HCDC, 1991), the AEW Nimrod and the Foxhunter radar, the Chief of Defence 
Procurement, Peter (now Sir Peter) Levene had instigated with strong cabinet support a 
policy of tangible and substantial risk transfer to industry coupled with a requirement to 
produce a single contracting point and a policy of value for money as measured by cost/ 
operational effectiveness analysis. Within the naval procurement organisation this resulted 
in a stated desire that the next surface and submarine procurements would be competitive. 
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There are two projects in question, the first being the provision of a number of submarines 
to enhance the existing fleet nuclear submarine flotilla, and known as the Batch 2 Trafalgar 
Class (132TC). This project is dominated by two players, VSEL, the existing builders of 
the Trafalgar class submarines on which the new design is firmly based, and GEC who 
have a strong interest in the provision of weapon systems for B2TC and in developing 
themselves into a position of being a prime contractor for the project as a whole. The 
motivation of VSEL is to maintain a dominant position in the project, to the extent of 
claiming a prime contractorship position for the submarine. VSEL are threatened in no 
small way by the ambitions of both GEC and BAe to grow their prime contractorship 
capability and experience (gained respectively in home and overseas surface ship building 
and in aircraft and overseas defence systems provision). While VSEL at the time had an 
impressive track record of producing excellent submarine hulls which, in service performed 
as well as any in the world, there was a perception that their ability to contain and manage 
the high risk elements of a whole submarine procurement was unproven. A common 
perception at the time was that the addition of either GEC or BAe to their team would fill 
that credibility gap and provide a 'dream team. It is also worthy of note that it was an 
imperative of VSEL at the time that they should remain in command of the project. There 
was little attraction to them of retaining work in their yard at Barrow-in-Furness while 
losing managerial control of the project. 
The second project under consideration was a similar procurement of a new NATO ftigate 
known at the time as the common new generation frigate or CNGF. Here the predominance 
of the players is reversed in that GEC hold the advantage because of the experience of their 
Yarrow Shipbuilders' yard on the Clyde in building appropriately sized frigates. VSEL is 
viewed as being competent but inexperienced at this type of build. The advantages to 
VSEL of having BAejoin their frigate team are large, in VSE1: s view, since the provision 
of effective surface ship weapon systems has been a BAe competence for some years. BAe 
also br ings with it a competence in risk management which VSEL felt at the time would be 
important in fighting off the threat from GEC. From GEC's point of view BAe are useful 
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because of their weapon system competence, but in addition having BAe in their camp 
would deny VSEL an important competence to the extent that their bid would be unlikely 
to be credible. 
Theproblens 
BAe has been chasing these projects for some years. Because of a concatenation of 
circumstances, a simultaneous decision has to be made regarding the team which BAe will 
offer to join, whereas previous planning had assumed that these teaming decisions would 
be made sequentially. 
At heart the problem is this: should BAe offer to join with one partner (GEC or VSEL) on 
both projects or should it 'split the pair' by offering to do each project with the company 
that is more likely to win? The commercial directorate of BAe at the time was of the 
opinion that since VSEL was almost certain to win the submarine contract it made no 
sense to join with GEC on the submarine contract; moreover, since GEC was more likely 
to win the ffigate contract it made no sense to join with VSEL on the higate contract. 
Hence the 'split the pair' option was recommended and, in fact won the day, as will be 
seen, with interesting consequences. The counter-argument to 'split the pair' is that since 
workshare won in a negotiation tends to be proportional to the marginal benefit brought to 
the team, it makes more sense to partner with one company for both projects, since in that 
circumstance the chosen company would have the expected workshare on their likely project 
to give away (conditional on eventually winning, admittedly) and would view the benefit 
of having BAejoin its team on the other (less likely) project as being great. 71iis argument 
then supports a position diametrically opposed to 'split the pair', advocating a commitment 
to a single prime, be it VSEL or GEC. 
Structural issues 
It should be noted that apart from the failure of BAe to analyse fiffly the situation, there is 
no belief space problem here. Each of the protagonists have spent most of the previous 
four years in constant discussion over the two projects, and their view of one another's 
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objectives can be said to be complete through the medium of public utterances and through 
S=i-public conversations between senior executives of all companies. Moreover joint 
teams have been in existence for a number of Years engaged in primary design for the two 
different projects, which have lent important insights into the likely approaches of opposing 
teams. 
Theplayers 
The participants in this strategic struggle, then, are as follows 
B= BAe's System and Services Division 
G= GEC Naval Systems, representing the interests of its weapon systems 
division, Marconi Underwater Systems Limited (MUSL) and Yarrow 
Shipbuilders Limited (YSL) 
V= Vickers Ship Engineering Limited (VSEL) 
The states 
Start BAe is teamed with no one and GEC and VSEL are 
separately forging teams to bid for the two projects 
Sput BAe offers to team with GEC on the fiigate and VSEL on 
the submarine 
GEC alliance BAe offers to join the GEC teams on both projects 
VSEL alliance BAe offers to join the VSEL teams on both projects 
frigate only BAe joins with GEC on the frigate alone 
s/m only BAe joins with VSEL on the submarine only 
freeze out BAe has no position on either project 
Other states where, for example, BAe teams with VSEL on the frigate alone were rejected 
out of hand by the BAe board very early in the actual analysis and do not appear here. 
Rank ordering ofpreferences 
Table 18 shows the preferences allocated to the three companies in respect of the states 
defined above. It can be seen that, from BAe's perspective, being frozen out is the worst 
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state, and that they would prefer the split position of all, with a preference for an alliance 
with GEC over VSEL (for peripheral strategic and long term reasons) over an alliance 
with VSEL. 
From VSEL's point of view, the alliance with BAe is a good option, since it will increase 
the chance of winning surface ship work for their Barrow-in-Furness yard, and they see 
that because of BAe's declared development path in to submarine prime contractorship, 
Me will be willing to accept a relatively small workshare in order to obtain a foothold. 
VSEL in turn, protecting their strategic development path of retaining an effective monopoly 
position in submarine manufacture in UK, while expanding their surface ship throughput 
(HCDC, 1990,199 1). VSEL, therefore, would prefer most states over that where BAe is 
assisting their competitor on the fhgate, GEC. What they will not accept is the 'cuckoo in 
the nest'whereby BAe take work (from what VSEL sees as their already secure submarine 
position) while assisting GEC. 
ri 
BAe I VSEL I GEC 
start 
. . . 
7 7 7 
.......... . . 
spin 
............... 
1 6 6 
.. 
alm only 6 6 4 
........... . frigate 3 3 1 
only 
VSEL 4 1 5 
alliance 
. .............. .. GEC 2 4 2 
alliance 
.............. 
f reeze out 7 2 3 
Table 18: Preference ordering for Battle for Trafalgar case 
From GEC's point of view, it would like to see BAe on its side in the submarine competition 
in order to remove it from VSEL's team. Similarly GEC has a preference for BAe to assist 
it in the frigate bid. GEC would be quite happy to see BAe frozen out (i. e. not obtaining a 
Position on either project because with BAe out of the game GEC would feel fairly confident 
in the long term of obtaining control over the naval prime contractorship opportunities on 
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both submarines and surface ships. VSEL view the expressed intent of BAe to enter the 
naval prime contractorship business as a line of weakness over which it can be threatened, 
the main force of argument being that major opportunities in this sector come along very 
rarely, and the ability of a company to win any particular project is strongly conditioned 
by its performance in previous projects of that type together with the knowledge and skill 
won in previous implementations (Sandler and Hartley, 1995, pp 147,148). 
Influence matrix 
................................................................................................ Transition Matrix for TraYaIgqrexerqjfj 
__ 
i ................. I .. I.................. 1-- ......... 
................... .................. ? .................. ............ ..... . ...... . ...... .................. ................... GEC .................. frigate 
start split s/m only 
VSEL 
i freeze out, only alliance all ance 
.................. 
start B 8 B B B 
B. V. G B+G B+V B. V. G B. V. G V. G 
stm only V. G B. V. G V % B+V 
................... frigate V. G % B. V. G B. V B. G B+G 
only 
VSEL V. G B. V B. V. G B. V B. V. G B+V 
alliance 
GEC V. G B. V. G B. G B. V. G B. G B+G 
alliance 
................... 
freeze oLA B. V. G B. V B. G 13. V B. G V. G 
Table 19 : Transition matrix for Battle for Trafalgar In the table I indicates an 
infeasible transition 
Table 19 shows the influences being brought to bear on the transitions between the states 
defined above. It can be seen that many transitions are not deemed feasible, for example, 
moving directly from the start to being frozen out is not a sensible transition. Others are 
under the control of participants who have a unilateral sanction on its persistence. For 
example, from the split state either GEC can reject its element of the proposed agreement 
(sending the system to a s/m only state) orVSEL can reject its element of the offer, sending 
(perhaps temporarily) BAe to a state where it only has an agreement on the fzigate with 
GEC (frigate only). 
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Afolivatedpower matr& 
In accordance with the Powergraph procedure, each transition is then examined to determine 
whether the participants who have influence according to Table 19 are motivated to bring 
that about according to the preference ordering of Table 18. The effect of such consideration 
is to reduce the complexity of the boolean expressions by virtue of the setting to a value of 
0 those variable in each transition expression which are associated with a participant who 
has the power (and therefore appears in the transition expression) but who does not have 
the motivation (since the terminus state is preferred less than the source state). This leads 
to the matrix of Table 20. 
................................................. I ........................................................................ Motivatedpow, r matrix for Trafalgar exercise 
.................... r .... ......... 
q_ 
..................................... .......... ........................................ *"*'*"*********'*" .................. *f. '. *. '. *. '. '. * ........... ... ........ 
................... .................... .............. . .... ................... ............ .................... frigate VSEL 
start I split s/m only - 
............ . ...... GEC . .................... freeze out 
orJy allianoe 
................... 
allianoe 
: start B B El 
I 
El B 13 % 
split B. V. G G v V. G 
alm only B. V. G v v 
frigate B. V. G 
only 
VSEL B. V 
afflance 
GEC B. G 
allianoe 
freeze out 
................... 
N B. G B. V B. G V. G 
Table 20. MotIvated power matrix for participants in Battle for Trafalgar 
This matrix is equivalent to the transition diagram of Figure 32, in which the characteristics 
of the problem can begin to be seen and which are described below. 
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12421 
17771 
Figure 32., Transition diagram for Battle forTrafalgar problem 
Analysis of the Directed Graph 
The output of the Powergraph procedure is, equivalently, the motivated power matrix or 
the directed graph. This section deals with the existing heuristics and more formal results 
which assist in determining the behavioural conclusions from the directed graph in particular. 
First, however, it is noted that the scope of such an analysis is necessarily limited. 
The Powergraph directed graph is an example of a deterministic graph game (DOG), first 
discussed by Washburn (1990). Alpern (1993) describes such games as being 'directed 
graph analogues ofperfect informationfinite tree games', where cycling is allowed between 
the defined states. There are two types of pay-offs, terminal (Washburn, 1990) and time- 
averaged (Alpern, 199 1). In the former case, referred to as DOT games, the payoff accrues 
only when a terminal state is achieved, and in the latter, referred to as DGA games, the 
payoff is averaged over the pay-offs met at the locations visited in the trajectory of the 
game. Powergraph directed graphs are thus terminal payoff games or DOTS. 
Alpem (1993) observes that a DOG can be rewritten as an infinite, extensive-form tree. 
There exists for each two person zero-sum game a pure optimal strategy determinable in 
Polynomial time relative to the number of nodes of the graph (Washburn, 1990). We are 
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not concerned here, however, with zero-sum two person games. The general case for conflict 
analysis has more than two players and pay-offs which are terminal, differently perceived 
by players and non-zero-sum. There is no available theory to support analysis of such 
graphs and we are thrown back on an essentially heuristic approach which mirrors that of 
Fraser and Hipel and of Howard. 
Analysis of Options Approach 
Fraser and Hipel (1984, pp214-215) approach the problem of equilibrium in a similar way 
to Howard (1971) by dividing the equilibrium characteristics of a given state into three 
types of equilibrium, distinguished by the type of rationality associated with them. Tlie 
associated figures (33 to 35) show the situation under the Powergraph diagrammatic 
convention. 
Rational outcomes occur when no unilateral improvement exists for any player. 
Figure 33. No path leads from state i; it is therefore a rational outcome 
Symmetric metarational outcomes occur when although one player has a Ul from 
a state (and should myopically, therefore, move) other players can act, in pursuing their 
own interests so that the game will subsequently arrive at a place less desired by the first 
player. It is, thus, not in the interests of the first player to move since she will subsequently 
be disadvantaged. This is referred to as a sanctioning of Xs UI by the threat of B's 
subsequent (self-interested) action. 
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1321 
A 
1241 
Figure 34: A is sanctioned by Bs subsequent transition 
General metarational outcomes occur when a player has a Ul away from a state, 
other players then choose ajoint strategy and subsequently the first player can move again 
to a state he prefers. Such a process can continue indefinitely and in Fraser and Hipel's 
phrase (op. cit, p215) 'it might [sic] be betterfor the particularplayer to remain with the 
original outcome! This can be seen as a neutralisation of the sanctioning process of the 
symmetric rationality above by the inescapable improvement offered byA! s second move. 
Again, all players act in a locally self-interested fashion. 
[321 
1131 
A 
[241 
I Figure 35. General metarationality; A can improve to a third state (here the 
original one, V 
This taxonomy is used as the basis for an equilibrium analysis procedure, suitably extended 
to encompass the multi-player control of the transitions, and with this structure in mind, 
the procedure for relaxation of the directed graph is as follows. 
1) Determine the start position. 
2) Delete from the diagram any state other than the start state which has no 
arrow into it. 
3) Repeat step 2 until all states are accessible. 
4) Rational Outcomes: Identify any states which have no arrow leaving 
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them. These are rational outcomes and the resultant graph, known as the 
1-step graph identifies those transitions which are both empowered and 
motivated from the point of view of the players. 
This graph represents the possible trajectories which the situation will follow when each 
player considers only his own motivation one step at a time. By extension of the Fraser and 
Hipel taxonomy above, however, we see that certain 2-step paths may result in an outcome 
less desired by the players than the origin state. In other words, some transitions may 
result in a temporary improvement which can be denied by other players acting in their 
own self-interests. This is the symmetric metarationality case described above. 
5) Identify Sanctioned States (Symmetric rationality): In the I -step graph, 
examine each pair of successive transitions (from state i to state j to state k, 
for all i, j and k) ftom each player's point of view. If the utility of state k is 
less than the utility of state i and the player in question has no control over 
the transition j>k, that player will not be motivated to bring about the 
transition i>j because transition j>k will result in an overall fall in utility 
(over the two steps). Set that player's variable in the boolean expression for 
i>j to logic value 0. 
The phrase 'has no control over the transition j> Wdemands explanation. It is not simply 
a matter of whether the player's variable appears in the boolean expression describing the 
power over the transition j>k. If the boolean expression for transition j>k is of the form 
P. 0 where P is player P's boolean variable and 0 represents any boolean expression, P can 
clearly control whether or not the transition takes place in spite of any other playcrs'desire. 
In any other circumstance player P will be partly under the control of the other players in 
respect of this transition. 
6) Identify inescapable improvements (General Rationality): For each 
sanctioned path identified above, determine if an inescapable improvement 
exists by tracing possible paths away from the state j above. 
It will be seen that the above procedure drives out metarationality at the 2-step level. 
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General metarationality requires a N-step approach, a more demanding requirement 
reflected in the weak phraseology of Fraser and Hipel (quoted above). Even in the simplified 
'grammar of their diagrams N-step motivations are difficult to uncover, and their approach 
is, in the end, largely by inspection. Annex C to this work gives a set of theorems on which 
basis the boolean matrices of Powergraph can be manipulated in order to generate N-step 
motivated transitions. They indicate the feasibility of a computer-based decision support 
which may be a useful practical extension of this work, but, perhaps more importantly 
indicate that the necessarily myopic approaches of Fraser and Hipel and of Howard (which 
this work shares) may not be an essential limitation in the future. Figure 36 (Fraser and 
Hipel, 1984, p217) surnmarises their approach, and it should be noted that while the term 
'Inescapable Sanction' is clearly defined the concept of 'Inescapable Improvement'which 
determines whether a state is general metarational for a player requires, similar to the 
Powergraph problem of N-step stability described above, an examination of an arbitrary 
number of transitions. 
Start 
. I- Ul from No q is outcome q or RATI NAL 
,, playerA> 
f- 
foOrA 
Yes 
q is 
SYMMETRIC 
METARATIONAL 
for A 
No 
JETARATI 
q is 
GENERAL 
I 10 No ME 0 e TARATIONAL e for A 
Yes 
UNSMLE 
tbr A 
End 
Figure 36: Algorithm for determining rationality of outcome (From Fraser and 
Hipel, 1984, p 217) 
The equivalent algorithm for Powergraph is shown at Figure 37. 
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Start 
A=A+l 
I.. No I IS ..? RATIONAL 
Yes 
Yes 
E . 
&. 
A, 
&A, 
ý 
for A 
No 
GENERAL No mETARATIONAL 
fr A 
A 
Yes 
UNSTABLE 
Se(A'sbwlean 
variable to 0 in 
relevant path from 1 No 
Figure 37. Powergraph stability algorithm 
End 
71eexampleof 77ze Battlefor Trafalgar is now analysed according to the above procedure.. 
Figure 30 (repeated here for convenience) is the directed graph produced by the Powergraph 
procedure. 
1242 
[7771 
Figure 32 (bis): 777e Motivated Power Directed graph for Battle for Trafalgar 
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Inspection of the diagram shows that only the Start state has no path into it. This means 
that all the other states are potentially accessible. 
Rational States: 
States GEC alliance, VSEL aWance and frigate only are rational, since they have no 
paths out. They are shown here as shaded. 
Figure 38., Rational outcomes in Battle for Trafalgar 
We now have four remaining states to consider, with each of their transitions. These are 
start, freeze out, s/m only and split. 
State split has two paths from it, split > frigate only and split > s/m only. 
split > frigate only under the control of V, ends in an equilibrium (rational 
outcome). Hence it will be taken by V since no player will move from frigate 
only thereby reducing the utility from V's point of view. 
split > s/m only, under the control of G, improves G's utility from 6 to 4, but 
path s/m only > VSEL alliance under the control ofV would reduce G's utility 
from 4 at s/m only to 5 at VSEL alliance. As G's utility at VSEL alliance is 
better than at split, such a path would be, on balance, in G's interest even 
though G would prefer to stay at s/m only). A similar argument applies to the 
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path s/m only > freeze out also under the control of V, which results in a 
utility for G of 3, a better rank ordering than the utility at split whA is only 6. 
Thus split is unstable. 
State s/rn only has two paths from it, sIrn only> freeze out and s/rn only> VSEL alliance. 
s/m only > freeze out, under V's control, improves V's utility ordering from 5 
to 2. From freeze out, however, there is a development path controlled by B. G 
to frigate only, which V likes less than freeze out, but not less than s/m only. 
Hence it does not sanction V's transition from s/m only to freeze out, and s/m 
only is unstable thereby. 
s/m only > VSEL alliance, under the control of V, improves V's utility from 5 
to I and puts the game into a rational outcome, from which no movement will 
result. Hence path s/m only > VSEL alliance would occur. 
This last pair of transitions illustrates coincidentally the impact of the stability analysis on 
the order of play choice presented to V at the state s/m only. V has the choice of making 
two moves, and will base the choice (under conditions ofperfect rationality) on the terminal 
pay off. Here the choice of VSEL alliance would be made since the frigate only utility 
order for VSEL is 3 as opposed to I in the other path. 
State freeze out has only one path out to a rational outcome (equilibrium) and hence is 
unstable. 
State start has 4 paths out, namely start > split, start > frigate only, start > s/m only and 
Start > VSEL alliance. 
start > split, under the control of B leads to an initial improvement of utility 
from 7 to 1, but is subject to V's movement from split to frigate only, which 
leaves B's utility at 3. While this is less advantageous than the utility at split, 
it is better than the utility at start, and hence does not constitute a sanction. In 
fact, since start has a utility of ordering of 7, the worst in B's eyes, no sanction 
can be invoked, since no threat can be worse than the utility at state start. 77his 
applies then to the other three transitions, start > frigate, start > s/m only and 
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start > VSEL alliance 
Discussion of transition diagram 
Having identified the rational states (equilibriums) a more interpretative analysis follows. 
The process is essentially one of rehearsing the consequences of taking available choices 
at each of the states where more than one transition is available. 
The transition diagram shows that BAe starts the process by offering one of the teaming 
choices. 
Case I- BAe offers the split 
Here, simultaneously (or, equivalently, without mutual knowledge) BAe offers the teaming 
with GEC on the frigate and with VSEL on the submarine. Either VSEL can take them to 
position frigate only by rejecting the advance, or GEC can take them to position s/rn only 
by rejecting the advance. It depends who is quickest to become dissatisfied (or to rationalise 
their dissatisfaction) with the offer. What the diagram shows clearly is that because of the 
motivations of the players the direct consequence of moving to split is that BAe will either 
be taken to frigate only or to s/m only, neither of which it has preference for. Figure 39 
shows the reduced diagram when BAe moves to state split. 
(& ýý 
B. G 
B. V. G B. V 
B. V. G 
V 
Figure 39. Transition diagram after BAe has offered a frigate position to GEC 
and a submarine position to VSEL. 
We can see (Figure 40) that if V rejects the offer the resultant state frigate only is stable, 
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since there are no routes out of iL Similarly (Figure 41). if the state s/m only is brought 
about by GEC's rejecting the BAe offer. VSEL is put in control, and, according to its 
whim, can either offer a full alliance, replacing GEC as BAe's frigate partner, or can offer 
BAe the distasteful prospect of being shut out completely (state freeze out). In this latter 
case BAe will restart conversation with GEC in order to recover state frigate only, this 
requiring BAe to initiate those conversations, and GEC to be compliant. 
sbmt, 
B. V. G 
ED (9D 
Figure 40: VSEL reacts to the BAe offer 
Case 2- BAe offers to team on thefrigate only 
Here the state arrived at is frigate only which, as described above, is stable. GEC is likely 
to accept the offer. 
Case 3- BAe offers to team on the submarine only 
Here VSEL are subsequently put in charge and can either decide to shut out BAe or to ally, 
as discussed above. 
Case 4- BAe Offersfull alliance to GEC 
The state GEC alliance has no paths leading from itý and therefore is 
likely to persist. 
GEC accepts the offer. 
Case 5- BAe Offersfull alliance %ith VSEL 
S'rlilar to the case above, VSEL is likely to accept the offer, since there are no paths 
leading from the state VSEL alli2nce. 
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Me, therefore must come to the conclusion (See Figure 39) that if it plays the 'split the 
pair'tactic, 
a) BAe will irranediately hand control over either to GEC or to VSEL 
b) the best outcome that can emerge is an alliance with VSEL, with the very real 
danger thatVSEL will shut them out. Examination of the preferences ofVSEL will indicate 
which is the more likely. 
C) If VSEL take exception to being treated as an expedient, the result will be a 
Position on the frigate alone. 
(Z) 
fftn 
E3) 
B. V 
Figure4l: Prefeffed tactics for BAe 
G 
$tan : 
ago BG i i-). * 
i: s 
B. V. G B. v 
' 'N " B. V. G -, V 
V 
Figure 42. 
The situation ff GEC rejects the proposed BAe offer to split the projects 
lience, on examination of the consequences of the tactical choices, BAe would be better 
0 ffl ýring an alliance to GEC from the start, since the indications are that GEC would not 
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have the motivation to renegue on such a deal. See Figure 42 above. 
H%at actually happened 
Ile actual decision was that because of the weight of the argument that it made no sense to 
back a loser, and hence that supporting VSEL on the frigate and/or GEC on the submarine, 
an offer would be made to GEC to support them on the frigate and to VSEL to support 
them on the submarine (i. e. to 'split the pair'). GEC was duly informed and considered 
theirposition, keeping theirpowder dry until negotiation on the workshare could be started. 
At a professional institution dinner that same night, the managing director of the relevant 
BAe division informed his counterpart in VSEL of the good news; BAe had decided to 
support VSEL in their submarine bid, but, understandably, felt that it made no sense other 
than to support GEC in their frigate bid, bearing in mind the formidable track record in 
their favour. 
7beVSEL MD was incensed. Calling his Chief Executive over to join the conversation, he 
informed the BAe MD that VSEL was not prepared to allow BAe to take workshare from 
the submarine programme (which VSEL already considered theirs for the taking) if BAe 
was not prepared to offer any assistance in the face of a threat to VSE1, very existence. The 
dockyard at Barrow needed the frigate work for its future survival. BAe had, they considered, 
renegued on an already done deal. 
Diplomatic relations were broken off and BAe and GEC beat out a deal on the frigate. It 
was not favourable to BAe, but how could it be? After all, they were now playing on 
GEC's territory and it was clear that there was no retreat to a submarine position with 
VSEL. 
BAe's only recourse, eventually, was to attempt a buy of VSEL. 
Shortly after the abortive attempt by BAe to buy out VSEL, the results of the competition 
for the submarine project between GEC (who now owned VSEQ and VSEL were 
announced. 
GEC won on merit and price. 
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Comparison with Fraser and Hipel Approach: Analysis of Battle for 
Trafalgar 
In order to provide a comparison with the existing approach the following analysis results 
from the use of the Fraser and Hipel approach to the case study Battle for Trafalgar, described 
above. 
Theplayers and their options 
The participants in this alternative analysis of the battle for the frigate and submarine 
projects described in Powergraph terms above are the same as in that previous analysis. 
The Fraser and Hipel approach requires the tactical options for the players to be expressed 
as a set of bipolar choices which are described in Table 21 below. 
Tactical options for Battle for Trafa ......................... . ........................................................... ........................ 
: BAe 'Do frigate with GEC ....................... ............ . .......................................................... ........................ Do frigate with VSEL 
... . ................. ....... .... ........ Do submarine with GEC 
....................... ......................................................................... ....................... Do submarine with VSEL 
....................... 'GEC Do fii gate with BAe 
......................... ............ . ........................................................... ....................... Do 
Do submarine with BAe 
. ....................... .......................................................................... ....................... Do submarine alone 
: VSEL I Do fri eate with BAe 
Do submarine with BAe 
Table 2 1: The tactical options for players in Battle for Trafalgar (Fraser and Hipel 
analysis) 
Feasible Tactical Options 
The next stage in the Fraser and Hipel analysis is to reject infeasible tactical options by 
considering the viability of options of tactics to and between the participants. For example, 
in this case BAe cannot do the frigate with both GEC and VSEL, and so any combinations 
having the appropriate entlies will be rejected. An array of Os and Is is constructed, I 
indicating that the participant in question adopts that tactical choice and 0 indicating that 
the tactical choice is not taken up. Table 22 below shows the feasible choices remaining. 
The feasible individual tactical choices are now compared with those for other players in 
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order to rejectjointly infeasible tactical choices, i. e. choices of tactics which are infeasible 
because of interactions between players, for example, if BAe chooses to bid the submarine 
with VSEL but VSEL chooses to bid on its own. 
The results of this are shown in Table 23 below. 
frecze-out frigateonly GECalliance VSEL s/m only split 
I 
alliance BAO 0 11 00 
D 
t 
0 00 00 
................... ........... 
D 0 01 000 
Do submanne with VSEL 0 00 11 
0 
..... . ........... . 
L). o.. su bm. an n e. w. t t h. B. A. c 
................... 
001c 
........ I........ ...... .... . Do submanne alone I101 
................... 
Do fngatFýt4. BAc 000 _0 
. ......................... Do 
' 
fri p't'c" alone 
*1111 Do submanne*wit*h BAe*'*"'* ---------- 0001 
alone 00 
................................... .............................................. ...................... ...................... ....................... ....................... 
Table 23 The remaining jointly feasible tactical options In Battle for Trafalgar 
Table 23 shows clearly that the states implicit in the Fraser and Hipel analysis are identical 
with those derived directly in the Powergraph approach except for the Start state. In this 
instance we should expect this because the basis for the definition of the states is limited to 
the particular choices made by the player B (BAe). This application of the Fraser and 
Hipel method shows how the future is defined by the tactical choices. If the tactical choices 
are not completely understood, however, inadequate representation of the states will result. 
Table 23 also shows the correspondence with the states used in the Powergraph analysis. 
Unilateral Improvement Analysis 
The next step in the Fraser and Hipel procedure is to identify Unilateral Improvements or 
Uls which are transitions between two states where a player is motivated to induce the 
transition and has the power to do so. The Fraser and Hipel interpretation of power in the 
transition is whether the player can, unilaterally, change his tactical choice without the 
choice of another player being altered. This is a most strict interpretation of the concept, 
and requires a player's ability to induce a transition to be truly completely within his own 
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power. The procedure begins with a rank ordering of the states in preference order for each 
player as shown in Table 24 below: - 
Rank orde g tin 
.. 
qfp 
............................. ........................... 
............................. ............................. Wame Index BAe GEC .............................. VSEL 
Treeze-out i ................................ 
2720 6 3 2 
ifrip! "a! y 2705 3 2 3 
: GEC alliance 2 2645 1 4 
......... 
1704 5 4 5 
1689 1 6 6 
, VSEL alliance 
ý 
1450 4 5 1 
Table 24 Preference ordering for Battle of Trafalgar 
These preferences accord with Table 19 above. The preferences are reordered in compliance 
with the Fraser and Hipel index, which is a numerical device used by them to ease the 
tedious comparisons which an result from extensive tactical choices. The index is calculated 
by taking the decimal equivalent of the binary number which forms the 'word'of Os and Is 
describing the tactical choices which define each state. (Fraser and Hipel, 1984, pp 14 -15) 
Next the states are put in preference order for each player as shown in Table 25 below. 
.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
...... ...... . ...... ....... ....... ............... ............. .......... ...... ................ ................................................. 
soit GE-Cdlimce Mcgeorty VSELmlhance S/M on] v firem-out 
...................... 
I i 1 0 00 
. ........... with 
VSIU. 
............. ..................... 
0 0 0 1 00 
Do mibmanne with GEC 0 0 0 00 
Do mibmanne with VSEL 1 0 0 1 10 
FEC 
....... . 
jý. wi. th. B. A. e 
................. .... 
I I 1 0 0 
.............. 
1? 2ffiga 
............................ 
0 0 0 1 11 
Do submartne vnth Be 
... .. ... _0 
1 0 0 0 0 
. . . Do stibmanne alone 1 0 1 1 11 
...................... 
0 0 0 
Doftg. atc alone 
............... 2 
. -- 
[ 4t t OE: 
1 
....... .. 
D. s n n ne alone 0 1 0 
- ---------------- ............ .......................... ................................................. 
Table 25 Showing the preference vectors for BAe in an attempt to find Unilateral 
Improvements 
The Fraser and Hipel method (and indeed that of Howard, on which their material is based) 
now requires unilateral improvements to be found. In Table 25, then, we examine each 
state in turn to discover whether another state differs from it only by our own choices, 
while the component of the defining word determined by other players' choices remains 
the same. 
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It is here that the method fails, since no such state exists for BAe (nor for the other players). 
Hence there are no UIs and the conclusion of the Fraser and Hipel method is that all states 
are equally likely as equilibriums. This is not a satisfactory conclusion. 
Why does the Fraser and Hipel method fail? 
The fundamental difficulty lies with the constraint placed upon the method by the restriction 
to states based on mutually compatible tactical choices. This places a constraint on the 
cffective power structure of the method, since it assumes that each transition has effectively 
to be agreed by both parties. This is not necessary in many cases. An example will serve to 
illustrate the point. 
Consider the transition from the split state to the submarine only state (1704). In the real 
situation this transition is clearly in the power of GEC. An offer has been made to VSEL to 
bid the submarine and an offer has also been made to GEC to bid the frigate with them. In 
order to move to the submarine only state it is clearly necessary for GEC to reject the 
offer. Thus the transition is controlled exclusively by GEC. Fraser and Hipel, however 
offer a method which appears to require the compliance of BAe, since the tactical choices 
of the two must be compatible. This is clearly not an appropriate representation of the real 
life project situation. 
Now, it is clearly possible to amend the Fraser and Hipel procedure to accommodate such 
effects, but the effect of this would be to bring it nearer to the approach of Powergraph, 
and, ultimately to the same assumptions about the need to address issues of which party 
has power over transitions directly rather than as a consequence of a procedural approach 
based on tactical choices. 
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Some Classical Problems 
The game theory literature contains a number of exhaustively analysed stylised situations, 
among them being Ae Prisoners'Dilemina, Battle qfthý Buddies and Chicken (Fudenberg 
and Tirole, 1991; Gibbons, 1992; Heap and Varoufakis, 1995; Morris, 1992; Rasmusen, 
1989) , each of which has on occasions been used as a stylised framework for the study of 
conflict (Brodie, 1959; Ellsberg, 1959; Schelling, 1966; Rathjens, 1969; Jervis, 1984; 
DeNardo, 1995). This section describes the Powergraph analysis of these three important 
games in order 
a) to show that the conclusions of this literature are reflected by and included 
in the Powergraph analysis 
b) to provide further material for the subsequent explanation of the methods 
used to analyse the directed graphs 
c) to provide further examples of the use of Powergraph 
The Prisoners Dilemma 
No game has received more attention from game theorists than the Prisoners' Dilemma, or 
PD. It concerns two prisoners who are arrested and put in separate cells. They can choose 
either to cooperate (i. e. to keep trust with another ) or to defect (or betray the partner in 
crime). It is made clear to both prisoners that if they should turn Queen's evidence on their 
colleague, then they should expect to receive a certain leniency from the court, while the 
criminal colleague receives the full measure of the law. Of course if neither turns evidence 
on the other, both will do well, since the court will have insufficient evidence and they will 
benefit to the tune of their illegal profits. Lastly, it will be clear that it will be to neither's 
advantage if both turn evidence since then both will be found guilty, but it is more hurtful 
to each one if the other (alone) turns evidence, leaving his colleague to face the charges 
alone. This is often expressed as a bi-matrix of pay-offs (Morris, 1992) thus: - 
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B's Choice 
Cooperate Defect 
Xs Choice Cooperate (-2, -2) (-101-1) 1 
Defect (-l, -10) (-5, -5) 
The convention here is that the pair (x, y) indicates the pay-offs to A and B respectively. 
States 
Conventionally, the four states of play in which the two players cooperate with one another 
or defect and bear witness against their partner in crime are denoted by a symbol such as 
CC or DC which indicate respectively that both cooperate or that A defects while B 
cooperates. We therefore define in the Powergraph procedure the following states- 
CC Both players cooperate with one another, denying information to the police 
CD While A keeps silent, B reveals his evidence to the police 
DC B is silent and A gives evidence 
DD Both tell what they know. 
We note here that in this artificial example the states are adequately and unusually defined 
by the tactical choices alone. One can view them, however, either as a set of implemented 
tactical choices by the two players (A chooses C and B chooses D) or as a description of a 
state of affairs (A is keeping quiet, B is stitching him up). 
Rank ordering 
The entries in Table 25 below show the rank ordering of the preferences of the states in the 
eyes of the players, A and B. 
A B 
cc 2 2 
CD 4 1 
DC 1 4 
DD 3 3 
Table 26. Preference ordering in PrIsoners'Dilemma 
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Feasibility of transition 
Examination of the feasibility of transitions between states leads to Table 27. 
CC 
....................... ....................... 
CD DC 
................... 
DD 
CC 
.......... 
B A A. B 
........ 
C-D 
........ 
B A. B A 
DC A A. B B 
DD A. B A B 
Table 27. - The feasibility of transition between states in Prisoners'Dilemma. 
AfotivatedPower 
We now apply the information in Table 26 to Table 27 to give the motivated power 
transition matrix of Table 28. 
cc CD I DC DD 
cc BA 
........................ CD A 
DC B 
DD A. B 
Table 28: Motivated power marix for PrisonersDilemma 
In constructing this matrix we apply the following procedure: - 
Select a transition (say, CC to CD) 
For each player who appears in the boolean expression for that transition 
in Table 27, determine using Table 26 whether the terminal state (here 
CD) is preferred to the source state (here CC) 
If the player has the motivation to bring about the transition (the terminal 
state is preferred to the source state), we retain that player in the relevant 
boolean expression. (Here we find that player B is motivated to bring 
about the transition and so we enter B in the relevant cell of Table 28. ) 
Continue for each element of the boolean expression, deleting (or, to be 
more precise setting to logical 0), that element of the preference ordering 
associated with a player who has no motivation to make that transition. 
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Continue through the remaining cells of the feasibility matrix. 
Figure 43 is a network representation of Table 28. 
CC 
12.21 CD 
A. B 
AA 
LDJ co 11.4] L1,14 jDD 13,31 
Figure 43: Transition graph for Prisoners'Dilemma 
Figure 43, as should be expected, shows an exactly symmetrical graph, where, by two 
paths, A and B (or B and then A), acting entirely in their own localised interests, cannot 
help but gravitate to the state DD, and in order to recover to thejointly preferred CC, must 
cooperate in some way. It should be noted that the cooperation referred to here and in 
conventional game theory texts is not necessarily a communication contemporaneous with 
the problem, nor indeed an overt communication of any form. It could equally be a proper 
agreement that neither will talk at all, or (as in the case of military captives a schema by 
which only specific information will be released). More interesting is the qmergent behaviour 
paradigm of criminals where 'grassing up'a colleague is deemed defacto to be unacceptable 
behaviour. Both cases are cooperation in the game theoretic sense. 
@---L--q) 
A 
DC 
Figure 44: Gravitation to DD by applying localised self interest. 
In this respect, then, the Powergraph treatment shows the classical result of the Prisoners' 
Dilemma treated as a noncooperative game (Morris, 1992, p127; Fudenberg and Tirole, 
1993, pp9-1 0) in which the players have no option but to play DD. In Powergraph terms 
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the important phrase non-cooperative game would seem to mean that any path having A. 13 
as its residual boolean expression cannot be implemented. Treated as a noncooperative 
game A and B cannot cooperate to bring about the effect of A. B. Such a development path 
would emerge from the action planning stage of Powergraph at which, having recognised 
that state CC is the best (for both players) each player would then determine what has to be 
done in order to ensure the successful pursuit of the path CC to CD/DC to DD to CC. At 
the point where the path element DD to CC was discussed it would be realised that the 
boolean expression A. 13 is, at best, jeopardised by the inability of the players to 
communicate. 
At this point conventional game theory adopts the concept of a cooperative game in which 
'theplayers are allowed to make binding agreements about which strategies toplay'(Morris, 
op. cit. p 132). Under this assumption of cooperation, in this situation, A and B are deemed 
to have the ability to communicate and therefore come to a joint agreement that they are 
both better off standing by their protection of the other's interests. It will be seen that the 
Powergraph approach fully reflects the structural conclusions of the conventional game 
theory analysis. 
A specific example of the symmetric rationality issues occurs in the Prisoners' Dilemma 
game, the graph of which is repeated here for convenience. 
Here we see that when considering state CC, A has control over the transition CC > DC 
and DC has only one path out to DD. The transition CC >DC is therefore sanctioned by B 
in the transition DC > DD since A knows that if he takes option DC (i. e. defects), B will 
have no option but to take path DC > DD. State CC should, therefore never be taken by 
jointly rational players. The Prisoners' Dilemma also provides an illustration of general 
Metarationality in that the recovery from DD to CC constitutes a general metarational 
justification of a player making a move CC to, say, DC if that constitutes a threat of 
remaining at DD which can be resolved by cooperative action subsequently. 
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Battle of the Buddies 
The second of the three classical games treated here comparatively by the Powergraph 
approach is a game of cooperation between two friends who have different preferences 
for an evening's entertainment; one of them prefers to go to the ballet, while the other 
prefers watching wrestling. If they were not friends there would be no dilemma; each 
would go his own way. Here, however, they value one another's company, too, so that they 
would prefer to go to the same event rather than go to different ones. 
The game is, again, covered extensively in the literature (Morris 1992, Fudenberg and 
Tyrole 1993), and is included here in order to show the ability of Powergraph to arrive at 
the results achieved by conventional game theory approaches. 
Payoff Matrix and conventional treatment 
Morris, (op cit. pp 116,117) offers the following as a suitable payoff bi-matrix to represent 
the dilemma of the two ftiends. A prefers the ballet, B the wrestling: - 
B's choice 
Ballet Wrestling 
Xs choice Ballet (5,1) (0,0) 
Wrestling (0,0) (1, S) 
Table 29., Payoffs for Battle of the Buddies 
Treated as a noncooperative game (for example, if A and B announce their intentions 
irrevocably simultaneously), there is a mixed strategy solution, where each player chooses 
his own preferred choice with a probability of 516. This is not too helpful in practical 
terms, however. 
The solution to which conventional game theory comes to is indeterminate and can be 
summarised as follows (Morris, op cit., p126) 
1. A can choose always to offer the ballet. If B believes that A will never 
cooperate by choosing to go to the wrestling, then his best response is to 
choose the ballet himself. As Morris (ibid. ) observes 'The success of this 
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scenario requires a degree ofstubbornness between [A] and [B]. Otherwise, 
by symmetry, [B] might persist in playing [wrestlingl. ' 
2. Neither player shouldplay a random mixed strategy. In all cases there is 
a chance that either by design or by accident the other player will choose a 
response mixed strategy that does significantly worse for his ftiend. 
3. A could choose wrestling. If B believed that A would continue with this 
he could respond by choosing wrestling. The result would be excellent for 
B and not bad for A. Symmetry again enters the problem, however, because 
if choosing his least preferred choice is good for A then choosing ballet is 
good for B and we may have the strange situation of each choosing the 
other's preferred option. 'That would be a rather comic turn of events, but 
the possibility ofit does cast doubt on the idea'(Morris, ibid. ) 
States ofplay 
We commence with an analysis based on three states as follows: - 
Start No decision has been made; discussion continues as to the evening's 
entertainment 
BB Both go to the ballet 
WW Both go to the wrestling 
Part Go separate ways; disparity of choices (either order) 
Preference Ordering 
Table 30 below shows the preference ordering consistent with the payoff matrix for Battle 
of the Buddies. 
A B 
Start 4 4 
BB 1 2 
ww 2 1 
Part 3 3 
Table 30. - Preference ordering for states of Battle of the Buddies 
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Note here that we are maintaining faith with the somewhat stylised scenario presented in 
thegame theory representation by deliberately setting the preference of the start/unresolved 
state (Start) to bottom preference, 4, for both players. This ensures that both parties wish 
to leave the start state. We shall see below that there are other representations of the situation 
which comprehend extensions to the states and associated rank orderings of those states. 
Feasibility Matrix 
Table 31 below shows the feasibility of the various transitions. 
..... ...... .... . ...... ... I ............ .......... .... I ............. .... . ........... Teasibility Matrix for Battle of the Buddies ................... ............... .......................... 
........... ......................... ......................... ......................... ; ......................... Start BB WIV f Part 
A. B A. 13 Start A. B 
BB A+B 
.......................... WIV A+13 
Part BAA. 13 
.................. . ..... 
Table 3 1, Feasibility of transitions in Battle of the Buddies 
There are certain inherent assumptions in the matrix concerning the irrevocability of the 
decisions. Observe transition (Part, Part), which defines the ability of parties to prevent 
movement from the state Part (the sustainment power of the parties). We assume inherently, 
although it is not stated in the conventional description of the problem, that the decision to 
part is revocable, in that each party has the opportunity to defuse the disagreement by 
reversing his choice of event. Similarly, in the states WW and BB, we assume (quite 
arbitrarily, in fact) that once the parties have agreed they will not renegue. This assumption 
could equally well be reversed, representing a different social situation. Similarly, we assume 
that once the Start state is left, the parties cannot revert to the state of indecision. This 
assumption is necessary not for the application of Powergraph, but to ensure that the 
representation achieved by Powergraph in this application is restricted in similar ways to 
that of the conventional representations. 
Even at this preliminary stage of the analysis of a starkly stylised game, the Powergraph 
approach throws up, in a natural way, assumptions inherent in conventional representations 
and causes disciplined observation to be made of hitherto untested assumptions. 
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Motivated Power MatrLx 
The inclusion of the preference ordering into the feasibility matrix results in the following 
motivated power matrix, Table 32. 
................... .............. ......... ........... .................. . ... Start BB WW Part 
Start A. B A. B A. B 
BB 
BAA. B 
............ 
Table 32. Motivated power matrix for Battle of the Buddies 
Unusually we see here that no further constraint is placed on transition feasibility by the 
preferences of the players. The resulting transition graph is shown below as Figure 45. 
A. B 
sii 
BB 
A. B 
A. B B 
. I-- 
Part 
): ýA. 
]W> 
Figure 45., Directed graph for Battle of the Buddies 
From the diagram we can see that there are two possible equilibriums (WW and BB). 
They are each reached in one of two ways. Either both parties agree straight away to go to 
the ballet (BB) or to the wrestling (WW) or they can, by acting selfishly in the first instance, 
offer a parting of the ways. That would take them to Part ftom which there are two paths, 
one under the control of A which ends at state WW, where A has given up his preference 
in order to enjoy the company of his friend, and one under the control of B which ends, 
symmetrically at BB. Note the significance of the sustainment power loop marked A. B 
associated with state Part. This is a statement of who has the power to hold the situation at 
state Part. We see that both A and B must act to keep the system at the least desirable state. 
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In summary the Powergraph procedure is telling us that there are essentially two solutions 
to the game, namely BB and WW. This is in complete accord with Morris'(1 994) analysis, 
and mirrors the mechanisms he indicates, already quoted, in the following fashion. First, 
the bullying strategy where either player chooses his preferred event and the other reluctantly 
complies, is represented by the paths Start > BB and Start > WW. Morris (ibid. ) calls into 
question the stability of such an equilibrium, pointing out that (in Powergraph vocabulary) 
both paths Start>BB and Start>WW are under the control of different parties. Additionally 
to Morris' analysis, then, we can state that the essential issue in determining which of 
WW or BB will be an equilibrium is the order of play at Start. In observing that the 
symmetry can be broken by a pre-declaration in this fashion by admitting the possibility 
that one player can have 'first shot' at determining the evening's entertainment we have 
already transcended the level of representation in the conventional game theoretic analysis. 
In practical business vocabulary we have an action plan emerging naturally from the 
Powergraph analysis which indicates a possibility of agreeing with our ffiend that, in order 
I to maximise thejoint return, we will toss a coin for the order of play. It is realised that this 
is tantamount to tossing a coin to decide which of the two events we should attend, but it 
represents a level of structural understanding of the problem arising from the Powergraph 
approach that is above that of the conventional analysis. 
Second, Morris' 'comic' situation, quoted above, results from the lack of declaration of 
order of play at Part. If play is not ordered, there is the possibility that each player will see 
the improvement path to WW and BB respectively and will simultaneously take it, selflessly 
but vainly seeking a reconciliation. We sometimes see this in emotional arguments when 
the weighting of conflicting results characterised by'having one's own wayand 'wanting 
not to fall out' change relative weighting as the consequences of failure to agree become 
more tangible. To put flesh on the Powergraph resolution of the Morris comic situation, 
we again consider the order of play, this time at Part, and see that a conditional agreement 
is needed such as 'We'll say what we each want first, but one of must decide in that 
instance (or we'll be here all night! ) We'll toss a coin to see who will decide. 'Again at first 
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glance it appears to be a simple resolution of the dilemma by the tossing of a coin but 
underlying that resolution is a more realistic structural understanding of the powers and 
motivations in the conflict/ cooperation problem. 
Last, Morris holds out no hope for a randomised game theoretic mixed strategy and neither 
does the Powergraph analysis. 
As a final observation on the difficulty of determining a single, satisfactory solution for 
the Battle of the Buddies, it is inconceivable that any single equilibrium should emerge 
from any analysis since the game is exactly symmetrical for the two players. Powergraph, 
however, rather than accepting the situation as modelled, naturally leads the analyst into 
practical development paths aimed at resolving the situation. 
Developed representation 
In the previous analysis we were concerned mostly with accurately representing the situation 
described by the conventional analysis, and in so doing we observed that there were certain 
hidden assumptions therein. In order to indicate how the Powergraph approach can be 
used to extend this simple representation, the state definitions are now extended to cover 
reneguing and 'agreements to disagree'. It should be noted that there is no implication that 
because then conventional analysis does not cover these more realistic situations that it is 
in any way defective in its analysis. The defect lies only with the speed and flexibility of 
representation and its propensity to generate richer representations, rather than with the 
correctness of the results. 
Expanded List of States 
In order to comprehend these other aspects of the likely situation we adopt an expanded 
list of states as follows: - 
Start No decision has been reached, no offer made 
Indecision No decision has been made, but at least one proposal has been made 
WW Both agree to go to the wrestling 
BB Both agree to go to the ballet 
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Part Both agree to go to separate events 
Part No agreement has been reached, but both go to separate events anyway. 
Preference Ordering 11 
Table 32 below shows the rank ordering of the states defined in the previous section. 
AB 
Start 66 
Indecision 44 
WW 21 
BB 12 
Part 33 
Part 55 
Table 33., Preference order for the participants in Battle of the Buddies 
The preference expressed for Start must be the lowest for both parties, since it is pre- 
defined to be a state which cannot persist. Next liked in order for both players is the Part 
(-) state where theypart on bad terms, having failed to achieve an agreement. The preference 
expressed for indecision requires careful treatment, since it is in fact time dependent; until 
time runs out (the shows are about to start) not deciding is better than Part (-), but when 
time runs out no benefit will be gained and indecision becomes highly disliked. We will 
accommodate this singularity in our equilibrium analysis by assuming that at some point 
an appearance at Indecision becomes the last opportunity; on leaving Indecision at that 
time we cannot return to it. Another way of analysing the situation is to produce two 
different networks with the different preference ordering explicitly expressed. In this case 
the former method is easier. The remaining orderings are self-evident. 
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Feasibility Matrix H 
Table 34 shows the feasibility of the transitions. 
................................................................................................................ ........................ ......................... ........................ Teasibilitv Matrix for Battle of the Buddies 11 : --------------------- -I --------------- ------------------------ ................................................... 
........................................................ 
Start 
............................. 
............................. 
Indecision 
...................... 
........................ 
: BB 
....... . ......................... ------------------------ - ----------------- 
. .................................................. ........................ 
WW Part Part 
Start 
................... 
A. B A. B A. B A. B 
Indecision - A+B A. B A. B A. B A. B 
BB 
........................... . 
A+B A. B A+B A+B 
. . ww A+B A. B A+B A+B 
i Part f. ) 
........... -I 
A+B B A A+B AB 
Tq!!, (0 
.......... -I 
B A 
- 
A+B 
Table 34: Feasibility matrix for Battle of Buddies // 
The entries are largely self-explanatory, but note should be made of the inherent assumptions 
that either party can destabilise a situation (e. g. from Part (+) to Part Improvement 
from Part (-) to WW or BB is dependent upon the other party's agreeing to accept his less 
preferred option, so that Part (-) > BB is in the control of B but not A. Start cannot be 
reached from any other state. 
Motivated Power MatrLx II 
Table 35 below shows the result of incorporating the preference ordering. 
.......... ................... ............... 
: Motivated Power Matrix for Battle of ............... I ........................ ............................. 
....................................................... ............................. Start Indecision 
. . .. . . 
the Buddies 11 
................................................... ......................... ......................... 
......................... ................................................... ........................ : BB WW :: Part Part (+) 
. . . . .. .................. Start 
............................. 
A. B A. B A. B A. B 
. Indecision A+B A. B A. B A. B 
BB 
............................ 
A. B 
.......... 
WW 
......... 
A. B 
p4Y i. 01 A+B B A A+B 
ft) 
.......... 
I -I - B A A. B 
Table 35. - Motivated power matrix for Battle of the Buddies // 
The network diagram which is equivalent to Table 35 is shown as Figure 46 below 
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A. B 
AZ 00 
AM 
Indecision 
A. B 
A. 13 
AB 
+B 
ww AJ3 
Part(-) 
Figure 46., Directed graph for Battle of the Buddies // 
Figure 46 represents a game definition wider than that presented in Battle of the Buddies 
and gives an indication of the kind of expansion to the simple situation which one stage of 
analysis using Powergraph can produce. 
In terms of a behavioural analysis, taking the motivations and powers inherent in the 
diagram at face value, we can describe the situation as follows: - 
1) There are three possible stable outcomes, namely both to go to the 
wrestling, both to go to the ballet or both to go separately to their preferred 
choice bi4t on good terms. 
2) Initially an attempt will be made, by virtue of the players'choosing events, 
of agreement on the wrestling on the part of both players, or on the ballet 
by both players. If that is the case, the game will end so. Thirdly there is the 
possibility of a disagreement by both players choosing their preferred options 
(leading to Part (-)). There is also a possibility that each player will 
immediately see that there is possibility of agreement by the two to part on 
good terms (Part) 
3) A disagreement is unlikely to be maintained (because of the preference 
orderings of the two players) and so an adoption of an agreement to attend 
wrestling or ballet (which will require one of the two to alter in favour of 
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his friend) will result. Alternatively it may be possible that a state of 
indecision will be reached from which it may be possible for a third 
equilibrium to be reached whereby both players agree to part company, but 
on good terms. 
There is, as in the conventional game theory solution and the Battle ofthe Buddies addressed 
earlier, no basis for deciding on which of the equilibriums will emerge. It is, however clear 
that the two will not part on bad terms, and therefore the relationship appears safe. The 
essence of ensuring predictability and determinism in the game is to remove the insolubility 
produced by the complete symmetry of the solutions by a prior agreement on the order of 
play at Part (-) and at Start/In decision. Just as before we could conceive of the two 
players agreeing on the toss of a coin that one of them would choose first, or that one of 
them would choose if there were a disagreement in the first instance. 
There is a relaxation of the diagram which we can adopt, additionally, by imbuing the 
players with a rationality which comprehends Figure 46. They may observe that if they 
adopt the order of play coin-tossing resolution there is no need for them ever to revert to 
the fallback of Part (+). They argue thus. If we can agree on either WW or BB thenjointly 
we prefer that to Part (+), and so we will never adopt any path which leads to Part (+) if 
one of the two others can be an equilibrium solution. Hence we will never choose Start > 
Part (+) or Indecision > Part (+). 
Page 298 
Chicken 
The game of Chicken is of importance in the study of international strategic conflict and 
has been used extensively as a paradigm for arms races (Sandler and Hartley, 1995; 
Ordeshook, 1986). It is also of interest in certain business situations, for example, when 
two companies compete for domination of a market in such a way that withdrawal from 
the race leaves the other in complete control of the opportunity, the withdrawing company 
being no longer viable. Like the other two classic games addressed in this section, is of 
interest not because it offers any plausible, complete, model for business behaviour, but 
rather because it is a game well (some would say exhaustively) analysed, which presents a 
simplistic but archetypal model for social behaviour. 
The objective of this section, then is to compare the solution provided by classical analysis 
with the equilibrium statements and results of a Powergraph approach. 
In describing the game we can do no better than to quote from Morris (1994, p 117). 
, ... Two teenage males with cars meet at a lonely stretch of straight 
road. Yheyposition the cars a mile apartfacing each other, and drive 
toward one another at a high rate of speed The cars straddle the 
center (sic) line of the road. If one of the drivers swerves before the 
other, then the swerver is called 'chicken'and loses the respect ofhis 
peers. Ae nonswerver, on the other hand, gains prestige. Y both 
swerve, neither is considered very brave hut neither really losesface. 
If neither swerves, they both die. We assign numerical values, 
somewhat arbitrarily, to the various outcomes. Death is valued at - 
10, being chicken is 0, not swerving when the other driver does is 
worth 5, swerving at the same time as the other is valued at P 
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Table 35 shows the appropriate payoff bi-matrix. 
B's choice 
Swerve No swerve 
Xs choice Swerve (3,3) (0, S) 
No swerve (5,0) 
Table 36., Payoff bi-matrix for Chicken 
Conventional Analysis 
I As Morris (ibid., p 117) observes, viewed as a cooperative game both players should quite 
clearly swerve, but the conclusion is dependent upon the relative sizes of the pay-offs. If 
the (3,3) payoff is replaced by (2,2) it is better in game-theoretic terms to toss a coin to 
decide who should swerve. This conclusion comes from a mixed strategy analysis of the 
outcomes. If the change indicated is made the total payoff to the players if both swerve 
becomes 4 rather than 6. The total payoff to the players if only one swerves (by prior 
agreement) is 5 in both cases. Hence it is better for the two together to accept the greater 
payoff of tossing the coin to make a prior agreement. 'nie concept of tossing a coin as a 
means of establishing the pecking order in teenage sub-society may, however, encounter 
some obstacles before it becomes accepted social practice. 
There is a fundamental difficulty here with the concept of numerical pay-offs. As discussed 
previously, the concept of numerical pay-offs in games is usually defended in terms of 
dominated utility measures, where the important factor is the relative ordering of players' 
Perspectives on the utility of the various outcomes as opposed to the ordinal measure. If 
the players were paid here to compete and the monetary return were deemed to be an 
adequate and complete measure of utility of outcome then we might feel comfortable with 
the game-theoretic, numerical ly-based argument that if the pay-offs for (swerve, swerve) 
were to be changed from (3,3) to (2,2), then the nature of the solution would change. But 
in practice there is a difficulty over the common knowledge within the game structure of 
the pay-offs to the players (and indeed the stability of the utility of outcomes as the game 
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the pay-offs to the players (and indeed the stability of the utility of outcomes as the game 
progresses). To be precise, we can conceive of a degree of certainty in establishing the 
relative ordering of outcomes but it would seem unlikely that players could agree even in 
their own proportional judgements as to the utility of the various outcomes: we may agree 
that death is preferred to dishonour, but to agree that death has a utility, say, 3 times greater 
than dishonour appears to present certain difficulties to the player. The game theoretic 
argument here is in danger of claiming that the tactic adopted by the players is dependent 
upon a numerical exactitude which cannot in practice exist. 
Of course, Chicken is not a wholly cooperative game, and other solutions to the tactical 
problem which do not require cooperation have been presented. One of the most interesting 
is the transcendence of the game structure by a conscious act of irrationality. Since, without 
cooperation it is clearly in an individual player's best (rational) interest to swerve rather 
than die, the meta-tactic is to present a denial of rationality. The proposal is to make a prior 
rejection of the process of arriving at a rational tactical solution by offering evidence of 
irrationality. For example, observation that the other party in the Chicken game is clearly 
so drunk that he cannot be responsible for his actions, even to the extent that he is seen to 
be tying the wheel of the car so that swerving cannot take place, would present a different 
problem to the other player than the conventional problem. In the 'drunken opponent' 
case, one has no option but to swerve. It is an interesting example of how, rarely, irrationality, 
introduced at a level above the strict definition of the game can be a winning tactic. 
71iis is not merely an idle and amusing observation. In many less terminal games, such as 
Rasmusen's (1989, pp99-106) analysis of nuisance suits, the conclusion is reached that if 
the nuisance plaintiff makes no prior sunk cost arrangement with his lawyer (so that he has 
to bear an additional cost if the case actually goes to court), then he will never bring a 
nuisance suit. Rationality takes over and allows a backward recursion through the nodes of 
the extended game tree with the conclusion that it will not be worthwhile. Surprisingly, 
however, if the plaintiff pays his lawyer a flat fee which is paid whether or not the case 
actually comes to court, it becomes worthwhile to bring the nuisance suit. The parallel 
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costs, there is a new understanding on the part of the defendant that his irritating opponent 
puts nothing further at risk in going to court. 
States 
In the Powergraph analysis of Chicken we adopt the following states which recognise the 
approach phase of the game as well as the conclusion and the possibility that the cars may 
miss one another (or alternatively that there is a non-fatal collision) even if neither swerves. 
In this way we approach the game situation in a more open-ended fashion, aiming not, as 
the conventional theory does, at a convincing solution for a specific well-defined game, 
but rather at a model of the game situation which provides a basis for both extensions to 
the game definition which reflect reality more closely and at a'solution'which is normative 
rather than descriptive. 
We have three players, Marlon (M), Brett (B) and chance. 
Start The cars are stationary facing one another. 
Converge The cars are moving towards one another 
mB Marlon swerves, Brett holds 
Mb Marlon holds, Brett swerves 
mb Both swerve 
NESS No one swerves - the cars miss one another 
Crash The cars crash 
Preference Ordering 
Taking into account the game-theoretic payoff matrix, we adopt the following ordering 
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Taking into account the game-theoretic payoff matrix, we adopt the following ordering 
Marion Brett 
Start 6 6 
Converue 5 5 
Mb 1 4 
mB 4 1 
mb 3 3 
Miss 2 2 
Crash 7 7 
Table 37. The preference ordering for the enhanced Chicken game 
Chance, as a player, has no preference ordering, but prefers Miss to Crash with a certain 
probability, p. 
These preference orderings reflect the perception that both players would prefer to survive 
the game, that there is a certain merit in having not swerved. Additionally, to swerve when 
the other player has not involves a serious loss of face, but if both players do not swerve 
and the cars miss one another by chance the result is better than both having swerved. 
Feasibility Matrix 
Table 38 shows the feasibility of transitions for the enhanced Chicken game. 
....................... ..................... Start ........................ . ..................... Converge mB ... . ................ mb . ........ 
. ......... 
mb 
..................... 
Crash 
... ................. 
AESS 
MB M+B 
Converge MB m B M. B M. B. c M. B. c 
ms 
......................... 
B 
Mb m 
mb ......................... 1 Crash 
......................... 
Table 38: Feasibility matrix for enhanced Chicken game 
Note that most of the entries are empty, reflecting the assumption that adoption of a swerve 
is irrevocable. Twitching the wheel is not allowed, but could easily be the topic ofa signalling 
game which allows intent to be indicated during the converge phase. 
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Uotivated Power Matrix 
Table 39 below shows the effect of introducing the preference ordering and Figure 47 
represents the motivated power matrix in graphical form. 
ted Power Matrix for enhanc ed Chicken I .... ........... ................... ............... 
.......................... ..................... . ............ ...................... ..................... .......... start Converge MB Mb mb 
M+B 
M. B MBM. B 
MB .......................... 
. mb 
........ ... Miss 
Tab/639. ý Motivated power matrix for enhanced Chicken game 
ýM. B 
MB DStart M. B 
M+B m 
prob I -p M. B 
Converge M. B 
(Mb 
mb prob -p 
Crash 
Ficure 47., Motivated power network for enhanced Chicken game 
Observe here that the structural characteristics of the Powergraph model are identical with 
that of the conventional game theoretic solution. In particular both treatments agree that 
Crash is avoided by the players if the probability of crash given convergence is I (since 
the path Converge > Crash dominated by M. B will be unmotivated if Crash is inevitable). el 
The dilemma of the players at state Converge is illustrated clearly in the Powergraph 
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network. Player M. for example is in control of the transition Converge > mB and will be ep 
forced to take it (we have set the preference ordering for Converge to be less desirable 
than any outcome; the players cannot converge for ever). Similarly B must make a decision 
at some point and the diagram indicates a transition to Mb, paralleling the conventional 
presentation. The boolean expression M. B on the transition Converge > mb (indicating 
that both have chickened out) requires the cooperation of both parties. The preselection 
issues raised by Morris (op. cit. ) are exemplified by the order of play dilemma from the 
state Converge. The rational player will observe that from Converge the other player may 
be in control and that this can only be made deterministic if a predetermination is made as 
to what happens at converge. This is identical to the argument used in conventional game 
theory. 
The'winning by irrational ity'argument appears from the diagram also. If from Converge, 
M, for example, is bound to reject the path to mB leaving the probabilistic path to Crash/ 
Miss (See also below), B will be forced to take path Converge > Mb in order to avoid a 
loss of utility. 
The probabilistic path Crash/Miss presents no real escape route for the players unless the 
probability ofCrash rather than Miss occurring is very small. Theoretically we could use 
an expectation argument to determine whether for both players the expectation of utility 
gained from Miss (at probability I -p) is greater than the utility (at probability p) gained (? ) 
from reaching Crash. 
In summary, the nature of the solutions proposed by Morris (ibid. ) and others of the Chicken 
game also emerges from the Powergraph approach. Additionally, the Powergraph network 
can be seen to present a basis for discussion of the wider game environment. For example, 
what does the sustainment power expression M. B mean in connection with the Start state? 
Can we think of methods of ensuring that both M and B in that state are unwilling to 
proceed to convergence? What, for example, is making thernjudge the Converge state to 
be better than then the Start state. Perhaps the presence of bystanders is altering their rank 
ordering of preferences. Perhaps the feasibility of proceeding from Start > Converge can 
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be removed by disabling the cars. All these and similar contextual, meta-game issues fall 
outside the definition of the game as described by conventional game theory, and there is 
no implication of failure on the part of conventional analyses as a result, but the Powergraph 
approach can be seen, potentially, to provide a framework of examination for such games 
as Chicken which render it more usefiil than the conventional treatment, while encompassing 
all the results which they produce. 
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Chapter 8: State Generation 
Problem statement 
One of the key steps of the Powergraph method for resolving conflict situations is the 
generation of a set of states which, in some sense satisfactory to the client actor, represents 
the future development possibilities of the situation. 
We have seen elsewhere that the Fraser and Hipel method generates the futures states of 
the conflict by consideration only of the tactical choices open to the participants. The 
states are defined, in fact, entirely by the set of selections made by the players. This generates 
a rich set of states which can result from those tactical choices being made. These 
combinations of choices are then examined for feasibility by a method not dissimilar to 
that of EFAR, and frequently as few as 20 or 30 states result (Fraser and Hipel, 1984, p88, 
p94, p40). In applications other than the pedagogic ones detailed in Fraser and Hipel (1984), 
however, the resulting set of outcome states can be rather large. This of itself is not a great 
problem when using the Fraser and Hipel algorithms, because of the limited nature of their 
motivation-power logic. Because of the concept of a UI (unilateral improvement) in the 
Fraser and Hipel method the motivated transition matrix can be generated by a simple 
algorithm. However, when the concept of motivation-power comprehends more than one 
actor (i. e. the transition is controlled no longer by a single participant, but by, potentially, 
more than one) the generation of the transition matrix becomes distinctly more onerous. 
Moreover, the Fraser and Hipel approach requires only a simple algorithm, the output of 
an automatic function of the tactical choices made by the participants (which define the 
source and end states) and their preference ordering. In the Powergraph algorithm, however, 
the examination of the respective powers of the participants in a particular transition is in 
Part ajudgemental matter, and, while it is clearly assisted by an algorithm, cannot be done 
purely on a procedural basis without losing significant opportunity for the inputting of 
exPerientially-based knowledge into the model of the conflict. 
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In Chapter 3, the wisdom of limiting the state generation process to states derived from the 
tactical choices of the participants alone has been questioned. The essence of the difficulty 
is that if the future is seen exclusively as a result of apfiori tactical choices, the opportunity 
to generate new tactical choices is limited. The preferred method advocated here is that the 
future of the conflict should be seen as deriving not merely ftom the tactical choices made 
by the participants, but also from other, exogenous or non-tactical, variables. Tbus, for 
example, the state of acceptance of a participant is a valid basis for characterising the state 
of affairs (a non-tactical variable, since it cannot be chosen as such) as can the actions of 
an actor not explicitly included as a participant or the 'actions' of chance (both exogenous 
factors). If the tactical choices are the entire basis for the future states of nature, no new 
tactical choices can emerge from their consideration; rather, what emerges are new states 
of nature which were not conceived of. If, conversely, the possible outcomes are generated 
directly, no constraint is placed on the generation of new tactical options, and these may 
well emerge from the consideration of what is necessary to reach the desired states and 
prevent movement to or towards the less desired states. 
This, naturally, can complicate the. issue further, and the exhaustive Fraser and Hipel style 
of state generation becomes less appropriate as the number of state variables (whose values 
collectively define the state of nature) becomes greater. We see in the example of The 
Postage Stamp CHsis of 1937 (a relatively simple international conflict described below), 
that the conventional method leaves much to be desired in terms of providing a set of 
future (outcome) states which at the same time characterise the future adequately, while 
providing a simple, tractable solution framework for the Powergraph method. 
The problem, then is to indicate a procedure for generating a sufficiently rich set of outcome 
states while retaining coherence and structural simplicity in order to allow the maximum 
input from the domain expert into the conflict model. 
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SuPiective worlds and the belief-space problem 
There is a particular difficulty associated with the generation of outcome states based 
upon any attempt to 'put oneself in the shoes' of other participants. It is known as the 
subjective world problem, and is most easily expressed using the terminology of Schutz 
and Luckman (1963) as used by the German post-Marxist philosopher, Habermas. 
Habermas(1981,1986, vol. 2, chapterVI) utilises the concept originated by Schutz (1962), 
primarily, that underlying all possible knowledge lies a lifeworld, the body of all knowledge 
which could be known by persons attempting to act within the system, the set of all physical 
realities in which the acts of life are carried out. Each participant thus samples the lifeworld 
to produce his own subset, known as the subjective world (SW). This subjective world is 
not merely the subset of all things which could be known in a physical sense, but includes 
the process and objective values, moral judgements and all other things supposed to be 
known by the participant. Consequently all persons will have different subjective worlds 
by virtue of their different standpoints. This is often summarised by the relativist mantra 
that 'we all see different rainbows'. 
Habermas goes on (ibid. ) to develop extensively the concept of communicative rationality, 
whereby an act of any type has reality or rationality only to the extent that it is expressed 
in a valid context to other participants in the system, the word 'system'here being used in 
a specific sense; firstly as a foil to the concept of the lifeworld in order to contrast the 
physicality and abstraction of the latter with the physicality and procedures of the former 
and secondly to give an intimation of association with the social system in which Marx 
and post-Marxists mobilise their philosophies. Tbus knowledge becomes defined by the 
extent to which a position or assertion is understood and comprehended (but not necessarily 
agreed) by other participants. 
In the limited objectives of this note we are concerned primarilY with a subset of the SW of 
a player which, in a way similar to that of Bacharach (in Binmore, 1993, pp255-276) we 
define as those things deemed by a player (and therefore thought to be known by him) 
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which are relevant to the struggle in question. We shall call this the belief-space of the 
player, and as it is a sample of the subjective world, we shall represent the belief space of 
player i by the expression SWr 
Figure 48 illustrates the subjective world problem. Consider two players A and B engaged 
in a struggle. Each will have a different belief space, SWAand SWI3 and they will overlap 
to some extent as shown. From the point of view of player A, he knows that B will have at 
least some part of his belief space which A does not know and that A does not know what 
that is. A, however, knows what he knows and what hejudges to be relevant to the struggle, 
and can conceive of what he knows about B's belief space. This latter is the intersection of 
SWAand SWBas shown. 
Lifeworld 
What A Imaws 
about B's bokof 
SPW& 
Figure 48: Limitations of knowledge and conception 
Xs problem, of course, is that while he possesses this latter knowledge, and knows the 
extent of what he knows about B's belief space, he does not know how far B's belief space 
extends. Thus he cannot know what he cannot conceive of about B's position. Any attempt 
to hypothesise about B's position is limited to those things which A can conceive of in B's 
position, and these things are limited to the immediate vicinity of what A knows about B's 
SW- Thus, attempts to enlarge upon the knowledge which A possesses of B's position is 
limited to the boundary of Xs knowledge about B. 
Put simply, the philosophical position is that A cannot enquire about something in B's 
subjective world of which A has no conception. This presents some insurmountable 
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difficulties in the extrapolation of Xs belief space to encompass what B's belief space is in 
order that B's behaviour can be predicted. 
The only'hope, is to develop the boundary of SW,, and in the procedure outlined below, the 
purpose of the initial stages is to provide some structure for this extension process. 
Possible approaches to the state generation problem. 
There are four main approaches to the generation of states appropriate for the use of a 
Powergraph representation of conflict: - 
a) Intuitive 
Here the informant is asked to simply write down what states are, in his opinion likely to 
prevail in the timescale of evolution of the conflict. 
In simple cases this is an appropriate approach, the client simply casts his or her mind 
forward and tries, without any great attempt at analysis or structure, to predict the evolution 
of the conflict in question. In the applications reported in Chapter 8, and in other cases, 
this approach was satisfactory to a degree, but exhibited some shortcomings. First, it is 
necessary that the client should be fully aware of and immersed in the problem. If this is 
the case, a degree of cognitive rehearsal has already taken place, and there is a good prognosis 
for the development of the states. 
Second, the conflict has to be seen initially as simple in its development. Often the informant 
becomes simply overwhelmed by the potential futures, particularly if the first informal 
representation is that of a highly unstable situation with a number of participants, each of 
which can push the conflict in different directions. 
Third, and most important, is the difficulty that the intuitive method does not admit partial 
use of a structure. A number of attempts were made, during this research, for ex=ple, to 
model the situation surrounding the Italian elections of 1996, with no success. The process 
Of failure was as follows. The informant, an Italian researcher fully aware of the detailed 
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dynamics of this complex subject, first attempted to cast his mind forward and made good 
progress by prediction of the processes and dynamics of the changing political situation. 
Then, in an attempt to implant a defacto structure the options of the participants were 
detailed, and inunediately the intuitively derived summary structure was thrown away, 
using the argument that 'the states derivingfrom the tactical choices are so much easier to 
order You can check whetheryou have missed any'. Lastly the problem was. discarded as 
too difficult because the tactical choice approach threw up a level of detail too great for the 
client to hold in the mind. 
Conversely, a good example of the intuitive approach working in practice is that of ne 
Spanish Mayor (Chapter 9), where, again, a client totally immersed in the problem and 
with the benefit of hindsight, found it relatively easy to summarise the futures for a blackmail 
situation. This is not an entirely false example, since although the client had perfect 
knowledge of what actually happened, the Powergraph state generation problem is to 
determine a plausible set of states' for what may have happened. The client found this 
relatively easy to do because of the similarity of the situation to many others with which he 
had previously dealt, and because he had an intimate knowledge of the likely mechanisms 
involved. 
The conclusion, then, from the evidence ofpractice, is that the intuitive method is appropriate 
if 
the client has substantial immersion in the problem 
significant cognitive rehearsal has already taken place 
the problem is seen as simple at the start of the process 
the client can be restrained from applying an exhaustive procedural approach. 
In practice this last task is not easy to do. It is similar to the Zen teacher asking his student 
to meditate for an hour without thinking about white tigers. 
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h) Incremental and resolving approaches 
One possible method is that of concentrating on elements of an existing network and 
generating new states on the boundary of the network (incremental growth) or breaking 
existing states down into more detailed state definitions. This can be effective, and is, in 
fact a good way of applying some procedural discipline into the intuitive approach without 
paying the cost of the combinatorial despair caused by the application of an exhaustive 
method. 
One can observe clients using this approach intuitively, but at this stage no work has been 
carried out to determine whether this is a viable general method for building up networks. 
Some observations, however can be made as to the general wisdom of such an approach on 
the basis of the experiences summarised in The Battlefor Trafalgar case study and the 
Mardonius and the Greeks case study reported above. 
Without a justifying superstructure of values or tactics it provides no better a 
basis for proceeding than the arbitrary one of intuitive state generation 
At worst it can simply generate a mass of detailed states unsupported by any 
stopping rule. No judgement is being applied as to whether the discrimination 
between states is significant or not. 
At best, like the intuitive method it produces a network which is of arbitrary 
size. There is no externally applied rule indicating whether it is in any sense 
complete or sufficient (or not). 
C) Bottom-up method 
The- method used by Howard (1971) and Fraser and Hipel (op. cit. ) is essentially an 
exhaustive descriptive method which leads to a complete list of outcomes defined on the 
basis of the tactical choices made by the participants. The method assumes that it is the 
tactical choices of the participants alone which determine the future, and under certain 
assumptions this is true. To be more precise, we must consider that the model is complete 
Page 313 
in the sense that all participants who have any control over the development of the situation 
are included in the tactical definition. Additionally we must assume that the 'state' of the 
participants is defined adequately by their tactical choices alone. Thirdly, we have to assume 
that the knowledge we possess of the tactical choices is adequate, i. e. the representation is 
sufficient. 
With these assumptions we can then define the tactical choices of the participants as a 
series of bi-valued decisions. The case study The Postage Oisis, described fully later in 
this chapter provides a suitable example. In this conflict the choices available to the 
participants are shown in Table 40. 
..... .... .... ..... .... -... ...... ... ... ... Postage. StaLnp Crisis 
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Table 40. Tactical choices in the Postage Stamp Crisis 
Here we see that the two participants, Nicaragua and Honduras have a series of choices to 
make, ranging from the declaration of an interest in a piece of territory to invasion. Table 
40 above shows that certain choices can be made together. We see, for example, that 
Nicaragua can both claim territory and enter negotiation. Certain actions (tactical choices) 
must be made together. For example, in Table 40, in order for Nicaragua to accept 
negotiation, she must have entered negotiations. This is reflected in the appearance of aI 
in both the relevant rows of Table 40. 
Next, (and again, described more fully later in this chapter) the mutual compatibility of the 
two players'joint choices is checked. Thus, in the example of Table 40, any combination 
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of tactical choices of the two players together which has one participant entering negotiations 
while the other does not cannot be admissible; the definition of 'enter negotiation'is that 
of ajoint negotiation. This and similar arguments lead to extended list of combinations of 
tactical choices made by the two participants which are mutually compatible. 
In principle, one can extend the procedure beyond that of Fraser and Hipel to cluster states 
together, so that, for example, if it isjudged that the state of the battlefield is not important 
if a negotiation is taking place, one would group together all states (tactical choice 
combinations) which have enter negotiation =1 forboth players. This group of states would 
then be renamed appropriately. 
Thus one can conceive of a process for state generation which takes the exhaustive Fraser 
and HiPel procedure and groups states according to some ex post criterion or criteria of 
indistinguishability. 
There are practical difficulties with this procedure, which nevertheless remains potentially 
a method for state generation. First, the process does tend to generate excessive number of 
states. In this respect it is not dissimilar to that of FAR. With FAR the process of state 
generation throws up many hundreds of states (typically) after the filtering process (Rhyne, 
198 1; Coyle, Crawshay and Sutton, 1994; Powell and Coyle, 1997; Powell, 1997), and the 
clustering of the resultant states into groups which bear a closer relationship to what the 
participants see as reality can take a number of days. While this may be acceptable in the 
context of a futures study, in the relatively fast moving environment of strategic conflict 
resolution (where the action horizon is often measured in days rather than in years) this is 
unacceptable. 
Second, the process is essentially weakened by its initial reliance on the tactical choices as 
the basis for the future. As argued elsewhere, this initial reliance can lead to a cognitive 
limitation. If the tactical choices define the future, the tactical choices chosen initially tend 
to be the only ones admitted. If, on the other hand the futures are subsequently used to 
define the tactics in the form of an action plan, new and previously unseen tactical choices 
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May well emerge. 
7bird, because the discriminants for clustering are applied postfacto, there is an essential 
inefficiency. With a number of participants, many hundreds of states result when the 
participants actually value and discriminate among only a score or so. This is most wasteful 
of effort. 
Last, one observes that if clustering is carried out with a large number of states the resultant 
state network structure can be expected to be more complicated than one derived from the 
same problem approached top-down. This is because the discriminants applied to states 
are not clear cut. Iley are the basis of experiential rules heuristically applied. As a result, 
if a synthetic procedure (bottom-up) is applied, in cases of doubt two states will not be 
combined, whereas if the procedure is essentially analytic where states are decomposed, a 
state will not be broke into two or more unless the discriminant can be applied with obvious 
reason. The result is that the bottom-up method essentially produces more complex networks 
for later solution. 
d) Top-down valued based method 
The fourth approach considered was the analytic approach or top-down method by which 
a small number of states are defined on the basis of what the participants perceive or value 
within the situation and these states are then decomposed if necessary to give a more 
detailed state description of the conflict. This is shown in practice in Yhe Postage Stamp 
Crisis case of this chapter of this report, and a detailed description of that particular example 
will not be repeated here. 
The process in general is essentially simple. 
1) The domain expert or client is requested to indicate a small number of 
discriminants which each player would apply to the results of the conflict. 
This is conveniently done by a semi-structured discussion about the aims and 
objectives of the different participants concentrating on what the main criteria 
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for success (of various kinds ) or failure could be. There appears to be a natural 
synoptic process which takes place where the more complex the situation (say 
the War of the Austrian Succession) the more the skilled expert summarises. 
Because the focus of the semi-structure is on the objective the detail of 
implementation is left undeclared, a phenomenon which is most inconvenient 
for the bottom-up approach but one which fits in most conveniently with the 
Powergraph concept of allowing action planning to emerge from examination 
of the behaviour of the conflict rather than vice versa. 
2) According to the discriminants a small state space is set up which offers 
a base state for each of the values which each discriminant can take. This is 
done for each player separately. Tbree examples can be found in Tables 41,42 
and 43 below for Nicaragua (N), Honduras (R) and the international community 
(1) respectively. 
3) If appropriate each of these states is allowed to be decomposed into a 
small number of substates, where the original discriminants are incomplete. 
This incompleteness can arise essentially from two sources. First, there may 
exist obvious states which need to be recognised as discriminated by the 
participant in question, but which do not fit easily into the discriminant structure. 
Second, pre-defined states may exist (Start, for example) which the modeller 
can predict will need to be accounted for in the state space. 
4) By a filtering method of pairwise comparison of compatibility of the 
base states of each player, a set of states defined by the total set of discriminants 
for all the players can be generated. In effect this results in a correlation of the 
base states for each player with that of each other player. The combination of 
these states then constitutes a first level state space on which basis a network 
can be constructed. 
What is happening in this process is essentially very simple. The discriminants for each 
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Player constitute the minimal value system on which basis the outcomes are judged. On 
the basis of the values placed on the outcomes outcome states are valued as better or worse 
than other states. Conversely, if a participant does, not place any value on the difference 
between two states, then those states will not be discriminated, and will be seen a 
indistinguishable by that player. By examining the basis on which outcomes are valued, 
then, we have a basis for determining what the player will perceive, since valuation and 
perception are strongly related (Treisman, 1960; Uhr, 1966; Neisser, 1967). 
The base states for each player constitute a subjective world for each playerjudged according 
to the implicit discriminants. The base state spaces for each player are combined to produce 
a higher dimensioned state space whose dimensions are the discriminants of each player. 
Each base state space can be considered mathematically as a space the dimensions of 
which are the discriminants the actors. The allowable values along those dimensions are 
defined by the values admissible for the discriminants. 
The filtering method then provides a series of mappings which identify states in one sub- 
space of the multidimensional space with states in another. Put in vector algebra terms, 
each player's base state space is a null space of the combined space whose base is the 
union of the discriminants of all the players. 
An example - The Postage Stamp Crisis 
Background and description of the Crisis 
The Crisis originated in a judgement by the Spanish sovereign in 1906 regarding disputed 
land between Nicaragua and Honduras. The Spanish sovereign ruled in Honduras' favour, 
but Nicaragua never accepted the ruling. The summary below is taken verbatim from Brecher 
et al. (1988, p 161). 
Turing the second week ofAugust 1937 Nicaragua issued a postage stamp bearing a map 
of the Republic which included a considerable part ofsoutheastern Honduras, marked as 
being 'territory in dispute. ' Yhis triggered a crisis for Honduras, which protested this 
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'affront to her sovereignty'on the 25th. On 30th August Honduras'major response was 
Concentration of military forces along the border 7he possibility of military hostilities 
triggered a crisisfor Nicaragua. Its response, on 3 September, was a refusal to withdraw 
the stamp, declaring it to be the official map ofNicaragua. 
Armed hostilities wereprevented by the mediation of Costa Rica, Venezuela and the 
United States. On 10 September 1937 the two crisis actors signed a Pact ofReciprocal 
Agreement at San Jose in Costa Rica, terminating the crisis. Yhe conflictflared up again 
in 1957... 
.' 
The conflict is one of the simplest in Brecher's (op. cit. ) directory of twentieth century 
conflicts. Nicaragua makes a claim, Honduras packs the border and a standoff results 
which is eventually resolved by a mutual agreement brokered by the international 
community which at least temporarily resolves the conflict. 
In point of fact the conflict could have resulted in various types of escalation. Nicaragua 
could have invaded; Honduras could have attacked Nicaragua. The outcomes also could 
have been different; Nicaragua could have negotiated a territorial gain; a stalemate could 
have resulted. 
Ilie analysis below indicates some of the reasons why the conflict followed the trajectory 
which it did. 
77ieActors 
There are three actors 
N Nicaragua 
H Honduras 
I the international cornmunity 
Nicaragua is motivated primarily by the territorial aspects, an issue dating back to 1906. In 
Particular she has as main priorities the public laying of a claim to land which she considers 
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is national territory, and the gaining of that territory. Clearly, by examination of her offensive 
actions she is, at least at this initial stage of the conflict less concerned about the potential 
Outbreak of war. Equally she clearly discriminates between having gained territory and 
having an unresolved claim. The latter is clearly different from having won or lost the 
territory in any final sense, either by virtue of a negotiation or by virtue of a military 
standoff. 
Honduras, on the other hand is concerned not only with not losing territory but also with 
the threat which Nicaragua presents, and discriminates the scene (as far as we can judge) 
on the basis of whether she is threatened actively or not and whether she remains territorially 
intact., Sub-discriminants of these are represented by the distinction between there being a 
stalemate as opposed to her being under attack, and by whether there is a settlement in 
place ornot, but these are viewed as being subsidiary to the former two main discriminants. 
The international community has a rather different agenda and is concerned primarily 
with the state of stability in the region (open conflict, a state of tension or relatively peaceful 
'concordance of nations'), and whether threatening behaviour on the part of any state has 
led or is likely to lead to a cession of territory. The former is easy to reconcile with common 
sense, as is the second when the observation is made that in general terms the international 
community will always act so as to discourage any changing of the status quo, since a 
more stable situation threatens the position of individual national leaders less than a world 
in which an aggressive power can upset the local balance of power and make material 
gains by armed action or the threat of the same (Mitchell, 198 1). 
State generation 
7be state generation method followed here is the value-based top-down method, where 
the key issues of the players are stated (for the client actor) and hypothesised (for the 
rcmainder) 
The base states of the three actors are as shown in Tables 41 to 43 below. 
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Stamp Crisis - Value-based State Generation - ................. I............ . ... . ......... ..... . ........ 
Perspective 
Claim Made 
.......... 6 .......... C 
1) N gains territory 
emtory 1) N issues claim but no resolution is ma 1) Start position 
N's airrvs are blocked by H 1) N fails to gain land and is forced to vAthdraw her claim 
Table 41: Nicaraguan base discriminants. 
T= tertitwy has been gained by N 
To = no resolution of territodal issues 
1=N fails to gain tenitory 
C= claim has been made in the intemational arena 
-C = no claim 
in play 
... ........... ... ................ Crisis - Value-based State Generation 
............................................................. .................................................................................. duras loses trr 
......................................... ................................................................... t 
.......................... . A.... 
11. Under attack. and. lo. st. te mit r ..... ........ ......... ........ ... ... ......... ...................... 
1) N issues claim but situation unresolved 
Under threati 2) under attack b ut holding 
:a ....................................................... 
qjrreyýi 
................... ................... 
territor 
................ ...... 
12)Withdrawn 
threat (no necotiatianI 
I 
7; Ible 42., Honduran base disctiminants 
a= being attacked (under threat) 
a= not under threat 
t= Honduras loses tenitoiy 
I= no Honduran terfitm lost 
Table 43., International community's base discriminants 
S= settlement by negotiation or stable military situation 
So = semi-stable -face-off 
5= conflict 
c= territory ceded 
r= no territory ceded 
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-- ................................................................................................. ..................................................................................... 
. 
PO$tqQe: Spmp. qýFk. - Vahip-basad State Generadon ... ......................................... ................................. ............................................................................................... 
................ ............................................................... ............................................................................................... 
.......... ... ........... . ... ..................... ..... . ..... .... ... ................... . .................. ...... . ...................... Degr" of conflict ....... . ..... : ... ........ ................ ..... 
It will be seen that the base discriminants lead to relatively small initial state spaces. Within 
these base spaces certain states emerge naturally as sub-states. For example in the 
intemational community's base space of Table 43 above, the start position and the face- 
off where the two sides are not in conflict, but where no settlement has been reached, are 
seen as different (or are hypothesised by the client actor as being seen as different by the 
other actor or actors) 
Next are identified those states which, from the point of view of each player, are mutually 
feasible. This includes the cases where a state called status quo by one player is identical 
with one called start by another. Some states in one player's base space are consistent 
with certain states in another player's base space. 
First we compare the compatibility of Ar's states with H's states. See table 44. 
........................................................................................................ Crisis - Value-based State Generadon . ...... ............ ....................... ................ .......... 
............ ; ................................ ......... .......... : Cory"nation of states N 
N issues Withdrawn Under attack Fallum lost clairm Under attack Status Quo threat (no Negotiated and lost territory settlement situation but holding negotiation) territory irrevocably 
............................... ........... ; ........ . ........ .................... I ................................................................. at af2 all RM atIl ....... ...... ............... 
................ ... 
y y x x x x x 
. N issues claim but no To x x y x x x It re splut ipp ia made . ...... . . . . ......... .................. ........ Ns block e d H 1q eirns are by .. . x x- 
x y x x x 
. ... .. . ........... . . . . . . .... ...... ..... ....... Stallo. ! or ......................... . .......................... 
x x x x y x x 
iails to gain land and is TQ x x x x x y y forced to withdraw claim 
Table 44: Joint compatibility of Ms states and H's states. 
Where the table shows X the two states are incompatible; where Y is shown the two 
states are compatible. 
Tbus we see that whereas Nmay view states TC/at and Tc/. gt as indistinguishable (according 
only to his initial base discriminants) H will view them as different. Nicaragua does not 
care directly whether Honduras feels threatened by Nicaragua's action; it is not a primary 
Concern of hers. 
Table 44 can then be unpacked to provide a list of states (now defined by both N and R) 
which are mutually compatible. These states are then examined in the same fashion against 
the very different base states of Iin table 45 below. Table 45 has entries which are marked 
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according to whether the states of Table 44 are compatible with the states ofrs base space, 
Table 43. The marking convention is similar to that of Table 43. 
The names of the base states of Tables 41 to 43, in combination here, lend themselves to a 
naming convention. Each state ofTable 44 can be named by stating the shorthand description 
which each of the players would call it (by referring to Tables 41 to 43). Thus the state 
whichNseesasTcandHsees as at, while I views it as cSo, will be denoted by Tc/at/cSo. 
Unpacking Table 45 gives a tree of states, defined differently by the three players according 
to their base discriminants, which is shown in Table 46. This table illustrates well the 
different points of view of the three different players. Note that because N is concerned 
with the gaining or otherwise of territory, state I (in Table 46) which has the key Tc/at/ 
S. Sol is seen by N as the same as state 3, having a key Tc/at/cS. Similarly player I sees 
state 4 (To/atl/cSo) as the same as state 5 (Ic/A12/cSo) since Fs discriminant (the component 
/cSo) is unchanged, whereas the other two players view them as different, and for different 
reasons by virtue of their different base discriminants. 
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f ............................................................................................................................................................................... I .................. Ifostage Stamp Crisis - Value-based State Generation 
.......... --- -- - --------- 
....... ......................... .......... Combination of states all p .......................................................... . ......... . 
A!! I. es 
....................... : .......... 
-- --------- 
. .......... 
--- -------- 
.......... ....................... 
........................................................... ....... ............... 
.................................................... ........... ....................................... .......... : N's description H's description .......... ........................................................ ...................... lInt'l description Index 
Under attack and: Face -off: borders 
. 
N gains territory: TC 
... ....... ........................... .......... I ........... 
i at lost temtory : 
..................... . .............. ... :.......... 
Cso I changed 
. .................. . . . . . Invasion with open 
...... ................................................. ...... .. . 
C-S 2 conflict 
. . . Failure: lost ...................... Negotiated settlement, 
territory At Cs but borders have 3 
Irrevocably changed 
N Issues claim but no 
N issues claim: Face-off: no border To 
resolution Is made situation all esol 
4 
change unresolved 
N's aims are blocked Withdrawn threat:: Faceýoff: no border Tc by H at2 (no negotiation) 
qsol 5 change 
...... ..................................... ....................... ....... .......... ..................... Open conflict: no fixed 
Cs 6 gains 
Start: Toc Status Quo . A- : tl Cso, A 
...................... Start 7 
N fails to gain land: .................... . 
and is forced to* Ic 
Withdrawn threat! 
at2 Csol 
Face-off: no border 8 
...... 
withdraw claim 
................. ................................ 
(no negotiation) change 
........... Negotiated ------------ Negotiated settlement: 
I 
at3 settlement :-. cS - I 
. 
9 
no border change 
Table 46. - States compatible with all three players'base states 
There results, then, a set of states, differently defined by the three players which together 
constitute Ar's best view of the union of the belief spaces of all three players. 
Transition power matrix 
In the normal way we derive the transition power matrix, filling the cells on the basis of 
our understanding of the powers available to the participants. of course, without detailed 
knowledge of the military strengths and wills of the two main actors, these judgements 
will be subjective, but it will be seen by exarnination that they are not unreasonable and, 
eventually lead to a plausible description of the conflict. 
The transition power matrix is shown as Table 47. 
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:..... ........ ..... ... . .... ... .... . .... ........ 'Postage Stam Crisis 
. .......... ........... ................. . .................................... 
........................................................................ ...................... Traqqfflon matrix 
......................................... 23 ... ...................... ......................................... -Tetat/cso -Tclat/cS Tdat/cS 
...................... 4 
....................... Tolati/eSol 
. .................................. ...... ................................................................ 567a 
....................... ; ..................... . ............................................................................ : lc/a! Vcsol : jc/a! V. C'S : TOC/2tl/cSo2 ýJdstVgSol : IdRtl/. CC 
H. N LH. N H 
WN MH N H+N 
-4 H. N N LN 
: ..... - 
MH H+N IAN 
6 N H. N H LH. N 
N 
_ 
N 
_ N 
Table 47 Feasibility matrix for Postage Stamp Crisis 
Preference Ordering 
Table 48 below shows the preference ordering of each player for the states I to 9. 
................ 
........... ............... ..... ......... ................ ................ 
. ...... . ...... I ....... ....... ...... ........ ............... 
3 
9 
Table 48: Preference ordering for players in Postage Stamp Crisis 
Examination of the table and comparison with Tables 41 to 43 will show that the preferences 
are consistent with the base discriminants for each player. In other words, the preference 
shown for states by any player will group states I to 9 according to the discriminants of 
Tables 41 to 43 for that player. Preferences are first exhibited between base states and only 
then within base states. Thus player N sees states 1,2 and 3 as sub-states of his base state 
Tc, and so we see the preference ordering of these states as adjacent. If we were to see in 
Table 48 that N saw state 5 as having preference 3, we should know that the base 
diSCriminants were incorrect, and we should have to return to the beginning of the process 
in order to incorporate the newly understood base discriminants of N. 
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Alotivatedpower niatrix 
By the usual method of comparing the preference orders of start and end-states together 
with the contents of Table 47, we derive Table 49, which shows which transitions are both 
within the power of participants to bring about and, at the same time are desired by them. 
.......................... ýPoqlage Stamp Cýisis 
Tr -'ýnsfflon Mýtriý 
................. .......... ................. .......... .......... 
............................ ...................... Tdal/cso : Tclal/rA : Tdat/cS 
..................... . ...................... ................ --- - ---- - ..... ........... ....................... . ..................... 
... ...... ... ............... ......... ....... ...... ........... ... 
......... ........... .......... ..... ........ 
.......... ......... .......... ....... .......... i ........................ ............ ....................... ......... 
...................... ....................... ................................................... ..... ........................ .......... .. : To/all/cSol : Tdat2/c. Sol :: Tc/at2/cS ýToelafl/cS4 -TelstVc. vol iTe/aMeS 
LI - 
H 
H. N 
3 
., 4 RN 
N H. N H 
N 
; A. N 
N 
Table 49: Motivated transitions for the Postage Stamp Crisis 
Directed Graph 
Figure 49 below shows the graphical version of Table 49. The states have been renamed to 
be more accessible to the reader. 
N winning 
war 
I 
N gets 
'y to tory 
fart SN 
N'Vt\ 
N4ý. N (bwoarrdmetr 
N 
N loses 
(negotiation) 
Dfistion) 
N falls but 
keeps claim 
Figure 49. Directed Graph of Postage Stamp Crisis 
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The network shows certain interesting characteristics. The pair of arrows between the 
states N winning war and war at border indicate that to the extent that H has the power ep 
to drive N back, he will do so, causing the front to shift back towards the Nicaraguan side. 
Similarly if N has the military advantage then naturally N will drive H back towards the 
territory in AT's greedy gaze. 
State N wins (negotiation) is not achievable, not because it is impossible for such a state 
ever to exist but because the implications of the power expressions in Table 47 and the 
preferences of table 48 mean that there is an implicit assumption that the Hondurans have 
the power to prevent it. This is not merely a construct of the method, but a result of the 
intelligence implications of the information in the process. 
The diagram reflects accurately the early stages of the crisis, in that it is easy to see that the 
first steps will be from start to N's claim, (the issuing of the eponymous stamp) and then 
to face-off (state 5 in previous tables). The diagram then indicates that there is either 
insufficient power or no motivation to move from state 5 face -off which existed from 3 
September until the resolution. 
N winning 
rt 
war 
g H. N 
Ngets 
co. off 
t 'i 'y erritory 
N face-off 
Start 
N N's claim NH 
H 
H. N HoN 
we at N 
border 
Moses 
(negotiation) 
N fags but 
keeps claim 
H 
N wins 
(n. gotiatlon) 
Figure 50: The effect of international action: the preference ordering of N was 
altered 
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This is in fact the case. Examination of Tables 46 47 and 48 will show that from state 5 
(face-ofo there were two possible routes out to states 6 (war at border) and to state 9 (N 
loses (negotiation)). These are prevented by respectively the preference orderings of H 
and N. 
The activities of the international team, then, can be interpreted as being aimed at changing 
the motivation ofN with respect to the relative preference of state 5 (face-off) versus state 
9 (N loses (negotiation)). The arguments brought to bear would have concentrated upon 
the undesirability of N losing international respect and possibly even trading strength 
through international action. Similarly, the activities of the international community would 
be interpreted validly as seeking, defensively to prevent Hprecipitating the face-off into a 
conflict on the border. Again this would have been implemented by arguments pointing 
out the undesirability in the eyes of the world of undergoing the transition. 
We thus see that the activities of the international community (Costa Rica, Venezuela and 
US) was to change the motivation (preference ordering) of Non a temporary basis, so that 
a relaxation of the position became possible to state 9. What was perhaps not understood at 
the time was that moving to state 9 (N loses (negotiation)) was not an equilibrium state, ft 
and that N in a unilateral action actually considered that the negotiation had resulted, not 
in a resolution of the conflict, but merely in a restitution of the start state. 
The result was the flare-up in 1957, where the game essentially follows a similar initial 
trajectory (Brecher op cit, p 234) 
Bottonj-up (Fraser & Hipel) approach to state generation forth e Postage Stamp 
Crisis 
Tactical Choices 
Within the context of the conflict described above one can characterise the freedom of 
action of the players by a schema similar to that of Table 49. 
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Table 50. The tactical choices available to each player separately 
Here we see the compatibility of the tactical choices for each player alone. Clearly some 
tactical choices cannot be made at the same time by a player, and Table 50 illustrates those 
combinations which are mutually feasible by a vertical word of Os and Is where Is represent 
the choice being made by he player and the Os represent the choice being rejected. 
We now consider the combinations of choices available to N and H together, and these are 
shown in Table 5 1. Here we have rejected any combinations of tactical choices made by 
Nand H which are not compatible one with the other. 
Table 51: The jointly feasible tactical choices available to N and H. 
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It is noted that when a comparison is made between the outcomes generated by the Fraser 
and Hipel method there is little overlap. The Fraser and Hipel bottom-up method generates 
twice as many states, but only 7 of these correspond in any direct way to the value-based 
states generated in the top-down value-based analysis above. There is more detail in the 
Fraser and Hipel method, but this detail is in areas where the players do not judge it to be 
important. For example there are 5 states involving an invasion of Nicaragua by Honduras 
which do not appear as relevant in the top-down method. It could be argued that these 
states could be rejected by an overall feasibility judgement after the application of the 
bottom-up method, but this would be equivalent to applying judgements about the value 
systems of the participants without declaring what those assumptions are. 
It is also observed that two states (3 and 9) representing whether a border change has 
occurred or not are not discriminated by the bottom-up method. 
Lastly it is observed that Table 51 only includes the states generated bottom-up by the 
tactical choices of the two players N and H. If we were to include the possible tactical 
choices of the international community, a level of detail would result which would swamp 
the characterisation of the situation by the valuejudgements of the players. Of the order of 
50 states could be expected to result from combinations added when the tactical choices of 
I are included. 
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Chapter 9: Powergraph in practice - 
sensemaking and planning 
Introduction 
In the Chapter 7 the procedural aspects of the Powergraph approach were described and 
some of the underlying analytical issues discussed. In this chapter, through the examination 
of two case studies, the more practical aspects will be addressed. In particular, the generation 
of an action plan from the directed graph and the connection between that action planning 
and the sensemaking of the problem environment are discussed. 
The two case studies described in this chapter are BAe's Project Staffing, where the 
negotiating moves necessary to achieve a particular project appointment on an international 
project are elucidated and The Spanish Mayor, an examination of the difficulties confronting 
a local politician who is in danger from a blackmailer. 
They are very different one from the other. The BAe Project Staffing case is a report of a 
real life intervention on behalf of BAe's project organisation, in the form of Mr. Robert 
Irvine, who was required by his company to generate a plan by which he would take up a 
position as Risk Manager on the international NATO frigate programme. Though the task 
may appear less than strategic, it must be borne in mind that the importance of the project 
to the company, for reasons which can be inferred from the outcome of the Battle for 
Trafalgar case, was very high. It would not be exaggerating to state that the ability of BAe 
to remain a contender in the naval prime contractorship market was determined by the 
degree to which it could claim to have controlled the risk inherent in such projects. The 
position of Risk Manager was, therefore, a strategic one for the company. The case study 
is strictly cc ante, and can be compared with the events which transpired after the analysis 
was complete. The main lessons to be learned from the case surround the defensive action 
planning required to bring about desired outcomes, and the consequences which resulted 
when the defensive planning was not implemented. 
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The Spanish Mayor is an ex post case in reality, but one where the Mayor's real life 
consultant, S. Giovanni Manunta, was willing to provide the information necessary to 
carry out the analysis as if the events were taking place at the time of the analysis. This was 
a, most effective method of testing the efficacy of Powergraph; normally an expost case is 
subject to posterior knowledge on the part of the analyst as to the real outcomes, and there 
is a real risk that, even subconsciously, the theory is made to fit reality. In the case of the 
Spanish Mayor case study, however, the consultant was punctilious in not revealing the 
actual events except at the end of stage one of the analysis and at the end of stage two, the 
last iteration. The main purpose of describing the case is to illustrate the high degree of 
connection between action planning and sense making in a complex and imperfectly 
understood situation. 
The next chapter contains a case which links together the EFAR strategic futures analysis 
and subsequent Powergraph analysis in one ex ante case, that of the OSFs Strategic Future. 
Planning framework for Powergraph 
Planning Paradigms: acceptance and manipulation 
The planning process can be characterised by the extent to which the planner assumes that 
the assumptions inherent (and indeed declared) in the Powergraph process are immutable. 
At one end of the scale is the assumption that the diagram is, in some sense, 'correct'; that 
the motivations and powers inherent in it are correctly stated. With this assumption the 
planning procedure essentially consists of operationalising the trajectories predicted. By 
this is meant the implementation of practical measures to enable the practical aspects of 
the formal transitions of the Powergraph directed graph. Where a transition implies the 
release of information, the press release must be planned and published, where the transition 
implies the purchase of another company or the securing of a project, the practical 
implementation must be secured. The planning is then, under the assumption that the directed 
graph is wholly predictive, the conventional procedure of operational planning and falls 
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outside the scope of this work. 
There are two alternative assumptions about the knowledge in the Powergraph model, 
however. First, one could assume that the information is subject to error, and that an 
investigation into the effect of errors (a sensitivity analysis) would be wise. Here a check is 
made on the effect of single changes in the powers and motivations of players. Sometimes 
changes will have no effect; on occasion small changes in, for example the preference 
ordering, will have dramatic effects on the stability of equilibrium analyses. 
Second, we can carry out such an analysis not from the essentially neutral point of view of 
an error effects analysis (i. e. where might the model be in error), but from a manipulative 
point of view (i. e. which elements could we manipulate to improve the prognosis from our 
point of view). These manipulations can be upon the preference ordering of participants, 
or to the powers implied in the boolean expression of the directed graph. Clearly such 
considerations can be a ftuitful source of action planning and sensemaking. 
Generalproceduresfor Powergraph Action Planning 
The process of planning under the Powergraph framework can now be seen as some or all 
of the following elements 
a) selecting a desirable outcome 
b) identifying the trajectories which lead to that outcome 
c) defending the desired trajectories against unwelcome amendment 
d) identifying actions which could result in new trajectories emerging, some 
of which may lead to improved end positions 
e) identifying the effects of errors in the assumptions of the model. 
These steps will now be illustrated using the vehicle of the Ne Project Staffing case as a 
real-life example. 
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BAe's Project Staffing: Negotiation for Organisational Position 
Background 
This analysis is concerned with the manoeuvring for a post in an international defence 
project known as CNGR The project has an existing procurement organisation and a 
parallel industrial organisation known as the INC (International Joint Venture Company). 
GEC are the major British contributor to the INC and hold the all important Technical 
Director slot. BAe Systems and Services Division are in partnership with GEC as their 
subcontractor and there are contributors from other countries (France and Italy) in the 
INC. 
Safety is a systemic issue for the design and the client company, BAe SSD, have an expert, 
known here as RAI, who has been instrumental in increasing the awareness and the level 
of technical skills associated with safety. There is no doubt that RAI is, cetefispafibus the 
preferred choice, but naturally company and national issues come into the equation as well 
as technical skill, and there is a defacto conflict of interest between major company and 
organisational elements such as the Ministry of Defence (UK), GEC, BAe and individuals 
within the IJVC. 
The objective of the exercise is to indicate what pressures should be brought to bear on 
various contributors to the project in order to ensure that RAI is appointed within an 
appropriate organisational structure in order that the project interest and company interests 
of the client company can be satisfied. 
Tlle specific objectives then are: - 
a) to describe the structure of a potential conflict of interests between the interested 
parties 
b) to indicate effective development strategies in order to bring about (or condition) 
desirable outcomes for BAe. 
This safety management task may be carried out either within the structure of the IJVC or, 
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effectively as a subcontract task to one of the contributing companies. The post (if it is 
established) could be appointed from outside UK or from within UK; if the latter, it could 
be filled by a BAe man or a person from another company; if by a BAe man it could be 
RAI or a different person. Lastly, the appointment could be delayed for an indefinite 
Period. These options are of importance in the establishment of states. 
The information summarised here resulted from a series of meetings with company 
representatives (Snarey 1996a). In particular the analysis method was offered to the company 
through their consultant, Mr. VL Snarey on August 18th 1996, and a meeting then took 
place between Mr. Snarey and company representatives on 19th August. A further meeting 
between the writer and Mr. Snarey resulted in further work on the state definitions in 
preparation for a meeting with a senior company representative on Wednesday 28th August 
(Snarey, 1996b). 
771 e Players 
T The technical Director of the IJVC, John McIver from GEC 
p The Engineering Director of BAe SSD, Peter Chamberlain 
B The BAe project organisation, headed by John Crashley 
m The UK Ministry of Defence 
G The GEC project and contracts organisation 
i The Joint project organisation Safety Manager, Alessandro Pini 
s BAeSEMA, the naval contracting organisation of BAe 
The States 
Table 53 below illustrates the possible states resulting from the options described in the 
background section. There are in theory, some 24 states, but many of these are 
undistinguished by the players, and so are clustered as shown. 
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Table 53: State definitions for BAe Project Staffing case 
Preference ordering 
Table 54 below shows the preference ordering resulting from a meeting on 28th August 
between the writer, Mr. Snarey and Mr. Irvine, Warship and Nuclear Safety Manager, 
BAe. 
. ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
: ýrrvivrunce oraeri ------ ............. goriarion srUa ng ror organisarionat nec . ......... 
r.......... 
. -- - --- --- -.................... . .. ................. .................. ...... .. .......... 
......................... 
M G J S 
. 10 11 11 11 11 
2 
............................. 
9 9 6 7 1 9 
8 8 1 6 8 
5 5 2 3 
4+ 2 4 3 2 3 1 3 
5 7 3 4 2 5 1 3 
5+ 
.... .......................... 
6 1 1 1 2 
6 7 7 7 8 10 7 6 
6+ 
................................ 
5 6 6 7 7 7 6 
7 10 9 11 9 10 10 10 
8 2 2 10 9 1 
Table 54: Preference ordering for BAe Project Staffing case 
Ile BAe candidate, RAI, is generally well supported but with certain provisos on the part 
of different agencies. For example, the GEC project organisation, G, would prefer to have 
a non-BAe safety manager appointed for obvious reasons. Other factors do affect the 
Preference ordering of parties. Certain participants would prefer a delay in appointment 
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rather than accept an unsatisfactory solution. 
At the meeting on the 28th August, the following points also emerged (Snarey 1996b). 
I 
a) BAe has agreed a number of seats on the IJVC which have not been taken up. 
This gives them some leverage over their prime contractor, GEC. Contractually 
these seats must be taken up by BAe. 
b) The safety function is already being covered in an informal way by RAI. It is 
a function represented in the organisation at a relatively senior level, being one of 
only three functions which act at the 'superblock'level, which is normally reserved 
for major engineering functions. Effectively, today we have a safety manager but 
he is not formally appointed. 
c) It appears that the technical director IJVC, (7), would be happy for RAI to 
continue to give informal support indefinitely, not least because the GEC company 
would be unable to provide an adequately qualified replacement. There is also a 
hint of not wishing to precipitate a political struggle over a particular appointment 
unnecessarily. 
d) The engineering director of BAe SSD, (P), should be viewed as a channel of 
communication rather than as a direct participant in the struggle except for those 
states where a BAe engineering staff member is or is not appointed, thejob having 
been given to BAe. In these circumstances his assent is required for the 
appointment. 
e) The IJVC requires an appointment to be made and LIK MoD support the general 
idea of appointing a safety manager early in the project. 
BAe appears at present to be best placed to provide that safety manager. 
g) The relationship between BAe's naval business and that of BAeSEMA, the 
naval contracting arm (a joint venture between BAe and SEMA Group Ltd. ) is 
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changing. It is very likely that the entire naval business of BAe, other than its 
weapon system business (BAe Dynamics) and the highest prime contract function 
will be given to BAeSEMA to execute. Existing staff in the main part will be 
seconded into BAeSEMA. This presents a dilemma as far as the model is 
concerned, since the motivations, and therefore the preference orderings of the 
participants Band S are uncertain. A conclusion was reached whereby S is imbued 
with the motivations of B. The argument is as follows. If BAe is in its present 
leadership position, then BAeSEMA will have the same motivation as its contract 
holder. If, on the other hand, BAeSEMA leads the activity, by extension, its 
motivation and preferences will be the same as BAe's present ones since the same 
commercial pressures will apply. 
h) Under any new BAeSEMA regime, the acceptability of RAI to fill any BAe 
post is unknown, but the best assumption is that his credibility is the same under 
any new intercompany arrangement as is the case today. 
Feasibility of transitions 
Table 55, below, shows the influence of various participants upon the feasibility of the 
transitions between the states. In spite of having over a hundred cells, the matrix is easy to 
derive, because the participants having power over the appointments are very well defined. 
The IJVC technical director has the final say subject to effective veto by the IJVC (J) and 
UK MoD (M. There is no divergence of policy discernible between the IJVC technical 
director and the remainder of the IJVC organisation. Hence each cell contains TMJ 
Additionally, where a BAe selection has to be made as to the appointment of a safety 
manager, B and P have power to control that appointment. Hence some cells contain the 
expression TM. JB. P. Where an actor has equal preference ordering between states the 
relevant element of the boolean expression is shown in lower case. 
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Table 55., The feasibility of transitions for the BAe Project Staffing case 
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Motivated Power 
The table below, Table 56, shows the effect of incorporating the motivations of Table 54 
into Table 55. Table 56 exhibits a large number of motivated transitions and is best analysed 
by inspection of the matrix itselfrather than the normal method adopted with sparse matrices, 
namely inspection of a network diagram. 
Interpretation of motivatedpower matrix 
a) Today's state is considered to be state 1, from which any other state is accessible. 
b) There are three rational equilibrium states, indicated by empty rows (other than the 
leading diagonal). These are states 4+ and 5+. The latter is highly favoured by the client, 
but the former, 4+, is disliked, mainly because it does not provide the in-project influence 
necessary to control safety within the engineering function. 
C) State 4 leads inexorably to state 4+. 
d) If a delay (state 8) is accepted as an output from state 1, the client is greatly 
disadvantaged because there is no route to the desired state of 5+. In fact the result is likely 
to be an acceptance of state 3 (rank order 8 by BAe). Delay, therefore is to be avoided at all 
costs. 
e) Because of the high connectivity of the other states one with another, the best tactic 
would appear to control, in the first instance, the transition out of state 1. Any temporary 
agreement to discuss, for example, a solution based on state 6 would move the resolution 
of the situation no filrther on,. The consequence for the action plan, therefore is to ensure 
that the best arguments are presented in the first instance to strengthen the clear possible 
route ftom 1> 5+ direct. 
0 Note the boolean expression for the sustainment power at state 5+, TMJBP. If this 
solution is proposed efforts will have to be made to reinforce the adherence of all 5 parties 
to this solution; a weakening of resolve by any one of the five will force the system unstable 
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Page 343 
again, potentially. 
9) State 5 is essentially equivalent to the highly desired state 5+, since any exit must be 
to state 5+. 
Figures 51 and 52 below show respectively the overall directed graph for the case and a 
reduced diagram which illustrates the paths to the most desired state, 5+. This directed 
graph is a particularly difficult one to draw in such a way as to be easily accessible to the 
reader. In order to help understanding the boolean expression have been suppressed: 
reference should be made to Table 56, from which Figures 47 and 48 derive. State 1 is 
connected to each of the other states and these connections are not shown explicitly. It can 
be seen that, since there are paths from most states to 4+, which is the equilibrium less 
desired than 5+, it is highly desirable, in terms of robust planning, to attempt a direct 
transition to state 5+ from the start, rather than to run the risk of the motivations of other 
players (which are neutral in some cases) dominating the transitions. A delay to state 8 
would be tempting but unsafe. 
T+M+J 
TMJBP 
(to states 2 to 2 
Figure 51: Directed Graph for BAe's Project Staffing Case 
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(to all) 
0 
Figure 52. The paths to the most desired state, 5+ 
Selecting a desirable outcome 
(D 
CD 
(S) 
This step is a straightforward one, resulting as it does from the already declared preference 
ordering of the preference ordering matrix. 
A complication can arise when a desired state is not accessible within the directed graph. 
In this case, until the identification of new trajectories, the assumption is made that the 
outcome (equilibrium) states shown in the diagram are the only outcomes accessible from 
the start state. 
In the present case study, state S+ is easily recognised as the most preferred outcome. The 
BAe specialist, RAI, is desirably placed within the international project both for the reason 
that he is considered to be the best man for the job, but also because from BAe's point of 
view, having a well-respected man in such an important position is a desirable state of 
affairs. 
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Identifying the trajectories which lead to that outcome 
This is a straightforward extraction of the accessible paths from the diagram. The cases 
shown in this work are sufficiently simple to allow enumeration by inspection. 
Here we see the following trajectories which may lead to the desired outcome together 
with the parties controlling the transitions: - 
(TMJBP)6 (tMJBP) 5 (TMjBP) 5+ 
I (TMJ) 7 (TMJBP)5 (TMjBP) 5+ 
I (TMJ) 2 (TMjBP) 5 (TMjBP) 5+ 
I (TMJ) 7 (TJIJBP) 5 
(TMJ) 7 (TMJBP)6 (TMJBP)5+ 
I (TMJ) 2 (TMJEP) 5 
I (TMJBP)5+ 
A 
The process of delineation is the straightforward procedure of developing a tree, starting 
with the desired end point and declaring each possible entry state to the nodes of the tree. 
Here the originating tree was: - 
5 
672 
Fig 53. - Tree of possible paths to desired state, 5+ BM9 Project Staffing case 
In this case the most appropriate path from state 1 to state 5+ is the direct one. Planning 
conunences with this path as the preferred one. If this path is seen to be too risky or 
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practically infeasible, the alternatives of I>2> 5+ or 1>7> 5+ will be considered. 
Defending the desired trajectories against unwelcome amendment 
There are two elements to this part of the planning approach. 
First, the trajectory itself must be defended. Each path to the predicted outcome carries 
with it a set of assumptions about the powers, motivations of the participants in the conflict. 
There is a possibility that the preferences, in particular, of these participants may change, 
or that through the activities of other interested parties, the powers of other participants 
may be altered. Defensive measures need to be planned to ensure that undesirable changes 
do not occur. 
In the case in hand we see that the path from state 1 to state 5+ is under the control of the 
boolean expression TMJBP. If this path is to be followed each of the parties who have 
both the power and the motivation to enable it must be kept empowered and supportive. 
T the GEC Technical Director of the IJVC 
This individual, who in some respects represents both GEC and the INC is empowered by 
his authority as the appointing person for staff within the IJVC. It is unlikely that his 
position is threatened in any way. Of more importance is the need to ensure that Tis made 
aware of the competence of RAI in terms of his potential contribution to the IJVC technical 
effort. The main aim then is to bolster what should be an already strong desire on his part 
to appoint a competent individual to his team. Equally important is to guard against the 
possibility that Ts home company, GEC, should identify the post as an important one for 
them, so that the advocacy to Tmust include a commitment that Twill behave in a neutral 
fashion. 
U The UK MOD 
The MOD will be happy with RAI's appointment, but must be maintained by being allowed 
access to BAe's safety information in order that they will naturally assume a BAe ownership 
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of the safety function. The empowerment of the MOD is through the contract which they 
hod, over the IJVC. 
J The IJVC Safety Manager, Capitano Alessandro Pini 
Again, the main line of support here os through the competence of RAI who is already 
known to known to J. It is important to ensure that J is not subject to international advocacy 
which might provoke him to take a position which is anti-UK in terms of this particular 
appointment. Discussions with staff indicate that this is unlikely in that the UK at this time 
were clearly seen as having a high level of competence in this respect. 
B The BAe project manager, Mr. John Crashley 
No difficulties were anticipated in respect of the BAe Project function 
P The Engineering Director of BAe SSD, Mr. Peter Chamberlain 
The BAe engineering director is viewed as likely to be supportive of the appointment of 
RAI to this post if the transition were to bejudged to be feasible. 
Second, escape paths from the desired trajectory need to be identified. Each state on the 
assumed path is examined and alternative routes are marked. The desirability of each 
alternative path is assessed and the actions needed to prevent the alternative being taken 
are identified. A particular set of paths emerging from a state may present what game 
theory refers to as an order of play issue. In such a situation the outcome of a game turns 
on the order of choice of players. In the practical analysis of directed graph models, the 
order of play must be determined by reference to the outside actual situation, and can form 
the basis for critical elements of an action plan. Examples of order of play problems can be 
seen in many of the directed graphs in this work. In particular the Battlefor Trafalgar case 
shows an order of play problem controlled only by BAe from the state start and in the 
present example state 6 can be seen to present a similar problem. Clearly some resolution 
can be achieved if a single player or small group of payers whose choices are consistent 
control the choice, but multiple transition choices which do not present straightforward 
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single player order of play issues can be difficult to predict, and in many cases the trajectory 
of the game is essentially unpredictable. An example of such considerations can be seen in 
Figure 50 (Postage Stamp Crisis) where, were the situation to be forced to state war at 
border, an international body might be inclined to put external pressure on H and N in 
order to ensure that either H (Honduras) accepts the Nicaraguan claim or that NandH act 
together to stop fighting. 
In the present case the trajectory I> 5+ is the preferred development path. Here state 1 
presents the following escape routes 
I (TMJ) 
I (TMJ) 3 
I (TMJBP) 4 11,2,1,5,51 
I (TMJBP) 4+ (2,2,1,3,4) 
I (TMJBP) 5 (7,2,1,4,3) 
I (TMJBP) 6 (7,8,7,7,71 
I (TMJBP) 6+ f 5,7,7,6,6) 
I (TMJ) 7 (10,9,10) 
I (T+M+J) 8 
The preference ordering of the empowered parties is shown above thus (5,8,1 ). Examination 
of these preference orderings indicates that some escape paths are strictly dominated, in 
the sense that each and every empowered party prefers at least one other escape path. 
Thus, each of TMJBP prefers transition 1>4 over transition 1> 6+. We can therefore 
discount state 7 (dominated by 3), state 6 (dominated by state 4) and state 6+ (dominated 
by state 4). All other states have at least one escape path which at least one empowered 
party prefers. 
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Thus the remaining potential escape paths from our desired trajectory are 
(TMJ) 2 (9,6,1) 
(TMJ) 3f1,5,61 
Iý (TMJBP) 4 
I' (TMJBP) 4+ {2,2,1,3,41 
I (TMJBP) 5f7,2,1,4,3) 
I (T+M+J) 8 
The planning task, then is to identify the players who can prevent these undesirable 
transitions and present advocacy to them to bolster their power and motivations against the 
undesired transition vis-a-vis the desired transition of 1> 5+. 
We compare the preference ordering of the players for state 5+ against those of the possible 
escape paths 
I (TMJBP) 5+ ( 6,1,1,1,11 
... and we see that the advocacy must be aimed at ensuring that the players MJP (we are 
B) continue to be aware of the desirability of ending up at state 5+, where they will be 
favoured with an expert safety manager from a competent company in a timely manner 
(etcetera) and by advocating to T (the most dangerous of the empowered parties in this 
respect), that other escape paths for him (say to state 4 or4+) will face opposition compared 
with the 'natural choice'of 5+. The details of such arguments are a function of the particular 
situation, and here the vehicle was chosen to be a safety management report from Mr. 
Snarey, in which the main line of advocacy was the timeliness of appointment, which 
served the parochial interests of the parties well. 
Identifying actions which could result in new trajectories emerging 
Here the objective is to examine the directed graph for changes which can feasibly be 
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brought about which could result in the appearance of new paths some of which may result 
in more favourable outcomes. 77ie Postage Stamp Crisis (Figures 49 and 50) shows this 
approach to effect. By acting so as to change the preferred ordering of participants, the 
international community, I, makes the transition face-off at border >N loses (negotiation) 
a feasible one, thereby (from the international community's point of view), opening up a 
path away from undesirable equilibriums. It should be noted here that the international 
community's action does not result in an equilibrium (history shows a flare-up of the 
situation some years later) but rather a neutralisation of the previous equilibrium. The 
Postage Stamp Crisis shows a cycling around the states Start, N's claim, face off at 
border and Moses(negotiation). b. 
The process essentially involves examining the differences between the motivated power 
matrix and the transition power matrix to uncover which changes might result in feasible 
transitions appearing. The effect of these potential; new transitions is then determined by 
inspection. 
Comparison of Tables 55 and 56 show that in this case all states are immediately accessible 
from state 1, the start state. The connectivity of the graph is high in general and the only 
state which, by inspection appears to present potential for further development paths is 
state 8, delay. This state is potentially highly accessible form state 1, since it is under the 
control of any one of Tor M or J. If state 8, then does emerge by failure on BAe' part to 
bring about the desired transition, it will be seen that the model predicts a devolution to 
state 3, which is not desired by BAe. Examination of Tables 55 and 56, then indicate that 
more desirable development paths ftom 8 to 4+ or 5+ could result if TMJBP could be 
persuaded that 4+ or 5+ respectively were preferable to state 3. Such persuasion would 
render the situation less risky from the client's point of view. We compare the preference 
ordering for the empowered players (TMJBP) for the three end states in question, 3,4+ 
and 5+ against that for state 8. 
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3 {1,5,6,8,8) 
4+ '(2,2,1,3,41 
5+ {6,1,1,1,1} 
8 11,10,9,2,2) 
We see that T is the controlling influence. All other players see a prefer-red result in state 
5+. The client therefore needs to discover methods for persuading T that if a delay occurs, 
it is preferable to resolve the situation other than to state 3. Because of the disparity of 
preference ordering for players MJBP between state 3 and both states 4+ and 5+, it should 
be possible to mobilise them in the persuasion of T that state 5+ is not as bad as he thought 
(or that we assume he thinks). We observe however, that the disparity for T between the 
preference ordering for state 3 and that for state 5+ is substantial; (I st vs. 6th), and we may 
be more likely to achieve a change of only one unit by persuading T that his preference 
orderings of I and 2 respectively for states 3 and 5+ may be reversed. Such a line of 
argument would then open up a new path from state 8 to state 5+, presenting BAe with a 
credible risk reduction strategy. It will be seen in the section below on the evolution of the 
actual situation, that BAe failed to carry out this risk reduction preparation with undesirable 
results. 
Identifying the effects of en-ors in the assumptions of the modeL 
7be last step in the planning procedure is closely connected with the previous one, and 
amounts to a sensitivity analysis of the effects of errors in the assumption of the model on 
the stability analysis. While it would in theory be possible to check small changes in every 
assumption of empowerment and preference ordering such an approach would be 
impracticable without computer support. In practice this sensitivity analysis is limited to 
the path selected for development at step 3 of this procedure. 
The judgements applied to target this sensitivity analysis are essentially structural ones 
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similar to the inspections of the directed graph in order to determine potentially fruitful 
new development paths, but the following check list is appropriate for this examination 
Are any previously unidentified players controlling this transition? 
Are the preference orderings correct in view of the order of play 
considerations above? 
Are any players dominated politically in a boolean expression controlled 
by AND terms? 
In the case in hand checks are made as to the empowerment of parties in moving 
from state 1 to state 5+. No additional players were identified as being important, although 
the MD of the IJVC was considered as a possible foil to any desire for a GEC interest to be 
served by T. It is clear that the disparity in each party's preference ordering between states 
I and 5+ indicates a clear cut difference in preference which is unlikely to be erroneous. 
It is important that the sensitivity analysis is delayed until the last step of this procedure 
for two reasons. First, because of the high degree of commonality of thinking between the 
process of seeking additional favourable paths within the diagram and the sensitivity analysis 
step, it is more efficient to delay the latter. Second, the process of sensitivity analysis is not 
just an examination of the directed graph ; it is also a re-examination of the conflict situation 
statement itself, and we shall see in the next case, Yhe Spanish Mayor, that the sensitivity 
analysis can result in a wholesale rewriting of the model as understanding is gained in one 
iteration and applied in a subsequent one. We shall see, additionally, that the action planning 
process and the sensemaking process are inextricably bound together. 
Action Plan 
At the meeting on August 28th, the following action plan points emerged (Snarey 1996b). 
I. The danger of delay was clearly recognised. The safety document being prepared 
for the IJVC by Mr. Snarey would be slanted so as to indicate the effects on the project 
Page 353 
safety competence for failing to achieve an early appointment of the Safety Manager. 
2. This document was recognised to be primarily aimed at the BAe audience, but it was 
also understood that equivalent arguments must now be presented to the IJVC Technical 
Director. 
3. In order to ensure that undesirable states are not reached directly from today's state, 
the slant of the documents describing the function of the Safety Manager would be directed 
towards the benefits of having the Safety Manager inside the IJVC (state 5 or 5+). If 
additionally state 5+ can be advocated directly, all well and good; if state 5 is reached first, 
the transition 5> 5+, dominated by TMjBP will be strengthened by similar arguments to 
those already addressed in Mr. Snarey's document. 
4. , It was understood that arguments must be addressed to all of T, M, J, B and P in 
order to ensure that the desirable transitions would result. 
Outcome qfSituation 
The action plan was implemented as described (Irvine, 1996). Mr. Snarey's paper (Snarey, 
1996c) and others were amended to take into account the arguments militating against a 
cautious, delaying approach on the part of BAe. 
BAe took a different view, being of the opinion that taking the argument for an early 
resolution to the interested party would show a weakness to them, thereby sensitising 
them to the importance of the issue to BAe- 
This put them at state 8 in Figure 5 1. From here there were three possible transitions, to 4, 
4+ and to 3. Examination of the motivated power matrix of Table 56 shows that in each 
case TM and J are in control of the transition, with, in the latter two transitions, B and P 
also having a controlling interest. Because BAe disliked the thought of ending up at either 
4 or 4+, they fought against a resolution, thus keeping the struggle at state 8. 
Now the balance of the struggle turned to the transition 8>3. This is controlled by only 
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W J, GEC, the MOD and the Joint Project Organisation. BAe thus have no control over 
that transition, and a safety manager was appointed by agreement with those three parties. 
The safety manager appointed was not BAe, but was appointed within the JVC. 
Thus the equilibrium predicted was reached, primarily because of the effect of the insistence 
of BAe that a delay would be safest. The transition 1>8 should have been sanctioned 
rationally by a recognition of the subsequent (undesirable to BAe) transition 8>3. 
There were a number of failures of implementation, not least of which was the failure to 
advocate a risk reduction path from a state of delay to the desired state. As can be seen 
from the analysis, such a line of advocacy was already supported by three out of the four 
controlling parties, and would probably have resulted, if not in a devolution to state S+' 
then at least to the almost as desirable state 4+, where a safety manager outside the IJVC is 
appointed, and he is the universally accepted candidate, RAL 
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The Spanish Mayor: 
A case study in sensemaking and action planning 
The second case in this chapter is included in order to illustrate the connection between 
sensemaking and action planning. It will be seen ftom the case that the action falls into 
two section. First an examination of the situation was carried out with just the information 
available on the day of the disclosure of the potential threat to the mayor. Certain actions 
result from this analysis some of which are persuasive in nature, some of which are primarily 
information gathering. This new information then forms the basis for a new, but connected 
examination of the situation. 
Situation and context 
(7his section draws on original documentation (Manunta, 1996a)providedby the consultant 
to the Mayor, andprovided hy the consultant to the writer on 6th June 1996) 
The situation recorded here is a real-life one which took place during the early 1990s and 
draws on the experiences of an adviser to the mayor of a district in the southern half of 
Europe. The mayor's past business dealings have perhaps been unwise, and he has held on 
to business interests which, while appropriate for a private citizen, may perhaps be viewed 
by some as unwise for a man in public life. He is not a rich man; he lives for the service 
which he gives to his district and the resulting respect in which he is held by his fellow 
citizens. 
Like many small politicians he is used to the trading of influence and power and has no 
difficulty with the concepts of utilising infonnation about associates and threats to the 
advantage of his position. 
Ile general political situation in the district is relatively stable but there is a political 
atmosphere in the country at large, suggesting a fierce struggle for power between regional 
Interests and federal interests. The mayor has returned to power (which he held for some 
15 years) having been ousted for 4 years by the active local opposition party, who have 
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strong connections through a coalition with the government party in the capital. The mayor 
did not enjoy being out of power and wishes to avoid the loss of an election in the fiiture if 
it can be arranged. The Mayor hopes to have some support from the local Chief of Federal 
Police, but distrusts the Chief of Local Police, who had been appointed by the opposition 
party during its mandate. He is not sure of his loyalty and believes that he is acting as an 
informant for the local opposition party. He cannot dismiss him, however, without just 
cause. 
The situation within the country is democratically stable, one of the key political issues 
being the degree to which regions of the country have autonomy from the capital. To this 
extent there is a dichotomy of interest between the national (federal) authorities and that of 
the regional or local government. The government party and the Chief of Federal Police in 
the region are aligned, in that the Chief of Federal Police sees his future as falling both 
within the sphere of influence of federal politicians rather than local ones, and within the 
sphere of influence of the opposition party rather than the party of the Mayor. There is 
some alignment of interest between the Chief of Federal Police and the Chief of Local 
Police. 
The mayor is concerned. Reports are coming in from his associates that three local policemen 
have been arrested and are being held locally on a charge of receiving stolen goods, namely 
motor vehicles and computer equipment. What concerns the mayor most is that in their 
possession has been found a collection of some 60 tape cassettes which rumour says contain 
potentially embarrassing information in the form of recorded telephone conversation. The 
tapes have been sealed and locked away. The mayor is clearly concerned that his unwise 
business connections will be exposed by some interested party thereby reducing the mayor's 
political influence in the community. It is not evident to the mayor who it was who invited 
the three policemen to engage in this alleged surveillance; he knows that he did not instigate 
it and he suspects that it was done at the request of the Chief of Local Police, but it could 
equally well be an initiative of the Chief of Federal Police, or as a personal initiative by 
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one of the policemen (who had already been fined for a similar offence). 
The Mayor's Problent 
As yet there has been no disclosure of any potentially embarrassing material, but the Mayor 
wishes to know how the situation might develop, and how he might influence events and 
individuals in order to prevent an embarrassing release, or, if the situation were to change, 
to reduce any damage to his reputation which might occur. 
Theparticipants and their objectives 
A- the Mayor 
The Mayor's objective within the situation is to maintain the stability of his position. 
Ideally he would like to retain the status quo, but he recognises that he could be threatened 
by either the Chief of Local Police (B) or by the arrested officers (C). Additionally the 
Chief of Federal Police (D) could have instigated the surveillance and may be interested in 
bringing pressure to bear on the Mayor in order to strengthen his own position. Tle Press 
(E) also present a threat, but only if they have access to the material on the tapes (and 
assuming that the Mayor's worst fears about their content is well-founded). The Mayor 
does not want disclosure of the contents of the tapes and would prefer not to be threatened 
since, although he is too poor to be blackmailed in any conventional sense, he would not 
wish to have to agree to political demands by the threatening party in return for that party's 
silence. He would also like to change the Chief of Local Police in order to have a person 
loyal to him in that post. 
B- the Chief of Local Police 
The local Chief of Police is trying to play on both the Mayor's team and the opposition's 
team. The Mayor (A) cannot fire him, but the Chief of Local Police must be careful that he 
does not alienate his present master unless he sees the Mayor losing power terminally. The 
objective of B is to secure his position and career with minimum trouble. He is known to 
be a ruthless man. The investigation carried out on the Chief of Local Police revealed 
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some form of complicity with the arrested policemen (he bought a computer at a suspiciously 
low price from them). Additionally, he had attended a course in audio and telecommunication 
security. However, his previous connection is with the opposition party now appeared 
looser, and he seemed desperate to establish a good relationship with the winner of the 
political struggle, namely the Mayor. 
C -the three arrested policemen 
These individuals are interested in minimising the effect of their arrest. They are going to 
prison, but they will act so as to reduce their sentence. 
D- Chief of Federal Police 
The Chief of Federal Police owes little allegiance to the Mayor, but rather to the national 
government coalition. What is not clear, however, is whether D had any part in the 
surveillance in the first place, and, indeed, what is the content of the tapes. He certainly 
knows of their existence and contents. The objective of the Chief of Federal Police will be 
to threaten A with disclosure if it is in his power and interest. The tapes have been sealed 
by the Chief of Federal Police and could form the basis of a new charge of corruption 
should they be given to thejudiciary (the Judge). 
E- the Press 
The local newspapers will disclose any information which they have if it is in their interest. 
Generally speaking they will be interested in a scandal which they report first. Disclosure, 
then is in their interest. 
F- the Judge 
The local judge has been very open in his support of a 'clean hands' campaign and will 
wish to be seen to be acting in a publicly stainless fashion. 
G- the Opposition Party 
The opposition would seek any opportunity to threaten the mayor's position, unless, of 
course, they were implicated. 
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Analysis procedure 
The analysis follows the standard Powergraph analysis in two iterations. The initial problem 
as presented above is discussed and from this certain actions result, concerned primarily 
with the gathering of more data; in the analysis of the original situation, for example, the 
importance of differences in motivation between the three policemen appear. In the real 
life situation, of course, the Powergraph representation was not available, and so the second 
phase of the analysis is carried out using the retrospective knowledge of the consultant in 
question of the actual interactions between parties, rather than carrying out the actual 
investigations. Inevitably the same type of data emerged from the original, conventional 
advisory approach but the focusing process on the important characteristics of the situation 
took rather longer than using the Powergraph approach (Manunta, 1996b). 
States ofplay 
The following possible states of the situation were identified by direct elicitation (Manunta, 
1996a) and emerged naturally from taking successive points of view of all the participants. 
State 1: status ouo 
Here no disclosure has taken place, the information, whatever it is, remains 
inaccessible to the public. No blackmail or other threat is being made to the 
mayor. 
State 2: D threatens A 
Here a threat of disclosure has been received from D but no disclosure or 
resolution of that threat has yet been made. Depending on the demands 
made, no money has changed hands, and no agreement has been entered 
into to which responds to the threat. Conversely, although disclosure is 
threatened no actual release has been made. 
State 3: B threatens A 
A state exactly the same as state 2 but where the threatener is B, the chief of 
Local Police. 
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State 4: Disclosure has occurred without a threat 
This state recognises that disclosure may occur because of some party who 
has no direct advantage to be gained from doing a deal with A (perhaps 
I 
because A has no direct influence over that party's situation) but where 
disclosure could be to the benefit of the holder of the information. 
State 5. A has responded to a threat and disclosure is 
prevented 
Here A has relaxed the threat by responding appropriately to the threatener, 
agreeing that the threatener will not thereby disclose the information. The 
information is not in the public domain 
State 6: A has responded to a threat but the information 
is disclosed 
Here A has relaxed the threat (agreeing to the demands) but the information 
has come into the public domain (by whatever means). 
Transitions 
The next stage in the Powergraph process is to identify those transitions between the states 
of the previous section, together with the influences which govern those transitions. In 
particular the 'owner' of the transition must be identified, in the sense of the participant or 
participants who are in a position to bring that transition about. Equally important is the 
. 
identification of the sustainment power at the state, being the ability of participants to 
maintain that state (should they wish to). 
In the present example, the matrix of Table 57 resulted from these considerations. The 
elements of the matrix contain a0 if the transition is not feasible and a logical (boolean) 
Statement as to the 'owners' of the transition if it is feasible. 
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To state 1 3 4 
............ 
From 
state 1 
................. .. 
A? D B A+B+C+D+E 0 
.... .. 
2 
......................... 
D+A? A 0 0 D. A? D+A? 
. 
3 
. ... ...... 
B+A? 0 A 0 B. A? B+A? 
4 
......... ........ 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
............... ......... 
A(t) 0 0 0 AB. D. EG A+B+D+G 
6 
.......................... 
0 0 A A 
Table 57. Feasibility matrix for Spanish Mayor case 
Some of the entries contains symbol A?. This indicates that if A were to take specific 
actions then he could gain control of the transition, whereas taking no preparatory action 
would deny him influence in the transition. For example the transition from state 2 (where 
D has made a threat but disclosure has not yet taken place) back to the status quo (state 
is under the control, apparently ofD alone (since he and he alone could retract the threat). 
In point of fact A could have influence over him by means of sanctions outside the 
representation of the game which might induce D to view state I (the status quo) as being 
more desirable than leaving his threat on the table. To the extent that A can conceive of 
means of altering D's freedom of action then he has control of the transition. For example 
may be able to conceive of pressure which a third party (say the federal government) 
may be able to bring to bear upon D which would cause him to withdraw his threat. 
Preference Ordering 
Next we order the states for desirability from the view point of each of the participants. 
The table of preferences is shown as Table 58. 
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........... .. 
. ............... ............. 
. ............... ............ 
Table 58: Preference ordering of participants - The Spanish Mayor case 
Final network representation 
Application of the Powergraph method described above leads to the final network of Figure 
54. Before addressing the real-lifc considerations of Figure 50 there are certain structural 
points to be made. 
A? 
1; 
: 
ýr ------------------- A? Statu 
Quo Jý 
-ý ý2. 'ýD 
B+A 
3: B 
threatens 
A 
A 
Figure 54: Final network of states - Spanish Mayor case 
Firstly, state 1 has only two routes leading out of it, to state 2, where D makes a threat and 
a disclosure has not (yet? ) been made, and to state 4 (where disclosure has been made 
without a threat being made). 
Secondly, state 4 has no routes leading from it. In other words, if disclosure is made without 
threat, then there is no means of recovering the information. We also observe that if state 6 
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were reached (where after a threat is received and resolved, the information is nevertheless 
disclosed) there is at least a theoretical path back to state 4 (presumably the blackmailer is 
disanned by the disclosure and other sources of pressure can be brought to bear on him, 
since he has no power now over the mayor). 
State 5 is not accessed within this model, since it is not in A's interests ever to pay the 
political ransom of a threat (since he judges he would lose power terminally in such an 
event anyway). However ifA were to act irrationally and pay the ransom, the model indicates 
that possible improvement routes are back to 1 (by recovering influence over the blackmailer 
and recovering the money over a longer term campaign) or to 6 where (disastrously, D or 
a third party, H discloses the information anyway). The movement of D from 5 to 6 is an 
example of Rudyard Kipling's danegeld argument, whereby paying off a threatener results 
in a subsequent demand becoming more likely since the threatener's position is strengthened 
rather than weakened by the payment of a ransom (since defacto guilt on the part of the 
payer is implied) 
W%at do we tell the Mayor? - conclusionsfront the analysis. 
There are two development paths which should concern us. These are represented in the 
diagram by the transitions from state 1 (today) to states 2 and 4. These are respectively, 
threats to disclosure represented by the Chief of Federal Police (D) and by the three 
policemen and/or their advocate (C+, E) respectively. 
771reat by the Chief of Federal Police 
The Chief of Federal Police may be involved in the plot or at least knowledgable about the 
contents of the cassettes. He therefore represents a threat since it is in his advantage to 
threaten the Mayor, and he would be in control of that process. How then might we defend 
against such a move? There are a number of possibilities 
a) sustainmentpower at state I 
There are ways in which A can defend state 1, the status quo. We might be 
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able to act in such a way as to dissuade D from threatening before the threat 
takes place, possibly by bringing influence to bear from the national level 
upon his situation. Although the Chief of Federal Police is a natural ally of 
the opposition party, to the extent that the Mayor's party will remain in 
power, they have a degree of control at the national level over the Chief of 
Federal Police's situation. In the diagram one can consider this as an attempt 
by A to readjust D's view of state 2 being more attractive than state 1. 
b) reversal of the move 
There will be similar activities in which we can engage if D threatens. in 
particular we might be able to exercise influence over him with the national 
party, using the argument that as no blackmail has been paid, the Mayor is 
clearly innocent. 
c) sustainmentpower at state 2 
Once the Chief of Police (D) has made his threat there is no way in which 
he is going to follow through with the threat to disclose since it would be in 
his interest so to do. Perhaps the judgement is that the disclosure may be 
damaging to the Mayor, but the loss of power by the Chief of Federal Police 
in not having a threat with which to control the Mayor may be more attractive 
to The police chief. A can also attempt to recover state I by persuading D 
over a period of time to withdraw his threat. 
Threat by the arrestedpolicemen and their lawyer 
, 
The second development, represented in the diagram by the transition from state I to state 
4, is for either the three imprisoned policemen or the Press to release the information any 
way. This may happen in a number of very real ways. Firstly the attorney of the prisoners 
may advise them that a plea bargain may be achieved by giving up what they know of the 
surveillance which will inevitable result in confession. A defence against such a development 
might be to show loyalty in front of the judge in an attempt to assist the prisoners in 
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achieving a sympathetic hearing, threatening them then that if they attempted to disclose 
the information the Mayor would not only withdraw support, but would make sure that the 
three policemen went down with him. Critical in this is to prevent disclosure of the material 
to the Press. 
Of primary importance is the observation that if state 4 were to materialise, the judge (F) 
alone has control over the situation. 
Sensitivities 
One would also make the observation that the only reason that the local Chief of Police is 
not a player in the diagram is because of our judgement that he would see state 3 as less 
desirable than state 1. This needs to be tested by judicious enquiry and sustained by the 
careful application of an argument that he has to be sure that the Mayor will be utterly 
brought down by the disclosure if the Chief of Local Police is so thoughtless as to betray 
him. 
Conditional observations 
If the affair were to follow the analysis above states 3,5 or 6 could never materialise. In 
practice, however, the mayormay be tempted to pay the blackmail, thereby placing himself 
at state 5. He then has a more limited freedom of action. He could attempt to recover the 
status quo (recover the money by the exercise of some influence undeclared up until this 
stage), thereby inducing the transition ftorn state 5 to state 1. Second, he could attempt to 
limit ten damage by defending state 5, but in order for state 5 to persist, all of A, B, D, E 
and G must act together - any of them could break the situation. Tbird, and worst 
for A, 
either the Chief of Federal Police, D or the local opposition party A could cause an 
investigation to be started anyway once the mayor's guilt is confirmed by his response to 
the threat. The mayor would lose everything unless he could cause the situation to recover 
to state 4 (where the information is disclosed but the threat of further action has been 
removed) but only by the exercise of unacceptable power or by an equally unpalatable loss 
of face or political power. 
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As far as state 3 (a threat by B), which should not arise, but which nevertheless could 
happen, A would appear to be in a fair position, in that he should be able to cause the 
situation to recover back to the status quo by persuading the chief of Local Police to 
withdraw his threat. 
Overall conclusionsfrom analysis 
The mayor needs more information rather than immediate action. He needs, specifically, 
to determine the attitude of D towards A, since this will substantiate or otherwise the 
preference ordering ofD. The mayor also needs to investigate the options available to him 
for the avoidance of path I>4. This amounts to detennining 
a) how he can avoid being threatened by D 
by reducing D's motivation to threaten 
by reducing D's ability to threaten 
b) how the mayor can minimise the damage if he is threatened. 
The mayor also needs to investigate the position of the judge, since he is clearly a key 
player in some developments and that of the press, since, if they have the information in 
their possession, they will likely prove a dangerous disclosure route. 
Conintentary on actual situation 
This section draws on the commentary provided by the consultant to the Mayor in real life 
and seeks to answer the questions raised by the analysis above, albeit in retrospect. It is 
quoted verbatim (Manunta, 1996c). 
Following the suggestion coming from the exercise, more specific 
information has heen researched, andohtainedActions have heen taken 
to reduce vulnerahilities, find arguments for negotiation, and for 
minimising those damages which are inevitahle. 
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The attitude of the Chief of Federal Police [D] towards the Mayor [A] 
maybe described as one of friendly neutrality'. The different reasons 
for this are: he depends on central government: y directives (which ruling 
party is the same as of the Mayor), and is in this moment under attack 
for corruption. In this moment, the Federal Police is under attackfor 
having spied politicians, ministers, even the Chief of the State, This is 
causing on high charges in Police, an enormous amount oftliticism and 
personal pressures. He is a mature man, next to retirement, with a 
background ofnot getting involved into political-issues andlocalfamily 
interest. Until now, he has not officially informed the Judge about the 
existence of the. tapes, which he considers irrelevant to the main case. 
More, he has not ordered all investigation on this specific issue. 7herefore, 
we can assume that, ifhe is not obliged by thirdparties (the policemen, 
lawyer, the opposition, or the press) he will be quite happy to keeps 
things how they are. The investigation on the three policemen led to the 
conclusion that only one ofthe arrestedpolicemen, [CII was responsible 
for the illegal surveillance, and that probably the reason for that was 
not political, personal (actually, hisfamily was in good relations with 
the mayor'ý) or intended to blackmail, but cautelative [sic], [a 
precautionary measure] in case ofinternal investigation). 
The investigation oftheJudge revealedhim to havepolitical ideas similar 
to the Mayor ý, to have heen at schools with his son (with whom he had 
remained in good relations), to he rather lazy and not toofliend ofthe 
press. However, the Judge is considered an honest person, which, if 
Ihe] receives aformal communication ofcrime, will do his dutý), with 
no regard ofthe consequences. 
The above extract is from the informal considerations of the consultant in question in 
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respect of what issues the initial Powergraph analysis would have thrown up at the time if 
he had had it available. As a result of a 'role-playing' exercise on 17th June 1996, the next 
stage of the analysis, based on an extension of the above considerations was carried out 
(Manunta, 1996d). 
Second iteration 
Convergence of representation 
The analysis of the previous section leads to an appreciation of the importance of two 
interest groups, namely the chief of federal police and the three policemen (and their legal 
adviser). The appreciation that it is these two groups who essentially control the situation 
allows a more refined analysis to take place. Before describing this next iteration of the 
method, it is worth discussing the relationship between the two analyses. 
Firstly, one is tempted to ask why the more refined analysis was not included as a subset of 
the preliminary analysis. In the tactically exhaustive approach of Fraser and Hipel (op. cit. ) 
and of Howard (1971), to the extent that the tactical choices were comprehended by the 
model, then it would indeed be the case that the situation would be completely covered by 
the model, but the effect of the Powergraph approach is different. It allows a greater 
understanding to be achieved by examination of the situation itself. It is again a question 
of the order in which the characterising elements are defined. In the conventional methods, 
tactics define outcomes, and the only outcomes admitted are those which emerge from 
tactical choice. Hence, if the tactical choices do not completely define the outcomes, then 
outcomes which are possibilities in the real world will not emerge since the tactical choice 
will not cover them. To put it another way, one has to decide whether the approach of 
participants is to decide what they and their opponents can do and then to accept the 
consequences, or to decide what they would wish and not wish to happen and then determine 
the likely behaviour thereby. Powergraph takes the latter approach. 
Second, one must ask whether the preliminary analysis is wrong in any sense. Every analysis 
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is wrong; if it were not it would at the very least reflect a totally accurate representation of 
the real world in all its complexities; such would be indistinguishable from reality. The 
question, rather, is whether the inaccuracies of the model are materially important. There 
is a time component to this judgement in any real-time application. If we were dealing 
with apost-facto description of the situation then we could say with confidence that if the 
actions of the participants were not adequately described by the model in some material 
sense then the model would be defective. In particular, if the model appeared to judge the 
behaviour of a participant as irrational in the sense of not following a sensible set of rules 
towards an outcome which (it is judged) the participant in question would desire, then it 
would be defective. But there are many conditionals in such a criterion. We may be dealing 
with a participant whose ordering of outcomes is imperfectly known to us. We may be 
dealing with a participant who sees a different game space to ourselves, in which case we 
have a defect not in the analysis itself, but rather in our statement of the problem. 
So much for the postfacto descriptive use of such a model. Here the method is being used 
as a real-time advice tool, and the criteria for goodness are rather different. First, it is noted 
that the model is utilising information that is sporadic and defective; to the extent that the 
information is good, the model will tend to be good. Second, it is observed that the raison 
d'etre of the model is different. Because of the recognition in the real-time problem that 
not everything is known and that ways must be found of knowing where to look for more 
and relevant information, the model is used as a sensemaking tool as well as a descriptive 
tool. Hence a lacuna in the solution can be accepted so long as the modelling leads us to 
fill that lacuna within the time scale appropriate to defend against the consequences of that 
imperfection in our reaction generated by the gaps in our understanding of the conflict 
situation. Tbird, the model is being used in a normative style rather than purely descriptively 
and so the need for timely advisory information is the important criterion rather than 
accuracy at any cost. Fourth, it is observed that in a real-time situation, it may be that none 
of the participants have a clear view of the entire game -space, and so a defect in the model 
may not have the consequences to be expected in a game of perfect information. 
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A newperception 
The mayor sees the situation after the first analysis with a new understanding. First, he 
sees the importance of knowing who releases any information and whether or not an 
investigation has been started or not. The policemen are newly understood to be in different 
situations one from the other-, one of them (subsequently called CI) has been found with 
the tapes; the others (C2) have no knowledge of the material, being simply small time 
criminals engaged in petty theft of computers. 
The importance of the lawyer for the policemen is now seen to be significant. 
In particular the mayor realises that it may be critically important whether he releases the 
information or whether a third party releases it. In the former case he could claim to have 
aided then investigation, in the latter his silence would almost certainly count against him. 
A new analysis is needed to comprehend these new variables, and proceeds in a similar 
way to the first phase. 
The new actors 
Where possible the actors in this iteration have been given the same indicators as in the 
first iteration. 
A- The mayor 
B- The chief of local police 
Cl- The policeman who was found in possession of the tapes 
C2- Ile other two policemen 
D- The chief of federal police 
E- The Press 
F- Thejudge 
G- The head of the local opposition party 
H- The lawyer acting for CI and C2 
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The new states 
Ile following states were defined. They recognise that the critical element at this stage of 
analysis is the question of who has released the information. It was judged that there was 
a significant difference between two states 'Information has been released' and 
'Information has been released by the mayor', for example. 
1 Status Quo. No information has been released. 
2CI releases infon-nation but no investigation has started 
2+ CI releases infon-nation and a crirninal investigation is started 
3G (the local opposition chief) releases infonnation but no investigation 
has started. 
3+as 3 with a criminal investigation in train 
4 The Press releases information (without an investigation at this stage) 
4+as 4 with an investigation 
5 The lawyer releases information (no investigation) 
5+The lawyer releases info (with a consequent investigation) 
6 The mayor releases the information (no investigation) 
6+As 6 with a criýnal invesfigation 
7 No information is released but an investigation has started. 
Influences in transition 
The following matrix (Table 59) summarises the influences and feasibility of transition in 
this second iteration. 
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Table 59. Transition matrix for Phase 2 of the Spanish Mayor problem. 
Table 60 shows the preference ordering for the participants 
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Table 60. Showing the preference ordering for the participants of the states 
defined above 
The resulting motivated power matrix is shown in Table 61 below. 
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Table 61: Showing the motivated transition powers. Small case letters thus (f) 
show neutral motivation. 
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In Table 61 the judge (F) is frequently found to have neutral motivation, whereby he has 
no preference between two states. In order to indicate this his boolean indicator F is written 
thus (0. Such an indication allows for easy examination of those preference order changes 
which might induce a significant change in the outcome. It is easy to see here that if the 
judge were to be only slightly motivated against the transition it would not take place, but 
if he were only slightly motivated for the transition, then it would take place. It is a 
rudimentary sensitivity analysis tool. 
Analysis of the Phase 2ftnal network 
The directed graph of Figure 55 reflects that there is no one who has both the motivation 
and the ability (knowledge) to release the information. Thus it is likely that any investigation 
which starts will be because of a general suspicion by the authorities or indeed the Press 
that something is wrong. The mayor's efforts, then should be concentrated upon denying 
the Press any usable information (or indeed aprimafacie case) for starting a public inquiry. 
If the investigation starts, any one who has the information is motivated to release it. The 
question here is who has the infonnation at that point. 
Once the investigation has started (states 2+, 3+, 4+, 5+, 6+) it is the judge who is in 
control of the investigation (primarily) and the mayor has had the situation taken out of his 
hands. This places even more emphasis on preventing the transition from 1>7 in the first 
place. Alternatively, pressure may be brought to bear on the judge to dissuade him from 
allowing an investigation to go ahead. This could range from direct pressure to preparing 
him for the persuasion of the press by pre-briefing him so as not to believe theprimafacie 
case of the Press. 
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Figure 55. * Final network of the Phase 2 analysis of The Spanish Mayor case 
Subsequent Commentary by Consultant 
The practical resolution of the problem eventually turned upon the age of the wiring 
discovered in the Mayor's office. The advisor's commentary is quoted verbatim (Manunta, 
1996e): - 
A technical inspection conducted by the advisor in the Mayor's office 
has found evidence of an illegal connection to the Mayor's telephone 
lines in the PABX and of three different connection points to a tape 
recorder to three different lines, in the Mayor's office, in his secretary's 
O! fflce, and in a briefing room which is normally, but not only used by the 
opposition party. A similar number of non-utilised cables, leaving the 
above premises were equallyfound, who could have been erploitedfor 
listening or recording room conversations. A similar inspection conducted 
on the Mayor'spremises and cars has revealed no evidence ofpresent or 
past attacks. It was easy to tellfrom examining the wifing that it had 
been placed there more than one year before. 
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'All the information led to thefollowing set of conclusions: 
Yhe age andplace of illegal defivations suggested that the opposition 
could equally have been spied [upon]. Ais suggests that common interest 
in avoiding the disclosure of tapes could have been ewploited with the 
opposition. 
No deliberate intention of harming the Mayor could be identified. 
C1 could he convinced, with some help, to stay quiet. [a] 
In case ofproblems, the Mayor could claim to be the victim ofapolitical 
plot. 
If necessary, the Mayor could make a preventative attack giving the 
Judge the evidence of heing attacked'11f 
These conclusions, ot, 0 and y above can be seen to be reflected in the final networks of 
Figures 54 and 55. Conclusion ot bears directly on the original analysis and is in effect an 
implementation of the need to dernotivate C1 in moving from state 1 to state 4 in Figure 
54. In this transition (marked with the boolean expression C+E) the influence of E is 
erroneous, as was subsequently determined, because the Press were not in fact in possession 
of the information which enabled them to control transition I>4. 
Conclusion 0 is reflected in Figure 55 transition 7> 4+, where the Mayor himself is now 
in a position to release information to the Press, safe in the knowledge that the evidence 
gathered will safeguard him from prosecution, and that he can influence the Judge, in 
particular to see justice done and move the system to state 4 where the Mayor is safe from 
further investigation. 
Conclusion y is reflected also in Figure 55, where transition 7> 6+ has the direct effect of 
conclusion 0 above without the need to involve the Press ab initio. 
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Issues of practice for Powergraph 
The case studies described throughout this work constitute a substantial body of practice 
in the use of Powergaph and certain valuable lessons emerge regarding its use. These are 
summarised here prior to an overall description in Chapter 10 of an ex ante, real-time case 
study which links together EFAR and Powergraph into a foveal game approach. Arguments 
for the justification of the elements and for the whole of the foveal game approach will be 
presented in the next chapter. 
Intervention issues 
As described above the intervention framework for the whole of this research was a 
participative enquiry framework. In practice the Powergraph procedure was found to be 
highly supportive of such an interactive enquiry approach. Because the stage products of 
the Powergraph procedure are essentially graphical in nature (either as tables or as diagrams) 
the respondent (in most cases a busy and powerful member of a large organisation) was 
able to see the developing structure as it emerged. The process is, therefore highly 
contributory, since, because the consultant and the respondent have the linguafranca of 
the tables and the directed graph, it becomes relatively easy to adopt an attitude of joint 
objective, both in terms of research and commercial aims. 
The directed graph representation in particular lends itself to ajoint approach. Because the 
analysis method is essentially one of interrogating a partially understood diagram, the 
conventions of which are found very easy to assimilate, an atmosphere ofjoint understanding 
(and sometimes ofjoint confusion) prevails. This of itself tends to tie together respondent 
and researcher in a common goal of understanding. The alliance is further strengthened by 
the realisation that the researcher is in no position to dictate the sensemaking of the process 
and requires, as much as does the respondent, a joint approach in order to progress. 
The action planning stage is particularly supportive of a participative enquiry paradigm, 
since the very nature of driving out action plan elements, as seen in the BAe Project Staffing 
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case is an amalgam of semi-analytic results derived from the analysis procedure with 
heuristic and often subjective sensemaking on the part of the respondent. 
In order to foster ihis participative approach in the use of Powergraph it is important not to 
declare the intent to adopt the objectives of the client organisation at too early a stage. It 
has been found that the stage products of Powergraph naturally set the agenda for a joint 
approach, and too overt an espousal of what can be seen as a presumptuous position of 
joint objectives is almost always counterproductive and unnecessary. 
Preparatory Issues 
It is generally considered a good approach in this type of research to come to some agreement 
about the question is being addressed (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). This research has indicated 
that while this is a good temporary structuring step it can also have the disadvantages that 
if it is defined and declared too rigidly the sensemaking product of Powergraph, which 
emerges gradually through the procedure, can be attenuated. It is far better in practice to 
agree with the respondent upon a working question, making the point that the objective of 
the Powergraph approach is as much to make sense of the situation in hand as it is to 
generate action planning. 
Determining the participants is generally found to be straightforward. In none of the practical 
cases reported here (nor in the OSF case in the next chapter) was there any difficulty in 
deciding a working set of participants. Again, it is important to make statements to the 
effect that if a participant is forgotten the model can be amended later. While this is not 
strictly accurate it tends to avoid the difficulties of respondents trying to make sense of the 
whole problem in order to state it. 
State generation 
The process of state generation, as discussed in chapter 8 can be troublesome. Some 
respondents find it an intuitive and easy process to set down the likely outcome of a situation, 
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particularly if they have been involved in it for some time. This was certainly the case in 
TheSpanish MayorandBAe ý Project Staffing. Frequently, however, aprocedure is required 
and the top-down value based approach described above is an appropriate one. It has 
disadvantages, however, in practice, First, it is more time-consuming than an intuitive 
state generation process and second it can constrain thinking. One of the criticisms offered 
here of the existing Fraser and Hipel method (op. cit. ) is that they generate a view of the 
future by considering tactical choices alone, and the top-down state generation process 
described can lead to a similar myopia, not through an over-concentration on what is seen 
as 'the tactical options'but through a fixation on the di ffi cult judgements of the valuations 
placed by other players within the conflict. This needs to be guarded against in practice, 
but nevertheless the top-down method does produce a wider set of states than the bottom- 
up tactical I y-derived approach. 
Subjectivity of Information 
Respondents sometimes need reassuring that while the procedure may appear algorithmic, 
it is in fact a mobilisation of subjective infonnation on their part. There is general suspicion 
of methods which appear to be too procedural. 
Analysis ofDirected Graph and4clion Planning 
The heart of the Powergraph is the process of deriving action planning (including intelligence 
gathering and sensemaking action) from the directed graph. There can be certain difficulties 
here. In particular, the presentation of a complex graph for analysis in one indigestible 
meal is a bad research option. The respondent frequently feels outfaced by this and the 
participative nature of the activity is lost when the researcher has to provide what can 
appear to be a ready-made analysis. The same care is required here as with any complex 
system representation, and in particular the technique of reduction, seen in Figure 52 of 
the BAe Project Staffing Case where only a subset of the path is shown, is important and 
effective. In practice there can be less difficulty than might perhaps be expected since the 
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process of identifying desirable options and paths is essentially a sensemaking one, and 
the respondent can be drawn along with the analysis procedure. 
The analysis procedure is, in practice, very intuitive. The essential poýwer-motivation 
algorithm is very easy to understand, and to a very great extent the value derived from 
analysis of the directed graph is one of ordering and structuring a plethora of subjective 
and partially understood data. Attempts to make the process too procedural fail because of 
this. 
The analysis procedure does not drive out predictions where none can be made. An example 
of this is the identification of order of play issues where, on occasion there can be a 
temptation to look to the analytical procedure to give a single prediction of what will 
happen in the conflict. Some of the examples given above (Yhe Postage Stamp Clisis is 
one) indicate that there are times when no single answer can be given because the future is 
essentially undetermined and depends on the micro-behaviour of participants to determine 
the macro-behaviour of the conflict. The essential unpredictability needs to be explained 
in advance to the respondent as a defensive measure. 
Work Content 
The Powergraph procedure is not a lengthy one. The Ne Project Staffing case took some 
three working days, including two meetings of about half a day each. Much of the work 
was done in direct consultation with the respondents. The Spanish Mayor case was different 
since it was performed using the consultant at the time as a dummy respondent. It took 
some 6 working days to complete for the two iterations. The Battle for Trafalgar took 
some 4 working days. 
An appropriate technique is to limit time in contact with the respondent to those times 
when subjective input is critical; setting out the problem, defining the states and analysis 
of the directed graph are obvious ones. The process of generating the matrices can be done 
a off-line' with occasional contact by telephone with the respondent. 
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Chapter 10: A developed approach to conflict 
management 
lntrýductlon 
The previous case studies have addressed particular elements of the foveal game approach. 
In order to illustrate the overall performance of the foveal game approach (in contrast to its 
separate elements), this chapter describes a real-life, ex ante strategic analysis for Oxford 
Scientific Films Ltd., a medium sized media company experiencing restrictions to growth. 
The case study commences with a multi-futures analysis using EFAR, on which basis the 
owner started discussions to dispose of part of her company. The negotiations then 
developed, and a Powergraph analysis was required, which developed the detail surrounding 
one of the EFAR states. On the basis of this Powergraph analysis negotiations were continued 
and resulted in a successful resolution of the company's structural problems. The company 
was disposed of to a larger communications company. 
This complete cycle of strategic planning, then, forms a part of the basis for thejustifi cation 
(in Chapter 11) of the foveal game approach and its elements. 
This study has been previously published (Powell, 1997), from which this section draws. 
Certain textual changes have been made to fit the context of this present work 
Case Background - OSFs Strategic Future 
This section reports an actual analysis carried out at the request of a medium sized company, 
Oxford Scientific Films, Ltd., (OSF), based in Poland Street in Central London and with a 
site in Long Hanborough, some 60 miles outside London (Goldie-Morrison, 1995). The 
company produces advertising material of a specialist nature, piimarilyusing natural history 
material and has a forbidding competitive environment, with a number of large companies, 
some the products of consolidation, some the result of entry from adjacent sectors, all 
under pressure in an increasing technical market. It presents essentially a niche marketing 
strategy based on a specific set of filming techniques, including time-lapse and extended 
Page 383 
time photography (Anon, 1995). 
OSF sits at a cross roads. The majority owner gained control some seven years ago and has 
engaged in a vigorous and successful streamlining programme including an effective 
organisational development programme based on the Investor in People standard. Now, 
however, she has come to an understanding that further growth, and possibly the viability 
of the company can only be secured by a strategic appraisal of importance of particular 
elements in the scene which she saw at the beginning of the present appraisal. 
The two specific change issues were 
a) the share holding status of the company. 
The owner and MD holds some 53% of the shares of the company, which is 
not listed on the Stock Exchange. Another director holds a further 10% or 
so of the shares and the remainder is held by a number of partners. At the 
beginning of this appraisal the owner recognised (but did not openly declare) 
that a key decision to be made concerning the future of OSF was the 
determination of the consequences and possibilities of alternative share 
structures encompassing sale within and outwith the company and an outright 
sale. These options are declared in more detail below. 
b) the organisationalposition of the company. 
At the start of the exercise the company maintained two sites, one in Central 
London and one in a small town some 60 miles away. Elements of the 
operation, which consisted of two distinct entities, namely a film production 
capability and a still photograph library, were, in one way or another sited 
at both locations. The maintenance of a Central London site was expensive 
but essential for image and for adjacency to customers and the individuals 
who provided some of the key skills in production. Similarly, the mere 
existence of two sites produced a management overhead and an 
organisational communication difficulty because of the need to maintain a 
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motivational presence at the two sites and a degree of coherence between 
the two teams. 
Linking the two issues were a number of secondary, but important factors which emerged 
in an introductory session during late November 1995 (Goldie-Morrison, 1995). Firstly, 
the availability of funds had always been an issue in OSR Over and above the need for 
careful husbandry, the cash and revenue position did not produce, and seemed unlikely to 
produce in the near future, an excess of cash for development, either organisation 
reconfiguration or market development. Secondly, the competitive situation was seen to 
be changing. New technology in the form of computer aided design, production and image 
manipulation methods meant that there was a possibility that previously high entry barriers 
would be seen as lowered by new entrants into the sector, and moreover may undermine 
the basis on which OSF differentiated itself from the its competitors, both in the still 
image part of its business and in the (film) production side. The employment market in the 
sector was fairly volatile, so that a lack of expressed focus on the part of the company 
could well result in the short term loss of key technicians and creatives. 
Study background and context 
This case study was carried out at the invitation of the owner on the recommendation of 
another consultant, who had provided extensive advice on the organisational issues of 
OSF. An initial meeting at OSF's offices in Poland Street identified a number of ill-defined 
corporate issues in the mind of the owner. These included a changing competitive and 
technological environment, a sensitivity to the vulnerability of OSF to some of the very 
large competitors (such as the BBC). A particular concern was the feeling that OSF was 
constrained in its activities by virtue of its specialised niche position. In a sense, the owner 
had a model of OSF as a small animal which survived among larger beasts by remaining 
inconspicuous. She felt that this was both a risky ecological position and one that did not 
allow any opportunity for expression of the technical and creative skills of the company 
into commercial benefits. OSIF had outgrown its specialised role. 
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The owner of OSF appeared frustrated and bored by her lack of freedom of manoeuvre. 
This showed itself in three ways. First was the ecological niche problem described above. 
Second was the inability of OSF to raise operational funds for expansion or even extensive 
product development within the existing corporate configuration. Third, she felt personally 
constrained because she had brought the company out of its initial poor financial state, had 
weathered a difficult recession period in the market, and was now left with a company 
which did not allow her personal expression of her clear competences as a manager. 
In later interviews (Goldie-Morrison, 1996a, b, c), it became clear that the owner was a 
mixture of justified self-confidence mixed with patches of doubt. The development of 
OSF was not necessarily seen by her as coincident with her personal development, but she 
felt a great sense of loyalty to the other shareholders and therefore a solution to the owner's 
developmental problem would be more acceptable if it involved securing a future for OSF. 
The approach adopted to the interventions was a participative one. This involved two 
activities. First, the owner had to be made sufficiently aware of the procedures involved in 
EFAR (and in subsequent stages of the foveal approach) such that she could take a full part 
in the multiple futures analysis. This took considerable time and consisted of talking the 
owner through a number of pilot multi-futures analyses (including a sanitised version of 
the case studyBAe Mlternate NavalStrategy reported above). Second, a conscious attempt 
was made by the researcher to identify with the problems of OSF as a whole and of the 
owner as an individual. It soon became clear that the owner valued (probably 
disproportionately) the experience of the researcher in operating a unit of a PLC which, 
although it was small in terms of that PLC was some 5 times larger than OSR This became 
a focus for a series of 'coaching'conversations about the approaches which could be taken 
in turning from a reactive 'ecological niche'approach to competitors to more conditioning, 
manipulative approach. A professional rapport rapidly built up, with a regular weekend 
telephone conversation being established at which a review of OSF's strategic situation 
was carried out, the owner clearly using the researcher as a confidant for matters which 
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could not be discussed with other consultants nor with her fellow director-shareholder. 
Triangulation was available through the activities and confidentiality of the consultant 
who originally provoked the research. This consultant had been engaged for some two 
years in an organisational analysis of OSF and as a result had, to a large extent, both the 
confidence of the owner and the necessary background to offer a critique of the progressing 
multi-futures analysis. 
Great care was taken from the second meeting on to use the appropriate vocabulary, referring 
to 'our' future, 'our' approach etcetera. The style of dress of OSFs senior (male) 
management team was noted and appropriated. This transference of allegiance was accepted 
without difficulty and it is a measure of the effectiveness of the attempted identification 
with the aims of OSF that it became natural for the researcher to be invited to all planning 
meetings between OSF and their financial and M&A consultants (Coopers and Lybrand) 
when these eventually became focused on the sale of the company (Goldie-Morrison, 
1996d, e). 
The intervention used EFAR to allow the owner to make sufficient sense of the future to 
allow strategic planning by producing a strategic network. In the first instance, the client 
presented her central problem as one of organisational design, in that she was concerned 
about the organisational viability of running a multi-site operation, but it soon became 
clear that the central issue was, in fact, the very existence of the company itself, and the 
effect of the EFAR study was to invoke an initiative to offer the company for sale. Central 
to this decision was an understanding achieved through the multi-futures approach that 
incremental development approaches were unlikely to offer sufficient security to the 
company, and that in order to realise the potential of the firm, a relationship with a parent 
which had greater funds available for development would be necessary. The resulting 
negotiation formed the key decision locale. Intelligence gained during the analysis and 
execution of detailed plans within that decision locale then informed the strategic network, 
as will be seen below. 
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Objectives 
The initial discussion with the owner\MD during late November 1995 identified a need for 
a general review of the strategic future for OSF, concentrating on the issues identified 
above. It was quickly decided that the EFAR technique was to form the basis of the study. 
From the company's point of view, then, the objective was to throw some light on the 
effect of the interactions between share structure, organisation issues and related 
factors on the possible states in which OSF could find itself. (Powell, 1996) 
Describing the Futures for OSF 
In conversation with the owner of OSF a series of attributes were identified, following the 
EFAR methodology. 
Table 62 shows the resultant set of characterising sectors together with the values which 
each could conceivably take. This is the final version of the table. The effect of deliberation 
over a period of time amended the table in detail from the initial draft. Close examination 
of the definitions of what grow incrementally means or what single site improved comms 
means resulted in a reduction of the number of values in the 0 sector from five to four and 
in some minor changes in wording. 
These sectors and values emerged quite naturally from a semi-structured discussion about 
what is important to the client's business. Two structuring aids were used. Firstly, previous 
examples were offered to the client as a limited check list. There is a potential danger here 
that the client will simply choose what she sees someone else who 'runs a similar business' 
has chosen before. This was avoided by not showing an example from a similarly sized 
business. In practice this danger does not seem to appear, clients being generally keen to 
differentiate their businesses from previous users by pointing out different characterising 
values. Secondly, a set of previously successful 'key cue'questions were used at appropriate 
times in the discussion in order to ensure that appropriate coverage was achieved. Examples 
of these were, "Ifyou were tellingyour shareholders how things are going how wouldyou 
structure your answer? " and "Ifyou knew the levels of these attributes [characterising 
Page 388 
cu Z-, 
LL 
Table 62., Sectors and values for OSF strategic study 
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sectors] doyoufeelthatyou would know what thatfuture state consistedoj? ". Use of these 
key-cue questions is a very effective way of establishing coverage and depth. 
The Sectors and their values 
C-Competitive Context 
Although initially (Goldie-Morrison, 1995) the client was most concerned 
about the share holding and organisational structure of the company, it 
quickly became apparent (Goldie-Morrison, 1996a) that the competitive 
environment of OSF, although comfortable at the time, was a key 
characterising element of the future for the company. In particular, if the 
large competitors either viewed OSF as a threat or as a preferred (or even 
necessary) partner, their attention could be drawn to the company very 
specifically, and if that were the case, the power of the competitors in the 
market would be very great unless OSF had a niche position by virtue of a 
technological or quality edge or through an essentially unassailable customer 
base. Certainly the degree to which partners/competitors were fHendly or 
hostile was considered to be important. 
A- Extent of ambition 
No expression was made of any ambition beyond the security which results 
from having a niche in the sense above. The present situation was 
characterised as incremental growth, with survival and exit as (clearly less 
desirable) options below. This limit in ambition was felt to be an expression 
of the implicit time horizon of this example, it being clear that the future 
forecast was to be centred on the next few months rather than the next 
decade. 
S- Shareholding 
The share structure of the company allowed four main positions to be 
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adopted, namely the status quo, where the client retained a controlling 
interest; a sale of a minority interest; the sale of a controlling interest; and, 
lastly, the sale of all of the assets of the company. Clearly one of the important 
issues surrounding such a sale would be the extent to which operational 
funds would become available either for organisational change or for more 
general market and product development. This will be seen later in the 
constraints defined between and among sector values. 
E- Externalperception 
This, the customer community's view of the quality of OSFs product, was 
included after observation of a previous client's sector value table (BAe's 
Alternate Naval Strategy, reported above). Clearly the perception will be 
related to actual performance in terms of lateness and poor quality, but may 
be subtly but importantly different. Thus the customer's perception of quality 
is only partly under the control of OSF; competitors' standard setting and 
benchmarking, for example, will affect the expectations of the customer. 
D- Delivery capability 
This was intended to indicate a wide definition of 'capability'encompassing 
both quality and delivery. In particular a point raised early in the discussion 
of the sector values was that of presumptuous marketing, in the sense of 
'the customer gets what we offer because we know best'. 
0- Organisation Coherence 
The background for the importance of this sector is discussed above. Note 
here that the result is not necessarily better in the eyes of OSF as the sector 
value rises. In other words having only a central London office is not 
necessarily per se a better solution than having a regional office with a 
central London front office. It is necessary here to define rather carefully 
what is meant by the different sector values. 
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Sector value 01 - TWo sites status quo is held to mean the present 
arrangement where two generally equally weighted sites are operated, 
with the owner/MD spending significant periods of time at both. 
Communication among employees at the two sites is good, but could 
be better. Significant and successful investment has been made in an 
Investors in People exercise to improve communication standards. 
Sector value 02 -Two sites with improved comms means that further 
investment has been made in a way as yet undeclared which allows a 
tangible improvement on coherence of operation to be achieved. The 
main motivation for including this level of the sector 0 is to identify 
whether the physical location of the operation to one site is important 
when the balance of internal and external factors are taken into account. 
Sector value 03 - Single site + London front office. Here a regional 
site is anticipated, possibly but not necessarily at the existing regional 
facility, together with an office in central London to allow interfacing 
with customers and freelance production staff who centre themselves 
there. 
Sector value 04 - Single London site. This means that the only site 
operated is in central London. The financial consequences of such a 
move are considerable, and it was freely admitted that although this 
may be the most desirable from an operational point of view, financial 
considerations will probably militate against it except in a limited set 
of cases. 
F- Availability offunds. 
This was considered to mean the freedom of the organisation to expend 
resources either in the development of new products or techniques or in 
internal reorganisation. 
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Rejection of Infeasible Combinations 
The next step in the EFAR process is to establish the connections between the sector 
values described and defined above by pairwise comparison of sector values. For example, 
the two sector values Obtain security through nicheposition and Last resort supplier would 
be incompatible. In the present analysis the understanding of the connection between 
operation funding, ambition and share structure required considerable discussion and 
clarification before the connections between the appropriate sector values could be defined. 
Table 63 summarises the connections between the sector values. Each row consists of a 
single sector value in bold type and a list of all possible values of all the other sector values 
to its right. Some of these other sector values are replaced by '-', denoting that the 
combination is not considered feasible. Thus we observe that (in the column headed A), if 
Ambition has the value 1, then column S may only have the values 3 and 4, and the sector 
F can only have the values I and 2. 
Annex D to this work contains notes on the table which will assist in determining the 
underlying connections of Table 63. 
Resulting states 
The matrix of Table 63, then, consists of a set of relations between the sectors so that any 
combination of the sector values of the attributes can be judged against Table 63 for 
feasibility. If any pair of sector values in that combination under examination does not 
appear in Table 63, then that combination as a whole is infeasible. In practice this is carried 
out by working backwards from the lower right hand entries of Table 63. The effect is the 
same; all the feasible combinations of values for the attributes CASEDOF can be determined. 
Each combination of values for the set of sectors CASEDOF constitute a possible future. 
Without the feasibility statements of Table 63 we would have around 25000 possible futures 
(possible combinations of CASEDOF). After the rejection of infeasible combinations we 
are left with 66 feasible combinations or states. 
Page 393 
Compliancy Matrix for OSF study 
Entries show which values are acceptable or feasible for each value in the left hand box. 
E. g. For attribute C=1, F can take only the values 12 or 3 
For attribute D=3, F can take only 2 or 3. 
1 12-- 1234 --- 45 --34 12345 123- 
2 1234 1234 --345 --34 12345 123- 
3 1234 1234 12345 123- 12345 -234 
4 -234 --34 --345 -. 34 12345 --34 
5 ---4 --34 --- 45 --- 4 12345 --34 
1 --34 12345 1234 1234 12-- 
2 123- --3-- --34 12-- 123- 
3 123- --34- --34 -234 --34 
4 123- --- 45 --- 4 --34 --34 
1 12345 1234 1234 12-- 
2 --345 --34 -234 -234 
3 --345 -234 -234 --34 
14 --345 -234 1234 --34 
1 12-- 1234 12-- 
2 12-- 1234 12-- 
3 --34 1234 -23- 
4 --34 -234 --34 
5 --- 4 -234 --34 
1 123- 1 --- 
2 123- 12-- 
3 1234 -23- 
4 -234 --34 
1 12-- 
2 -2-- 
1 
3 --34 
4 --- 4 
Table 63: Compatibility of sector values for OSFs strategic futures analysis 
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Clustering states 
Sixty six states are difficult to hold in the mind, and, moreover, represent many possible 
situations where the specific future circumstances represented by the choice of values of 
CASEDO and F are, in an empirical sense, indistinguishable. For example, any set of 
futures characterised, say, by C being I (competitors focused strongly against OSF) would 
overshadow the detail in the other columns, and would tend to result in the perception of 
all such states being essentially the same. As another example, if funds are extremely 
scarce, states representing different market states will look the same to the client since no 
funds are available to act differently in one state than in another. 
At this point then, the remaining 66 states are examined in an attempt to judge, using 
empirical criteria, whether any can be combined together. 
The result of extensive examination of the states (Goldie-Morrison, 1996) is the list of 
combined states shown overleaf in Table 64. This table also contains a short note on each 
state to allow interpretation of the values of the CASEDOF attributes. 
Transitions between states 
The transition matrix 
In order eventually to generate a strategic network, the feasibility of movement between 
states is examined. This is done by pairwise examination of the states of Table 64. Each 
pair of states is examined and the feasibility of moving between them in either direction is 
examined. 
If this is done without assistance it is very tedious, since the number of transitions will be 
equal to the square of the number of states. A useful aid is to draw up a matrix of the total 
difference between states, adding up the differences between corresponding values of the 
attributes. We should then expect that states which are a long way from one another would 
be less likely to be linked by virtue of the transition between them being judged feasible 
by the client, but ultimately the criteria for the feasibility of transition lie entirely in the 
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Table 64: Resultant feasible states for OSF strategic futures analysis 
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business judgement of the informant. A table of distances between states can be found in 
Annex E of this work. 
Table 65 shows the feasible transitions between states, with combined states being shown 
by the lowest number states followed by +. 
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Table 65. - Feasibility of transitions between states in OSF strategic futures 
analysis 
What does this table represent? The possible futures are defined by combinations of choices 
from the attributes CASEDOF. Large numbers of these possible combinations were then 
rejected by considering whether pairs of sector values are compatible. Table 65 shows a1 
where a transition is adjudged feasible by the client and a0 where such a transition is 
deemed impossible. Table 65 thus represents a linked set of states which if shown graphically 
would be a map. Locations, rather than being physical towns or cities are states of the 
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future. Some of these states are desirable some are less so. Some transitions are within our 
power to control, some are under the control of another 'player'. 
Note that some transitions are feasible in one direction but not in the other. For example, 
the transit from state 37 to state 33+ is feasible but not from 33+ to 37. The underlying 
logic is easy to see, since moving from 37 to 33+ involves selling a majority of shares 
which, in real life would not be easily bought back. 
Graphical interpretation 
The structure of Table 65 is not easy for the unpractised eye to absorb, and so a number of 
equivalent representations were created which represent the states as localities on a map 
and the transitions as lines linking them. 
Here, the states have been ordered into categories of share structure, so that all states 
representing the status quo are in one group, all states representing a wholesale share sell 
are in another, etcetera. This tends to group the states into clusters which represent the 
fteedorn of action under that assumption (of share structure). This is shown in Figure 56, 
the basic topology of the analysis, which is discussed in detail below. Figure 57 gives a key 
to the states for easy reference. 
Figures 58 and 59 show, respectively, the source states (from which transition can be made), 
and the receiver states (to which transition can be made). These were particularly useful 
reductions of the detail of Table 65 for this particular informant. Further detailed reference 
can always be made to the transition matrix of Table 65. Lastly, for ease of reference, two 
further figures (figs 60 and 6 1) indicate high competition states and states where particular 
organisational configurations pertain. 
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Fig 56: Summary strategic graph for the OSF strategic futures analysis. 
(Each large (clustered) state contains a number of sub-states. Shapes of clusters are 
arbitrary, but size reflects the number of included states. ) 
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Fig 57: Sub-states within clustered states of Figure 56. 
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Figure 58: Source states identified 
Fig 59: Showing the receiver states for the OSF strategic analysis 
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Figure 60: States of high competition in OSF strategic analysis 
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Organisational 
Posture 
Figure 6 1: States differentiated by organisational posture 
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Discussion of Output 
Share structure 
Figure 56, the summary topology shows that there are no direct transitions from the status 
quo to a total share sale; in order to achieve a satisfactory valuation OSF must move through 
intermediate states. In particular, the transition ftom state 37 to state 33+ (representing a 
majority share sale while the competitor community remains essentially unalerted to any 
major redirection of OSF) is important. Some interpretation of what 'majority share sale' 
and 'exit'mean is necessary at this point. 
Majority share sale here refers to the selling of a controlling interest in the company. That 
can only be done by the present majority owner, but clearly there is an implicit assumption 
that other minority shares will follow that precedent. That is not necessarily so, however. 
Although a buyer may wish to obtain full ownership, it is not necessarily worthwhile to go 
beyond a narrow controlling interest. If the intent is totally to absorb the activity of OSF 
into another operation without having to pander to the (admittedly emasculated) interests 
of the minority share holders, then a full and complete buy may be appropriate. In many 
cases, however, buying a controlling interest achieves just that -a minimal controlling 
interest. The critical analysis here is that by transiting state 33+, where a majority share 
deal has taken place, full transfer of shares may be achieved. The analysis of figures 56 
and 57 indicates that even if majority share-holding were to alter, the minority shares 
would not be sold unless the company's valuation increased to justify such a sale. The 
rationale could be that minority share holders would prefer to see whether the valuation 
rose under the new owners before deciding to sell or not. Note that the two exit states 
accessible from state 33+ are the very different 4+ and 58+, the former where a distress 
sale is induced by poor fortunes under the new owner and the latter where there is a 
realisation of value under good future conditions. 
A very clear operational indication is given by the size of the clustered states in the four 
different share holding conditions. Note the size of the majority share deal set (reflecting 
in Figure 56 the number of states in the set) compared with either the exit or the status quo 
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condition. Since the states in the set are essentially simply connected, each being reachable 
from the others, the size of the cluster determines the number of states which can be 
accessed from any member. The size of the set then indicates the freedom of action in that 
share ownership state. That is not to say that it is necessarily OSF which has that freedom 
of action; other agents will have some degree of control over movement between at least 
some of the states. Analysis of who controls the different transitions and in what manner is 
necessary to determine the 'owner' of a transition is a process which is at the heart of the 
next ongoing stage of the analysis of which EFAR is the precursor. Here, however, the 
freedom of action refers to the complexity and the opportunities of doing business under 
that share ownership condition. 
Why should this be so? It would appear that the determining characteristic is the additional 
operational funding which would become available if shares were realised. This operational 
funding then allows competitors to be confronted in the market or organisational 
reorganisation to take place. Each in turn alters the market state, either directly (through 
increased market share in the first case) or indirectly (through increased efficiency in the 
second case). This in turn affects the ability of OSF to generate cash and so on. Of course, 
some transitions within the diagram indicate the undesirable consequences of OSF failing 
to apply funds effectively, so that a more ambitious product position might result in a 
downturn in customer perception and delivery capability rather than an improvement in 
the market state. State 19+ is an example of such a deteriorated state and indicates the need 
to maintain product effectiveness even with an influx of operating funds. 
Organisational Position 
From the connectivities expressed in the diagrams it can be seen that the initial assumption 
made that a single central London office would be an unlikely outcome was correct. The 
indications are that the high cost of such an organisational solution would be achievable 
only with what amounted to a total share sell. Moreover the effect of such a move would 
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be likely to sensitize competitors to focus on OSF. If the product quality and cost base can 
be kept at high and low levels respectively, then there is the opportunity for OSF to move 
into the highly desirable state where the competitors become willing partners, OSF having 
some technology or technical advantage which makes it a highly advantageous partner for 
the bigger companies. The big disadvantage, it is surmised, is that moving to a London 
office would involve of itself a high expenditure in capital and upkeep terms, and would, 
additionally, require a significant investment to improve the product quality and 
differentiation and company image in order to bring about such a fundamental change in 
the attitudes of present competitors. It is not impossible, however, and one can imagine 
that with a transition strategy of 37 to 33 to 58+ discussed above, such a development path 
is feasible on the ground. 
What would that entail? Firstly a majority share deal would have to be negotiated without 
initially exciting the competitors. This would release funds to allow either a central London 
consolidation or a major product investment (the analysis does not distinguish between 
the two). This in turn would then allow the necessary transformation to take place in the 
relations between the competitors and OSF. There are dangers, of course. If the majority 
share holding releases funds which are not invested wisely in product improvement/ 
differentiation, then no amount of relocation will suffice to bring about state 58+. Instead 
the company will devolve to the unsatisfactory state of4+, as its product quality and external 
relations decline. The analysis would seem to indicate that OSF has the choice between a 
number of states where a single regional office is established and a majority share deal is 
struck, releasing funds to allow exploitation of the space around states 43+, 54 etcetera 
and, on the other hand, a higher risk development where a full sale is induced together 
with a major reassessment of the ambitions of the company. 
The analysis does not at this stage take into account the ambitions and resources of any 
buyer. It could be that a sale of itself implies a distinct change in direction, although at this 
level of analysis it would not seem likely that any of the competitors themselves would be 
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interested in a buy. Far more likely would be the arrival of a buyer interested itself in 
transition to a more equal position with respect to the existing competitors. 
The status quo organisational position is clearly untenable. The present arrangement is 
unlikely to lead to a sufficiently large change in the product quality or (perhaps more 
importantly) the perception of OSF as a high quality company as to allow a sea-change in 
the competitive and financial environment to be induced. Even two sites with improved 
communications appears only in the lower end of the desirable outcomes. The analysis 
shows the preconceptions implicit in the constraint matrix of Table 63 that if money were 
available two sites would not be the answer to the problem; there is a predilection towards 
a 'clean'solution which implies essentially a single site operation. But such a reconfiguration 
implies an influx of funds. 
General 
It is quite clear that in addition to the immediate and critical share ownership/funding 
issue the most important focus must be product quality and image. While this is always an 
important factor in the future of any selling organisation, here it is an important factor in 
opening doorways to states of the future which otherwise would be closed. In particular it 
bears directly on the share value of the company and on the likelihood of good relations 
obtaining between OSF and competitors/partners. The only incremental route for the 
company is in excellence in product performance (state 29+, allowing competitors to be 
taken on in the marketplace direct) or in being fortunate to meet a competitive environment 
which is just benign enough to allow cash to be generated with only a moderate product 
performance. This latter would not seem to be a particularly likely scenario. 
The minority share deal option in this context does not seem to present any states which 
give great comfort for the futurel 
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Theposition at the end of the EFAR analysis 
The result of the EFAR analysis reported above confirmed the hidden view of the owner/ 
MD that drastic structural action was required. In a series of conversations (Goldie-Morrison, 
1996b, 1996c, 1996d) she developed the idea that the only way ahead for the company was 
to seek at the very least a substantial share sale. It was clear that she had slightly different 
objectives from the companyper se. Her own motivations were for freedom of (personal) 
managerial action; the company's objective was for medium term survival in the face of 
the increasingly severe competitive environment. In point of fact these two objectives 
were not incompatible, and the initial reaction of the owner/MD was to invoke the assistance 
of Coopers & Lybrand, the management services consultants, in order to trawl the industry 
for suitable candidates for a major buy-in. 
The company at this point was considered to be at state 37; two sites were being operated, 
the competition were unalerted to the prospect of any change of share ownership, and yet 
OSF was unable to confront the competitors effectively because of a lack of operational 
funds. 
The owner considered two development paths. The first, from state 37 to state 29+, where 
the company's performance was improved under the existing exigencies of funding so that 
OSF's performance before the competition was substantially improved, was addressed by 
an audit of the capabilities of the company. Certain minor adjustments were made, to do 
with the efficiency of the operation, but the short term conclusion was that there was no 
speedy way to improve the efficiency of the operation. 
The second approach was to start a trawl for likely buyers (Anon, 1996). Shortly after the 
analysis reported here, the company, using Coopers and Lybrand as agents, began 
discussions with a number of large competitors with a view to selling a majority of shares. 
This represents the transition from state 37 to state 33+. At this point in the development of 
the situation there was little suspicion that OSF was engaged in any conflict as such -a 
situation had been identified which required response, and that response was to be an 
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attempt to sell a majority of the shares. Soon, however, the complex negotiation began to 
become difficult and more conflictual and the analysis of that decision locale commenced 
(Goldie-Morrison, 1996e). 
The negotiation analysis 
At the date of the analysis reported here (10th March 1996e), OSF is in the middle of 
discussions regarding its ownership. There are four interested parties who remain acceptable 
Primafacie to OSF. These are 
Dorling Kindersley 
Circle Communications 
(DK) 
(CC) 
Hannsworth Media (part of Associated Newspapers) (HM) 
Just Results (JR) 
(an independent company partly owned by Bob Morton, who holds a 30% 
investment) 
The last of these represents a vehicle for conversation between OSF and Bob Morton, and 
in fact is merely a vector for a possible minority share sale to Morton. Thus the first three 
represent genuine prospective owners, and the last a means of bringing operation funds 
into OSF. 
We are at the second round of bidding. In the first round CC, DK and HM effectively bid 
similar amounts, although the DK offer was couched in less favourable terms because of 
complexity of financial instruments and limited liquidity for the principals of OSF. In the 
second round, after a 'best and final' was requested by OSF's accountants, the following 
responses were received. 
CC offered the best cash amount (E3.75m), with good liquidity and a favourable 
salary package for the OSF principals. It is felt that there is a good cultural and 
operational fit with CC, and it is at the moment, the most likely of the bidders 
to offer the most acceptable package. 
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DK offered a similar amount on paper, but with poor liquidity. Much of the offer 
consisted of loan paper, and shares, with the result that the cash offer was a 
mere E800k. Moreover the management of OSF were being offered what the 
felt was a sweetener, in order that they would be prepared to pay less than 
appropriate attention to the interests of OSF's existing minority shareholders. 
Additionally, the salary offered for the OSF managers was insufficient bordering 
on derisory. Lastly, in discussions with DK, the approach of the company to 
confidentiality in particular and to management issues in general was felt not 
to be of the highest standards. 
HM Offered substantially less (E2.6m effectively) but still offers room for 
negotiation. 
JR Offered effectively f4m, but this represents a dummy bid, in that the real offer 
is for a nearpro rata minority buy-in by Morton. 
In terms of development opportunities, the bidders are very different. After a initial meeting 
of minds, the DK organisation is seen to be 'a large cottage industry' with insufficient 
shape and focus to allow full rein to the talents of the OSF management. More worryingly, 
the place of OSF in the DK organisation would place the OSF top management in an 
inappropriately junior peer group. CC presents a different picture; OSF would represent 
one quarter of the assets of the company, and would provide significant opportunity for 
development for the OSF management and indeed for OSF itself. Moreover the attitude of 
CC to the deal itself has been of the highest levels of integrity and professionalism. HM 
present the prospect of OSF being a small twig on a large organisational tree. 
Problem statement 
The predilection of OSF is to accept (eventually) a deal with either CC or HM as an 
outright sale, retaining the present management on a salaried basis or to accept an investment 
by Morton (JR) in order to raise operational funds for development. This would represent 
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another failure to acquire by DK, which may then withdraw goodwill from OSF. This 
might be damaging because of an attractive business proposition which OSF and DK are 
preparing (known as 'the series') which could represent a line of revenue approaching 
f2m, per annum. 
The task is to indicate what developments might take place in this situation, bearing in 
mind the motivations and influence of the players, and thence to offer proposals as to how 
more desired outcomes could be promoted, while managing the consequence to OSF's 
business of a possible loss of goodwill on the part of a useful business partner. 
Participants 
0 OSF 
C Circle Communications 
H Harinsworth Media 
M Morton 
D Dorling Kindersley 
States 
The following states of play are defined 
SQ Status quo; no agreement has been reached with any party. 'The 
series' remains in place with DK. 
1 Stalemate; no agreement has been reached and discussions have ceased 
with all parties. DK goodwill remains good. 
2 Freeze-out; no agreement has been reached and discussions have ceased. 
DK has withdrawn substantial goodwfll because of OSF's lack of cooperation 
3 Agreement has been reached with DK 
4 Agreement has been reached with CC or HM. DK remains cooperative 
at the operational level. 
Page 409 
5 Agreement has been reached with CC or HM. DK is chilly; they continue 
to buy footage, but 'the series' opportunity has to be pursued with another 
party. 
6 Agreement has been reached with CC or HM. DK removes goodwill. 
7 Agreement is reached with Morton on a minority share deal. DK are 
cooperative 
8 Agreement is reached with Morton. DK are chilly. 
9 Agreement is reached with Morton. DK withdraw goodwill. 
Transition Matrix 
The following matrix (Table 66) gives the influences operating over the transitions. 
. ......... .. SO 1 23 4 ... ... 6 5 ...... 7 8 9 
O. D O. D O. D O. C O-C-D O. C. D ON O. M. D O. M. D 
............. 
D+O+C+M D D O. D O. c O. C O. C. D ON O. M. D OLUD 
2 O. C. M. D D D O. D O. C. D O. C. D O. C O. M. D O. M. D ON 
4 
...... ......... 
1 1 1 D D D I 
5 
.................. 
1 1 1 1 D D D I I I 
I I I I D D D I I I 
7 1 1 D D 
I D D 
I D D 
Table 66. Transition power matrix for OSF negotiation analysis 
(0 indicates that no party is control) ' 
Preference Ordering 
The following matrix (Table 67) gives the order of preference of the participants. 
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7 
....... 
2 7 1 6 
8 
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4 
8 
9 
81 
2 
3 
5 
7 
Table 67., Preference ordering for the participants 
Clearly OSF would prefer to retain the goodwill of an important potential partner while 
doing what is necessary strategically to restructure share ownership. Thus state 4 is the 
best preferred. Generally OSF would not let a piece of potential business stand in the way 
ofa strategic necessity, so that states 7 and 5 are well preferred also. The potential business 
at this stage is seen to be a secondary issue, but this assumption represents an important 
area for examination. 
The other two bidders would clearly be less than desirous of seeing OSF partner (by 
implication against them) with another. Lastly, although DK may withdraw its goodwill, it 
is judged to do so unwillingly. From a business point of view, having to withdraw for 
purely tactical reasons from a desired partnership on 'the series, would not be desired by 
DK. 
Motivated Power 
Table 68 gives the feasible, motivated transitions between states. 
----------- ...................... so 
. .............................................. 
12 
.................................... 
34 
.......................... i ....... ...... "**, **"*,: 
9: 
1 1 O. D O. C I I O. M I I 
D+O+C+M O+C+M+D I O. D O. C O. C I ON I I 
O. C. M. D D O+C+M+D O. D I I O. C I I O. M 
_3 
1 1 
4 D D I I 
5 
............. .. 
1 D D I I I 
D D D I I I 
D D I 
I D I 
D D D 
Table 68: The transitions which are both motivated and empowered 
Page 411 
This table is derived from Tables 66 and 67 by application of the Powergraph algorithm. 
Transition Diagram 
I 
Figure 62 shows the transition diagram equivalent to Table 68. 
D 
Figure 62. Directed graph for OSF negotiation analysis. 
Equilibrium states are shaded 
Immediate simplification can be made to figure 62 by removing state 2 and its connections, 
using the argument that since state 2 can never be entered (it has only outgoing arrows), 
neither can it subsequently be left. Unless it appears as a start state, then, it is an 
encumbrance. Similar arguments then apply to state 1. Figure 63 below shows this simplified 
diagram. This can be easily seen to reflect the expected characteristics of the business 
situation; OSF are in control of the initial acceptance of the offers, but that if either the CC 
or HM offers are taken, DK achieve control, being able unilaterally to control those things 
which are in its control, and in particular its goodwill towards OSF and its new partner. 
One state, 3, where minority share holding change takes place by agreement with Bob 
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Morton, allowing an increase in operational funds, reflects the thinking of the EFAR strategic 
graph analysis above) and has the advantage of being less likely to alienate DK. 
Deal with HM 
9 
D 
%D 
% 
"' c 
illy DK 
% Supportive 0 SQ 
% Deal with CC DK D 
% supportive 
O. c %4% 
%D 
D 
6 
........... **-. ý .1... D 
DK If 
I 
chill yD 
T 
Deal with DK 
ýD 
Figure 63: Simplified transition diagram for OSF negotiation analysis 
Figure 64 below shows the critical transitions on which the action planning questions will 
be based. The figure takes into account that states 6 and 9 have no entry routes to them. 
DK D 
supportive _0 
o. c 4 
KeyTransitions D 
Deal with CC 
Deal with HM 
DK 
D chilly D 
D 
DK D7 
chi DK 
supportive 0- SQ 
Deal with DK 
Figure 64: The critical transitions in the OSF negotiation analysis 
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Action planning and sensitivity analysis 
The figures and structural analysis above give directions as to where thought should be 
applied to control the outcome in so far as OSF has influence. 
Desirability of outcome 
First, OSF needs to answer the question of which of the equilibrium states it would prefer, 
namely 8,5 or 3. This is analogous to the minimax solution used in game theory; one is 
asking what can be done for the best if the environment or opposition acts in our worst 
interest. Here our choices are to move to 7,4 or 3, after which DK will (under the 
assumptions of preference ordering, move us to one of states 8,5 or(trivially)3 respectively. 
State 3 represents a minority deal with Bob Morton. DK is viewed here to have no further 
influence over the state of affairs, the argument being that this should not be viewed as an 
opposing move to DK, but rather as a withdrawal from a strategic position. The argument 
could be presented that the decision to take a minority share deal was arrived at as a result 
of conversations with prospective partners. DK would look rather foolish in their own 
marketplace if they withdrew goodwill as a direct result and in a fit ofjilted pique. However, 
since share dealings in OSF are completely private in nature, there is no reason why DK 
should find out that such a deal had taken place for some time. One might even argue that 
the existing management of OSF might have a duty of care to keep such privileged dealings 
private, a duty which would transcend the generally accepted virtues of open and honest 
dealing. 
States Sand 8 represent the situation where a deal has been done with one ofthepartners 
(choosing between them purely on the basis of their utility to the interested OSF parties) 
and then accepting that DK might be prone to withdraw their goodwill on 'the series'. The 
effect of this on the deal should be relatively easy to determine. A key piece of information 
is whether the prediction of business in conjunction with DK is part of the valuation (formal 
or informal) being made by the bidders. This is of course not the only consideration, since 
it is possible that the relationship with DK is an important part of the business context for 
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the -new operation. Possibly advice may have to be taken from the bidders, but a company 
which acts in an ostensibly irrational manner over the loss of a buying opportunity to a 
near-competitor will lose credibility in the wider market place. 
In the end the decision comes down to a straightforward revenue prediction in the three 
cases, taking the pessimistic view that while DK would continue with its other activities, 
'the series' would have to be done with another partner. 
Adjusting DK's power and motivation 
The more pro-active approach is to enquire what power and motivation DK is using to 
move the situation to states 8 and 5 from states 7 and 4 respectively. The following will be 
detailed for the possible sale to CC. The HM version follows mutatis mutandis. 
Sustainment power at state 7 
Having accepted CC's offer, we are put under the influence of DK in respect of their 
business relationship with us. Sustainment power refers to the ability of a participant to 
sustain the situation at a state in the face of the power available to others in moving it away. 
Here we ask the question, 'What can we do to take control away from DK so that we can 
keep their businessT 
One must enquire whether OSF has rather more power than is being assumed in respect of 
'the series'. It many be that we have power in sustainment because of the uniqueness of 
our service. If that were not the case, can the concept be amended so as to make the series 
uniquely tractable by OSF. Similarly, one might look at weakening the importance of DK 
to the concept; if DK were to feel that they were only one of a number of attractive partners, 
their sustainment power would be weakened. Lastly, one could postulate the signing of a 
contract which bound DK and OSF (and its successors) together, perhaps using the argument 
that the series deal should not become subject to 'planning blight' if the strategic situation 
of OSF continues overlong. An amendment to this approach would be the delay of the 
share sale to the point where the series is prejudiced, thus invoking the need for tangible 
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progress to occur with DK, resulting in at least a partialfait accompli. 
Power to induce transition to state 8 
DK's influence over this transition lies in the assumption that it is DK which brings the 
spark of feasibilityto theproject; theirpower lies in the freedom of action which they have 
to withdraw if they think it appropriate. Insufficient information is available regarding 'the 
series' opportunity to be authoritative, but the initial line of investigation should cover at 
least the following issues: - 
If DK were to carry out the series work with another party would the return be as 
good, either in terms of financial return or in terms of risk? 
Is it in fact OSF who call the shots on the opportunity? It could well be thatjudicious 
strengthening of the negotiating stance on 'the series' would imbue DK with an 
understanding that OSF have an influence over whether the work will be successful or not. 
Motivation to transit to state 8 
Attacking DK's motivation to withdraw their support on the series work is also a possibility. 
For example, it could well be that other work may be identifiable which would be attractive 
to 
-DK, 
but which they would know would not be forthcoming if they were to lose their 
heads over the prospective sale. This investigation needs to be extended to the activities of 
the two prospective buyers, since it may well be the case that DK have opportunities or 
indeed existing business with either or both which could serve as a restraint on their reaction 
to the proposed sale. 
Summary 
1. Ajudgement must be made as to the relative desirability to OSF of having a minority 
share deal completed with Morton probably with a sustainable relationship with DK and, 
on the other hand, a total sale to either CC or HM with a withdrawal of DK's proposed 
business relationship with OSF on 'the series'. 
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2. ks indicated above, the business relationships between OSF and DK and between 
the two bidders and DK must be examined carefully for existing and possible linkages 
which lead to either a reduction in DK's power to remove their series business opportunity 
or to reduce their motivation so to do. 
3. An examination of 'the series'business opportunity to identify what OSF bring, and 
the extent to which that is irreplaceable must be carried out. 
4. Ultimately, the best decision may prove to be that OSF makes a minimax judgement, 
based on choosing the best option under assumptions that DK, for whatever motivation, 
have done the worst for OSF. This will emerge ftom action I above 
Resolution of OSF`s situation 
The result of the complex negotiation described above was quick to appear (Goldie - 
Morrison, 1996f). The decision was made after a further discussion with Circle 
Communications that a deal could be achieved, but the details of the transition from 4 to 5 
formed a part of the discussion, since a component of the valuation of OSF from CC's 
point of view was the deal on 'the series'. The action chosen was to approach DK directly, 
and put it to Peter Kindersley, the chairman, that the goodness of 'the series'was independent 
of the ownership of OSF. If the deal was a good one before OSF became available for sale, 
then it was a good one with another potential ownership. Fortunately DK were neither too 
upset about losing the purchase opportunity for OSF nor particularly dismayed about the 
role of CC, since they did not view the latter as significant competitors. In view of their 
imminent cash flow problems (a factor not fully appreciated at the time), DK decided that 
they would allow the deal with CC to go ahead without any interference. 
As a result an agreement was struck with the majority shareholders of OSF to sell a 
controlling interest to CC, shortly followed by an agreement to sell the small remaining 
minority of privately held shares. 
OSF now forms a successful part of Circle Communications, with the previous owner/MD 
and the senior staff holding down key roles in a largely autonomous division of the company. 
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Interpretation from a foveal game perspective 
With the framework of Chapter 5 in mind, the analysis supporting the strategic decision 
making of OSF in the above case can be described as: - 
1) the generation of a strategic graph using EFAR which provides the overall 
framework in which the future options for the company are contained. In this 
case the understanding was reached that it was not the organisational issues which 
dominated the future for the company, but rather the need for the release of 
operational funds. The owner immediately focused on the important transitions 
from state 37 to state 33+, but this should not be interpreted as ignoring the 
remaining states of the strategic graph. While the action planning was centred on 
the achievement of a transition from the status quo to a majority share sale, 
consideration was given to the operational efficiencies needed to sustain operations 
under the existing paucity of funds. This turned out not to be feasible, for reasons 
which were clearly expressed in the problem statement. 
original action plan is to Implement 
transition 27 to 33+ b yw n egodating with 
DK for majonfly share deal 
33+ 
.m 
Figure 65. The original action plan entailed implementing transition 37+ to 33 by 
entering negotiation with DK for a majority sale. 
2) the analysis of a particular state of the strategic graph, a decision locale, which 
formed the space within which a complicated and distributed negotiation took 
Page 418 
place. This analysis was carried out firstly by informal means, when the owner/ 
MD made an intuitive assessment of the options open to her in achieving a majority 
share sale. This informal analysis amounted to a series of discussions with Coopers 
& Lybrand to investigate the likely attractiveness and valuation of OSF and the 
likely extent of the interest. The owner/MD had an inherent preference for a sale 
to Dorling Kindersley because of personal contacts and there seemed no point to 
her at the time in analysing in any detail the negotiation which would ensue. 
There would be an agreed valuation of the company and a majority share sale 
would be made. The other minority shareholders would then, in all probability, 
want to join the deal, and the future would be once more clear and well-funded. 
As can be seen from the second part of the case study, however, the decision 
locale proved to be more complicated than she predicted. Because Dorling 
Kindersley were unable to convince the owner/MD of the desirability of accepting 
a bid from DK not just in terms of the value of the bid offered, but because of 
reservations as to the goodwill inherent in certain undertakings regarding the role 
of OSF within the DK empire, the transition from state 37 to state 33+ was aborted. 
3) New information had, thereby, come to hand, however, which led to a 
reappraisal of the strategic graph. In discussing with both Coopers and Lybrand 
and the DK representatives it became clear that the valuation being placed upon 
OSF by the market was different from that assumed in the original strategic graph. 
In effect it was seen that a transition, previously undetected, was feasible between 
states 37 and 58+. 
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Figure 66: New information gained in negotiation showed a newpath direct to 
the exit cluster 
The essential new perception was that the valuation of OSF from its point of view 
was very different than that valuation from the point of view of the potential 
buyer(s). From OSF's point of view operational funds were essential to raise the 
valuation of the company by realising the business potential, but from the point 
of view of the potential buyer the value of OSF lay in its technical superiority, the 
infrastructure to exploit which had already been laid down by the potential buyers. 
This differential assessment was detected by Coopers and Lybrand staff in the 
positions of a number of alternative potential buyers. 
As a result of this new information the strategic graph shown above in Figure 66 
resulted. We see here the effect of what is called in Chapter 5a transition effect, 
whereby information gained in examining one decision locale can change the 
structure of the strategic graph. Specifically here we see the effect of the feedback 
loops of Figure 23 (Chapter 5), showing the effect of sensemaking and action 
planning comb ining together to improve the perception of the situation. 
4) Within the new strategic graph, an attempt was made to execute the newly 
Page 420 
perceived transition 37 to 58+. It was the attempt to carry out the negotiation to 
ensure this path which resulted in the complication of the interference of the 
Dorling Kindersley existing business ('the series') with the valuation of the other 
three parties. By this time the owner/MD had effectively rejected DK's offer, but 
had not declared that decision to DK until the new decision locale analysis had 
been carried out. The declaration to DK of their unacceptability was part of the 
action plan which resulted, and which can be seen in the final part of the analysis 
of the OSF case study. 
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Chapter 11: Overall Justification and critique 
Introduction 
Previous chapters have described an overall framework for the consideration of strategic 
conflict and have shown how a particular embodiment of that approach is applicable through 
a number of practical studies. Tle main purpose of this chapter is to examine thejustifiability 
of this particular embodiment by comparing the performance of the theory and practice 
with the criteria forjustification and performance established in the early chapters of this 
work. 
This justification is essentially divided into two parts. Firstly, it is appropriate to examine 
the extent to which the embodiment offered here complies with the criteria established at 
the end of chapter 2 resulting from the discussion in that chapter of the epistemic and 
ontological foundations of strategic decision making and the requirements which emerge 
therefrom. The two types of justification might appear separate, the former seeking 
arguments forjustified belief in the method as a source of knowledge of a situation in hand 
and the latter seeking arguments for the efficiency or effectiveness of the solution in the 
light of what we know about strategic decision making, but this dichotomy is illusory, 
primarily because the criteria forjustifiability under a constructivist paradigm are essentially 
those of practicality. Secondly it will be necessary to judge the embodiment against the 
criteria forjustifiability established in Chapter 4, where the particular requirements for the 
justification of a method based on a constructivist paradigm are established. These are 
essentially criteria of effectiveness and are addressed through the examination of the 
collection of case studies already presented. The individual elements of the embodiment, 
namely EFAR and Powergraph, are separately considered along with the process as a 
whole. 
Lastly, the potential development of the work is addressed in ordered to give indications of 
futare work. 
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Justification and critique 
Compliance with the requirements of the process 
As has been noted, two sets of criteria forjustification have been established, in Chapters 
2 and 4. The former, deriving from considerations of what is necessary to support strategic 
decision making are summarised in Table 4. They are divided into three sections, namely 
internalprocess, epistentic assumptions and contextual issues. 
internalprocess 
The methodshould be based on thepower, motivation andpotential of 
participants 
It will be clear from the description of Chapter 5 and the case studies 
described in subsequent chapters, that the core of the EFAR/Powergraph 
embodiment of the foveal approach is the representation of the powers and 
motivations of the participants. Here the method departs substantially from 
the previous approaches of Howard (197 1) and of Fraser and Hipel (1989) 
in that whereas these authorities limited themselves to structures containing 
transitions controlled by only a single party, the present approach admits 
transitions controlled by groups and combination of participants. 
The action planning part of the Powergraph element of the embodiment is 
essentially one of examination of the ways in which the various powers and 
motivations of the participants can be manipulated or strengthened by the 
application of resources at our disposal. In the case of the BAe Project 
Stafflng, for example, in Chapter 9, it can be seen that the main part of the 
action planning process is the establishment of which participants control 
the important transitions and of establishing what could be done by the 
client company to strengthen the resolve of those participants in those 
transitions which it the client company viewed as desirable and to weaken 
the power and the resolve of participants controlling in part or completely 
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the transitions which the client company did not desire. 
In the EFAR strategic graph representation of the context in which the 
Powergraph analysis is carried out, this concentration on the powers and' 
motivations of the participants is less obvious, but is nevertheless at the 
heart of the process. In the EFAR action planning process statements are 
made which describe what has to be done in order to invoke desirable 
transitions and attenuate undesirable ones in the same way as in the more 
localised Powergraph representation, but the nature of the action planning 
product is different in the two cases. At the strategic graph level of the 
EFAR analysis the action planning product is much wider in effect, in part 
because of the general nature of the (low resolution) environmental 
description produced and in part because the mandate and resources for 
strategic intervention are inevitably greater than that at the operation level. 
Nevertheless the action planning results which emerge from both levels of 
analysis comprehend the powers and motivation of participants. This can 
be seen clearly in the OSF case, where the action planning resulting from 
the first level of analysis (the EFAR analysis) resulted in a set of interventions 
of a highly personalised nature between the owner/MD and the prospective 
majority share buyer, Dorling Kindersley. These interventions were then 
modelled in a more resolved fashion by consideration of the decision locale 
representing the negotiations 
Lastly, while the top-down value based state generation method described 
in Chapter 8 is by no means essential to the foveal approach, when it is 
used, by its very nature, it produces a set of states which comprehends the 
motivations of the participants directly because their value systems form 
the basis for the very definition of the states. 
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It should not he hound hy conventional game-theoretic views of 
equilihrium 
The concept of equilibrium used in the Powergraph method is very similar 
to that of the Nash equilibrium of conventional game theory in that a state 
is deemed to be a candidate for rational equilibrium if there is no 
improvement path away from it which is both under the control of the relevant 
parties and appropriately motivated. Whereas in the conventional Nash 
equilibrium each individual player's motivation (expressed as utility) is 
considered independently (Rasmusen, 1989 pp 15,23,31-32; Fudenberg 
and Tirole, 1993; Heap and Varoufakis, 1995 pp 51-62), in the Powergraph 
representation the combinations of players acting together in control of the 
transitions determine the feasible improvement paths. 
At a more fundamental level, it should be observed that the expressed intent 
of the conventional game theory approaches and that of Powergraph are not 
identical. As has been shown in Chapter 3, the Nash equilibrium concept is 
frequently criticised in game theory writing because it produces a plethora 
of 'solutions' (Heap and Varoufakis, op. cit. pp 51-55). The criticism would 
appear to be that the aim of the game theory analysis is to indicate what will 
happen in a given situation of conflict, whereas the aim of the foveal approach 
here is to provide an indication of what could happen in order that measures 
can be taken at a practical level to foster outcomes which are more desirable. 
The essential limitations induced in the strategic domain of differing belief 
spaces of the participants and by the lack of exact knowledge of the relative 
utility orderings of the participants of various outcomes renders impotent 
any attempt to obtain a single solution (even if it were to be accepted that 
such singularity existed). 
It is not essential in the Powergraph analysis that any state should appear as 
an equilibrium state in the strict sense. It would be wholly appropriate to 
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represent, for example, a cycling, unresolved negotiation as a directed graph 
structure without an equilibrium. Such a directed graph would be equally 
fertile a representation for the discovery of appropriate action planning as 
one which possessed a single, apparently stable equilibrium state. 
It should echibit a depth-changing ability 
The foveal approach exhibits this property in two separate ways. First, the 
relationship between the strategic graph and the more detailed local analysis 
clearly shows the resolving characteristics of the process. In the OSF overall 
case, for example, the strategic analysis of the company's competitive and 
organisational context of Figures 56 to 61 led the owner/MD to an improved 
understanding of the situation in which she and her company found 
themselves. From this wide ranging scan of the future environment, three 
states and their transitions emerged as being particularly relevant, namely 
the status quo and two negotiating states for majority share sale and total 
share sale respectively. In turn these three states became the subject for 
more detailed examination, both by informal means and by the use of 
Powergraph. Subsequently, the closure of the loop of Figure 20 shows itself 
in the reappraisal of the valuation of OSF on the basis of evidence gained in 
the negotiations (the decision locale under examination). We thus see a 
focusing effect inherent in the foveal approach embodied in the pairing of 
EFAR and Powergraph as, respectively, a low resolution wide-view method 
and a resolved specific conflict management tool respectively. We can also 
see this depth changing effect in the strategic graph of Figure 25, that of 
BAe MIternate NavalStrateV. Here the depth changing is from the strategic 
view inherent in the directed graph to the specifics of the project based 
action planning needed to sustain the developments identified, here in 
particular the search for an alternative target company to but and the internal 
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response took an investment in risk management competence and 
infrastructure. 
Second, 'the Powergraph method itself is strongly depth-changing in its 
characteristics. In the case of The Spanish Mayor, for example, the initial 
phase of analysis was fairly general in its extent. This in turn led to a more 
detailed analysis of the information surrounding the location and knowledge 
of the tapes. This, too, is a type of depth changing, in that this important 
information issue appeared as only a subsidiary issue in the first stage of 
analysis (Figure 54) but became the central part of the second analysis 
(Figure 55). 
Figure 67 below, which is also applicable to later sections illustrates the 
connection between the elements of the embodied foveal approach and shows 
how the feedback process of successive phases of analysis lead to appropriate 
focusing of the action planning and sense making, achieving the double 
loop feedback inherent in Figure 23 of Chapter 5. 
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Figure 67. The feedback mechanisms in the embodiment of the foveal approach 
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Ae method should be data improving 
The implication of this requirement is that there exists structure within the 
problem knowledge that, if disciplined, will produce new understanding 
which, in turn presents a more enlightened view of the data. Alternatively 
the new understanding allows the relevance of data to be newly addressed. 
The ordering and structuring of the data informs the problem. We can see 
this process in each and every case study presented. For example, in 77ze 
Spanish Mayor case we see the structure of the directed graph giving 
relevance to the information already held by the parties, but which is not 
yet seen as being material to the resolution of the threat. When the importance 
of the knowledge as to who has the infon-nation on the location and contents 
of the tapes is appreciated, existing knowledge is mobilised. In the Postage 
Stamp Crisis case the structure of the network allows incompatibilities 
between the objectives of the participants to be perceived, so that the 
international community's actions become more easily seen. 
It should be simple. auditable and trans arent p 
It is submitted that the process described in all its parts is simple and 
auditable. The practical evidence of the BAe Project Staffing case, Ae 
Spanish Mayor and the OSFStrategic Futures case is that senior executives 
of large companies are able not only to follow the procedure during their 
participation in the analysis, but also to weigh retrospectively the results 
for reasonableness. The evidence in practice is that because both EFAR and 
Powergraph are essentially procedural, albeit with strong elements of 
subjective data, progress toward an understanding of the conflict is easily 
achieved. 
There are gaps in its auditability, however, arising from the subjective nature 
of the information utilised in the process. The clustering process within 
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EFAR, for example, and the generation of states of play in Powergraph are 
essentially subjective in nature, and require recording other than through 
the procedure itself. This is a potential source of lack of traceability 
retrospectively. 
ePislemic assumptions 
It should be acceptant of diffefing belief spaces 
The foveal approach is inherently limited in the extent to which it can cope 
with differing belief spaces. While differences in perspective of the 
participants are encompassed through the mechanism of different rank 
ordering of preferences, for example, and while it is in theory possible to 
have different graphs for different players, the essentially singular viewpoint 
of the client company has dominance. If for example, we were sure that a 
competitor did not see a particular future because, say, we had proprietary 
information on an invention of which he had no concept, then we might be 
justified in believing that he would not encompass that set of future states, 
and would, therefore not be empowered to bring them about. We cannot be 
sure, however, since the very existence of that future or set of futures in our 
own minds may be mirrored by the thinking of the other party. Similarly, 
we cannot allow ourselves the paranoia of imagining that the other party 
can think of states and sets of states of which we can have no conception. 
That is almost certainly the case, but if we can have no conception of the 
nature of that set of future states then it is redundant to attempt any definition 
of them. 
There is substantial material within the foveal approach to encompass the 
different belief spaces of the parties in the wide sense, but in the narrower 
terms of each party having potentially a different view of the playing space, 
the approach limits itself. This limit is set not by the method itself but by 
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the limitations of what is to be known in the problem situationper se. 
It should be acceptant of limited, defective and deceitful data. 
The method will operate not only with limited data, but also tends to target 
attention toward the areas where data is lacking. The Spanish Mayor case 
is relevant in this respect, since, between the first analysis phase (where the 
knowledge as to who knew the contents of the tapes was unavailable) and 
the second phase, the analysis targeted information gathering to fill the 
gaps in the knowledge of the consultant, the Mayor and his staff. As far as 
deceitful data is concerned, like any other procedure its usefulness will be 
limited by erroneous data, but the procedure does have the advantage of 
being able to target disjunctions between the actions of participants and 
what should occuras a result of the assumptions made about their preferences 
and powers. For example, in the OSF Strategic Futures case the existence 
of the development path directly from the status quo state to a full share 
sale was inferred from the actions (the offers) of the potential buyers. 
A particular feature of the state based approach developed here is that it 
presents action plans from where the conflict has actually arrived (as distinct 
from where one would wish it to start). If, for example, in The Battlefor 
Trafalgar case of Chapter 7, the analysis had been canied out real time as 
opposed to aposteriori and the motivations of the competitor/partners had 
been misunderstood, with the result that the situation gravitated to a state 
like freeze out, even though this state would not have been predicted by the 
model (since some element, say the preference ordering) was defective, the 
model would still produce development options from that unexpected state. 
The approach is thus robust to unexpected turns and twists in the development 
of the real situation and arbitrary and irrational actions on the parts of the 
actors. 
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It should cope with hoth hard and soft data sources 
The input data to the model consists of a mixture of subjective and 
(apparently) objective data, and the balance between these types of sources 
will vary according to the situation. In 7he Battlefor Trafalgar, for example, 
the motivations of the parties is in part derived from personal contact between 
the executives of the companies, and partly from numerical financial analysis 
of the values of the various options to the other two companies, GEC and 
VSEL. Thus both hard and soft data are combined in the same model. 
Similarly in the negotiation modelling for OSF (Chapter 10) the 
receptiveness of the companies in question, Dorling Kindersley, Bob Morton, 
Circle and Harmworth, are partly derived from the analysis by Coopers and 
Lybrand of the value of the deals to the parties, based on the actual balance 
sheets and the offers already received, and in part on the subjective 
information deriving from contact between the owner/MD and the bidders 
and between OSF's agents and the bidders. Tle model encompasses both 
types of data without discontinuity. 
contextual issues 
It should be adaptive to changing circumstances (ateleological). 
The representation of the preference ordering in the method makes no 
assumption as to the end objective of the players. There is, it should be 
noted, a significant difference between having a particular state as the highest 
in preference and having that state as the objective of the conflict 
management. While that state may be most preferred, it may well not be 
within the compass of the player to achieve it. The nature of the 
representation of the conflict as a network of states among which the players 
move, allows states other than the nominal start state to be used as the 
instantaneous starting point for further analysis. In other words the procedure 
does not require analysis to start at any one point in the network arbitrarily 
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called the start point. As such conditional and contingent planning can be 
carried out. 
This ability to cope with changed circumstances can be see in a number of 
the case studies presented above. In the Battlefor Trafalgar, for example, 
while the most desired state may have been (for BAe) the state split, where 
the two projects in question were carried out with different partners, the 
structure of the conflict can be seen to militate against split as a solution, 
with the result that either of the other two equilibrium states (which were 
more preferred than the eventual actual result, could have been reached. 
When the actual preferences of the other partners were observed the model 
was easily changed to accommodate that new information. 
It should be anthropic 
It will be observed that while the whole foveal approach is procedural in 
design, the elements of which the resultant models are concerned, either in 
the EFAR representation or in the Powergraph models, are comprehending 
of the human nature of the interactions represented. In particular the EFAR 
networks are soluble only by taking into account the power structures of 
the participants and their motivations both individually and within the context 
of their organisations. Similarly the process of seeking the equilibrium 
solutions of the specific conflict management technique, Powergraph, 
involves the examination of the powers and motivations of the participants, 
a process which militates for an approach which recognises the free will 
and motivation of those players. 
It should be system-centred, vis-h-vis set(-centred. 
The constraints of the subjective world problem, described in Chapter 4 
(Figure 13) and Chapter 5 (Figure 22) limit the extent to which any 
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representation of a multi-participant system from a constructivist 
viewpoint. Our view of the system in focus is necessarily limited by the 
extent to which we can conceive of other players' knowledge. Within that 
limitation, however, we can see clearly in all the case studies presented 
that the effect of the deliberate deconstruction of the problem by the foveal 
approach into a series of connected, local examinations of transitions within 
a network, is to focus the attention on the factors which define the situation 
from the client company's point of view within a structural framework, 
but also to force examination of the other players' strengths and desires 
within the framework of our own objectives. The effect of this dual view 
is to force a viewpoint which is no longer one of the client company alone 
(i. e. self-centred) but encompasses the viewpoints of the other participants 
(i. e. system-centred). The value of the foveal game approach is that struggle 
is viewed and managed from within a context of the structural constraints 
on behaviour. This is inherently and essentially a system-based view. 
It should he aware ofthe social context in which it operates. 
Many of the observations of the previous section apply to this requirement 
of a conflict management approach. While the original conception of this 
requirement emerges from a socially sensitive ambition on the part of 
systems workers (a motivation which may well not be shared by the client 
company's representatives), it can be interpreted here in terms of the power 
structure within which the models are assessed. For example in The Battle 
for Trafalgar case the assessment of the willingness of VSEL to break a 
potential agreement is in part based on an understanding of the allegiance 
felt by their management to the workers, many of whom are their 
neighbours and one time school friends within the Barrow-in-Furness 
region To the extent that such information on the social context is available, 
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it can be incorporated into the thinking of both the EFAR technique and of 
Powergraph. 
It should he complementary with and contrihute to systems methods. 
Because of the focusing effect of the foveal approach a number of techniques 
can be used to provide structural knowledge about the conflict. It is, for 
example, not necessary to apply Powergraph to the resolution of issues at a 
particular decision local of the strategic game. Although this work 
concentrates on the particular embodiment, a contribution could be made 
as appropriate by any one of a number of techniques, particular the soft 
system methodologies and associated techniques addressed in Chapter 3. 
Compliance with criteriaforjustifliability 
critefia 
The criteria forjustifi cation of the techniques and frameworks involved here are reviewed 
and established in Chapter 4. 
internal 
stahility 
As discussed in Chapter 4, we should expect that with a well-defined set of 
entry conditions, the procedures applied should produce stable, repeatable 
results, this being distinguished from any external requirement of stability 
or replicability, a requirem ent which, as has been discussed, is not within 
the reach of a method aimed at the representation of strategic conflict. 
The embodiment of the foveal approach described here consists of a number 
of elements each of which contains both procedural, algorithmic components 
and subjective, non-procedural components. For example, the multi-futures 
tool, EFAR, which is aimed at producing a strategic directed graph for later, 
more resolved examination, consists of a strict procedure for generating a 
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rich space of possible futures on the basis of choices made among a table of 
possible values for a set of sectors or characterising variables, These choices 
each in turn, then describe a member of the set of possible fiitures. The next 
step in the procedure is to identify and record incompatibilities in the choices 
of values for the sectors and to eliminate those choices which are mutually 
incompatible, thus reducing the size of the set of all possible futures. The 
last step of the procedural part of EFAR is to cluster together sets of possible 
futures which are viewed as being sufficiently near in their definitions as to 
be indistinguishable one from another. Figure 24 summarises the procedure. 
Examination of these three steps reveals that for a specific set of well-defined 
sectors (characterising variables) and values of those sectors, together with 
a specific set of entries to the compatibility table (e. g. of Table 12), a single, 
well-defined set of possible futures will result. The process is simply a 
naming procedure and a selection from all possibilities of choices from the 
field values on the basis of declared and unique one-to-one relationships in 
tables such as Table 12. Similarly, the subsequent clustering process, while 
subjectively based is well-defined. There is no confusion as to the clusters 
which result. Clearly, to the extent that the subjective information applied 
at this stage is confused or uncertain, alternative clusters will present 
themselves, but for any particular input of information (i. e. the pragmatically- 
expressed criteria for grouping of the states) the EFAR directed graph or 
strategic graph will be unique. To the extent that the information inherent in 
that naming, filtering and clustering procedure changes, then the output 
will also change. Similar arguments apply to the information applied to the 
transition matrices which are exemplified by Tables 12 and 13. A specific 
application of information will result in a specific transition table, not least 
because the information input to the procedure is defined by the tables 
themselves. Thus the process up until this point, the generation of a directed 
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graph among defined groups of future states, is procedural and stable in the 
limited sense addressed here. 
This strategic graph is now applied in one of two possible ways, namely as 
a direct input into the action planning process or as a set of boundary 
conditions for more localised, specific conflict modelling using, in this 
embodiment, Powergraph. Here there is an apparent lack of stability in the 
EFAR element of the procedure, since the argument could be offered that 
the action planning resulting from the directed graph could be different at 
different times and with different understandings on the part of the user. 
Such an argument fails for the following reasons. Firstly, no claim is made 
in this work that the action planning itself is part of the foveal procedure 
(since it mobilises a very wide range of frameworks and procedures not 
covered here and generally available to any competent strategic manager), 
and secondly, the inconsistencies from application to application result from 
the different information comprehended by the different users at different 
times. Thus the EFAR element of the procedure can be considered to be 
stable. 
The Powergraph procedure, too, is subject to similar arguments. It consists 
of a procedural element, namely the naming of states, the expression of 
transition expressions which describe the ability of participants to invoke 
moves between these states and some equilibrium process which allow the 
identification of likely resting points of the system. 
The first part of the procedure, namely the definition of the states, the 
declaration of the relative utilities and the description of the boolean 
expressions is stable in the sense meant here since they are merely declarative 
of the understanding held of the conflict. Similarly the application of the 
relative utilities to the boolean expressions is a straightforward evaluation 
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of the boolean expression, a procedure mathematical in nature and clearly 
stable, it being a mere evaluation according to simple rules. This leads us to 
the conclusion that the Powergraph directed graph is stable in the sense 
understood here. It is connected uniquely with a specific set of input data. 
We are left, then, with the issue of whether the equilibriums identified are 
stable. Examination of the algorithm described in Chapter 7 (Figure 36) 
will show that the procedure for equilibrium identification has clearly defined 
steps and inputs, and is therefore stable in the sense required here. its 
correctness, it will be noted, is a different matter and is addressed separately. 
To the extent, then, that the output of the foveal approach consists of the 
application of the procedure to produce various representations of the conflict 
it can be seen to provide a single result from a specific input. It is therefore 
stable overall in this sense. What is not claimed is that the use of the foveal 
approach to generate action planning product is stable. The procedure may 
well be stable in this respect, but it is impossible to detect in any application 
what the inputs are (since they are so extensively subjective and undeclared). 
This is a fundamental limitation of proof of any procedure subject to and 
concerning itself with human activity systems (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). 
consistency 
Related to the stability requirement is the need for the procedures to be 
internally consistent. A failure of consistency should be expected to show 
itself in the application of the approach through the appearance of 
descriptions of the situation or understandings which are mutually 
inconsistent one with the other. For example, application of the procedure 
would throw up states which were at the same time discovered as 
equilibriums and not as equilibriums by the application of the procedure. 
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We might expect to see states of affairs which had duplicate definitions; we 
might expect to see competing expressions which describe the powers of 
participants in the directed graphs; we might expect to see more than one 
competing solution to the motivated power matrix when the relative 
preference ordering is applied to the power matrix. None of these effects 
have been observed throughout the application of the method to the cases 
described above. 
The level of proof exhibited here is analogous to that in the generally accepted 
scientific method, namely that if there were internal inconsistencies in the 
approach, we should expect them to evince themselves in the outputs. The 
hypothesis that the procedure is self-consistent is thus falsifiable. To the 
extent, then that no such evidence exists, then we can accept the hypothesis 
until counter-evidence is available. On this basis the evidence of the case 
studies shows consistency. 
traceable 
We should expect the procedure to be traceable or auditable. This implies 
that it is possible to express sufficient detail in the procedure"to allow an 
appropriately qualified or experienced person to audit the procedure for the 
correctness of the steps of calculation or syllogism. 
The traceability of the method can bejudged from the case study material 
offered in this work. The procedural aspects of the approach can be seen 
clearly to be traceable, both in EFAR and in Powergraph. Naturally, when 
subjective, experiential information is included in the procedure (for 
example, when in EFAR the compatibility matrix is filled on the basis of 
exogenous understanding of the business dynamics), the traceability of the 
process will be limited by the assiduity with which this new information 
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input is recorded. Once the information enters the foveal process, however, 
it is traceable and auditable, as can be seen from the examples given. 
Moreover, the algorithms declared above which define the procedure offer 
the basis for tracing of the decision making process at will. 
inclusion 
We should also expect it to provide answers which mirror those of other 
techniques in so far as those techniques an be audited for correctness. The 
game theory examples of chapter 7, of Battle ofthe Buddies, Chicken and 
Pfisoners'Dilemma indicate clearly that the results of these exhaustively 
treated archetypes are included in the solutions of the same situations by 
the foveal approach. In each case shown the main results are reproduced by 
the alternative foveal approach, and in all cases new insight into the 
mechanisms of resolution of the conflict appear. 
external 
transferability to users 
It is reasonable to expect that a technique for practical application should 
be usable by practitioners other than the inventor. The involvement of the 
two sets of informants in the BAe project Staffing Case and in the OSF 
overall case in the process shows some evidence of transferability. In both 
these cases the informants engaged themselves fully in the process, showing 
facility in using the method. It is recognised that this is not the same as an 
independent verification of the usability of the method. 
Of more direct effect is the work (Price, 1997) of a successful attempt made 
by a senior practitioner in Arthur D Little Ltd. to apply the method to a 
competitive analysis case. 
The EFAR method is clearly transferable, having been used (Munro, 1996) 
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in the analysis of an IS strategy problem and subsequently (Munro and 
Powell, 1997). 
. chronological stahility 
We should expect that when applied to a historical example the technique 
will reflect the progress of the conflict under investigation within the 
contemporary limits of knowledge of the participants. Evidence for the 
chronological stability of the method can be drawn from Mardonius and 
the Greeks and The Battlefor Trafalgar (Chapter 7), from Yhe Postage 
Stamp Crisis (Chapter 8) from the BAe Project Staffing Case and Ae Spanish 
Mayor (Chapter 9) and from the OSF Strategic Futures overall case. In all 
these cases there is clear evidence that the model produced by the approach 
is consistent with the facts as they subsequently appeared. For example in 
7he Battlefor Trafalgar, the decision by BAe to offer the two cooperating 
companies conflicting project involvements resulted in BAe gravitating into 
a well-defined state of the model, whereby BAe is only able to prosecute 
one of the projects, the ftigate. The sequence of events which led to that 
situation is clearly represented in the model trajectories. Similarly in Yhe 
Postage Stamp Crisis the trajectories predicted by the model for Nicaragua 
and Honduras are reflected in the historical resolution, even to the extent 
that the subsequent flare-up of the border dispute is predicted from the 
1937 analysis. In the BAe Project Staffing Casethe effects of the inaction of 
BAe are clearly predicted by the model and are reflected in the eventual 
result of the negotiation. Lastly, OSF's negotiation model of Chapter 10 
shows retrospectively the conflict between Dorling Kindersley's desire to 
obtain control of OSF and the negotiating space available to the owner; 
again the trajectories are successfully predicted when judged postfacto. 
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contemporary validity 
During the intervention in which a technique is applied it should be expect 
ed that the results should align with the perceptions of the researcher and 
informant(s) at the time. Two cases in particular provide evidence that the 
contemporary validity of the method is high, namely theBAe ProjectStaffing 
Problem and the OSFý Strategic Futures overall case. In the latter, as the 
informants and the researcher applied the method it was noticeable that the 
informants were confirming their conceptions of the problem situation 
against the model, and there were frequent occasions where the emergent 
structure of the model provided improved sensemaking for the informants. 
Their reaction throughout the application period was that the emerging model 
was consistent with their view of the situation. For them it exhibited 
contemporary validity. 
The OSF case is even more supportive. It was observed here that the primary 
informant, the owner/MD was using the procedure to make sense of the 
environment on a continuous basis (Goldie-Morrison, 1996c, d, e, f). The 
evidence that the sensemaking product of the foveal approach resulted in 
her committing her personal wealth to its results (Anon, 1969) witnesses 
that the method had, indeed, contemporary validity for her. 
contemporary valuation 
Critical to thejustifiability of the supporting techniques and frameworks is 
the concept of the usefulness of the results to the researcher-informant. 
The BAe Project Staffing case shows evidence directly that the product of 
the approach was deemed worthy of inciting action by the informant. The 
evidence emerging from the model that a particular line of advocacy was 
required instigated a particular change in the line of argument of the 
consultant in question. This is evidence that the new perception of the 
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problem induced by the approach was valued to the extent that action resulted 
(Snarey, 1996). Observations by both the consultant and the informant at 
the time of the analysis were that the procedural structure coupled with the 
ability to mobilise subjective information allowed a degree of understanding 
of the problem which was not available before hand. Moreover, the efficiency 
of the procedure was valued by the informant, in the sense that the modest 
amounts of time which he had to fund and personally contribute were entirely 
consistent with the timescale and importance of the problem. The procedure 
clearly made a contribution. Before the analysis Mr. Irvine, the informant, 
appeared completely at a loss as to what freedom of manoeuvre was available 
to him, what action he could take, and was visibly fi-ustrated by the lack of 
structural understanding he possessed about this important situation. The 
evidence of its valuation to him can be found in his willingness to contribute 
not only funding for a consultant, Mr. Snarey, to contribute to the analysis, 
but also to contribute his own time to the project. Lastly, the fact that he 
took action to implement the findings of the analysis is itself evidence of 
contemporary validity. 
More strongly, in the OSF Strategic Futures case there is overwhelming 
evidence of contemporary valuation by the informant. First, the engagement 
of the owner/MD herself in the process is evidence that the effort expended 
was seen as appropriate in return for the perception and understanding 
achieved. Second, the engagement of consultants (Coopers & Lybrand) to 
implement action plans resulting from the foveal approach to the OSF 
problem is evidence that the output was financially valued. Third, the 
commitment of the owner/MD to a line of action (selling the company) at 
some risk to her own personal wealth is the clearest evidence that the process 
was valued. It was only through the establishment of the strategic scene 
through the application of EFAR and the subsequent more detailed 
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negotiation analysis that the sale of OSF was able to be drawn to a conclusion. 
Before the application of the foveal approach the owner thought that she 
merely had a problem with her organisation; the application resulted directly 
in the decision to change the ownership of the company. 
This last case study, OSF, illustrates well the separate usefulness of the 
strategic directed graph analysis and the more detailed local conflict 
resolution tool. The understanding gained by the owner/MD of OSF as to 
her strategic situation was valued by her of itself. Before the analysis she 
was of the opinion that her problem was to decide whether she should 
consolidate her organisation or not (Goldie-Morrison, 1995). The 
understanding that her company stood in a competitive market environment 
was not new to her, but the degree of inter-relation between that environment 
and her internal freedom of action was of clear value to her, as evinced by 
the subsequent employment of costly management consultancy expertise 
to bring about a particular action plan, namely the sale of the majority of 
the company. 
The effectiveness of the conflict resolution analysis can be measured only 
by the difference in freedom of manoeuvre which the owner/MD achieved 
before the analysis with that gained after. Prior to the analysis summarised 
in Figures 62,63 and 64 of Chapter 10, the owner/MD was unable to 
negotiate with Dorling Kindersley for fear of causing them to withdraw 
from the important project ('the series') which they were potentially using 
as a lever to obtain a favourable negotiation on the bigger issue of the sale 
of OSF. With the understanding of the structure of the situation summarised 
in Chapter 10 the owner/MD could enter the negotiations knowing that she 
understood the structure of the whole negotiation at least as well as any of 
the parties. Moreover, by understanding that structure, she was able to 
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identify the consequences of negotiating moves before commitments were 
made. The analysis was valued by her, then, both at the strategic, general 
understanding level and at the level of detailed, negotiating tactics. 
Shortcomings and future work 
The embodiment of the foveal approach described here, as evidenced by the case studies 
described does achieve the aim of the research, in that it is a justified and appropriate 
technique for understanding an predicting strategic conflict, but like any approach or set of 
techniques with a practical intent, it has shortcomings. 
Multiple perspectives 
One of the significant limitations of the approach is its capacity to cope with the multiple 
perspectives question whereby the different players present (to themselves in sensemaking 
and to the lifeworld through their actions) a view of the conflict which others may not 
share. The foveal approach attempts to resolve this in a practical sense by mobilising 
kpqNyledge (or at least preconceptions) of the other pI ayers' motivations in generating the 
discrete states on which the analysis is based. This is formalised in the top-down value- 
based technique of state generation described in Chapter 8, but is inherent in more informal 
state generation methods. Secondly, the foveal embodiment described here utilises the 
inherent structure of the conflict description to detect irrationality in the behaviour of 
other parties, by induction of their motivations or powers from their points of view from 
the observation of their behaviour within the discrete state structure. As such it appears 
from the practical cases to be adequate. There is a need, however, for this multi-viewpoint 
view of conflict to be further investigated. For example, the knowledge of the different 
parties is in part constructed from exogenous information sources (observation or evidence) 
and from endogenous sources (sensemaking structures like the foveal approach). The 
availability of these latter structural supports to sensemaking alters the effectiveness of the 
former. One further research question is to identify the effect of proliferation of structural 
models upon sensemaking and effectiveness in strategic struggle. This question is analogous 
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to certain economics issues of common knowledge (Hirschleifer and Riley, 1992 pp 169- 
170,218-219)in that if in a conflict management intervention we assume that the other 
player has at least as much information about the structure of the situation as we have, we 
may be failing to utilise an advantage which we have gained through investment in that 
understanding of the structure. Equally, we may well fail in the management of that situation 
if we make the complementary error of assuming a level of structural knowledge of the 
situation to be particular to us when it is in reality shared by our competitor. Such 
considerations bring into relief the relevance of the rationality considerations of Chapter 
2. The first research topic in continuation, then is to determine the effect which structural 
understanding has on the interactive resolution of the conflict. 
Related to that topic is the expost examination of cases which show the disparate views of 
participants in a business conflict. This is notoriously difficult, because of the combination 
Of commercial security considerations leading to an unwillingness to say anything about 
the decision making process for fear of giving away a commercial advantage in a similar 
situation together with the general lack of historical multi-viewpoint narrative of business 
conflicts. Nevertheless, a useful longer term research aim would be the tracking of the 
constructed viewpoints of participants over the development of a conflict in order to 
determine how important the differences in view were to the end result. 
Decision support 
It will be seen from the case studies presented that while the techniques of EFAR, top- 
down value-based state generation and Powergraph are not onerous in the contained 
examples cited here, if the complexity of a particular conflict were to be high, the work 
content of the analysis would rise dramatically. In practice, knowledge of this factor causes 
early effort to be put into appropriate simplification of the situation in the models, but it is 
likely that there will be some cases where directed graph structures of greater complexity 
might be beneficial. In these cases a decision support package would be of significant 
benefit. EFAR in particular, like its foundation, FAR, is time consuming when done by 
hand, and while practitioners have produced software support for their own use, these tend 
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merely to be accounting packages. An I KBS approach whereby a decision support system 
might make proposals on appropriate clustering in particular might be of considerable use. 
Decision support, too, would allow the myopic planning difficulty of Powergraph to be 
addressed. We have already seen that inherent in the solution process of Powergraph is the 
assumption of how far the opponent will be able or willing to take into account the delayed 
gratification of moving to an intermediate state in order subsequently to achieve a more 
favoured position,. Like previous workers in the field (Howard, 1971, Fraser and Hipel, 
1989) the assumption has been used here that delayed gratification in that sense is not a 
major factor because of the inherent risks of the intermediate state. Because the structures 
being managed here are not perfectly known the risks are all too evident to practitioners. 
There is a structural problem here, however, which is that a risk-prone opponent may be 
tempted to take a view of the game structure which allows for a planning horizon more 
than one or two steps in length. The boolean algebra of (Annex A) allows for this to be 
taken into account in terms of calculation of directed graph topologies, but the application 
of the boolean algebra technique described there is rather onerous, and decision support 
which allowed successive presentation of the directed graphs resulting from successively 
less myopic planning and motivation assumptions on the part of the players would be 
highly advantageous. It must be stressed, however, that no amount of calculation and 
decision support will avoid the fundamental difficulty that the assumption of an opponents' 
degree of planning myopia cannot be calculated. It is a matter of perception andjudgernent 
on the part of the informant. The rationality of behaviour on the part of the opponent is 
judged under certain assumptions of the opponent's objectives, and the degree of risk 
aversion is one of those assumptions. Nevertheless a decision support package which would 
allow investigation of the effects of different degrees of planning myopia would be an 
important addition to the technique, not least because it would allow heuristic investigation 
of the theoretical best outcomes for participants. 
Relationship to coniplex systenis 
Lastly it is clear that there is a connection, at present only dimly seen, between this work, 
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which concerns itself with strategic issues and the body of work concerned with emergent 
behaviour. This literature concerns itself with economic system behaviour (Anderson et 
al, 1988; Saviotti and Metcalfe, 1991; Goodwin, 1992; Medio and Gallo, 1993) and with 
spatial systems such as the behaviour of cities (Allen and Sanglier, 1979; Sanglier and 
Allen, '] 989; Hiller and Penn, 1992; Batty and Longley, 1994) and more general social 
structures (Allen, 1996). 
It is possible that this work provides a useful intermediate structure lying between that of 
the myopic micro-actors and the overall implicit policy of themodels. The approach provides 
the potential of representing the arbitrary strategic behaviour of actors at an intermediate 
level or levels. For example, let us take the case of understanding the political behaviour of 
micro-actors in respect of support or otherwise for environmental legislation. At one level, 
the national bodies, government and environmental agencies, can be seen setting the 
constraints on behaviour and the resources available for the micro-actors, within which 
bounds the latter wil I produce emergent behaviour in support of various legislative policies 
or otherwise. There is, however a level of constraint below that of the national body and 
yet more empowered than that of the micro-actor, namely the commercial bodies involved 
in environmentally sensitive activity. These bodies too are constrained by the policy of the 
top-level, strategic bodies, but they have tangibly greater spans of control and resources 
than the individual micro-actors, and, moreover have a collective will and policy-making 
capacity which is significantly greater than that of any single micro-actor. They are able to 
act in wholly different ways (compared with the national bodies and with the micro-actors) 
in response to the strategic policy expressed above them and the emergent behaviour from 
below them. For example, they can engage in civil process and they can lobby coherently. 
It is possible that the approaches described in this work will Provide a basis for establishing 
the effect which this intermediate level of resource and policy span of control has upon the 
emergent behaviour of the system under question by allowing the expression of exogenously 
derived policy (from the intermediate level) upon the emergent behaviours of the 
conventional approaches. 
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Annex A 
Scenario Descriptions 
BAe Alternate Naval StrategY Case - Chapter 6) 
Index 1 11/2 1/2 1/2 11/2 
In poor market conditions caused in part by its poor performance in managing risk, the 
company has lost customer confidence and adopts a belated survival policy which may 
well involve seeking a purchaser. 
Index 2 11/2 1/2 3 11/2 
Although the company's performance in containing risk on its major projects is adequate, 
this is not sufficient in the poor market conditions to sustain the confidence of the customer. 
With a vulnerable share price but reasonably well-performing projects the company becomes 
an attractive take-over target. 
Index 3 11/23331/2 
In spite of poor performance in the project field, the company retains the loyalty of the 
customer, probably from a strategic industrial perspective. Nevertheless with such a low 
share price the company remains vulnerable to take-over, and in order to advance to more 
secure ground major improvements need to be made in project and related performance. 
Index 4 11/2 1/2 33 314 
Because of adequate risk containment on major projects and the loyalty of the customer, 
the market conditions are viewed as quite favourable, but the company remains under 
threat to take over, essentially because of a depression of the share price induced by a poor 
matching of skills with future project need. 
Index 522 1/2 1/2 2 1/2 
Absorbed into I 
Index 62 3/4 2 2/3 2/3 1/2 
In spite of poor performance on projects and a fragile to weak market, the company 
attempts to maintain its existing configuration and objectives. Customer loyalty is fragile. 
Index 72 314 3/4 42 1/2 
The company's performance on its present major contracts is proving satisfactory, but this 
has not been translated into confidence in the customer community or in the stock market. 
As a result the company is forced into a limited set of objectives involving little more than 
maintenance of the present position with only limited possibilities for incremental advance. 
Index 82 3/4 314 43 1/2 
In spite of good performance on present projects, customer confidence remains low, leading 
to poor market prospects and a related depressed share price. The customer remains sceptical 
of future performance. 
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Index 92 3/4 314 43 314 
Knowledge of the customer's scepticism of the company in spite of good performance on 
existing projects, and a satisfactory market projection leads to a depressed share price. 
Index 10 2 3/4 232 1/2 
Relatively poor performance on major projects, stemming from inadequate competencies 
(but with a portion of luck) leads to a lack of credibility in the market place, this in turn 
leads to poor market prospects, but management retain a view of improvement in internal 
performance so that incremental growth remains a possibility. 
Index 11 2 3/4 233 1/2 
Absorbed into 6 
Index 13 2 3/4 233 1/2 
In spite of a buoyant market the company's poor project performance depresses the share 
price. The poor project performance is related to inadequate core competencies. 
Index 15 22 1/2 2/3 1/2/3 1/2 
In the light of poor project performance, a weak market and lack of customer support, a 
limitation objective is adopted. Defence against take-over threats is marginally possible. 
Index 16 22 1/2 2/3 3 1/2 
Absorbed into 15 
Index 17 221/22/333 
Absorbed into 15 
Index 19 22 1/2 2/3 3 314 
Because of a buoyant market the company decides that it can sustain a limited survival 
objective in spite of its poor performance in project terms, reflected in poor customer 
loyalty. 
Index 20 2 314 314 5 31415 1/2 
In spite of the company's good performance in projects, the very weak market conditions 
cannot sustain future prospects of a size adequate to satisfy the share holders. as a result 
the share price drops, but the company decides that it may be possible to trade out of such 
a position. 
Index 22 2 314 3/4 5 31415 314 
Absorbed into 20 
Index34 3 314 2 2/3 2/3 2 
Absorbed into 35 
Page 468 
Index 35 3 314 2 2/3 2/3 314 
In spite of weak customer support leading to poor market predictions, the company retains 
a view of the future based on steady growth. 
Index 45 3531443112 1 
As a response to a weak market, and in then knowledge of good performance in existing 
projects, the company decides to engage in a repositioning exercise. 
Index 47 3531443314 
Because of a good performance and future prospects the company decides to engage in an 
expansion exercise because of limited opportunities within its existing markets. 
Index 48 35314434 
Absorbed into 47 
Index 54 4 415 2 2/3 2/3 3/4 
The share price is satisfactory, and with a reasonably strong market prospect. the company 
decides to engage in a major shift and growth, recognising that investment will be needed 
to improve both actual and perceived performance on projects. 
Index 57 4 415 3/4 5 415 2/3 
The risk management investments begin to pay off and in the light of high customer 
confidence and an adequate market condition, the company engages in a decisive growth 
strategy. 
Index59 4 415 314 5 415 415 
Heartened by strong market projections and with good prospects of being able to contain 
risk and perform well on major projects, the company engages in an aggressive development 
strategy. 
Index 63 4415314433 
In the light of adequate market predictions, a reasonable performance in projects and 
confidence in the ability of its organisation, the company engages in an aggressive 
developmental strategy. (TODAY'S STATE) 
Index 64 4415314434 
With a strengthened market the company builds on satisfactory performance in projects to 
develop an aggressive development strategy. 
Index 70 54154543 
The company performs excellently in risk management terms on major projects and 
customer confidence builds. As a result a strong developmental strategy is judged 
appropriate. 
Index 73 5 6/7 415 415 415 3 
In only moderately good markets predictions, the company feels that its excellent 
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performance in project risk management coupled with a strong level of confidence on the 
part of existing customersjustifies a set of objectives which are global in nature and which 
represent a shift in the competitive environment. 
Index 75 5 6/7 415 415 415 415 
Every indicator shows the feasibility of a global/European expansion strategy. 
Index 78 5 6/7 415 64 415 
The outstanding project performance allows expansive strategic objectives to be entertained 
and the stock market supports such a view, as does the customer community. 
Index 80 5 6/7 415 5/6 314 415 
Absorbed into 79 
Index 93 54/54433/4 
Although the performance of the company in existing projects is good, customer confidence 
remains cautious, and so a correspondingly limited set of development objectives are 
adopted. 
Index 96 54454152/3 
A weak market suppresses very expansive aims on the part of the company, which limits 
itself to consolidating its market performance and very good delivery on major projects. 
Index98 5545415415 
A strengthening market and healthy stock market position allows an ambitious strategy to 
be put in place. Customer confidence is high due to good performance in risk containment 
on major projects. 
Index 101 5 6/7 415 516 516 2 
Excellent performance both in the market and in major project terms, coupled with a poor 
market prediction induces a strategic plan based on major expansion into adjacent markets, 
and on a global basis. 
Index 102 5 6/7 415 516 3/4 
With a track record of performance in a static existing market, the company engages in an 
aggressive expansionist strategy on a global basis to allow further market exploitation. 
Index 104 5 6/7 415 516 516 5 
All indicators are set for a major global expansion programme. Nothing is going wrong. 
Index 106 54 2/3 43 314 
A market-led position where in spite of only adequate to good performance, sales 
opportunities expand, allowing the possibility of expansionist strategies which would not 
exist if the market predictions were weaker. 
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Annex B 
Clustered Scenario Descriptions in Vicinity of Today 
(for BAe Alternate Naval Strategy Case - Chapter 6) 
Index 6+7+8 2 314 2/3/4 4 2/3 1/2 
The company's performance on its present major contracts is proving satisfactory, and 
may even be improving,, but this has not been translated into confidence in the customer 
community or in the stock market. As a result the company is forced into a limited set of 
objectives involving little more than maintenance of the present position with only limited 
possibilities for incremental advance. An additional major problem is a weakening market 
prediction. 
Index 92 3/4 314 43 314 
Knowledge of the customer's scepticism of the company in spite of good performance on 
existing projects, and a satisfactory market projection leads to a depressed share price. 
Index 10+13+19 2 314 23 2/3 1/2 
Relatively poor performance on major projects, stemming from inadequate competencies 
(but with a portion of luck) leads to a lack of credibility in the market place, this in turn 
leads to poor market prospects, but management retain a view of improvement in internal 
performance so that incremental growth remains a possibility. Customer confidence is 
high in spite of relatively weak delivery quality. 
Index 35+47 3 31415 2/3/4 2/3/4 2/3 3/4 
In spite of weak customer support leading to poor market predictions, the company retains 
a view of the future based on steady growth. 
Index 45 353/4431/2 
As a response to a weak market, and in the knowledge of good performance in existing 
projects, the company decides to engage in a repositioning exercise. 
Index 54 4 415 2 2/3 2/3 3/4 
The share price is satisfactory, and with a reasonably strong market prospect. the company 
decides to engage in a major shift and growth, recognising that investment will be needed 
to improve both actual and perceived performance on projects. 
Index 59 4 415 3/4 5 415 415 
Heartened by strong market projections and with good prospects of being able to contain 
risk and perform well on major projects, the company engages in an aggressive development 
strategy. 
Index 57+63+64 44/53/4433 
In the light of adequate market predictions, a reasonable performance in projects and 
confidence in the ability of its organisation, the company engages in an aggressive 
developmental strategy. (TODAY'S STATE) 
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Annex 
Boolean Matrix approach 
The approach to the solution or analysis of the Powergraph transition matrices or directed 
graphs of Chapter 7 is essentially graphically based, and more than suffices as a heuristic 
basis for practical analysis. An alternative approach is offered here, however, which puts 
the rationality algorithm on a more formal basis and which provides a possible basis for a 
computer embodiment of the method. 
Powergraph solutions require the solution of networks of states, directed graphs, which 
are linked by motivated empowered transitions. The essential process is that of identifying 
the Boolean expression which describes the combinations of actions which are necessary 
and possible in order to bring about a transition. The abilities of participants in the game 
are expressed by a Boolean expression attached to each link between states and which 
describes the individual and combined capabilities of the participants to control that 
transition. 
The resulting Boolean expression is then evaluated by setting to logical 0 those arguments 
which represent participants who are not motivated to bring about the transition. This 
motivation is described by a rank ordering matrix which, for each participant, places in 
order of preference each of the states. This process results in a motivated power matrix, 
being a matrix describing the combinations of participants who are both able and motivated 
to bring about the particular transition. 
A solution of the game, then, is the identification of equilibrium states which are accessible 
from a start state, and which have no paths leaving them as described in the motivated 
power matrix. It can be seen that this is an extension of the Pareto equilibrium concept 
expanded by Nash, ubiquitous in Game Theory. 
As described, however, the equilibrium process has a fundamental shortcoming, namely 
that the motivations of players are myopic in the sense that there is no appreciation that 
moving from state i to statej may well provide an immediate improvement, but a subsequent 
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move from statej to state k, under the control of a third party, may well result in a reduction 
of preference. See Figure 68. 
[3,21 
k 
B 
K. yl - JA'$ prttertsco, IB's PM(Unatel 
12,11 
Figure 68. A is sanctioned by B. In moving to a myopically improved state 6), A 
should recognise that anotherparty (B) can move to a third state (k) which A 
likes less than state i. 
This is the well-known sanctioning process described by Howard and by Fraser and 
Hipel. Conversely, the myopic equilibrium-seeking described above fails to reflect the 
case where moving to an intermediate state which results in temporary reduction of 
preference may enable a later move to a better preferred state. In other words delayed 
gratification is not comprehended. See Figure 69. 
Ili 
Tk 
A 
fil - [A's preference order] 
[21 f3] 
Figure 69. Delayed gratification. By moving down in preference (to state j) A 
allows a later improvement to k. 
What is required, then, is a solution method which reflects the possible motivations of 
participants for transitions which encompass two or more steps through the directed 
graph. 
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Formal Definitions 
A Powergraph game, r (B, U, N, n) consists of a set of N states between any two of 
which transition may be possible. Player r is denoted by P,. The feasibility of such 
transitions are expressed in the Nx NBoolean matrix, B, whose elements, b,, (PIO... P 
'V 
consist of boolean expressions which reflect the various powers of the n players of the 
game in controlling the transitions from state i to statej. The symbols + and . in the 
following refer, then, to boolean operations of OR and AND respectively. 
The Nx n array U is a preference ordering for each player, where the states are assigned 
an ordering number from I to N indicating the order of preference for each player for 
each of the N states. Thus preference order I indicates the best preferred state and 
preference order N the least preferred. 
Motivated Power Matrix Generation 
Each transition, i)j, then, has associated with it a Boolean expression, b,,, and a 
pair of preference orderings for each player (I to n), each a row vector of U, 
u,,, (r rz (i, j), kE (1,... n)) - We generate a motivated power matrix, 
ml I = mij. jE 
where, for each player, P, 
'=b.. ( ... P v -,, 
p" P, 
-,, ... 
P. ) iff ui, > U,, 
bij ( ... P, -,, 
O, P,.,,... P. ) otherwise. 
Thus, if a player is not motivated to bring about the transition i j, the component 
of the relevant boolean expression is set to logical 0. 
Two-step Motivated Power 
We now take into account the effects of sanctions and delayed gratification by 
considering alternative routes to any state. Consider three states Q and k. Transitions 
can be made direct from i toj in one step or via state k, taking two steps. The transition 
from i toj direct is governed by m, ý, above. 
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In order for the transition i)k)j to take place, both i)k, (controlled by 
bik) and k )j, (controlled by ý., ) have to take place. We observe that transition 
i)k)j is, therefore, governed by ý., Vj = 
bk. bv. Observe that there is an implication 
that the agreement between the parties described by b,, and b kiwill be followed through; 
there is to be no reneguing at an intermediate stage. The potential danger of this is 
comprehended by the building up of the equilibrium picture from one-step to N-steps. 
However, the motivation for participants to induce the two transitions together is motivated 
by the comparison between the preference ordering for i relative to j rather than any 
consideration, of the intermediate state, k. Hence the component of the motivated power 
matrix concerned with the transition ikj has a boolean expression 
Mi(k)j 
where, for each player, P, 
Mi(k)j bi(k)i(-Pr-IIPrIPr+I***Px) iffujr>u,, 
bi(k)i(***Pr_, q0, 
Pr+1*, *Pn) otherwise. 
We now observe that transition i)i can be achieved not just via state k but via any 
other state (not i orj) in r. We are now in a position to describe the element of a 
motivated power matrix which takes into account that any transition i)i can be 
achieved via any intermediate state k so long as we apply the preference ordering to the 
relative desirability of the states i andj. We define b, _, as 
the boolean expression which 
describes the capabilities of the participants to control the transition from i toj via any 
intermediate state. Thus, 
bi-j = (bil * bli + 
bi2*b2j+* 
* *+bim * bmj +* , *+biN, blvj) + bu , 
which we can conveniently write as 
bi-j =I bi.. bj 
M. I. N 
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with the understanding that + and. are boolean operators rather than arithmetic ones. 
We now define an operator *, analogous with matrix multiplication which operates over 
(square) boolean matrices. We define * by: - 
If Z=X*Y 
zii =I xi. - Y-i M. I. N 
It can be easily seen that * is non-commutative unless both X and Y are symmetrical. it 
is, however, associative. See Theorem I- 
Let us now consider the matrix 13111, the elements b(",, of which define the boolean 
expression controlling transitions between states i andj in two steps or fewer. Then 
b(2) 
ii = bj+ biT 
In matrix terms, using the operator defined above, then, we have 
B (2) =B+ B*B, 
which for notational convenience we write as B(2) =B+B2. 
N-step transitions 
Theorem 2 shows that the boolean matrix describing the control of the participants over 
transitions between states in M steps or fewer is given by 
B'm'= 1: BkVM: 5 N, 
k-I. M 
again, with summation being by OR and matrix multiplication defined as * above. 
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Contribution to solution ofa Poweigraph network - depth of equilibrium 
The series B(u) =IBk constitutes a polynomial in B, the term of which represent the 
k=IM 
powers applicable to the movement between two states in a specific number of moves. If 
we calculate, then, for any network the series of motivated power matrices, 
M(k) = Mýk) (i, j, k (=- fl .... N)) ji 
where, for each player, P, 
(k) 
= 
(k) ( 
... 
P-J'P 
,,, 
P 
+1 ... 
P 
mu bij r. .ro., 
) 'ff Ujr > Ui, 
= bj ( ... P'-j'O' 
P, +, ... P,, 
) otherwise, 
we have a series of matrix representations of potential equilibrium states at path lengths 
1,2, ... k ... .... N-I . These equilibrium states are characterised 
by two features: - 
1) they must be accessible 
2) they must have no motivated and empowered path leading from them. 
(This does not imply that, in practice, no other state can be a rest state. Non-equilibrium 
states can be temporarily accessed, and the time spent at these states can be substantial. 
Secondly, one observes that errors in the data, particularly in the utility matrix, U, which 
encompasses the perceptions of participants other than the client-actor, can result in different 
equilibriums in practice. ) 
These two requirements are satisfied respectively for a state cr if 
1* #1 for some i 
vj. 
The depth of an equilibrium is defined as the lowest value of k at which I* and 2* above 
are satisfied. 
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Theorem 
The operator * is non-commutative and associative 
I 
Proof 
1. * is non-commutative 
Consider Z=X*Y. 
Zij = 
1: 
Xik * Ykj 
k-I. N 
Consider W=Y*X 
wij =I Ya - Xtj kzl. N 
Ya X1, j * Yik k-I. N 
Then zij = wij iff 
x, 
p, = xqVp, q and 
yp, z = yqp 
Vp, q. 
Hence X*Y = Y*X iff both X and Y are symmetrical. 
2. * is associative 
Consider Z=A* (B * C) 
zij = 1: aik 
(1: bk,. cj 
kzl. N r 
1: 1: aikbk, cj 
k. I. N r-I. N 
1: (I: akb,,, )ci 
k-I. N r-I. N 
Hence Z=(A*B)*C 
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Theorent 2 
B'm'= 2: Bk 
kzl. M 
Proof 
The proof is by induction. 
JB k Assumethat[Hm]: B(m)= 
., k-I. M 
Now, bjm*"=bj, +j: bj', m'. b,, 
1-1.1v 
since we can traverse the path in one step or by a path of length between I and M with a 
path of length I added to it, via an intennediate state t. 
Hence, B(m*') =B+ 13(u). B 
Therefore, B(u+') =B+Bk). B 
k. I. M 
= 
kI. M+I 
Therefore Hm =* Hm. 1, but we know that 
H2 is true, since 
B (2) =B+B*B=B+B 
2=IBk 
k-1.2 
But H, =ý 
H3 and H3 =* H4etc. 
Hence Hm is true for all finite M 
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Theorent 3 
B(m) =- B (NI VM >N 
Proof 
B'm) I B' 
k-I'M 
(2) So that bl. ") =b+b. +... +b(. " 
bj + b,, ý. b,, j + b,,,. b, ý,, - b, -ýj 
bak, bk. 
_, kM-2, 
bk,, 
_ýj k, -I. N kj-1, N $-I. 'V k, -I. N 
This can be seen as a series of boolean terms covering the possible paths between states i andj passing 
through all other states. 
Ibus, each term of b(. ')consists of a series such as 
b, 
j + 
(b, bj) + (b,,. b.. b,, )+... +Ib ...... 
býj 
where ( ... 
Idenotes that all combinations of paths from i to j are covered. 
17hus, since 
býN- 1) b, ', '). bj 
we can see that every bkjappears already in some element of b(,, "). We can write 
b, (, ') =f. bj. ip, where 0 and ipare boolean expressions. 
Hence, bi(kN). bj = 0. bkj. V. bkj = 0. bj. (p, 
N+I) 
= so that b, (, - 
b, (, v) if M 2: N 
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Annex D 
From Chapter 10 
OSF strategic analysis. 
Notes on compatibility of sector values 
0 vs. F 
The present two sites are only acceptable to OSF if there are insufficient funds to make 
a change. Improving the communications between the existing sites is viewed as an 
inadequate but possibly temporary expedient. If funds become available single site 
working, possibly with a central London site, is highly desirable. Significant funds are 
required to relocate either to a provincial site or to a single London site. The latter 
requires substantially greater investment. 
D vs. 0 
A single London site would undoubtedly lead to a good delivery performance. 
D vs. F 
There will be a strong correlation between delivery performance and available funds, 
although availability of funds will be affected by other factors. 
E vs. D 
We should expect a strong correlation here; the customers are aware of supplier 
performance and are strongly communicative. 
E vs. 0 
Little connection here other than the status quo will not support a greatly enhanced 
customer perception (possible second order effect here) 
E vs. F 
An improved customer perception will lead to availability of funds through market 
pressures (assuming, of course, that OSF can accept an enlarged throughput). 
S vs. E 
An adequate perception is required to encourage any shareholder to buy in. 
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S vs. D 
The present share holding position could in theory support any level of delivery 
performance, but exchanging minority shareholders would require a confidence in the 
incomers that the existing management could support the market. On the other hand a 
new majority shareholder may consider that significant improvement could be induced 
by a change in ownership. 
S vs. 0 
A buyer will be uncaring about the organisational position whereas a major investor will 
be concerned with buying into a coherent and viable business. 
S vs. F 
Any major ownership change will bring development funds. 
A vs. S 
The only feasible routes for exit are by a complete sale or by a majority share ownership 
deal. 
A vs. E 
To maximise the value a good external perception is required, but a poor market 
performance reflects the option of a distress sale. To obtain an increased market share 
improved performance will be required. 
A vs. D 
While a sale can be achieved with any performance, growth is only possible with an 
improved performance in delivery. 
A vs. 0 
A sale can be achieved under essentially any organisational configuration but some site 
arrangements will not allow high levels of performance. In order to achieve security 
single site working is deemed necessary. 
A vs. F 
Clearly ambition and financial resources go together, both by cause and effect. 
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CVS. A 
The extent to which the competition is willing to accommodate OSF in their plans is 
crucial to the market penetration. Similarly of OSF is not active in the market 
competitors will not be interested in accommodating OSF. 
C vs. S 
OSF is unlikely to disengage if the competitive environment is promising. 
C vs. E andD 
Competitors are unlikely to view OSF as a target unless delivery is good. The status quo 
can remain tough, under any delivery condition. 
CVS. 0 
No correlation 
C vs. F 
The level of competition is likely to work against OSF's cash flow and hence 
availability of funds. 
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Annex E 
(from Chapter 10) 
OSF Strategic Analysis 
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Table 69. Distances between states 
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